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Introduction: Methodology and Conceptual 
Framework 
Ottoman political thought, especially in its incipient phase during the fifteenth century, 
has not received much scholarly attention, and it has often only been treated in rather 
schematic terms. Though there are quite a few exceptions, many historians have 
considered the fifteenth century a period about which not much can be said due to the 
lack of sources, or else as an age which did not produce any original political discourse. 
For instance, when comparing Ottoman and Burgundian political ideas, Antony Black, a 
specialist of the history of Western political thought, categorised Ottoman political 
discourse as stagnant and underdeveloped compared to its European counterpart: ‘in the 
Islamic world, with the exception of Ibn Khaldûn, political ideas remained unchanged 
after the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate (1258); there were to be no major new 
developments.’1 Black also upheld that ‘there was no concept of consent of subjects as 
necessary to political legitimacy. In the Islamic world, everyone agreed that authority 
resided in the sultan and the Sharia; there was no conflict of ideas about forms of 
government. There was, finally, no concept of the state as an abstract entity separate 
from the individual ruler or dynasty. […] In the fifteenth century, there was hardly any 
Islamic political theory.’2 Likewise, the older generations of scholars have ascribed a 
certain uniqueness to the historical trajectory of Europe and have assumed that the 
nature of Ottoman history was inferior to that of Europe.3 It seems that such orientalist 
notions, which since the last decades have been surpassed in the study of Ottoman 
history, still somewhat resound in Black’s view.  
 
                                                     
1 Anthony Black, ‘Ottoman Political Thought. A Comparison with Europe’, in: ed. Robert Stein, Powerbrokers in 
the Late Middle Ages. The Burgundian Low Countries in a European Context (Turnhout, 2001) 235. 
2 Ibidem, 236. 
3 Especially, see: Herbert E. Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 1916) 41; Perry Anderson, 
Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974) 379, 382-384, 397-398. 
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In this study, I intend to shift the focus from ‘political thought’ in the sense of the ‘high 
theory’ that can be found in learned treatises to the more mundane and everyday political 
discourse one encounters, for instance, in historiographical and diplomatic texts. I will 
specifically aim at a textual analysis of the earliest Ottoman chronicles, all written until 
the end of the fifteenth century. By rereading these fifteenth-century chronicles, I will 
examine how an Ottoman ‘state ideology’ was developed in this period and what kind of 
a political discourse was reflected in those early historiographical texts. It will be shown 
that conclusions like those of Black’s have been far too premature and that a specific 
political discourse was developed within the Ottoman sphere of power during the early 
stage of its state formation. 
 When it comes to empirical research of the fifteenth-century sources, specialists of 
Ottoman history such as Cemal Kafadar, Suraiya Faroqhi, Dimitris Kastritsis and Feridun 
Emecen have pointed out that there still remains a lot of qualitative text analysis to be 
done on the early Ottoman chronicles, especially concerning Ottoman state-building and 
ideology.4 This is precisely the focus of this Ph.D. research. I set myself the task of re-
exploring and re-interpreting the early fifteenth-century Ottoman state building process 
and ideology through the analysis of the discourse in these early chronicles. My objective 
is to contribute to the study of the genesis of Ottoman political language or ‘state 
ideology’ in general. My main objective is to study the specific ideas and concepts that 
formed, as it were, the ‘building blocks’ or ‘central notions’ of the early Ottoman ‘state 
ideology’. The fifteenth century is especially interesting in this respect, as it is a period of 
experimentation with both ideological discourses and specific forms of state formation. 
The fifteenth century is also the age when the foundations were laid for the Ottoman 
Empire as a world power in the later period. And finally, this study of the early Ottoman 
state ideology is also a modest attempt to search for alternative approaches to early 
Ottoman history that go beyond the Orientalist assumptions. 
Until a few decades ago, under the influence of a strict positivist stance, the earliest 
Ottoman historiographical sources have been often too quickly rejected by reasoning that 
they were useless for the scientific reconstruction of historical events.5 Even a well-
known and learned historian like Colin Imber too quickly discards, in my opinion, the 
 
                                                     
4 Especially, see: Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (Los Angeles, 1996) 91-
117; Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History. An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge, 1999) 146-147; 
Dimitris Kastritsis, The Sons of Bâyezid. Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-1413 
(Leiden, 2007) ; Feridun M. Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset (İstanbul, 2011) 13-47; Rudi Paul Lindner, 
‘Anatolia, 1300-1451’, in Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge, 2009) 105.  
5 Aziz S. Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis (London, 1934) 35; Rudi P. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia 
(Bloomington, 1983) 19-20; ibid., ‘Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History,’ Greek Orthodox Theological 
Review 27 (1982): 207-224; Colin Imber, ‘The Legend of Osman Gazi’, in: E. Zachariadou ed., The Ottoman Emirate, 
1300-1380. Halcyon days in Crete (1993) 67-75; ibid., ‘The Ottoman Dynastic Myth’, Turcica 19 (1987) 7-27.  
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early Ottoman chronicles for scientific historical analysis. He argues that early Ottoman 
history represented ‘a black hole’.6 In his view, the early Ottoman chronicles were all 
commissioned by the princely court. And thus, Imber assumes that these narratives 
merely consisted of legends and stories that must be regarded as unreliable propaganda. 
There is of course plenty of sense in such a critical attitude, but the same might also be 
said about historical texts from many other regions across the world, which all easily 
blend ‘facts’ with ‘fiction’ or ‘myth’. It is evident that ancient and medieval 
historiographical texts should be looked at using strict historical-critical methods. 
Nevertheless, an exaggerated form of historical criticism can unwillingly become a sort 
of orientalist view, which does not allow the ‘Orientals’ (in this case the Ottomans) to 
speak for themselves. Characteristic of the fifteenth-century Ottoman texts is the strong 
stylisation of their forms of expression.7 The Ottoman chronicles, but also genres like 
mirrors-for-princes and the epic poetry from this period, similar to the Western ‘chansons 
de geste’, share an elaborate series of concepts, words, expressions and metaphors. The 
unity found in theme, style and genre is all the more valid for those works that 
disseminated the Ottoman principles of ideal kingship or ‘state ideology’.  
Imber’s rejection of the early Ottoman sources as useless for historical reconstruction 
is thus somewhat problematic as they still offer, as I will show, clear reflections of actual 
political developments, and also form excellent sources for ideological and cultural 
history. Although they cannot be taken at face value, their narratives provide us with 
interesting clues and suggestions about how the Ottomans constructed and described 
their own history. In fact, new research into the Ottoman historical tradition has shown 
that the Ottoman chronicles of the fifteenth century can be neither taken for granted nor 
dismissed entirely. They reflect a plurality of voices stemming from different social 
groups and one has to understand and to explain the interconnections between these 
texts.8 In Chapter 1, I will discuss this corpus of sources more in detail. It is noteworthy 
that the ideas of the early Ottomans were transmitted to the later generations in the form 
of their oral tradition of accounting stories. In this tradition, these stories carried morals 
and values significant to the social lifestyle of the early Ottomans. Whether they were 
true or invented, these stories obviously had a role to play in the consciousness of the 
historical actors. They often seem to have served to prescribe a given set of political and 
moral values. Moreover, the accounts of the Ottoman chronicles also helped to refine the 
 
                                                     
6 Imber, ‘The Legend of Osman Gazi’, 75. 
7 A detailed discussion of the chronicles that I have used is provided in Chapter 1. 
8 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 103; Halil İnalcık, ‘The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State’, 
International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (1980) 71-79; ibid., ‘How to Read Ashik Pasha-zade’s History’ in: ibid., 
Essays in Ottoman History (Istanbul, 1998) 31-50; Kastritsis, The Sons of Bâyezid, 14, 21.  
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manner in which these actors saw themselves, according to their social and political 
preferences, cultural values and attitudes.  
In recent western historiography, there is an elaborate literature that deals with 
discursive representation in medieval European fictional and non-fictional sources, for 
instance in the Burgundian chronicle tradition.9 However, scholars of Ottoman 
historiography have not yet fully explored the broad field of discourse analysis of early 
Ottoman historical texts. Hence, my goal is precisely to explore what the narratives of the 
Ottoman chronicles tell us about early Ottoman state ideology. To do this, I will make use 
of the conceptual framework of ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA), as developed by the 
British linguist Norman Fairclough and his followers.10 The advantage and interest of the 
methodologies encompassed by CDA, which contrasts with the positivist premises, is that 
it takes the narrative of the texts seriously and considers them as valuable. This method 
departs from the idea that value judgments are pervasively present in discourse. CDA thus 
aims at reconstructing the ‘utopic’ assumptions of these discourses. Making use of the 
methodological ‘toolkit’ offered by CDA, but using it pragmatically and avoiding an 
overload of theoretical jargon, I will scrutinise the ideological discourse that can be found 
in the early Ottoman chronicles and situate it within the larger historical and cultural 
context in which it was produced. Particularly in Chapter 3, I will empirically explore the 
‘ideological’ values and dominant ideas of the Ottoman world-view as they were 
expressed by the chroniclers up to the fifteenth century.  
This study also deals with Ottoman state formation in general. As is generally known, 
early and mid-twentieth-century scholarship on Ottoman history constructed a narrative 
describing the Ottoman state as a ‘Holy War machine’, rapacious and lacking rationality, 
dynamism and knowledge of state building because of its so-called ‘oriental despotism’, 
Islamic ideology and Asiatic nomadic origins.11 The categorisation of Ottoman political 
 
                                                     
9 For example, see: Frederik Buylaert and Jan Dumolyn, ‘Beeldvorming rond adel en ridderschap bij Froissart en 
Bourgondische kroniekschrijvers’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 124/4 
(2008): 609-632; Dumolyn, ‘Le Povre Peuple estoit moult opprimé: Elite Discourses on ‘the People’ in the 
Burgundian Netherlands (Fourteenth to Fifteenth Centuries)’, French History 23/2 (2009): 171-192; ibid., ‘Philippe 
de Commynes et les Discours Politiques en Flandre Médiévale’, ed. J. Blanchard, 1511-2011: Philippe de Commynes. 
Droit, écriture: deux piliers de la souveraineté (Genève, 2012) 33-50; ibid., ‘Justice, Equity and the Common Good. The 
State Ideology of the Councillors of the Burgundian Dukes’, ed. J. D. Boulton and J. R. Veenstra, The Ideology of 
Burgundy: The Promotion of National Consciousness, 1364-1565 (Leiden, 2006) 1-20. 
10 On the methodology of CDA, see among others: Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (Harlow, 2001); M. 
Jorgensen and L. Philips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London, 2002). 
11 Nicola Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen Dargestellt (Gothe, 1908-1913); ibid., Byzance 
après Byzance: Continuation de l'Histoire de la Vie Byzantine (Bucarest, 1935); Lilo Linke, Allah Dethroned. A Journey 
through Modern Turkey (London, 1937); Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies on the History of Turkey, 
13th - 15th Centuries, ed. Colin Heywood (London, 2008; first published in 1938); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of 
Modern Turkey (London, 1961); Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 1, Empire 
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thought as the antithesis of the European ideas of sovereignty has indeed very much been 
part of western discourse since the Renaissance.12 
In line with Orientalist attitudes in historiography and the social sciences in general, 
the older scholarly studies on Ottoman history shared the simple presumption that 
European civilisation had inevitably produced ‘modernity’. The premise was that unlike 
European culture, non-western civilisations – such as the Ottoman Empire – lacked a 
possibility for progress and were therefore frozen in their historical trajectory, incapable 
of changing themselves into a version of modernity without the intrusion of outside (i.e. 
European) forces. This view was most vividly expressed by the Austrian orientalist and 
founding father of ‘Ottoman Studies’ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall. When the Ottomans 
had begun to reform their state by implementing European ideas and institutions, he 
noted: ‘Finally, the writer and the reader of Ottoman history can freely breathe [...] 
Ottoman history has become humane. The stiff ice crust of the Turks melts down, at least 
from outside, with the warm importation of European culture and politics, which blows a 
gentler touch of fine human civilisation. A new life is awakening in the Ottoman Empire.’13  
The history of the Ottoman state and society has also often been framed in terms of 
‘arbitrary use of power’ or ‘oriental despotism’.14 Traditional scholarship on Ottoman 
state formation owed a great deal to Max Weber's theories. In his theory of patrimonialism 
and sultanism, Weber referred to the Ottoman state as ‘an extreme form of patrimonialism 
and of ‘oriental despotism’. He defined ‘oriental despotism’ as a regime in which the ruler 
uses the state institutions as ‘purely personal instruments’ to accumulate ‘arbitrary’ 
power. The Ottoman sultan allegedly demanded total servility of the state and its people 
for his personal whims. As a subcategory of patrimonialism, he described sultanism as a 
patrimonial regime that ‘operates on the basis of discretion, which is distinct from every 
form of rationality’.15  
 
                                                     
of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808 (New York, 1976); Even some recent works still bear 
some traces of this view, see: Jason Goodwin, Lords of the horizons. A History of the Ottoman Empire (London, 2000) 
10; Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923 (London, 2006) 10. 
12 Margaret Meserve, Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge, 2008); Nancy Bisaha, Creating 
East and West. Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks (Philadelphia, 2004). 
13 Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte Des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. 7 (Pest, 1831) 1-2: ‘Endlich kann der 
Schreiber und Leser osmanischer Geschichte freier aufatmen (…) Die osmanische Geschichte wird menschlicher. 
Die starre Eis Rinde des Türken taut wenigstens von außen auf, in dem warmen Verkehre europäischer Politik 
und Kultur, es weht ein sanfterer Hauch menschlicher Milde und feiner Gesittung, ist auch im osmanischen 
Reiche ein neues Leben erwacht.’  
14 On Weberian sultanism and for its variant ‘oriental despotism’, see: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline 
of Interpretive Sociology, transl. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley, 1978) 231-232, 1031. 
15 Ibidem. 
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Weber contrasted sultanism, located in ‘the Near East’, to an estate type dominion that 
existed in medieval Europe. As opposed to both of these types of authority and rule, he 
considered bureaucracy or ‘rational bureaucracy’ as a polity based on objective and 
impersonal rules and laws that characterised the relations between the rulers, 
administration and civil society. Following this conceptualisation, many scholars have 
claimed that in Ottoman history such notions as rationality and public service were not 
to be found.16 This perspective adheres to a belief that Europe made unique contributions 
to world history, whereas other cultures are supposed not to have contributed at all. In 
Chapter 2, I give an overview of the Ottoman state formation process based on a wide 
range of existing scholarship. It will become clear that the thesis of ‘oriental despotism’ 
is not supported by the empirical material. The Ottoman polity in fact gradually 
developed into a ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘centralised’ dynastic state. 
During the twentieth century some influential studies of Ottoman history still 
validated a set of orientalist premises. This was particularly the case with the recurring 
discursive register on the ‘gaza’ (‘conquest’) ideology, which has wrongly been translated 
as ‘holy war’. Relying on Ottoman chronicles, the Austrian historian Paul Wittek claimed 
that the gaza – which he understood as continuous ‘holy war’ and proselytism against 
Christians – was the raison d’être of the Ottoman state. As I will discuss in detail in Chapter 
2, Wittek’s thesis for generations remained the dominant explanation of the Ottoman 
state and is even today still quoted.  
In line with recent tendencies in Ottoman and world historiography,17 this research 
casts doubt on the explanatory capacity of such orientalist premises about Ottoman 
history. Of course, since the last decades, orientalism has already received its share of 
criticism in the scholarly debate.18 In studying Ottoman history, Huri İslamoǧlu, for 
instance, has demonstrated that typical orientalist assumptions and conceptions often 
lack appropriateness and scientific relevance. Like many recent scholars, she has 
suggested to rewrite and to decolonise Ottoman historiography.19  
 
                                                     
16 For a critic of Weber’s thesis, see: Halil İnalcık, ‘Comments on Sultanism: Max Weber’s typification of the 
Ottoman Polity’, Princeton Papers in New Eastern Studies 1 (1992) 49-79. Haim Gerber refuted Weber’s premises on 
the supposed arbitrary juridical institution and practice in the Muslim world. See: Gerber, State, Society and Law 
in Islam. Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (New York, 1994). 
17 S.N. Balagangadhara, Reconceptualizing India Studies (New Delhi, 2012); Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the 
Modern State. The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (New York, 2005); Janet Abu-Lughod, Before 
European Hegemony: the World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford, 1989); Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the 
World around It (London, 2005); Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth Century 
Paradigms (Cambridge, 1991). 
18 Edward Said, Orientalism (London, 1979); Huri İslamoǧlu, ‘Oriental Despotism in World System Perspective’, in: 
ed. ibid., The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge, 1987) 1-24; S.N. Balagangadhara, The Heathen in 
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Similarly, the current study departs from the observation that a pattern of distortion 
is present in many studies on Ottoman history. The reason is that these studies have 
translated Ottoman concepts by using western concepts as their synonyms. Terms like 
‘oriental despotism’, ‘cleric’, ‘proselytism’, ‘slaves of the sultan’, ‘holy war’ or the Marxist 
concept of ‘Asian Mode of Production’ have invariably led to the distortion of not only 
the connotation of Ottoman concepts, but also of our understanding of Ottoman history 
and its political realities. In popular language and culture, the faulty translation and 
interpretation of Ottoman concepts has resulted in a discourse on ‘fanatic warriors’, 
‘cruel barbarians’, ‘despotic sultans’, etc. In this respect, I am aware that using the term 
‘ideology’ is perhaps equally problematic, but I will explain below in which sense I will 
use the concept as an analytical tool.  
In short, the aim of this study is to explore and to situate the concepts present in 
fifteenth-century Ottoman texts in their own historical and semantic context and as such 
to diminish the degree of distortion. In this research, I explore the possibility of going 
beyond the ‘orientalist’ and ‘colonial’ premises and descriptions of Ottoman history. 
Indeed, concepts and conceptualisations matter; they form the basis of our knowledge 
frameworks, which are very influential in the construction of not only social reality, but 
also in the writing of history. In this respect, this study is a modest effort to let the 
Ottomans speak for themselves in their own words. 
Theories of State Formation  
The problem at the start of this study is an obvious one: without having a theory about 
the phenomenon of state, one cannot meaningfully engage in a discussion about state 
formation. The theoretical approach to Ottoman state-building which I propose in 
Chapter 2 is eclectically composed. I will deploy Ibn Khaldûn’s early political sociology; 
Nicola Di Cosmo’s theory on nomadic state formation;20 John Haldon’s conceptualisation 
of the ‘tributary state’; Immanuel Wallerstein’s analysis of world-system theory; and 
finally also Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state and his concept of ‘symbolic 
power’.21 
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This composite approach is very useful to understand the early Ottoman state building 
process, as it goes beyond the classic theories of state-building that strictly emphasise the 
development of institutions and taxation. The blending of the theories mentioned above  
can help to go beyond the outdated theories of ‘Asian Mode of Production’ and ‘Oriental 
Despotism’. These theories provide tools to understand Ottoman political organisation 
and the manner in which the Ottoman dynasty mobilised the various social groups in 
joining their efforts. Indeed, early state formation took place when the early Ottomans 
still had minimal organisational structures at hand. But they did make use of many social 
relations and ties in order to influence, control and create networks. It was precisely in 
this way that they generated political institutions and attracted followers.22  
What is a ‘state’? 
I must of course clarify what I mean by the term ‘the state’, a crucial heuristic tool in 
studies on history but at the same time often a very vague concept. Surely, one directly 
encounters the problem that the term ‘state’ itself has been hotly debated for many 
decades and a great number of definitions have been proposed. In everyday usage, we are 
accustomed to thinking of a state in terms of a clearly defined national unit, representing 
the same cultural, ethnic, ideological and linguistic characteristics. This is somehow true 
for the modern nation-states,23 which Benedict Anderson has called ‘imagined 
communities’.24 However, as my unit of analysis is the fifteenth-century Ottoman Empire, 
an ancient ‘world-empire’, it is necessary to make a distinction between ‘capitalist’ and 
‘pre-capitalist’ societies.25 It has also been demonstrated that the paradigms on feudalism 
and the ‘Asian Mode of Production’ are empirically and scientifically inadequate for the 
understanding of the Ottoman state formation.26  
I will make use of a more pragmatic and eclectic view of the early Ottoman state. I 
define a state as a territorially demarcated region, controlled by a centralised political 
establishment which has the monopoly over the use of coercion and taxation. A state is 
represented by a particular idea of sovereignty, which serves to legitimise its existence 
and the position of the ruling elite. This can provide a specific identity to the population 
 
                                                     
22 Also see: Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York, 2008) 9-33.  
23 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in: ibid., Selected Works (London, 1968) 94-179, 169. 
24 Benedict Anderson, Verbeelde Gemeenschappen. Bespiegelingen over de Oorsprong en de Verspreiding van het 
Nationalisme (Amsterdam, 1983) 17-19. 
25 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New York, 1979) 158. 
26 For an overview and criticism of the Marxist state theory of the ‘Asian Mode of Production’, see: John Haldon, 
The State and the Tributary Mode of Production (London, 1993) 14-69.  
  9 
as subjects of a state, members of a religion, etc.27 In addition, a state also usually relies 
on a class or social group that mediates the relationship between the ruler/ruling elite 
and the population, by controlling and redistributing the resources; a degree of 
institutional reproduction of important administrative functions; a hegemonic political 
theory or ideology which provides the ruling class or the ruler with a legitimation for 
their rule and claims on sovereignty. The Ottoman ideological discourses express the 
political tensions between various social groups and bind the various elements of a 
society and state structures together.28  
Pierre Bourdieu remarked that the classic theories of state formation did not ask who 
benefitted from having the monopoly on power, symbolic and material. According to the 
French sociologist and anthropologist, the building of dynastic states was accompanied 
by the concentration of various kinds of power, or ‘capital’ in his specific terminology. 
Different forms of ‘capital’ (political, cultural, social, symbolic, intellectual) were 
combined and accompanied the creation of various corresponding ‘fields’. In Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework, fields are more or less institutionalised relations, in which 
activities take place. State-building was accompanied by the creation of a specific ‘field of 
power’, the arena in which the holders of different fields and kinds of ‘capital’ contended 
for state power. According to Bourdieu, this conflict was the result of the fact that state 
power granted control over various kinds of resources as well as over the control of their 
reproduction.29  
Another interesting conceptualisation of ‘the state’ has been formulated by Immanuel 
Wallerstein in his method of ‘World-Systems Analysis’. He has argued that modern 
national state structures exist within an overarching capitalist world economy. This 
world economy is a social system that emerged in medieval northwest Europe after the 
demise of feudalism. It gradually expanded and encompassed the whole world.30 As a 
formal structure, the capitalist world-economy is defined by absence of an overarching 
political authority. Without a political structure, the surplus within the world-system is 
redistributed via ‘the market’. Hence, ‘historical capitalism’ is characterised by a unified 
economic structure that operates worldwide, reproducing a hierarchy between various 
states and cultural forms, based on the extraction of surplus from the outlying regions in 
the world to the powerful states at the core areas, as a result of technological progress. 
Wallerstein has argued that the profound inequalities of distribution within the capitalist 
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world-system ensue in greater inequalities than has ever been the case in ‘ancient’ 
empires.31  
Indeed, before this capitalist world economy emerged, there obviously existed many 
other social and political systems in history, among which the large political entities that 
Wallerstein has called ‘world-empires’. These ‘ancient’ empires were administered by one 
overarching political structure within which various economic systems and cultural 
forms coexisted.32 Therefore, the ‘world-empire’ is a fundamentally different kind of 
social system in comparison to the capitalist ‘world-economy’, which is the most 
important distinction between the ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ states. A world-empire was 
based on the collection of agricultural and artisanal surplus in the form of taxes or tribute. 
Subsequently, this surplus was redistributed to the administrative classes of the state 
(bureaucracy) and to other segments in the society (as in the Ottoman case, in the form 
of poorhouses, land-donations, hospitals, high schools, bathhouses, infrastructure works, 
public buildings and monuments, etc.). Despite the obvious inequalities between the 
producing and tax-paying classes and the ruling elite of state officials who did not pay 
taxes, there were many inbuilt social and political limits to profit. These limits prevented 
the unrestricted surplus accumulation by a group within the ruling elite at the expense 
of impoverishment and starvation of the producing groups. They also prevented the 
emergence of rival political groups within the elite, by maintaining control of resources 
and surplus in the hands of the central authority. Hence, the fundamental feature of a 
world-empire was the political unity of the economy, in the form of a relatively highly 
centralised state structure. In short, there existed an all-encompassing political 
governance within which various kinds of economic and cultural systems co-existed. A 
relatively highly centralised administration controlled the economy in the entire realm.33 
In this respect, the needs of world-empires were facilitated by rationality in 
administration, which produced immense amounts of records, as was the case with the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Besides the centralised ‘tributary and redistributive’ mode of production, another 
crucial factor is the social and cultural context within which states evolve. The political 
boundaries of the ancient world-empires did not necessarily determine the limits of 
cultural forms, values, conventions and perceptions and the accompanying set of social 
relations. The Byzantinist John Haldon has highlighted the cultural hybridity that 
characterised the ancient states and societies: ‘There are always overlapping structures 
of levels between neighbouring societies – whether in respect of the basic structure of 
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the family and household, patterns of kinship and lineage attribution, religious and 
political ideologies and even legal systems. States may intersect in all these features (…) 
there are historical examples where the same set of legal and juridical principles are 
adopted by several states sharing a common heritage.’34 Similarly, Wallerstein has argued 
that the successive world-empires in the same geographical zone often shared common 
cultural forms. There was a certain ‘revival’ and transmission of elements of a specific 
culture or civilisation, every time a new world-empire was created in the same place. 
These patterns of ‘high culture’ or civilisation were developed and reproduced by the 
ruling elites.35  
Concerning the concept of state, one also has to mention the theory on state building 
of the fifteenth-century Muslim philosopher of history, Ibn Khaldûn. In his Muqaddimah, 
he noted that dawla (the state) was formed and that civilisations were revived and 
renewed by influxes of nomad peoples from beyond their frontiers.36 His approach is very 
useful in understanding the emergence and development of the Ottoman state. Ibn 
Khaldûn argued that there was a strong stimulus within the nomadic tribes to cooperate 
on a larger scale, which granted them social cohesion. Only under such conditions could 
large and powerful states emerge. This impetus which he called asabiyya (‘group 
solidarity’, ‘esprit de corps’) was one of the most central concepts in his work. The social 
bond or asabiyya was indeed stronger among nomads than among sedentary peoples. It 
did not consist of blood ties, for politically, asabiyya could also be shared by people who 
were related to each other by long and close contact as members of a group. A nomadic 
group with a strong asabiyya achieved predominance over other groups and the ruling 
dynasty would be the one who inspired the strongest social solidarity. It was through this 
esprit de corps that the leader and his dynasty enjoyed the support of one or more groups 
and that he could retain his dominant position within the group. The leader who enjoyed 
the support of a sufficient asabiyya could succeed in founding a dynasty and gain royal 
authority. To Ibn Khaldûn, ‘dynasty’ and ‘state’ were one and the same thing – the dawla 
or devlet. In other words, according to Ibn Khaldûn, the dawla was the embodiment of the 
state power of the ruling dynasty. A state existed only in so far as it was held together by 
the dynasty; when the dynasty disappeared the state also collapsed.37 This is true for 
Ottoman empire building as well, as it integrated Islamic legal principles on state 
formation, Central Asian Turkish political ideas as well as some Eastern Roman traditions.  
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Nomadic State Formation 
In tracing the historical developments of the Ottoman state, it is crucial to review how 
‘nomadic’ state formation has been regarded by historians and social scientists. Because 
the nomadic tradition was one of the very influential dynamics of Ottoman state building, 
it may be interesting to shed more light on theories on nomadic state formation. The 
stereotypical historical image of the nomad is one of a plundering barbarian motivated 
only by a desire for booty and slaves. This image reflects sedentary cultural biases rather 
than any historical reality. For a better understanding of the early Ottoman state 
formation, which was a very complex and multi-layered historical phenomenon, I will 
briefly consider the social and political developments in the steppe in Chapter 2. I will 
make use of some recent theoretical models in the field in order to go beyond the 
sedentary biases on nomads. 
The views of Ibn Khaldûn about nomadic state formation has already been mentioned 
above. A modern scholar, Thomas Barfield, has argued that tribal political structures 
employed a model of rulership to build groups that acted together in order to organise 
economic production and preserve internal political order to defend the group against 
outsiders. ‘In these structures, people identified themselves as members of a defined 
nomad group, not as residents of a particular place.’38 Furthermore, Nicola Di Cosmo 
conceptualised the nomad state formation primarily in terms of crisis, militarisation and 
centralisation.39 In this latter theory on state formation in the Central Asian nomad 
tradition, there are some structural parallels with the earliest Ottoman state formation. 
Early Ottoman history displays some similarities in its social and political development. 
Therefore, in Chapter 2 on ‘pre-Ottoman history’, I will shed some light on the 
characteristics of nomadic life in the steppe. 
According to Di Cosmo, the initial momentum for nomadic state building came from a 
challenge to the current leadership of a group of nomads at a time of economic and social 
crisis. Then under an effective military leader, a process of political centralisation took 
place that would lay the foundations for territorial and political expansion.40 
Undoubtedly, institutions set up by nomadic empires borrowed administrative 
knowledge from the sedentary states. However, some nomad states survived without 
borrowing institutions from the sedentary states, as was the case for the Hsiung-nu and 
the Kök Türk Empires. Recent research does not support that these could only be states if 
they used administrative institutions and a bureaucracy.41  
 
                                                     
38 Barfield, ‘Turk, Persian and Arab: Changing Relationships’, 62. 
39 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 162-184. 
40 Ibidem, 179. 
41 Ibidem, 173. 
  13 
The second phase of nomadic state-building coincided with building an army to 
neutralise or dominate the rivals inside and outside their own territory. Although 
nomadic communities were accustomed to fighting, because of their lifestyle in the 
steppe, they were not always engaged in war. Their armed conflicts were limited to the 
level of tribute disputes: raiding the camp of the adversary or avenging a wrong, whereas, 
the mobilisation for war meant the creation of allied tribal armies. This occurred when a 
large disturbance or crisis took place in the steppe environment. Drought, overgrazing or 
epidemics could threaten the survival of the herds which were necessary to sustain the 
pastoral nomads. Such difficulties could cause unmanageable conflicts among tribes, or 
force entire communities to leave their homeland for large-scale migration in search of 
new pasturelands42 Migrations of nomadic communities required tightly organised 
military escorts to protect them. Every male able to fight then became a soldier and 
enrolled in the nomad army.43 
As the power and authority of the charismatic leader grew, members of the defeated 
tribes were incorporated, ranks were established and leaders were appointed. The 
creation of a supra-tribal polity increased the size of the army and turned part-time 
soldiers into full-time warriors. The increase of this non-productive class of ruling elite 
usually led to the rise of consumption. This in its turn augmented the need for acquiring 
tools and resources to build a political organisation. The ruling elite sought to incorporate 
other economies that could supply the revenues necessary to fill the gap between 
consumption and the productive base of the society. The ability to gain revenues from 
outside the territorial boundaries of the nomadic polities seems to be the key to the 
emergence of their state apparatus.44  
The ability to create revenues from tribute was important for the Central Asian 
nomadic states. In the scholarly literature, they are referred to as ‘tributary states’, in 
which the extraction of tribute and taxes was monopolised by the ruler/khan and the 
ruling elite associated with the khan. This implied the limiting of the surplus extraction 
by other factions within the ruling elite by weakening their control over production and 
hence limiting their autonomous revenue base. This was meant to prevent the emergence 
of rivals to the elite.45  
The third phase of centralisation consisted of a social revolution from decentralised, 
relatively egalitarian relations of a nomadic society to a centralised and hierarchical set 
of class relations that emerged along with the birth of a state and that concentrated 
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power at the top. However, this was never an easy process. The tribes were usually 
composed of egalitarian lineages and had leaders who ruled by means of consensus and 
consultation.46  
The key to the centralisation process was the rise of a supra-tribal leader.47 During the 
crisis and the ensuing ‘bureaucratisation’, the khan emerged from the pool of aristocracy 
by defeating competing lords and by successfully defending the interest of the tribe. He 
would receive the support of other tribes whose chiefs elevated him to the position of 
supreme leader and submitted to him. Isolated individuals could also flock to join the 
leader and then become part of the emerging polity. According to Barfield, the Turkish-
Mongol nomad culture was more accepting of hierarchy and charisma of the khan than 
the Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Partly, because they confronted 
larger and powerful sedentary empires in Asia than the Bedouin tribes.48  
The establishment of a centralist rule required the khan to expand his original base of 
authority beyond his own household, retinue and tribe into a supra-tribal position. Only 
then he could control the other tribes by providing them sufficient benefits in order to 
retain their loyalty. The khan needed to provide justice that transcended tribal dispute 
resolution.49 His task was to ensure the loyalty of the people by providing them security 
and justice of which the ruling dynasty would be the guarantor. The khan needed to 
rapidly consolidate his power base. He achieved this objective by monopolising the 
surplus extraction (taxes) and redistribution to the military aristocracy that he had 
collected around him. The khan controlled the resources and rewarded the military class 
with revenues. The ensuing territorial expansion was an essential part of the state 
formation process. The tribute revenues from newly conquered lands enabled the khan 
to reward loyal service and to provide leading positions for members of the ruling elite. 
If the founder of a dynasty could not place his House in the control of the state, then the 
foundation of the state would remain weak and the state would itself easily vanish at the 
death of its leader.50  
The nomadic cultural and political heritage of the early Ottomans expressed itself in 
their state building and ideology. The founders of the Roman and Persian Empires were 
sedentary farmers. The founders of the Ottoman and Seljuk Empires were pastoralist 
nomads.  
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The concept of ideology 
Since the core investigation in this study concerns early Ottoman political discourse, the 
concept of ‘ideological discourse’ or ‘ideology’ in general also needs clarification. In order 
to explain my understanding of Ottoman ‘state ideology’, I will clarify how I define 
‘ideology’ in this study.51 Generally, the modern concept of ‘ideology’ is used to denote 
views such as liberalism, socialism, nationalism, fascism, etc., all of which have their 
origins in the eighteenth century. The question is: can we use this concept for ‘pre-
capitalist’ or ‘pre-modern’ historical systems of the past?  
The answer seems to be affirmative, provided that the notion is used with care and 
understood as nothing more than an analytical category to explain political, cultural and 
historical phenomena. In that case, ideology is not a ‘tool of domination’ and cannot 
simply be equalled to ‘power’. I will use the term ideology in the sense of ‘a set of 
discourses which have specific views of relations of power at all levels of social relations’. 
Of course, subordinate groups can also develop their own ideologies, opposed to the 
discourse of the hegemonic groups. In this respect, ‘utopias’ or ‘ideologies’ have a 
distinctive rhetoric, one which is simultaneously rational and emotional. As we will 
observe, early Ottoman political discourse was also framed in value-laden language. The 
normative principles of the relations between state and society appealed to deep-rooted 
cultural symbols and ideas.  
Indeed, each historical society has developed its own set of claims. The achievement 
of its principles and ideas would establish the best and desired social order of which 
humankind was capable, an order of which the justness and legitimacy were self-evident 
for everyone at the time. Indeed, all states in the pre-modern age also had such ‘utopian’ 
ideologies, whereby the ruling dynasty and the elites used a set of values and ideas about 
sovereignty that to a degree was shared or at least agreed upon by other social groups in 
that particular society. As Roland Barthes has pointed out, where connotations of words 
are accepted as normal and evident, they act as a conceptual map of meanings by which 
we make sense of the world.52 In this perspective, ideology can be defined as ‘a discourse’ 
by which people live, experience and explain the world.  
Every sovereign has had to justify his claim to rule over territories, people and 
resources to different audiences within his realm and to outsiders. Through these 
justifications, we can see what individual rulers, their advisors and their subjects thought 
was important in the conception of rulership and of political organisation. In Chapter 3, 
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which makes up the bulk of this thesis, I will explore the predominant ideas of the 
Ottoman state ideology. As such, Ottoman ‘state ideology’ can be defined as a set of 
normative ideas that was used to define and explain the sovereignty of the dynasty. The 
concepts defining Ottoman rulership were important as they expressed a broadly 
consented value system. Indeed, the dynasty, the ulema, and the opponent gazi marcher 
lords deployed similar ideological discourses in their conflicts over resources and power.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)  
As already mentioned, I will make use of a hybrid methodology, in which the approaches 
of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Conceptual History are central. Despite some 
reservations, the CDA approach can be applied to the study of Ottoman historical texts 
when common sense and pragmatism are combined with an attempt at a heuristic 
understanding. The CDA provides some useful elements for a highly practical, well-
rounded yet flexible in-depth analysis of discourse of early Ottoman historical texts. Most 
scholars working within the CDA paradigm have focused on the relationship between 
language (text, discourse) and power (political struggle, inequality, hegemony, etc.) in 
modern capitalist society. However, the general insights and the conceptual apparatus of 
CDA also offer a useful methodology for identifying and interpreting the way ‘ideology’ 
works in discourses produced in other older societies, and this also holds for Ottoman 
historical texts.  
However, the CDA model must be complemented by a careful study of the historical 
and social context in which the Ottoman chronicles were produced. Its particular 
strength is that it bridges the gap between language phenomena and social processes. The 
CDA model provides useful insights into the workings of ideology in creating and 
maintaining social systems, as it considers discourse as a tool through which ideologies 
are reproduced and disseminated.53  
Theoretically, the approach of the CDA method shows some affinity with the work 
of the French social theorist and philosopher Michel Foucault. A discourse, according to 
Foucault, is as an entity of sequences, a unit of semiotic signs, in the sense that they form 
enouncements and statements.54 A statement, for Foucault, is composed of ideas, 
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attitudes, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects’ world view and 
the social world of which they speak or write. It is subject to repetition, transformation 
and reactivation. It is interlinked, notwithstanding some modifications, to the statements 
or texts that precede and follow it.55 There is always a relation between texts or 
intertextuality. Foucault has argued that truth and knowledge (savoir) are plural, multi-
layered, contextual and historically produced through specific ways of using language. 
He has placed the role of discourse within the wider social and political processes of 
seeking legitimacy and power. As the claims to truth were socially constructed, according 
to Foucault, he explored how these truths were maintained and which power relations 
they carried with them.  
Foucault also concluded that power and knowledge were interrelated and therefore 
that every human relationship was a struggle for and negotiation about power. As such, 
power forms a discrete capillary woven into the fabric of the entire social order. Power is 
not simply repressive, but is productive as well; it brings ‘subjects into being’.56 Power is 
also always present in language use and can both produce and constrain the truth. 
Foucault has argued that discourse is controlled by what can be spoken of; where and how 
one may speak; and who is privileged to speak.57 To give a fitting example from Ottoman 
historiography, the Ottoman historian Neşrî omitted the marriage of Orhan Gazi with the 
Byzantine princess Theodora in his account. This can be understood when we look at 
Neşrî’s social context. Neşrî was an ulema (cleric) historian writing for an audience of the 
ruling elite which advocated an image of the Ottoman sultans as the leading Muslim 
sovereigns. Probably, he omitted this marriage as it did not fit in his ideological narrative 
of the early Ottoman history. As we shall observe in various text samples, Neşrî usually 
accorded his selection and framing of events to the norms and expectations of his 
intended audience, and to his own value preferences and world view.  
CDA is also firmly grounded in De Saussure’s linguistic structuralism. According to 
Ferdinand de Saussure meaning is produced through the relationship between the 
’signifiers’ (i.e. the form or medium of signs) and what it is taken to mean, the ‘signified’, 
i.e. concepts and connotations. This relationship suggests that meaning is fluid, as well as 
culturally and historically specific. Meaning is regulated by specific historical 
conditions.58  
Fairclough was also clearly influenced by the Russian linguist Mikhial Bakhtin, even 
though he does not specifically refer to the latter. Indeed, as Bakhtin also did, CDA argues 
that concepts do not have fixed meanings, but are rather produced within a mutual 
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relationship between the writer/speaker (addresser) and intended audience (addressee). 
Meaning is the inherently unstable domain of contestation and not the product of a fixed 
and pure language.59 This view also aligns with what the philologist Robert Jauss has 
called the ‘horizon of expectation’ (horizon d’attente). In other words, the producers of 
texts adapt the line and topoi of their narratives to the tastes and presuppositions of the 
intended audience and their knowledge of what has happened.60 These concepts of the 
‘horizon of expectation’ of the ‘intended audiences’ will also be of fundamental 
importance for my empirical study of the Ottoman chronicles.  
Taken together, the general structure of the CDA is a three-level framework: language 
operates on an ideational level (construction and representation of experience in the 
world); on a relational level (enactment of social relations); and on a textual level 
(production of texts).61 Fairlclough considered discourse as something that is produced, 
circulated and consumed in society. Language connects meanings with their spoken and 
written expressions. Texts can be made up both by openly drawing upon other texts 
(inter-textuality) and by making use of elements, such as genre conventions, discursive 
registers and style. The analyst will need to find out what textual structures and 
intertextual conventions can be observed. Particular attention is given to the relation of 
textual expressions and society. Thus in CDA the idea is developed that discourse is a 
‘social practice’. According to Fairclough, language is subject to social conventions, such 
as ruling value patterns, spirit of the age, identity and the social group to which one 
belongs.62  
A final word of caution about the use of these theories is the criticism of Jan 
Blommaert, who has remarked that the methodology of CDA tends to close itself to non-
western societies as well as to pre-capitalist periods. The particular shapes of capitalist 
‘Late Modernity’, including its semiotic forms, are even today very different across the 
world.63 As Blommaert has noted, the historical horizon of CDA, much like its cultural one, 
is often a limited one. A focus on issues of power in contemporary societies and a 
synchronic approach to the past are inadequate.  
Indeed, some Ottoman concepts simply cannot be translated into English. Because of 
the time lag and cultural gap, contemporary English might lack that particular concept 
 
                                                     
59 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World (Bloomington, 1984). 
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61 L. Chouliaraki and N. Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh, 
1999) 138-140. 
62 Fairclough, Language and Power, 17-19. 
63 Jan Blommaert, Discourse: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, 2005) 35-37.  
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or the connotations attached to it. For instance, this is the case with the problematic 
translation of ‘gaza’ as ‘holy war’ (see Chapter 2). The historical context in which a term 
developed its meaning can be totally different in another historical context. Likewise, the 
semantic connotations of terms may have quite different effects as well. In order to avoid 
this, I will give more attention to the specific historical and semantic contexts of the 
Ottoman concepts as they were used and understood by the chroniclers.   
Still, the emancipatory work of CDA cannot be ignored. The CDA method can certainly 
be used to scrutinise the narratives of Ottoman chronicles in a more unbiased way than 
has been the case among the older generations of scholars who interpreted these same 
texts. When used as a methodological tool and not as a paradigm, the CDA can support 
the purpose of this study, which is to let the Ottomans speak for themselves.  
Outline of this study 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the various genres of Ottoman sources in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth century. This chapter principally discusses the production of the 
earliest preserved Ottoman historical texts. Each chronicle is distinctly introduced by 
situating the social background of its author and the historical context of its production.  
Chapter 2 deals with the historical context of the emergence and process of Ottoman 
state formation. It serves to provide the general background of the historical and social 
context to what follows in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 mainly deals with the building of 
institutions and provides a historical overview of the main events. I reconstruct how the 
Ottoman polity was founded by a group of Turkish Oğuz pastoral nomads, as a frontier 
principality (beylik) in western Anatolia, at the frontiers of the Muslim world. Chapter 2 
discusses how the early Ottomans had to start life again in a new geographical, social and 
cultural environment. They mixed the legacies of their nomad way of life with their new 
sedentary milieu, habits and institutions. They gradually built up their institutions and 
developed practices that resulted from this steady blending of nomadic tradition with the 
sedentary administrative traditions.  
During the process of centralisation of state power, there were clear tensions between 
the Turkish gazi nobility and the dynasty. This struggle among the ruling elites was a 
direct result of a struggle for the control of resources and the centralisation of 
administration. The creation of state institutions was crucial in order to stabilise the 
intra-elite tensions. It appears that the early Ottoman dynasty often acted autonomously 
from the Turkish gazi nobility, in terms of its claims to control of resources and by 
developing institutions. However, when we consider the process of Ottoman state 
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formation, we may discern different forms of ‘ideological’ expression, depending on the 
social groups they represented and on the specific historical context.  
Finally in Chapter 3, against this social and political background, I examine the 
development of the fifteenth century Ottoman ‘state ideology’. Surely, the Ottoman 
dynasty and the gazi circles constructed their own historical narratives about the intra-
elite struggle. An important question is: how did the intra-elite competitive power play 
influence the narratives of the early Ottoman chroniclers?  
Chapter 3 mainly explores how a specific Ottoman political language developed on the 
basis of different traditions. I consider how the various elements were blended together 
as the needs for legitimacy of the Ottoman sovereignty shifted due to changing historical 
contexts. The main principles of sovereignty were consolidated after a long process of 
experimentation and integration that lasted for more than a century and a half. Fifteenth-
century Ottoman historical texts reveal that besides the ancient Turkish steppe concepts, 
Islamic thought was the other important source for Ottoman political language. 
Somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, the Ottoman chronicles seem to contain no key 
concepts deriving from the Byzantine tradition, which apparently did not directly 
influence Ottoman political language. Therefore, I will primarily focus on Turkish 
nomadic political ideas and on – though a broad and diffuse term - Islamic political 
thought. These were the two principal languages that the early historical texts amply 
referred to. I will explore the influences of those traditions on the fifteenth-century 
Ottoman world view, at least in so far as they were expressed in historiographical 
production. 
To understand the normative value system of the Ottomans, I must consider the 
particularities of each of those traditions separately. Thereby, I explore the ‘discursive 
registers’ or the dominant concepts of Ottoman political language which are frequently 
expressed in the chronicles. My inquiry in Chapter 3 is clustered around the following 
questions: which kind of ‘state ideology’, if any, can we discern from the fifteenth-century 
Ottoman historical texts? Within this ideological discourse, which ‘central signifiers’ 
frequently recurred in the chronicles? And how did they contribute to the construction 
of the Ottoman political language? In this chapter, I will scrutinise the concepts that 
represented the paradigmatic ideas and value system of Ottoman political language. I will 
consider more closely the meanings of those central concepts that formed ‘discursive 
registers’, their etymological and semantic development and how they were finally 
understood and deployed by the early Ottoman authors. Chronologically, I have limited 
the scope of the study to the fourteenth century up till the experimental period that 
lasted until the early reign of Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481). The period after the 
conquest of Constantinople represented a time of consolidation of centralised 
governance. I sincerely hope that my study, will give rise to similar studies that will focus 
on subsequent periods or on other types of textual sources and that may nuance my 
conclusions in the future.  
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Chapter 1 The Sources 
1.1 Early Ottoman Historiography 
Ottoman sources for the study of the early history of the Empire are scarce. For the 
fourteenth century almost no Ottoman documents have survived, besides coins, 
inscriptions and some deeds of pious endowment or waqf.1 From the courts of the first 
Ottoman rulers, Ertuğrul, Osman, Orhan, Murad I and Bâyezid I, there is not a single 
chronicle that existed from that period. A developed tradition of Ottoman chronicle 
writing is only available to us from the fifteenth century onwards.2 Cemal Kafadar 
suggested that – apart from hagiographical writings and mostly orally transmitted 
legendary warrior epics – the early Ottoman literature had not yet produced a written 
and learned literary and historiographical tradition about the ruling dynasty.3 This 
observation obviously raises the following question: did Ottoman history writing truly 
begin that late or have some works already been composed during the fourteenth 
century, which were perhaps subsequently lost or destroyed in the chaos following 
Timur’s invasion of Anatolia after the Battle of Ankara? We do not know the answer to 
 
                                                     
1 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘Gazi Orhan Bey Vakfiyesi’, Belleten 5 (1941): 277-288. A ‘waqf’ or property is an 
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Medeniyet 12 (1955): 145-154; Şehabettin Tekindağ, ‘Osmanlı Tarih Yazıcılığı’, Belleten 35/140 (1971): 655-663.  
3 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (London, 1996) 93-94. 
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this question with certainty. We can only base ourselves upon the historical texts which 
did survive.  
Comprehensive chronicles on the Ottoman past, which I shall discuss below, emerged 
as a series of History of the House Osman of Ahmedî (1412), Şükrullah (1458), Enveri (1466), 
Oruç (1467), Aşık Paşazade (1484) and Neşrî (1495). Yahşi Fakih’s chronicle (1390’s), which 
is lost to us, is known as the oldest narrative as the later writer Aşık Paşazade made 
references to Yahşi Fakih’s work as his source for the Ottoman history up until the reign 
of sultan Bâyezid I (r. 1389-1402).4 In all likelihood, Yahşi Fakih, the son of the imam of 
Orhan Gazi (r. 1326-1362), wrote his memoirs in the years following to Bâyezid’s defeat at 
the Battle of Ankara in 1402. His text partly survived within the chronicle of Aşık 
Paşazade.5 Apart from Yahşi Fakih, Aşık Paşazade’s work and other interrelated fifteenth-
century chronicles undoubtedly contain echoes of other fourteenth-century texts and 
orally transmitted popular epics. On several occasions, Aşık Paşazade asserted that he 
studied and summarised various other records of deeds or menâkıbs, which he personally 
read or heard from eyewitnesses.6 However, it is not possible to attribute these to an 
identifiable author. In general Dimitris Kastritsis remarked that the issue of early 
Ottoman historical texts is highly complex, and that each account must be compared with 
others before it is attributed to a particular author or circumstances of composition.7  
According to Fuad Köprülü, we should not expect to find more than what is already 
known about the earliest period from other Islamic chronicles or Byzantine and Western 
sources.8 Byzantine and Western chronicles in the great majority of cases do not provide 
any more reliable information on the first appearance of the Ottomans. The Byzantine 
chroniclers, Pachymeres, Nikephoras and Kantekouzenos, and the Arab traveller and 
historians, Ibn Batuta, Ibn Said and el-Umarî, produced their works in the fourteenth 
century. However, the information they provide on Osman’s principality is still very 
limited.9 Fortunately, the available critical editions of the Byzantine writers, with whom 
 
                                                     
4 Aşıkpaşazâde, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, ed. Kemal Yavuz, Yekta Saraç (Istanbul, 2007) 271: ‘Orhan Gazi’nüñ imâmı 
Ishak Fakıh oglı Yahşı Fakı’dan kim ol Sultân Bâyezid Han’a gelince bu menâkıbı ol Yahşı Fakı’dan yazılmış 
buldum […] ve fakir dahı ba’zı hâllerindan ve kâllerinden ve menâkıblarından ihtisar idüp kalem diline virdüm.’ 
5 Victor L. Ménage, ‘The Menaqib of Yakhshi Faqih,’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 26 (1963): 
50 –74. 
6 On Aşıkpaşazade’s life and work, see: Halil İnalcık, ‘How to Read Ashik Pasha-Zade’s History,’ in: ibid., Essays in 
Ottoman History (Istanbul, 1998) 31–55. 
7 Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 21-23; ibid, ‘Ottoman Anonymous Chronicles’, Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle, 
ed. Dunphy, R. G. (Leiden and Boston, 2010) 1177-1178. 
8 Fuad Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Gary Leiser (Albany, 1992) 20-22; see also Lindner, 
Explorations, 6-14.   
9 Erhan Afyoncu, ‘Osmanlı Siyasî Tarihinin Ana Kaynakları: Kronikler’, Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 1/2 
(2003): 102. 
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the Ottomans were in contact, such as Doukas, Sphrantzes or Kritovoulos, do supplement 
our information on fourteenth-century and particularly fifteenth-century Ottoman 
history.10  
As I already mentioned, some modern historians, under the influence of positivism, 
rejected the earliest Ottoman sources by reasoning that they could not be used at all for 
historical reconstruction of chiefly military and political events. Herbert Gibbons and 
George Arnakis dismissed the earliest Ottoman chronicles as later fabrications,11 whereas 
Fuad Köprülü and Paul Wittek, aware of their problematic nature, did make use of them 
but only after applying very rigorous means of textual criticism.12 Specifically dealing 
with the battle of Nicopolis (1396), Aziz Atiya also dismissed the early Ottoman historical 
texts, since according to him: ‘the Turkish evidence is very doubtful and unreliable, and 
can hardly be taken into consideration (…) for Turkish knowledge of the West was hazy 
and unreliable’.13 Moreover, the British Ottomanist, Colin Imber, who followed the 
Gibbons-Arnakis thesis, remarked that the early Ottoman historical texts ‘lack any sense 
of exact chronology’.14 Imber considered that the early Ottoman chronicles were 
commissioned by the princely court and rejected all of them as not useful for scientific 
analysis. In his view, the narrative of the early Ottoman chronicles merely consists on 
legends and stories that must therefore be regarded as unreliable propaganda.15 Imber 
even claimed: ‘The best thing that a modern historian can do is to admit frankly that the 
earliest history of the Ottomans is a black hole.’16  
Surely, the same could be said about numerous other historiographical traditions from 
other parts of the world.17 Such historical texts follow a linear narrative structure through 
which they transform the past into a form of memory. They legitimise identities and allow 
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reign of Bayezid I, see : Paul Gautier, ‘Un Récit Inédit du Siège de Constantinople par les Turcs (1394–1402)’, 
Revue des Études Byzantines 23 (1965): 100–117. See also : ‘Elizabeth Zachariadou, ‘Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili and 
the Ottoman chronicles’, Islam-zeitschrift Fur Geschichte Und Kultur Des Islamischen Orients 60/2 (1983): 268-296. 
11 George G. Arnakis, Hoi protoi othomani (Athens, 1947); Herbert A. Gibbons, The foundation of the Ottoman Empire 
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14 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481 (Istanbul, 1990) 1. 
15 Colin Imber, ‘The legend of Osman Gazi’, in: E. Zachariadou ed., The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1380. Halcyon days in 
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16 Imber, ‘The legend of Osman Gazi’, 75 
17 For the biases of fourteenth-century Indo-Persian historical writings, see: Peter Hardy, Historians of Medieval 
India (London, 1966). 
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the past to be remembered and forgotten in a certain way. Nevertheless, notwithstanding 
these objections, the oldest Ottoman historical texts remain important sources 
expressing the dominant ideas of the fifteenth-century historical consciousness. As is the 
case for all historical sources, they should not be taken at face value, particularly not 
when they retrospectively described the events that took place a century earlier. It is 
obvious that they usually depicted early Ottoman history in flattering terms that 
prevailed in their own time.  
As with Western medieval chronicles, the main themes treated by these works were 
campaigns, conquests, the incorporation of foreign territories and the organisation of the 
princely court. But on occasion, the authors also included defeats, the losses of provinces 
and the truces and peace treaties that, provisionally or on a long-term basis, ended inter-
state conflicts. Conventionally, an Ottoman chronicle began with the praise of God and 
the Prophet and concluded its introduction with a laudation of the reigning sultan. 
Following the literary pattern of their time, the chronicles focus on the prince and the 
court and have a concise style of description. Although they sometimes show gaps in the 
events they cover and are also characterised by occasional emendations, this does not 
necessarily eliminate the useful information that these sources contain as authentic 
fifteenth-century narratives. But as we mostly lack other sources these texts remain 
indispensable as a body of historical information on the fourteenth century and on the 
Ottoman enterprise as seen from within. In short, the reformulations by the fifteenth-
century Ottoman historians about the humble origins of Osman’s beylik cannot be an 
excuse to dismiss all the early compilations and historical texts as pure myths. As 
Kastritsis already showed, the matter is more complicated than this.18 
Kafadar also noted that the Ottoman chronicles of the fifteenth century can be neither 
taken for granted nor dismissed: ‘A critical reading based on systematic suspicion can 
uncover significant truths underneath the seeming distortions. Different versions need 
to be understood on their own terms; without looking for one-to-one correspondence 
between textual variations and ideological orientations, one can still search for patterns 
identifying various traditions before determining their value.’19 He concluded that the 
early Ottoman historiography reflected a plurality of voices and one has to understand 
the interrelationships of these texts.  
While the Ottoman chronicle tradition obviously should be treated with great caution, 
Imber’s somewhat unduly form of positivist application of source criticism tends to result 
in a view that makes it impossible for the Ottomans to speak for themselves. One cannot 
simply reject the earliest Ottoman historical tradition as not useful for historical 
reconstruction. Instead, one can explore the specific historical and intellectual context of 
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their composition. The Ottoman chronicles can be analytically studied through a critical 
method, by juxtaposing them to other sources and situating them within the ideals of 
their own time and context of production. Halil İnalcık, for instance, composed a detailed 
chronology of the earliest history of Osman’s principality. He successfully filled the gaps 
in the chronology of the early historiography by using both Byzantine and Ottoman 
chroniclers and reading them from different perspectives.20 
1.2 Early Ottoman historical texts 
The American historian, Rudi P. Lindner too easily identified the early historical texts as 
a homogeneous body of ‘court chronicles’, written by the ulema (clerics) at the princely 
court of the Ottoman state. However, Lindner did have attention for the ideological 
content of these historiographical texts and he came to the conclusion that by the end of 
the fifteenth century, court histories were commissioned to glorify the past of the state. 
He suggested that the chronicles primarily ‘masked the nomadic tribal core, with the 
effect that Ottoman history was overwhelmingly described in terms of the gaza-ethos as 
the main component of a state ideology’.21 However, Cemal Kafadar and Halil İnalcık 
nuanced Lindner’s assertion and showed that the early historians, such as Aşık Paşazade, 
did not write typical court histories that expressed an officially endorsed state ideology. 
For instance, İnalcık identified Aşık Paşazade’s personal and ideological connection to the 
gazi circles, who were involved in vibrant conflicts with the members of the centralising 
state.22 They shared a target audience of the social groups rubbing up against the lower 
edges of the emerging Ottoman ruling elite. 
Kafadar noted that although Aşık Paşazade wrote his chronicle at the demand of the 
Ottoman court after 1480, this does not predicate either an ideological homogeneity or 
an official character in his text. Aşık Paşazade and the authors of the Anonymous 
Chronicles probably modified the final versions of their writings to some extent to 
protect themselves from possible risks. They were also undeniably influenced by the 
official state ideology that emerged during the fifteenth century. But such reservations 
do not necessarily undermine their specific characteristics. The criticism in these 
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21 Rudi P. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Bloomington, 1983) 19-20; ibid, ‘Stimulus and 
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chronicles reflected the world view of the frontier warriors and the Turkish nobility as 
opposed to the emerging central state. These writers were no ‘court historians’ in the 
conventional sense. They expressed the critical voice of this specific milieu, which after 
the adaptation of the imperial project were marginalised and stood in opposition to the 
princely court, or the policy upheld by the sultans and statesmen of the late fifteenth 
century.23   
During the fourteenth century, some written works were indeed produced in the 
courts of several Turkish principalities (beyliks) in Anatolia. However, these were no 
historical texts, but rather translations or compilations of the Islamic religious sciences. 
Many works on the practical sciences of medicine and astronomy in Persian literary 
classics were copied or translated into Turkish in the fourteenth century. In the 
fourteenth century, the Ottomans generally did not seem to have written down their 
histories. They rather told what purported to be historical narratives woven around 
legendary warriors and dervishes. These narratives remained focused on heroic ‘chivalric’ 
adventures of the legendary Muslim warriors at the frontier region in Anatolia, told from 
a noble spirit of enterprise. The cultural life of the frontiers was dominated by oral 
tradition, in particular the narratives that represented the frontier society's perceptions 
of its own ideals and achievements.24 Two interrelated types of narrative played a 
prominent role in formulating the historical consciousness of the people of the frontiers, 
including the early Ottomans: the warrior epics (gazavatname) and the hagiographies 
(menakıbname).25  
The early Ottoman historiography and the Ottoman state formation were to some 
degree related and at certain junctures they were even closely intertwined. Kafadar again 
observed that ‘the impressive historiographical output of the Ottomans in the fifteenth 
century must be seen in the larger context of transformations in the historical 
consciousness of Turkish-Muslim Anatolians.’26 Although early Ottoman historiography 
is usually based upon the Islamic tradition of history writing, over time the Ottomans also 
developed new conceptions and their own varieties.27 The first examples of what we 
might consider as Ottoman historical texts were composed in epic and lyrical prose style.  
The ‘court chronicles’ in the sense of ‘official’ historical texts actually did not come 
into being until the late seventeenth century, when the office of vak’anüvis or court 
 
                                                     
23 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 100. 
24 Ibidem, 62. 
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26 Ibidem, 95. 
27 For a general overview, see: F. Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden, 1963); S. Hizmetli, Islam 
Tarihçiliği Üzerine (Ankara, 1991). 
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chronicler had been established.28 The first Ottoman court chronicler was Naima. He was 
appointed as the official court historian with access to archival materials and he was 
charged with composing a record of the major events in the history of the Ottoman 
state.29 In the seventeenth century, the gaza-ideology had lost much of its significance 
and was replaced by another state ideology, expressing a different historical 
consciousness. The imperial dynasty no longer saw itself as a distinguished family among 
gazi-lords. The court chroniclers represented the new identity of the House of Osman as 
the sovereign of a dynastic, sedentary, bureaucratic and Sunni Muslim Empire. This 
perception was articulated by writers who belonged to the bureaucracy of the central 
state. Lindner somehow too readily projected the later seventeenth-century realities to 
the earlier periods.  
1.3 Gazavatnames or Books of Campaign 
The earliest Ottoman historical texts shared a range of vocabulary and expressions, 
largely originating in two forms of immensely popular oral narratives: the menakıbnames 
and gazavatnames. These two types of narratives portrayed the lives and deeds of the 
people at the frontiers in Anatolia and have a specific place in Muslim and Turkish 
historiography. After a critical reading, these two types of sources offer original and 
valuable information regarding the Turkish-Islamic and Ottoman history and the social-
cultural and political life in general.30 The biographical books of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the epic campaign books, which were produced for the motivation of the soldiers, 
paved the way for the birth of a new type of historical writing. Especially the gazavatnames 
constitute an important source for the Ottoman history. Probably in the ninth century, 
the menakıbs (بە) were created in order to describe the high moral values of both the 
Prophet and his companions. From the eleventh century onwards, the lives of influential 
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Sufi saints (evliya), sheikhs and the mystical orders were also accounted by these texts.31 
The word menakıb in the fifteenth-century Turkish meant ‘deeds’ both in an Islamic and 
in a political sense. In the thirteenth century, the earliest examples of menakıbs or 
hagiographies in the Turkish literature were produced during the Seljuks of Anatolia.32 
This was a period in which the cultural and intellectual life developed with the arrival of 
scholars and Sufi sheikhs to Seljuk Anatolia.  
Parallel to these developments, the Turkish communities who migrated to the marches 
in Anatolia also began to produce warrior gazi epics or gazavat. This gave rise to the 
Islamic heroic popular Anatolian Turkish literature of gazavatnames. These were 
recounted within the social and cultural milieu that was conscious of earlier layers of 
frontier traditions. The gests of Arab warriors, deriving from early Muslim history in the 
Arab-Byzantine frontiers, continued to play an important role in shaping the self-image 
and courageous ‘knightly’ behaviour of the Muslim Turkish communities in Anatolia. 
However, it is not possible to determine when Turkish versions of such normative epics 
started to circulate, but over time translations appeared in writing. The earlier epics were 
reworked for new audiences.33 Comparable to the European genre of the chanson de geste, 
these gazavat or menakıb works remained focused on heroic ‘chivalric’ and miraculous 
adventures of famous thirteenth-century gazi-leaders, such as the post-Seljuk heroes 
Seyyid Battal Gazi, Sarı Saltuk or Danişmend Gazi.34 These legendary histories or ‘pseudo-
histories’ dealt with the legendary vitae of warriors and dervishes and were produced 
within the ‘knightly’ gazi values of the social and political life in western Anatolia in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This was a period in which the historical texts in the 
strictest sense were not yet produced. In any case, written about individual persons or 
events, about sultans or famous marcher lords, the menakıbnames appear in general to 
give detailed and reliable historical information.35 As I shall discuss below, the early 
Ottoman chronicle writers of the fifteenth century, such as Aşık Paşazade, were strongly 
inspired by this genre of the gazavat and menakıb.   
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In the fifteenth century, a growing number of gazavat or  ݖا	
  (Book of Campaigns) 
deal with the accounts of the deeds and campaigns of a sultan or a famous commander.36 
The Gazavatname became a genre that narrated a given campaign and celebrated the 
victories of the commander or the sultan. Its thematic focus was determined by strong 
genre conventions, which also provided historical information. The compositional 
structure and the literary form of the Gazavatname genre are reflected in the early 
Ottoman chronicles, which are rather composed as testimonials to the exemplary deeds 
of the House of Osman.37 
1.3.1 The Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad bin Mehemmed Han  
One of the first major Ottoman examples of campaign narrative tradition or gazavatname 
is the anonymous fifteenth-century Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad bin Mehemmed Han or ‘the Book 
of the Campaign of Sultan Murad’ concerning the Battles of Izladi and Varna (1444) that 
took place during the reign of sultan Murad II. This is one of the early drafts of the 
Ottoman history writing in the fifteenth century and undoubtedly the most important 
Ottoman source on the Battle of Varna. 38 This text is also one of the earliest known 
examples of its genre of the Ottoman gazavatnames. The Gazavat survived in a single 
manuscript, dating from the late fifteenth century and is a valuable source for the 
Ottoman history of that period. Because it dealt only with the events that took place in 
the period 1443-1448, it exceeds the early Ottoman chronicles both in length and in 
accuracy of details. The chronicles of Aşık Paşazade and Oruç (see below) narrated the 
reign of each sultan individually and therefore kept their descriptions quite short. The 
Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad was discovered and mentioned by İnalcık and Oǧuz in 1948.39 İnalcık 
used the text in greater detail in his analysis of the reigns of Murad II and Mehmed II.40 
Until 1978, there was no critical edition of this gazavatname. In 2006, Imber published an 
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English translation of the Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad along with excerpts from several other 
sources on the events of the Battle of Varna.41  
According to the detailed information the anonymous author provides, he seems to 
have been an eyewitness of the events he described and he probably served in the court 
of sultan Murad II (1421-1451) as a scribe. As a secretary in the divan of Murad II, the 
chronicler might have had access to intelligence reports on the European meetings, plans 
and preparations to unite their armies, invade the Ottoman realm and expel the 
Ottomans. The events of Sultan Murad II’s Varna campaign of 1444 are narrated in prose 
style as an independent text. It was written during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481). 
The account was not composed in the style typical for the later sixteenth-century texts, 
which were overloaded with panegyric passages with embellishment and stylistic 
ornamentations. The anonymous author of the Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad created a sense of 
enthusiasm through the pace of his narrative.  
He organised his material in a series of discrete chapters, each of which marks a 
distinct stage in the narrative. He started with a description of the Council of Florence 
(1439) where the Byzantine emperor pleaded with the pope to instigate a full-scale war 
against the Ottomans. He also provided detailed information about the political and 
military decisions and discussions in Europe from the Ottoman perspective. Thereafter, 
he accounted the plotting of the Turkish bey of Karaman with the Byzantines behind 
Murad’s back. Meanwhile in the Balkans, the Hungarian king Wladislas and various 
Balkan princes break their oath and peace agreements with Sultan Murad II on insistence 
of the pope’s delegate, Ciriacus of Ancona. The suspense of the narrative gradually 
developed as the sultan fends off the first attacks and it reaches a climax with the 
abdication of the victorious Murad in favour of his young son Mehmed. The Byzantines 
saw an opportunity in this change and increased their intrigues, both by supporting a 
rival pretender to the Ottoman throne and by encouraging the Christian and Karamanid 
rulers to use this opportunity to invade the Ottoman lands. In the ensuing chaos and 
desperation, Murad II was recalled and he took the command from his son. He 
successfully led the army to a victory over a Hungarian-led crusaders army at Varna in 
1444. 
The author of the Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad portrayed the victory as by no means a certain 
one in advance, which lends extra excitement to his narrative. This suggests that the 
Ottomans were initially seriously threatened by a united and powerful enemy force. The 
anonymous writer also paid attention to individual ‘bravery and treachery’ of the 
marcher lords as good and bad examples. He depicted the fierce battle immediately 
around sultan Murad II, who managed to withstand with his kapıkulu or household army 
after the marcher lords had fled the battlefield. This proved to be the turning point in the 
 
                                                     
41 Colin Imber, The Crusade of Varna, 1443-1445 (Hampshire, 2006). 
  31 
battle. The marcher lords who had fled, returned to the battle when they saw that Murad 
and his janissaries held their positions.      
The narrative almost entirely proceeded through a continual shuttling back and forth 
between relation of events at Murad’s court and that of various other major actors. The 
author’s use of dialogue has the actors – Murad II, his viziers and commanders, the 
Christian enemy kings – appeared like real historical figures. The use of direct speech was 
a style of evocative rhetorical ornamentation and this was obviously composed in 
accordance with the expectation of the intended audiences. The various events were 
narrated in line with their ‘horizon of expectation’, in other words the tastes and 
presuppositions of his courtly public and their knowledge of what had happened. 
Moreover, the gazavat also served to affirm the views and norms of that audience about 
their society, its worldview and cultural life. The discourse on noble and courageous 
‘chivalric’ gazi behaviour was important in shaping the self-representation and forms of 
behaviour for the intended audience. In this respect, Sultan Murad II was portrayed as a 
ruler who confirms to the ideals of a gazi-sultan, who undertakes his campaigns in favour 
of the Muslim community and is therefore styled as the champion of the faith. A detailed 
discussion of this shall be given in the following chapters. Here we can say something 
about the context of the ‘performance’ of this text.  
The work was probably intended for public recitation at the court or in palace circles. 
The Gazavat had to be fairly accurate historically as witnesses to the events could have 
been present to correct the chronicler and it had to appear reliable. Nevertheless, a book 
of campaigns could also not be dull. Like many other historical texts the gazavat of Murad 
served to record history as well as to entertain the audience.  
Two other Ottoman accounts of the Battle of Varna are less known, but their narrative 
is complimentary to the anonymous one. The gazavatname’s of Zaifî and Kâşifî provide 
detailed information on the names of the commanders, the military operations at 
Gallipoli, the main battle and the death of king Ladislas at the battlefield.42 The first 
writer, Zaifî, was a poet at the court of sultan Murad II and wrote an account in Turkish 
of Murad’s campaign at Varna, a text which is an important source for Murad’s reign. We 
know that Zaifi understood Greek and the Serbo-Croat language. And since he was well 
informed about the events in Hungary, Zaifî might also have served as a spy.43 For 
instance, he wrote that king Ladislas and Hunyadi held an assembly in Budapest with 
ambassadors of the Byzantine emperor and the Vatican to discuss the possibilities to 
invade the Ottoman Balkans. The second writer, Kaşifî, was a Persian poet who came to 
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Istanbul during the reign of Mehmed II. Kaşifî wrote an account of the Battles of Varna 
and Kosovo based on oral testimonies of eyewitnesses who took part in these battles. 
There was also some attention for the Ottoman view of the battle of Kosovo of 1389.44  
1.4 Early Fifteenth-Century Chronicles 
As already mentioned, the writing of comprehensive chronicles began in the second half 
of the fifteenth century, one and a half centuries after the establishment of the Ottoman 
beylik (principality).45 There are several features that distinguish these chronicles from 
the genres mentioned above. The most important aspect is that these historical texts are 
the first comprehensive histories of the House of Osman from its beginnings and, in 
contrast to the gazavatname-genre, they no longer focus on the vitae of individual sultans 
or commanders. These chronicles covered a longer period of more than one century and 
a half, in which the narrative was divided according to the successive reigns of various 
sultans. As with medieval European chronicles, the main themes treated by these works 
were campaigns, conquests, the incorporation of foreign territories and state 
organisation. Although indispensable as the largest body of historical information for the 
period, these chronicles also contained gaps in coverage and have occasional 
emendations. 46 
Indeed, the early Ottoman chronicles were at the same time a kind of extension of the 
earlier popular epics (gazavatnames) and they copied each other with some additions or 
emendations. These texts were still composed according to the popular genre of epic 
literature (menakıbnames and gazavatname) situated within the oral tradition of the 
Muslim Oğuz culture in Anatolia.47 In a society imbued with the tradition of oral 
transmission, the early Ottoman chronicles were meant to be read aloud in public 
gatherings, in the army camp or in the bazaars. The following survey does not pretend to 
be exhaustive; it includes the works that I shall use for this study. I will mainly rely on the 
chronicles of Ahmedî, Oruç, Aşık Paşazade, the Anonymous Chronicle, Hadidi, Neşrî and 
the Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, of which the critical editions have been published in the 
recent decade. The reason for selecting these works is that they represent the most 
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important works for this period, while the others have either copied them or contain very 
little useful information for the purpose of this study. 
1.4.1 Ahmedî (c. 1410) 
Ahmedî’s Tevârîh-i Mülük-i Âl-i Osmân (History of the Kings of Ottoman Dynasty) is 
considered as the oldest identifiable comprehensive Ottoman history.48 Ahmedî was not 
only a historian, but also one of the most prolific and successful writers of Ottoman court 
poetry.49 Ottoman writers of poetry and historical works usually met their public in 
literary salons (meclis) patronised by educated Ottomans. In this cultural milieu, the 
writers might read out their works or show their manuscripts to their colleagues.50 
Authors depended on the generosity of a patron (the sultan or a statesman) for their 
livelihood. They were sometimes rewarded with sums of money and sometimes also with 
the appointment to an office which might provide a reasonable income.51 Presenting a 
chronicle or a work of fiction or poetry at a literary gathering can be regarded as a form 
of ‘publication’ in itself, but a more developed form of publication was to present a copy 
of the manuscript to an influential person, such as a vizier, the sultan himself or later on 
to a princess of the imperial family.52      
Ahmedî was born in Anatolia in 1330 and studied in Cairo, where he became versed in 
all branches of Islamic sciences. For a long time he lived in Kütahya, the capital of the 
Germiyan principality, one of the strongest and most cultured of the Turkish successor 
states of the Seljuk Sultanate in western Anatolia. Before he came under Ottoman 
patronage, Ahmedî was employed by two other Anatolian princes, Süleyman Shah of the 
Germiyanids and Isa Bey of the Aydın-oğulları.53 It is still unclear how and when exactly 
he entered Ottoman service. We do know that in the period between 1389 and 1390, Sultan 
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Bâyezid I had annexed the neighbouring Turkish principalities (beyliks) in Western 
Anatolia. At that time, Ahmedi was at the court of Isa Bey, the ruler of the principality of 
Aydın. Following the annexation of Aydın, Bâyezid appointed his young son Süleyman as 
the governor (sancakbey). Thereupon, seeking the patronage of Süleyman Çelebi, Ahmedî 
reworked his Iskendername (the ‘Epos of Alexander’), which he initially had composed for 
Isa Bey, and added a short chapter on the Ottoman history.  
During ten years of completion, he continuously made additions and modifications 
according to the political changes in Anatolia and waited for the best opportunity to 
present his magnum opus.54 Ahmedî finally presented his Iskendername to Süleyman Çelebi, 
who was one of the competitors for re-establishing the integrity of the Ottoman realm 
after his father Bâyezid had lost the Battle of Ankara in 1402 against Timur. During the 
civil war after the battle of Ankara, Süleyman had formulated his claim on the Ottoman 
capital in Edirne and he was known for his generosity towards poets. It was an utterly 
unstable period due to the political turmoil of the civil war.55 Ahmedî gained the 
patronage of Süleyman Çelebi. The fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicler Enverî knew 
Ahmedî and gave details on the poet who enjoyed the patronage of Süleyman Çelebi:  
‘Emir Süleyman spent his time to feast, and often got intoxicated with Ahmedî; Ahmedî 
was poor, the şah made him rich.’56  
The earliest redaction of Ahmedi's chronicle seems to have been written before the 
Battle of Nicopolis (1396), an event which he did not mention. Nevertheless, Ottoman 
historical consciousness seems to have been already fairly developed under Bayezid I (r. 
1389-1402). The dynasty started to outgrow its nomadic identity and began to acquire 
modes of governing and ideologies associated with the sedentary Islamic culture, much 
more systematically and self-consciously than before. 57 Ahmedî certainly survived into 
the reign of Çelebi Mehmed I and he died in 1413 at the age of eighty.58 
Ahmedî was highly educated. He mastered the Persian and Arabic languages and could 
easily attach himself at the court of the rising Ottoman state. However, he chose to 
compose his magnum opus İskendername in Turkish. Ahmedî dedicated the last chapter 
consisting of 334 couplets, to the history of the Ottomans from Ertuğrul to Emîr Süleyman. 
His İskendername is written in a long mesnevi or mathnavi poem style. The term mesnevi 
refers to a literary genre written in rhyming couplets, based on independent, internally 
rhyming lines. This is a poetic style that includes alliteration or a rhyme scheme within 
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the ending words of two lines, and follows a specific meter.59 Ahmedî’s work thus 
comprises over 8.000 couplets and is the earliest known versified Alexander romance in 
Ottoman literature. Around the legend of Alexander, Ahmedî wove a series of discourses 
on philosophy, theology, mysticism, medicine, geography and many other subjects. A 
large portion of the İskendername constitutes an account of the world history. In his work, 
Ahmedî made Alexander ask his tutor Aristotle to relate to him the history of the world 
until their own time. Of course, the Alexander romance was a familiar genre in the Muslim 
literary tradition, as writers gave the classical conqueror a distinguished role as a figure 
linking political and religious history.  
In this longstanding literary tradition, Alexander was known as Zülkarneyn in Turkish 
or in Arabic Dhul-Qarnayn, literally ‘the Possessor of Two Horns’. He is in fact a figure who 
is also mentioned in the Quran itself, where he is described as a great and righteous ruler 
who built the wall that kept Gog and Magog from attacking the people whom he met on 
his journey to the East.60 Zülkarneyn, usually identified as Alexander the Great, had 
traveled to Hejaz and had visited the two Holy Cities of Islam.61 Alexander’s successes had 
left a rich legacy inherited by Islamic literature and historiography. Zülkarneyn or 
İskender represented the ideally dynamic, triumphant and prudent king, frequently used 
by Muslim authors to portray the ideal ruler.62 The fifteenth-century Ottoman historian, 
Tursun Beg, for instance, also starts his chronicle on the reign of Sultan Mehmet II by 
referring to Alexander and citing a verse from the Qur’an, in which he is named.63 Within 
this same tradition, the Alexander legend was a convenient literary device for Ahmedî to 
achieve his goal of legitimising the Ottomans, who were caught in a civil war.  In his 
narrative, he appealed to a set of ideas which supported the Ottoman dynasty in its claims 
to legitimacy by manifestly glorifying the heroism made by the Ottoman gazi-warriors 
and their justice toward people. The gaza discourse and the idea of justice already existed 
when Ahmedî wrote his work. He reworked the predominant themes from the canonical 
Islamic literature.64 
In line with the tradition of Anatolian Turkish poetry, Ahmedî used the canonical 
sources of Islamic poetry as an inspiration for his narrative of early Ottoman history: the 
Qur’an, the Prophetic tradition, the already established Persian and Arabic literature on 
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the ‘virtues’ of gaza and the thirteenth-century Anatolian Turkish Gazavatname’s and 
Menakîbname’s.65 Ahmedî’s source has not been identified yet. It is possible that he copied 
and rewrote the chapter on the Ottoman history from an earlier work by an unknown 
author. His account was copied with little changes by the later historian Neşrî (see below).  
Ahmedî certainly portrayed the early Ottoman rulers as gazis and thus provided 
twentieth-century historians with material to assume that the raison d’être of the Ottoman 
state was ‘warfare against Christians’. Ahmedî presented the Ottoman sultans as gazi-
kings and defined the gazi as: ‘the servant of God’ (Tangrınun ferrâşıdur), ‘the sword of God’ 
(Hak kılıcıdur) and ‘the support and refuge of the people of religion’ (püşt ü penâh-ı ehl-i 
dîn).66 The influential Ottomanist, Paul Wittek used these verses of Ahmedî as his main 
textual evidence for the gaza-thesis, which I shall discuss extensively in the following 
chapter.67 Although warfare is only one aspect of state formation, Wittek initiated a 
controversial debate and claimed that the gaza – which he understood as continuous ‘holy 
war’ and proselytism against Christians – was the key ideological motive of the Ottoman 
state.68 Wittek described the Ottoman Turks as ‘fanatic warriors of Islam’ who ‘from their 
first appearance, warfare against their Christian neighbours was the principal factor in 
this political tradition, and this struggle never ceased to be of vital importance to the 
Ottoman Empire.’69  
However, Ahmedî’s portraying of the Ottoman rulers as gazi-sultans should be situated 
within the early fifteenth-century historical context. The use of the gazi-prestige as the 
dominant form of self-identification for the Ottoman dynasty in the fifteenth century was 
strongly related to an event that had changed the course of Ottoman history.70 In 1402, 
Sultan Bâyezid I was defeated by Timur Lenk (r. 1370-1405) – the powerful Turkish ruler 
from Central Asia.71 Most importantly, Bâyezid’s defeat in the hands of Timur created a 
crisis of legitimacy and a loss of prestige for the Ottoman dynasty. The post-Timurid 
period was a time during which the Ottomans expended their energies to restore their 
legitimacy.  
In Islamic historiography, such as the one developed by Ibn Khaldûn among others, 
there was a classical cyclical vision of the different phases of the state: genesis, apogee 
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and decline. The dervish-gazi audience, familiar with this cycle of a ‘triad of kings’, 
situated the Ottoman dynasty within the final phase of decline after Bâyezid’s defeat by 
Timur. Bâyezid was relegated to the category of a depraved and debouched ruler. In order 
to recover from the civil war and to reunite the territories, Ahmedî tried to show that the 
Ottoman dynasty was not declining as was suggested by critics from gazi and dervish 
circles.72 Recent discussions situated Ahmedî’s work within this ideological and political 
debate of the time to legitimise the weakened Ottoman sovereignty.73 His text devotedly 
and explicitly emphasised the gazi-identity of the Ottoman sultans in order to fulfill the 
Ottomans’ political need for legitimacy. Others suggested that Ahmedî’s narrative was not 
purely a chronicle, but a combination of various genres of history writing, nasihatname or 
mirrors-for-princes and epic literature.74 Ahmedî addressed his patron, Süleyman, the son 
of Bâyezid I, advising him to avoid conflicts with the Timurids, and to direct gaza-battles 
against the Christian kings in order to keep the Timurids off his back, and thereby to unite 
the confused princes of Bâyezid. His attitude towards the gaza-motive in his İskerdername 
was a source of identity and legitimacy for the dynasty against the looming Timurid 
threat and the gaza was a convenient vehicle to overcome disunity and internecine 
conflicts.  
1.5 The period of Murad II (r. 1421-1451)  
The period of Murad II represents the real formative period of the early Ottoman 
historical tradition. The first half of the fifteenth century was an active and brilliant age 
for literary compositions and historical texts. The restoration of the Ottoman state during 
the reign of Çelebi Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421) and the reinvigoration of the dynasty during 
the reign of his son Murad II resulted in the production of several historiographical texts. 
Sultan Murad II himself was a ruler who loved literature and music. Among the Ottoman 
sultans, he was the first who wrote poetry himself. He understood the lyrical art very well 
and also protected gifted artists. Moreover, he showed great interest in music and Islamic 
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sciences as well.75 As a generous sultan, he patronised scholars and artists, paid them 
special salaries and gave endowments (waqf) on various occasions. In short, Murad’s court 
was a stage open to artists and scholars, who came from different regions of Anatolia, 
Turkestan, Persia, Arabia and the Crimea. They performed their skills and carried 
scholarly discussions. According to the contemporary sources, Murad himself would 
sometimes select the topic of the debate among the scholars who gathered at his court.76   
 Murad II’s reign represented the production of not only historical texts but also of 
translations of various works on sciences and arts. With encouragement of Murad II, some 
important works of Islamic history were translated. About twenty-one texts in prose on 
various topics, most of which were translations, were presented to Murad II.77 Among 
these, the historical texts included the following: the work by the name Selçuknâme: 
Tevarih-i Al-i Selçuk (History of the House of Selçuk), which included the epic of Oğuz or 
Oğuznâme. The Turkish political tradition considered as central figure the mythical ruler 
Oğuz Khan, who was portrayed in the epic of Oğuznâme [Book of Oğuz] as a universal ruler 
who conquered the world together with his six sons.78 Oğuz Khan is a mythical personage.  
A group of Turkish nomadic communities identified themselves as descendants of Oğuz 
Khan and created various Oğuz genealogies. On request of Murad II, the epic of Oğuznâme 
was reproduced in the History of the House of Selçuk, written in 1436 by the Ottoman 
historian and scholar Yazıcı-zâde Ali.79 And in 1432, the translation of the Kâbusnâme, a 
Persian mirror-for-princes written by Keykâvus in 1082, was produced by Ahmed bin Ilyas 
and presented to Murad II.80  
Earlier, in 1421-1422, another Persian book of advice literature had been translated by 
the poet, Bedr-i Dilşâd, into Turkish. He dedicated his work to Sultan Murad II and called 
it Muradnâme.81 Based upon the Kâbusnâme, the book refers to the ideas of the ancient 
philosophers, Qur’anic verses and the traditions of the Prophet. The advice given in the 
Muradnâme is not very different from the advice literature of contemporary European 
literature. 
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Ottoman Civilization, vol. 2 (Ankara, 2009) 511.  
76 Halil İnalcık, ‘II. Murad’, Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8, 614. 
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78 For the oldest known version of the Oğuz-nâme, see: Zeki Velidi Togan, Oğuz Destanı. Reşideddin Oğuznâmesi, 
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80 Keykâvus, Kâbusnâme, ed. Orhan Ş. Gökyay (İstanbul, 2007). 
81 Bedr-i Dilşad’ın Murâd-nâmesi, 2 vols., ed. Âdem Ceyhan (İstanbul, 1997). 
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1.5.1 Royal Calendars or Takvims 
It was also during Murad’s reign that the Ottoman historical annals or lists (Tarihi 
Takvimler) were produced. Although these Takvims or Royal Calendars are very short 
texts, they constituted the bases for the early Ottoman chronicles because they contained 
historical data.82 They were composed for the palace and began with chronological lists 
of the prophets from Adam to Mohammed, of the caliphs and of the main events of the 
Seljuk, Ottoman and Karamanid states. The genre of Ottoman takvims belonged to an early 
branch of Islamic astronomy. Astrologers of the early centuries of Islam included in their 
works chronological lists on important political and natural events, such as earthquakes, 
astronomical phenomena, fires and pest. It appears that the Anatolian Turks were 
interested very early in this science of annalistic writing, as a basis to make predictions 
for the ruler. An original copy of a calendar, the Cetvel al-Ihtiyarat, written in Sivas in 1371, 
has been preserved. It contains a chronological list of the Seljuks and the Ilkhanids. The 
oldest Ottoman annals that survived, date from the years 1444 and 1446 and relied on 
earlier works. At the beginning of each year, a calendar was drawn up for the use of the 
sultan.83 The first entries in the sections on Ottoman history are very short, recording 
only the birth and accession of the sultans and their conquests. The entries for the first 
half of the fifteenth century are much more elaborate, containing several events and 
some very detailed. Major events in other Muslim states are included as well.84  
1.5.2 Anonymous Chronicles 
The core texts of the popular fifteenth-century ‘Anonymous Chronicles’, usually bearing 
the title Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân, were composed during the early reign of Murad II. There are 
about fifty manuscripts in European and Turkish libraries.85 The first versions relied on a 
common text, which was a collection of tales and historical data.86 The textual material 
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86 Ménage, ‘The Beginnings‘, 171. 
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was regarded as common property and each author or copyist felt himself free to change 
or elaborate as he wished.87 The later versions of the Anonymous Chronicles edited under 
Bâyezid II (1481-1512) are more complete texts than the earlier ones. They made use of 
the gazavatnames on the great campaigns such as the Battles of Varna in 1444 and Kosovo 
in 1448. In this study, I will use the recent critical edition of the Anonymous Chronicle, 
which is a compilation of the Giese edition and the manuscript in the Library of Topkapı 
Palace Museum.88 These Anonymous Chronicles are all related to each other and start 
with the migration of Süleyman Shah to Anatolia. Regarding the events of the reign of 
Murad II, they are composed in a series of short entries, very similar in style to the Royal 
Calendars. For example, the description of the Battle of Varna is rendered in a more 
detailed manner but thereafter it reverts to a concise annalistic record. The anonymous 
chronicles are composed in fifteenth-century popular Turkish and bear a resemblance to 
the genre and language of Aşık Paşazade, Oruç and Neşrî (see below).   
The versions of the Anonymous Chronicles, written in the 1480s, provide interesting 
information not mentioned in the chronicles of Neşrî and Aşık Paşazade. For instance, the 
anonymous texts mention that Gedik Ahmed Pasha, who had conquered the Italian city 
of Otranto, was called back to Istanbul when the succession struggle had started between 
Cem and Bayezid II, after the decease of their father Sultan Mehmed II in 1481.89 While 
Aşık Paşazade generally praises the former Byzantine general, Gedik Ahmed Pasha, for 
his brilliant military successes, he does not mention his execution by the order of Bâyezid 
II. In contrast, the anonymous chroniclers write that he was executed by Bayezid II during 
a ‘wine feast’ at the court in Edirne and lament his death by calling Gedik Ahmed a martyr 
or shehîd.90  
Moreover, the writers of the anonymous texts did not hide their criticism of the 
centralising policies of the dynasty and the statesmen. An obvious reason is that they 
belonged to the social group of the marginalised gazi circles and Turkish nobility who 
suffered from the imperial and fiscal policy of Mehmed II. By contrast, chroniclers such 
as Oruç, Tursun Beg and Neşrî belonged to urban officials and respectively were closer to 
the court as scribe, bureaucrat and scholar, who had expectations for their careers. In this 
respect, the anonymous chroniclers rather narrated the events in line with the horizon 
of expectation of the gazi milieu and Turkish nobility. They wrote in accordance with the 
 
                                                     
87 Ménage, ‘The Beginnings‘,173; Hasan H. Adalıoğlu, ‘OsmanlıTarih Yazıcılığında Anonim Tevarih-i Al-i Osman 
Geleneği’, Türkler vol. 11, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara, 2002) 286. 
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Paşa’yı şehîd eyledükden sonra..’ 
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tastes and values of their non-courtly audience and their knowledge of what was 
happening.  
The anonymous texts also seem to affirm the concerns and values of that gazi-audience 
about its society, its worldview and political life at the frontiers in the Balkan. For 
example, when accounting the conquest of the first Ottoman bases in Europe during the 
reign of Orhan Gazi (r. 1329-1362), they emphasised the gaza-spirit by narrating an 
alleged spoken testimony of Süleyman Pasha, the son of Orhan Gazi, who led the Ottoman 
forces in the Balkans. Therein, Süleyman addressed his gazi-followers directly and asked 
them to bury him there (Bolayir) after his death, in order to hold this newly seized place 
against Byzantine counter-attacks. He also demanded ‘to keep his corps out of the hands 
of the infidels.’91 Furthermore, the anonymous chroniclers accounted that the 
outnumbered Ottoman forces succeeded to fend off the Byzantine counter-attack, only 
after the charge of the mounted ‘grey horses’ (boz atlular), which symbolised and 
suggested the help of ‘heavenly forces’.92 This passage shows that the anonymous writers 
included folk-legends that were inspired on the genre of the fourteenth-century gazavat 
and menakıb works of ‘legendary-histories’, emphasising heroic and miraculous 
adventures of the gazis, who enjoyed heavenly support.  
In the historical tradition of the marginalised gazis of the fifteenth century, 
represented by the anonymous chronicles, things started to go wrong during  the reign 
of Murad I (r. 1362-1389) and continued to deteriorate under his son, Bâyezid I (r. 1389-
1402).93 The process of centralisation of state power, everything and everyone who, from 
the gazi perspective, embodied this process was criticised. The bluntest criticism was 
directed towards the alleged drunkenness and carelessness of Sultan Bâyezid I, having 
allegedly led to his defeat against Timur in Ankara (1402): ‘Until Vulkoğlu’s daughter 
[daughter of the Serbian king] came to him, Bâyezid Khan did not know what drinking 
wine and feasting was. He did not drink. In the time of Osman Gazi, wine was not drunk. 
At that time the sultans were humble and listened to the words of the ulema.’94 
Furthermore, Bâyezid I is criticised for not having consulted the statesmen during his 
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93 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 104-105. 
94 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 36: ‘Tâ Vılk-oglı kızı gelmeyince Bayezid Han sohbet ve işret neydügin bilmedi. Hiç 
şarab içmezdi. Osman Gazi zamanında şarab içmezlerdi. Anlar dahı ulemadan utanıp ne dirlerse sözlerinden 
çıkmazlardı .’  
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preparations to confront Timur Lenk. He is said to have fallen prey to his pride.95 After 
Bâyezid lost the battle and was taken prisoner by Timur, the anonymous chronicle gave 
an account of an imaginary conversation between Timur and Bâyezid. Timur says that 
they had both been given rulership by God but Bâyezid lost it because he did not know 
how to treasure it to its value.96 Bâyezid’s sultanate, which had taken sedentary 
bureaucratic forms and adopted Persian-Islamic principles of sovereignty, experienced 
great difficulties to maintain the loyalty of his gazi followers. The anonymous chronicler, 
who addressed the gazi audience, suggested that Bâyezid lost the battle because he failed 
to satisfy the needs of his followers, that he should have known better in order not to lose 
the divine support for his kingdom and to behave accordingly. The narratives of the 
anonymous chronicler, who was certainly no court historian, reflected the increasing 
tensions due to the antagonism between the Ottoman dynasty and the world of the 
egalitarian nomadic frontier society. The underlying sense of the waning of asabiyya 
(group solidarity) was apparent.   
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1.6 Chronicles from the period of Mehmed II (1451-1481) 
With his Behcetüt Tevarih or Splendor of Histories, the Ottoman ulema scholar and historian, 
Şükrullah, wrote the second oldest Ottoman historical tekst. It was composed in Persian 
between 1456 and 1458.97 Şükrullah was also a musical theorist and translated a treatise 
on music into Turkish on demand of Murad II.98 He wrote his universal history during the 
reign of Mehmed II, in retirement in Bursa and presented it to the grand vizier Mahmud 
Paşa. Şükrullah recorded a history of the world known to him in thirteen chapters. He not 
only narrated Islamic history but also paid attention to the histories of the Turks, China, 
India, Persia and Africa. Şükrullah also added a discussion of the Greek philosophers and 
the important thinkers of other religions. Finally, in the last chapter, he added a short 
history of the Ottomans. The Ottoman chapter contains a fairly full account up to the 
accession of Murad II and deals with the virtues and pious foundations of the sultans. As 
an example of Ottoman ‘high culture’ historiography, Şükrullah’s work enjoyed 
considerable prestige and remained a favourite source for sixteenth-century historians 
writing on universal and Ottoman history.99     
Another historical text from this period is the Düstûrname100, the chronicle of Enverî. 
Enverî wrote it in 1465 in dedication to Mahmud Paşa, the grand vizier of sultan Mehmed 
II.101 It is very likely that Enverî, like the other cultivated people of his time, had 
knowledge of Persian and Islamic literature, and that he was inspired by canonical works 
when writing his chronicle in Turkish. Düstûrname is composed according to the rules of 
a mesnevî. This chronicle consists of three distinct parts. The first part is the history of the 
prophets and of the Persian dynasties. The second part is a comprehensive narrative on 
Umur Paşa, the ruler of the Aydın-oğulları dynasty in Anatolia. Finally, in the third part, 
he briefly accounts the history of the Ottoman sultans until the reign of Mehmed the 
Conqueror. The account ends in 1464. The information on the first rulers is very brief. 
The deeds of emir Süleyman and the campaigns of sultan Mehmed II are elaborately 
described, according to reports of eyewitnesses of the campaigns in which he took part. 
Enverî’s account of Ottoman history constitutes a compilation from the chronicle of 
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Destân d’Umur Pacha (Düstûrname-i Enverî), (Paris, 1954). 
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Ahmedî and other unknown authors, popular tales and calendars. And because of its 
simple style, his chronicle tends to treat Ottoman history merely as a catalogue of events, 
names and dates.102 The historical texts of Ahmedî, Şükrullah and Enverî treat Ottoman 
history merely as an appendix to a world history. Their Ottoman histories are basically 
compilations from popular tales and calendars.  
Another very important early historical text is the work of Tursun Beg, who was a high-
ranking bureaucrat and familiar with the administrative issues of his days. He wrote an 
original work on the reign of Mehmed II the Conqueror in his Târîh-i Ebu’l-Feth or ‘the 
History of the Father of Conquest’.103 What is known about Ṭursun Beg derives mainly 
from the autobiographical references in his chronicle. He was probably born in Bursa in 
the 1420s, to an already prominent family of bureaucrats. Tursun Beg mentioned his uncle 
Cebe Ali Bey who had served as governor in Bursa, and his grandfather Firuz Beg in Iznik. 
He was, while relatively young, the holder of a timar, probably inherited from his father 
Ḥamza Beg.104 He retired sometime after 1480 and settled in Bursa, where he probably 
died after 1491. 
By virtue of his position as secretary of the Divan or chancellery, Tursun Beg was 
present when important decisions were made and witnessed important events first hand 
in the entourage of Sultan Mehmed II.105 He was also present at the conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453 and was subsequently employed as secretary on several survey 
tasks. Promoted to the office of scribe at state council (divan katibi) in 1461, he acquired a 
close knowledge of governmental affairs. Tursun also participated in the major 
campaigns of Mehmed II, especially those involving his principal patron, the grand vizier 
Maḥmud Paşa. As a specialist of the financial bureaucracy, Ṭursun may have risen to the 
post of defterdar (director of finances) of Anatolia.106 Tursun Beg’s work is based on his 
own personal observations. His chronicle is a detailed and panegyric history of the reign 
of Mehmed II, continuing up to ca. 1488 in the reign of Bayezid II, to whom the work was 
dedicated. Although rarely referred to by later Ottoman historians, Ṭursun Beg’s 
chronicle is significant, first as an insider’s account of events of the later fifteenth 
century. And secondly, for its theoretical preface on the nature of Ottoman political 
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thought. 107 He wrote his work in ornamented Turkish, containing a lot of Persian and 
Arabic terms and signalled the ornamented and mixed use of language of the later 
sixteenth-century historians.  
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1.7 Chronicles from the period of Bâyezid II (1481-1512) 
1.7.1 Aşık Paşazade (c. 1480s) 
Many of the general histories of the Ottoman dynasty were composed during Bâyezid II’s 
reign (1481-1512), in other words already after the consolidation of the Ottoman imperial 
central administration. At this period, various Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman or ‘Histories of the 
House of Osman’ were written as a result of the consciousness of having established a true 
empire. This was a new phase in Ottoman historiography, in which original historical 
texts flowered. Sultan Bâyezid II, the son of Mehmed the Conqueror, was probably keenly 
aware of a need to bolster his image as the most prestigious Muslim Sultan of his time and 
to provide the empire his father had founded with cultural and historiographical 
legitimacy. In the previous historical texts of Ahmedî and Şükrullah, which were 
conceived as world histories, Ottoman history only occupied a modest place as a story of 
gazis at the frontiers of the Islamic world. However, now Sultan Bâyezid II claimed to be 
the most distinguished and honored Muslim Sultan and he commissioned works which 
recorded the achievements of his ancestors. He was conscious of having established a 
Muslim Empire with a claim to universal rule, which was competing for supremacy with 
the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt. It was precisely at this period that the Ottomans had 
entered a long war against the Mamluks for the control of South Anatolia. This situation 
required a new outlook for the Ottoman historiography.      
The first coherent work as a history of the Ottoman dynasty is the chronicle of Aşık 
Paşazade (1400-1502).108 As a member of a famous Sufi family, Aşık Paşazade was born 
around 1400 in the village of Elvan Çelebi near Amasya, where he spent his youth among 
the dervishes in the Sufi ‘convent’ (tekke) of Elvan Çelebi.109 He lived through the entire 
century and reportedly died in 1502.110 His great-grandfather was the famous Turkish 
mystic poet Aşık Paşa (1272- 1333), the author of the Garibnâme, a prose work on tasavvuf 
(mysticism). Aşık Paşa belonged to a dervish family that had migrated from Khorasan to 
Anatolia in the thirteenth century.111 The pseudonym of the historian referred to his 
great-grandfather, Aşık Paşa. Because of the lack of any information on the life of Aşık 
Paşazade in the fifteenth and sixteenth-century sources, we can only get information on 
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his life from his own work. His real name was Ahmed, as he mentioned in his genealogy: 
‘Oh dervishes (aziz)! This fakir, Dervish Ahmed Aşıkî is the son of Sheikh Yahya, grandson 
of Sheikh Selman and the great grandson of the sultan of wisdom Aşık Paşa.’112 The word 
for dervish in Turkish at that time was aziz. The audience he wished to address were the 
dervishes from the Wafaiyya order. In one passage, he directly addressed the gazi-
dervishes, saying that his history was composed on the knowledge and sources that he 
personally observed or heard.113  
There is no indication that Aşık Paşazade received a higher education at a medrese or 
Islamic university. He was certainly educated at the Sufi convent of Elvan Çelebi 
according to the culture of dervishes. Aşık Paşazade noted that the members of his family 
were called Aşıkî by the Ottoman dynasty. They were all born and lived in the realm of 
the Ottoman sultans who always extended their favours to them.114 Throughout the reign 
of Murad II and in the early period of the reign of Mehmed II, Aşık Paşazade was active as 
a dervish and gazi-soldier. During his long and active life, he took part in all the 
campaigns of sultan Murad II and directly participated in raids with the gazi-leaders. He 
was well qualified to write down his memoirs or to collect first-hand accounts from his 
comrades-in-arms, especially concerning the fifteenth-century events. Aşık Paşazade 
wrote his history in Turkish in the final years of the fifteenth century towards the end of 
his life. In retirement in Istanbul and, not worrying about career considerations, he did 
not hide his views when criticising statesmen and generals. He noted that he begun to 
compose his history in 1484 at the age of eighty-six, when Bâyezid II started his campaign 
against Bogdan.115  
Aşık Paşazade’s History is stylistically straightforward and fluently composed in the 
popular Turkish language of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. It was meant to be read 
aloud and listened to by an audience of dervish-gazi circles in public meeting places. His 
work adhered to these cultural and linguistic conventions and genre, based in part on 
popular tales and historical facts. He mastered Persian and Arabic as well, as he used 
words from these languages in his poems. The first part of his History on the fourteenth 
century agrees with the common text of the Anonymous Chronicles. The menakıb of Yahşî 
Fakıh, which deals with the period from Osman Beg until the reign of Bayezid I and 
 
                                                     
112 I use the recent critical edition of Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Necdet Öztürk (İstanbul, 2013) 3. I have also checked 
it with the edition by Kemal Yavuz and Yekta Saraç, Aşık Paşazade Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (İstanbul, 2007). 
113 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 49: ‘Hey azizler! Vallahi bu menâkıbı kim fakir yazdum, cemî’isine ilmüm irişdi, 
andan yazdum. Siz sanmanuz kim güzafin yazdum.’ 
114 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 5: ‘Kim neseb ü neslüm bu âlile doğdu; Hem doğanumuz bu âli gördü; Nesl ü nesebüme Âl-
i Osman Âşıkî deyüb ederler ihsan.’ 
115 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 49: ‘Bu ömür seksen altı olduğında, Bayezid Han Boğdan’a agduğında menâkıb yazmağa 
defter çıkardum.’  
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continues until 1422, is mentioned by Aşık Paşazade as his source for this period. 
Unfortunately, Yahşî Fakıh’s text did not survive separately. Concerning the first century 
of Ottoman history, the text of Yahşî Fakıh seems to be the common source for both Aşık 
Paşazade and the Anonymous Chronicles. Yahşî Fakıh probably wrote his work during the 
reign of Mehmed I (1413-1421), after the civil war. He had been granted land by Mehmed 
I, whom he had probably supported in his struggle for the throne. Aşık Paşazade’s 
criticism on Süleyman and Çandarlı Ali Paşa apparently came from Yahşî Fakıh.116  
Aşık Paşazade, Neşrî and the Anonymous Chronicles each used their common source 
in their own way. Generally, Aşık Paşazade’s chronicle is more detailed, adding new 
information from oral sources and the menakibnames. However, the Anonymous 
Chronicles are more detailed in their criticism of Ottoman centralising policies. 
Furthermore, individual copies of these chronicles may be as important as different texts 
because their authors made revisions at various dates with additions or omissions. Aşık 
Paşazade also made such new revisions.117 He often added his personal observations and 
orally obtained pieces of information to his sources, which he says he summarised in his 
work. As his oral source to the capture of Bâyezid by Timur in the aftermath of the Battle 
of Ankara, Aşık Paşazade referred to Koca Naib, the janissary guard (solak) of Sultan 
Bayezid I.118 His source for the events of the Battle of Nicopolis (1396) was the oral 
testimony of Umur Beg, the son of marcher lord Kara Temürtaş, an Ottoman marcher lord 
who was present in the battle.119 According to Inalcik, the History of Aşık Paşazade and 
the Anonymous Chronicles contain two kinds of menakibname: the typical folk-tales, 
such as the dream narrative of Osman Bey, and real historical information in the 
gazavatname genre.120 These texts combined both genres to appeal to their intended 
audience, the dervish-gazis milieu. In any case, these texts give without doubt detailed 
and reliable historical information. 
Aşık Paşazade noted that he met Yahşî Fakıh in Gevye in 1413, on his way from the 
Elvan Çelebi convent (zaviye) to probably the Balkans. Aşık Paşazade fell ill at Gevye and 
stayed in the house of Yahşî Fakıh, the son of the imam of Orhan Bey. There, Yahşî Fakıh 
gave him his History, from which he ‘transmitted’ (nakl ederin) the events until the reign 
 
                                                     
116 İnalcık, ‘The Rise of Ottoman Historiography’, 152. 
117 Ibidem, 154; Ménage, ‘The Beginnings of Ottoman History’, 174-175. 
118 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 107: ‘Ey derviş! Sen hod o cengde bile degüldün. Ya bu mâcerâyı kimden nakl idersin? 
Bursa’nın bir nayibi varıdı, Koca Nayib dirleridi. Ve o Bayezid Han’un solaklarundan idi. […] Fakir kim andan 
nakl etdüm.’ 
119 Ibidem, 91. 
120 İnalcık, ‘The Rise of Ottoman historiography’, 157. 
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of Bâyezid I.121 The year 1413 was the final period of the civil war among the sons of 
Yıldırım Bâyezid Khan after the Battle of Ankara. At that point in the struggle for the 
Ottoman throne, Çelebi Mehmed I and his brother Musa were opposing each other. Aşık 
Paşazade probably travelled together with a group of dervishes from the convent of Elvan 
Çelebi to assist Mehmed I in his struggle. The convent of Elvan Çelebi was located in the 
region of Amasya, the seat of Çelebi Mehmed. In his final confrontation with his brother 
Musa, Çelebi Mehmed left Bursa in 1413, but Aşık Paşazade could not accompany him 
because of his illness. Mehmed was successful in gaining the support of the Turkish 
marcher lords and dervishes in the area. This seems to have been a decisive factor in his 
final victory over his brothers and Mehmed I gained the throne. In this region, the babai 
dervishes, to whom Aşık Paşazade belonged, must have had an important influence.122  
Autobiographical notes recur when Aşık Paşazade accounted the conflict between the 
young sultan Murad II and his uncle Mustafa at the Battle of Ulubat in 1422. In this crucial 
struggle against Mustafa, Murad II sought the support of the Sufi leaders of his time and 
obtained the blessings of Emir Sultan in Bursa. Murad also released the marcher lord 
Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Bey from the prison in Tokat. Earlier in 1413, after his victory against 
Musa, his father Çelebi Mehmed had put Mihal-oğlu Mehmed in prison. Mihal-oğlu had 
supported Musa as the leader of the marcher lords in the Balkans against Çelebi Mehmed. 
Aşık Paşazade notes that Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Bey, on his way from Tokat to Sultan 
Murad’s camp on the Ulubad river, visited the convent of Elvan Çelebi and took Aşık 
Paşazade with him to join Murad II.123 Aşık Paşazade’s detailed description of Yörgüç 
Paşa’s activities as governor of Amasya between 1422-1424 suggest that Aşık Paşazade had 
returned and lived in the convent of Elvan Çelebi.124 From 1422 until 1436, we have no 
further data of his biography. But we do know that in 1436, he went on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca and returned to live in Skopje under the patronage of the famous marcher lord, 
Yiğit-oğlu Ishak Bey. He writes that he participated in akın-raids in the Balkans together 
with the son of Ishak Bey: ‘When Ishak Bey returned from Mecca, Semendire had not yet 
been taken. At that time, I also returned from Mecca along with Ishak Bey. A messenger 
came to Ishak Bey from the sultan with the following order: Go up against Nigeobru and 
lay siege to it. […] Now, I had come with Ishak Bey to Üsküb and taken part in all sorts of 
 
                                                     
121 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 114: ‘Hünkar, devletilen Bursa’dan göçdü, yürüdü geldi, Yorusa kondu. Ol vakit duacı fakir 
Gevye’de kaldum, Orhan’un imamı oglu Yahşî Fakıh evinde hasta oldum. Menakıb-ı Al-i Osman’ı tâ Yildirim 
Han’a gelince ol imam oglundan nakl ederin.’  
122 İnalcık, ‘How to Read Ashik Pasha-Zade’s History,’ 32.  
123 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 129-130: ’Hapisden kim çıkardılar. Geldi, bizüm Elvan Çelebüm Tekyesine ugradı. Fakiri 
aldı, bile gitdi. Ulubat Köprüsünü Sultan Murad kesmişidi.’ 
124 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 147-154. 
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adventures. Once, I went on a raid together with Paşa Bey, the son of Ishak Bey, and Kılıccı 
Doğan.’125 
Aşık Paşazade recorded history according to the set of values and norms that his 
intended gazi-dervish audience expected to hear about. While he had depended on older 
written sources for relating the rise of the Ottoman state until the reign of Bâyezid I, much 
of his writing on the reign of Murad II (1421-1451) was actually derived from his own 
personal memory. In general, Âşık Paşazâde’s work was deeply influenced by the vibrant 
conflicts between the dervish-gazi circles and the bureaucratic elite of the centralising 
state. He was bitter when accounting Bâyezid’s conflict with Timur and his policy of 
centralisation and unification of the Turkish principalities. His work bears the marks of 
the great disappointment at the collapse of Bâyezid’s empire and was apparently 
influenced by Yahşi Fakih’s perception. The early chroniclers were at pains when 
justifying questionable conflicts with the fellow Muslim states in Anatolia, which posed a 
thorny problem. These writers felt the need to have a general outlook on their historical 
existence and at the same time sought a historical basis for their future claims.126 The soft 
and generous policies of Murad II are contrasted to the harsh centralising policies of 
Bayezid I and Mehmed II. The differences in the ideological programs of the early 
Ottoman historiography were related to the struggles among the two alternative and 
struggling groups within the Ottoman ruling elite: gazi-dervishes and the kapikulu 
officials of the central state. 
Victor Ménage provided a deeper understanding of the early Ottoman historiography 
by pointing out the fact that Aşık Paşazade belonged to these Turkish gazi dervish circles. 
He emphasised that Aşık Paşazade’s narrative was far from being the next court 
chronicle.127 Kafadar remarked that Aşık Paşazade’s History consistently reflected the 
worldview of the gazi-dervish milieu that was marginalised and to some extent in 
opposition to the Ottoman court and to the centralist policies upheld by statesmen, 
particularly after the conquest of Constantinople and the adoption of the imperial 
project.128 In 1470s, Sultan Mehmed II undertook to a drastic reform in landholding by 
putting all the mulk and waqf lands belonging to the Turkish aristocracy and the dervishes 
and sheikhs under state ownership. This drastic fiscal measure, which was meant to 
 
                                                     
125 Ibidem, 167: ‘Ishak Beg Mekke’den geldi. Henüz Semendire dahı alınamamışıdı. Fakir, Ishak Beg ile Mekke’den 
bile geldüm. Hünkârdan Ishak Beg’e kul geldi kim: Nigeobru’nun üzerine var, anı hisar et, didiler. […] Fakir dahi 
ol zamanda Üsküb’ e Ishak Beg ile Mekke’den bile gelmişdüm. Gâh gâh bu mâcerâlarda bile bulunurdum. Ve bir 
def’a dahi Ishak Beg’ün oğlı Paşa Beg ile ve Kılıccı Doğan ilen harâmîlıga bile gitmişdüm. [...] 
126 İnalcık, ‘The Rise of’, 155. 
127 Among his numerous contributions, the most pertinent is: Victor L. Ménage, Neshri’s History of the Ottomans: 
The Sources and Development of the Text (New York, 1964). 
128 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 100. 
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finance the imperial policies, led to resentment and confusion among the ruling elite and 
the people in general.129  
Aşık Paşazade also owned a considerable amount of property in Istanbul (in Unkapanı 
and Galata) and was exposed to the imperial fiscal measures of Sultan Mehmed II and his 
officials. The discontentment was also widespread among the sheikhs and dervishes who 
had lost their means of income and zaviye waqf for their convents. Aşık Paşazade certainly 
must have felt uneasy and discontent with Sultan Mehmed II’s centralist and fiscal 
policies. His bitterness has a lot in common with the one of the authors of the Anonymous 
Chronicles, who frequently criticised the Ottoman dynasty for depriving the Turkish 
aristocracy of their privileges, income and positions. For instance, when Rum Mehmed 
Paşa was appointed as vizier in 1465, Aşık Paşazade remarked in most suspicious words: 
‘Another Byzantine [Rum] has become vizier, know that thieves have entered this 
religion; the khan had called him a Muslim, but he searched for opportunities to display 
his hatred; since infidels became vizier, see with which poisonous tyranny they treated 
the Muslims. […] Rum Mehmed, who was revengeful, has displaced many Muslim families 
from their houses and lands in Larende and Konya […] Rum Mehmed had ended the 
continuation of some of the old traditions of the Ottoman state.’130  
Aşık Paşazade targeted another vizier, Nişancı Paşa, for the implementation of the ill-
reputed fiscal policy of confiscating waqf-donations: ‘His [Nişancı Paşa’s] origins are 
unclear. He reached his hands upon the properties, lives and decency of the people. Every 
illicit act was his invention. In the Ottoman realm, he disrupted the property rights of all 
the waqf donations and the mulk-lands that were bestowed according to the Islamic Law 
of the Sharia. He brought the profits [of this measure] in the treasury of the sultan. Once, 
I asked him: Why have you confiscated the property rights of the waqfs and other 
possessions, which are bestowed by the Law of the Prophet? How can you abolish the Law 
of the Prophet? He replied to me: What has been taken of you that you ask me such a 
question?’131  
 
                                                     
129 İnalcık, ‘How to Read Ashik Pasha-Zade’s’, 38-39. 
130 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 240, 242, 297: ‘Bir aceb Rum vezir oldu gene, Şöyle bil kim uğrı girdi bu dine; Adını mü’min 
komuşdı han anun, Fursatun gözlerdi gönülde kine; Bu vezir oldu kafirler gör nider, Ağu verür der Müsülmanı 
kına. [...] El hasıl-ı kelâm, Lârende’den ve Konya’dan ziyâde ev almakdan murâdı ehl-i İslâm’un evlerin 
yıkdurmagıdı. Rum Mehmed pâdişah emrinden dahi ziyade evler sürdü. [...]Âl-i Osman kapusunda, tâ ol vezir 
oluncaya değin teşrifün ba’zısın o kesdürdi.’ 
131 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Necdet Öztürk, 298; and Aşık Paşazâde, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, ed. Kemal Yavuz & Yakta 
Saraç (Istanbul, 2007) 479: ‘Âsâr-ı Nişancı Paşa: Kim ol nesl-i bühtandur. Allah’un kullarınun malına ve kanına ve 
ırzına tama’ itmişidi. Ve her kanda kim mühmel işler varısa anun ihdâsıdur. Ve vilâyet-i Osman’da ne kadar şer’i 
Muhammed’ilen olmuş vakıflar ve mülkler varısa cemî’sini bozdu. Hasıllarını padişahun hazînesine getürdi. 
Fakir sü’al itdüm: Şer’i Muhammed-ile olan vakıflar ve mülkler neden mensûh oldı? Hazret-i Muhammed 
Resûlullah kim hâtemü’l-enbiyâdur, didüm. Bir peygamber dahı gelmedi anun şer’ini mensûh ide, didüm. Fakire 
cevâb virdi kim: Senüñ neñ aldılar kim bunuñ gibi sü’âl idersün, didi.’ 
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In his chronicle Aşık Paşazade expressed the historical consciousness and ideals of the 
Muslim Turkish gazi aristocracy and its followers, with whom he strongly identified. The 
chronicle of Aşık Paşazade is thus one of the contemporary sources that expressed in their 
narrative style and perception the popular Turkish dervish-gazi milieu. The tendentious 
presentation of the Ottoman history in the chronicles resulted from the fact that they 
were produced for different audiences. Aşık Paşazade expressed the historical 
consciousness of the gazi-dervish milieu that was aware of its marginalisation and 
consequently felt alienated from the centralising Ottoman dynasty and its officials. This 
was a historiography full of bitterness and nostalgia for the good old days of more 
egalitarian relations and the sharing of power during the reigns of Osman and Orhan. The 
bitterness stemmed from deep feelings of loosening ties within a socio-political group of 
Turkish aristocracy, which had helped the House of Osman to build a state and had 
received in return the severe fiscal policies of Sultan Mehmed II. Precisely at a crucial 
point in the formation of Ottoman historical tradition, Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) 
was trying to soften his father’s severe policies. Aşık Paşazade praised Sultan Bayezid II 
for putting an end to the illegal dispositions introduced by Nişancı Paşa and Rum Mehmed 
Paşa; for returning hundreds of waqf and mulk lands and villages to their former owners; 
for re-establishing the justice and the Ottoman law and order [kânun-ı Osmanî] by 
restoring the means of livelihood of his people [sheikhs, dervishes and Turkish 
aristocracy].132   
The dervish-historian Aşık Paşazade appears to be discontent with Sultan Mehmed II’s 
fiscal policy of centralisation and the costs of rebuilding Istanbul as the new Ottoman 
capital. The payment of this imperial project also affected Aşık Paşazade’s life. This is the 
reason for his idealised egalitarian description of the reign of Osman Bey, in which he also 
tried to demonstrate how the Wafa’i sheikh Ede Bali and his own family played a crucial 
role in the establishment and rise of the Ottoman state.133 He intended to criticise his own 
period by presenting the first Ottoman ruler, Osman, as an ideal ruler. He emphasised the 
respect shown by the first rulers for the dervishes by generously granting them lands as 
livelihood. This indirectly meant a denunciation of the centralising policies of Sultans 
Bâyezid I and Mehmed II, who abolished the property rights on waqf (donation) lands.  
  
 
                                                     
132 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 292-293: ‘Ve hem vilyetinde adl ü dâd, bedl ü ihsan ve kerem memlû olundu. Ve hem ol 
Rum vezir bozduğu teşrifleri girü evvelki kanun-ı Osmânî üzerine mukarrer etdi. Ve ol nesli bühtan vezir kim 
vakıfları ve mülkleri kim bozmuşidi. Gine sâhiblerine mukarrer itdi.’ 
133 A detailed analysis of this feature is made by İnalcık, ‘How to Read Ashik Pasha-Zade’s History,’ 39-48.  
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1.7.2 Neşrî (c. 1490s) 
Shortly after Aşık Paşazade, Mevlânâ Mehmed Neşrî wrote his chronicle. There is no other 
information on the author himself to be found in his work. The only autobiographical 
note consists in the mentioning of his pseudonym, Neşrî.134 Whereas Aşık Paşazade was a 
dervish-historian, Neşrî belonged to men of high learning or the ulema. Not much is 
known of his life. He is said to have been educated at the medrese and worked in Bursa.135 
It is certain that he was present in the Ottoman army camp when Mehmed II died in 1481. 
Neşrî wrote that he was sleeping near the tent of the ‘master-assayer’ (sâhib-ayâr), who 
woke him with the news that the dignitaries had all struck up camp and gone. In panick, 
he went back to Istanbul, where he witnessed the riots of the janissaries after the decease 
of Sultan Mehmed II.136  
We have no certain indication for Neşrî’s date of birth and death. It has been suggested 
that Neşrî must already have been an educated young man as early as the reign of Murad 
II (1421-1451). One is Koca Naib, the former janissary guard (solak) of Bayezid I, who was 
the naib of Bursa early in Murad’s reign. However, there is no evidence that Neşrî has 
known him personally, for he took this reference to Koca Naib from his main source, 
Aşıkpaşazade’s History. Neşrî wrote that he had been interested all his life in the science 
of history, which suggests that he had already reached a mature age when he wrote his 
chronicle.137 The sixteenth-century biography writer, Latifi, noted that Neşrî came from 
the principality of Karaman and died during the reign of Selim I (1512-1520). We are thus 
left with little information on Neşrî. He was certainly a scholar of the ulema and was 
writing in the early years of the reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512). The very few references 
to him show that Neşrî lived a quiet life and enjoyed little personal fame, but his work 
lasted.138 
Of Neşrî’s World History or Cihân-nümâ, only the sixth book has survived. Not a single 
manuscript of the first five sections has come down to us.139 Neşrî dedicated this last book 
 
                                                     
134 Ibidem, 391: ‘Dergehinde Neşrî’yâ her müşkilün âsândur.’ 
135 Ménage, Neshrî’s History of the Ottomans, 2. 
136 In this study, I will use the following critical edition: Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, ed. Necdet Öztürk (İstanbul, 2008) 369: 
‘Bî-çâre ol seferde bileydüm. Sâhib-ayâr çadırına yakınduk. Sâhib-ayâr dün yarusında gelüp, kemîneyi uyarup, 
eyitdi: ‘Turuñ, atıñuz eyerlen’. Gördük, paşalaruñ ve kadı-askerlerüñ çadırları yirinde yiller eser. Cân başumuza 
sıçrayup, bir halvet yoldan azm-i Üsküder kıldık. [...] Yeñiçeriler aç kurt koyuna nice koyulursa, İstanbul’a şöyle 
koyuldular.’  
137 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 5: ‘Pes bu ma’ânî-i zahireyi tezekkür idüp, tûl-i ömrümde ben dahi sevdâ itdüm ki, alâ-
kadri’t-tâkati’l-beşeriyyet ilm-i târîhden Türkî dilde bir kitab cem’ idem.’ 
138 Ménage, Neshrî’s History of the Ottomans, 4-5. 
139 Paul Wittek, ‘Zum Quellenproblem der ältesten osmanischen Chroniken (mit Auszügen aus Nesri)’, 
Metteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte 1 (1921): 77-150; Franz Taescher, Mz (Einleitung Codex Manzel), 1-9; ibid, 
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to Ottoman history until the early reign of Bayezid II. His chronicle is divided into three 
sections: one on the descendants of the Oğuz tribe, one on the Seljuks and one on the 
Ottomans. The oldest manuscript which has survived dates from 1493. He is considered a 
great historian who influenced the later chronicle writers. Neşrî basically presented a 
similar style of narrative on the history of the fourteenth century as Aşık Paşazade, which 
suggests that they used the same sources. He did not claim that he was a witness of any 
of the events that he described.140 
At the start of his Cihân-nümâ, Neşrî describes how he decided to compose his History. 
He found that while for other sciences many adequate and exhaustive works had been 
produced, the existing historical works in Turkish were dispersed and not assembled 
together, and, moreover, they were sometimes lacking in agreement and not correctly 
arranged. So, he composed a history of the whole world, from the creation down to his 
own day, which he called Kitâb-ı Cihân-nümâ or ‘the Book of Cosmorama’.141 The 
ornamented style and vocabulary of the introduction to his work suggest that he 
mastered the classical languages of Arabic and Persian as well the historical works in 
these languages. Neşrî probably composed his work as a Universal History after the 
models of classical Arabic and Persian works. His chronicle was perhaps the first of this 
genre to be written in fifteenth-century Anatolian Turkish.142  
The first chapter is a summary account of the ancestors and descendants of the Turkish 
mythic ruler, Oğuz Han, and of the Karahanid state. The second is an equally short history 
of the Great Seljuk Empire and the emergence of the Rum Seljuk Sultanate of Anatolia 
until the Mongol invasions. He includes a history of the Karaman beylik in the fourteenth 
century. In the following chapters, which form the majority of the text, Neşrî accountes 
the history of the Ottoman dynasty from its beginnings until the first years of the reign 
of Bayezid II, the latest date being 1485.    
Although Neşrî nowhere refers to a written source, it has been demonstrated that he 
blended three clusters of historical sources.143 The first is a group of sources of which Aşık 
Paşazade’s text is a major representative; the second comprises what can be called ‘court 
 
                                                     
‘Eine Ausgabe von Neschri’s altosmanischer Chronik’, Der Islam, XXIV (1949): 307-317; ibid, ‘Neşrî Tarihi 
Elyazıları üzerine Araştırmalar’, Belleten 15 (1951): 497-505;  Faik R. Unat, ‘Müverrih Mehmet Neşri’nin Eseri ve 
Hayatı Hakkında’, Belleten 21 (1957) 297-300; V.L. Ménage, Neshrî’s History of the Ottomans. The Sources and 
Development of the Text (New York, 1964) 2-83; ibid, ‘The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography’, 175-179; İnalcık, 
‘The Rise of Ottoman Historiography’, 152-165. 
140 Ménage, ‘The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography’, 175. 
141 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ,  5: ‘Zirâ gördüm ki, sâyir ulûmda musannifât-ı kesîre tasnîf ve te’lîf olunmış ki, her biri şâfi 
vü kâfî; amma ilm-i tevârihde olan kitâblar müteferrik ve gayr-i müctemi’ buldum. Ve hiç bir târîh dahı 
mevkı’inde vaki’ olmamış, husûsan Türkî lisânda. Pes ibtidâ-yı âlemden, nakl müsâ’ede itdükce, ilâ-yevminâ 
hâzâ tesvîd idüp, cemî’i âleme vukuf virdügiçün işbu kitâba, Kitâb-ı Cihân-nümâ diyü ad virdüm.’ 
142 Ménage, Neshrî’s History of the Ottomans, 7. 
143 Ménage, ‘The Beginnings’, 175. 
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histories’: most notably those of Ahmedî and Şükrüllah; the third includes annalistic 
calendars.  
His main source for the Ottoman history was the work of Aşık Paşazade, which he 
followed chapter by chapter with a very close verbal correspondence. Here and there, he 
modified a word or a phrase; Aşık Paşazade’s poems were omitted or paraphrased into 
prose and all the autobiographical references were left out. However, the vigor and 
directness of Aşık Paşazade’s narrative was untouched. The most remarkable redaction 
that Neşrî made, was when he softened Aşık Paşazade’s criticism of the statesmen. As an 
ulema-historian, the intended audience of Neşrî was the sedentary and highly educated 
Ottoman public and he sought the patronage of Bayezid II. He was rather inclined to 
follow the official historical narrative that was endorsed by the Ottoman court. As a 
member of the ulema seeking patronage, Neşrî’s work was written for the learned circles 
in general.  
Relying on Wittek’s work, Kafadar pointed this out by comparing Aşık Paşazade’s and 
Neşrî’s representations of the conquest of Aydos Castle.144 At first glance the accounts 
appear so similar that it may seem that Neşrî reformulated Aşık Paşazade’s account. 
However, Neşrî, whose audience consisted mainly of ulema scholars, displayed in his 
narrative an indifference to the gazi-warrior traditions that are vividly expressed by Aşık 
Paşazade. Kafadar concludes: ‘although Aşık Paşazade was transmitting a tradition he had 
obtained from another source, he was able to capture the mentality of his source while 
Neşrî was not. This difference occurred, not because he was closer in time to the events 
than Neşrî, who wrote only a decade after Aşık Paşazade, but clearly because they were 
from two different social worlds.’145  
Another source used by Neşrî is the set of Royal Calendars or Takvims.146 His third 
source was the text of the Anonymous Chronicles, from which he drew extensively to 
supplement the account of Aşık Paşazade. Neşrî completely rearranged Aşık Paşazade’s 
narrative on the reign of Bayezid I to accord it with the chronology of the events and he 
reconciled the divergent chronologies of these three sources. However, İnalcık remarked 
that the calendars and the Anonymous Chronicles are far more chronologically exact 
than the later compilation of Neşrî.147 Neşrî tried to unite the different groups of sources 
by selecting the account of an event from one of these sources and arranging his selection 
chronologically, without making any striking changes in the account itself. Menage’s 
source criticism of Neşrî’s text suggests that while these clusters have common features, 
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they have kept their distinct identity at the same time.148 It seems that Neşrî used a text 
which had copied Ahmedi’s source more faithfully than Ahmedî himself and continued 
until the end of the reign of Mehmed I (1413-1421). Neşrî made two long additions to these 
sources, one about Murad II’s expedition against the Karaman beylik and the Battle of 
Kosovo (1448); the other concerning Mehmed I’s struggle for the throne against his 
brothers. Neşrî’s work is the oldest compilation that sought to combine the various 
traditions from the Anonymous Chronicles and Aşık Paşazade.149  
The historical works written during the reign of Bayezid II were very important for 
Ottoman historiography. It was these compilations that formed the basis of all the 
historical texts written later in the sixteenth century on the first centuries of Ottoman 
history. The chronicles of Aşık Paşazade and Neşrî were respected as sources by later 
sixteenth-century historians such as Kemal Paşazade (1458-1534) and Hoca Sa’adeddin 
(1537–1599). But the latter disliked their tone of popular storytelling and their 
unsophisticated use of language. Kemal Paşazâde, rising to be Şeyh-ül-Islam under 
Suleyman the Magnificent, would introduce an entirely new outlook on Ottoman 
historiography with his approach.150 He endeavoured to present a more historically 
analytical and linguistically elegant history of the dynasty than his predecessors. His 
account shows the attitude of a statesman trying to see a pattern in events and looking 
for guidance in policy.151 Kemal Paşazade apparently used a detailed copy of Neşrî, but 
also relied on other sources such as Oruç and Tursun Bey. He added many important 
details from his personal knowledge as well as from his contacts with informants.152 The 
language of Kemal Pasazade’s History is sixteenth-century Turkish, developed at the 
court as a hybrid compilation of Anatolian Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Its inherent 
complexity required far-reaching education to attain any degree of fluency. When the 
ornamentation is stripped off, the basic narrative of the fifteenth-century events is based 
on the works of Aşık Paşazade and Neşrî.   
1.7.3 Oruç Beg (c. 1502) 
One of the other Ottoman prose chronicles is the Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân (History of the House 
of Osman) written by Oruç Beg.153 Oruç was the son of a silk merchant and was born in 
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Edirne, where he worked as a scribe (katip). Unfortunately, there is no information about 
the life of Oruç Beg in Ottoman biographical works. He was probably born in the second 
half of the fifteenth century and belonged to the urban intellectual social group. He wrote 
his work in Turkish, but his use of language shows that he also mastered Arabic and 
Persian and had received a high education.154 In his work, he introduced himself as ‘Oruç, 
the son of Âdil the silk merchant, scribe in Edirne’ or ‘Oruç bin Âdil el-kazzâz kâtibü’l-
Edrenevî’.155 There is no other information on him. Franz Babinger speculated that his 
family had moved from Bursa to Edirne.156 Beldiceanu-Steinherr found information on the 
economic situation of Oruç Beg in a waqf-record from Edirne. This waqf-record, dating 
from 1499-1500, states that Oruç established a waqf (donated property) to the value of 
4.000 akçes (Ottoman monetary unit) and its annual income amounted to 1.848 akçes. The 
income was distributed among the students of the medrese-college, the imams and 
concierges serving at the waqf and to the management of the waqf itself. It also mentions 
Oruç as one of the executive directors of this waqf.157 
Oruç wrote a comprehensive history of the Ottoman dynasty from its beginnings until 
the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481). He probably wrote this first version (Oxford and 
Cambridge manuscripts) during the reign of Mehmed II, as the account ends in 1467-1468. 
Oruç Beg re-edited a second version of his text (the Manisa and Paris manuscripts) with 
more detailed information, which concludes with the events of 1502, during the early 
reign of Sultan Bâyezid II.158 In his own fashion, he used the common source of Yahşî Fakıh 
describing the events from the political rise of Osman Gazi up to 1413. Oruç openly refers 
to the text of Aşık Paşazade as one of his sources that he made use of.159 He noted that 
Aşık Paşazade’s source for the period until 1413 was the text (menâkib) of Yahşî Fakıh and 
that he transmitted the events of this period from this source. In some passages, Oruç 
provided a fuller treatment of his common source than Aşık Paşazade. He also added new 
information from various sources to the original source of Yahşî Fakıh, such as oral 
testimonies and menakıbnames. Individual copies of all these historical texts may be as 
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important as different texts, because their authors made revisions at various dates by 
adding or omitting information.160  
In the manuscripts that represent the second version of his chronicle, dating from 
1502, Oruç mentioned his colleague Aşık Paşazade: ‘If one would ask me how I knew these 
events and from where I collected them, I can refer to the eyewitness [account] of a 
dervish who lives now in the City of Kostantin [İstanbul]. He is called Dervîş Ahmed Âşıkî, 
a wise man of hundred years old. […] He has collected these events. However, his source 
was the son of the imam of Orhan Gazi, Bahşı Fakı, who lived until the reign of Sultan 
Mehemmed, the father of Sultan Murad.’161   
Regarding the period after 1422, Oruç depended on various sources. The Anonymous 
Chronicles and Oruç basically follow a common source from 1422 until 1484. Their 
common sources for this period appear to be the Royal Calendars or Takvims. In contrast 
to the writers of the Anonymous Chronicles, Oruç copied the calendars fairly well. The 
authors of the Royal Calendars or Takvims must have used a historical text for the first 
Ottoman rulers, since it is unlikely that any Ottoman calendar was written in the early 
fourteenth century. The calendars also give very brief information until the last years of 
the reign of Sultan Murad I (r. 1365-1389). Important contemporary events, such as the 
battle of Varna, are related more in detail in the calendars. Oruç’s account of this battle 
is even much more elaborate than the calendars. Apparently, Oruç and the Anonymous 
Chroniclers made use of the existing gazavatnames for the great events. In the 
chronological listing of the events, Oruç’s text is far more systematic than the compilation 
of Neşrî.162    
Relying on this corpus of early historical texts, I will explore the ‘ideological’ discourse 
of their narratives. By situating their discourses in the larger political and cultural 
framework, I will explore the ‘ideological’ values and representations of the Ottoman 
world-view as they were expressed by these chronicles. As a general historical 
background to what follows, the next chapter will provide a discussion of the Ottoman 
state formation process and the establishment of institutions.  
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Chapter 2 Patterns of State Formation in the 
Early Ottoman Empire, c. 1300-1453 
2.1 The world of the steppe 
To genuinely understand and to explain the genesis of a state ideology within the 
Ottoman polity as it is reflected in the earliest chronicles, a structural and elaborate 
overview of the state formation processes at work is a necessary precondition. In what 
follows I will try to suggest a synthesis of what has been written on this topic but with 
clear points of personal emphasis. Explaining several of these factors in some detail is 
necessary for a further understanding of the ideological discourses that will be under 
scrutiny in the next chapter.  
The Ottoman state emerged after the massive migration of the Turkish nomads into 
Anatolia in the thirteenth century. The stereotypical historical image of the nomad is a 
plundering barbarian motivated only by a desire for booty and slaves. As Fernand Braudel 
noted: ‘when civilizations are defeated or seem to be defeated, the conqueror is always a 
‘barbarian’. It is a figure of speech.’1 But then again, Braudel also referred to the nomads 
as: ‘the real dangers to civilization (…) a poor section of humanity (…) In short, they 
represent an exceptional case of a long parasitical existence that came to an end once and 
for all.’2 This image obviously rather reflects the sedentary cultural biases than the 
historical realities. For a better understanding of the early Ottoman state formation, 
which was a very complex and multi-layered historical phenomenon, we must first look 
briefly at the social and political developments in the steppe.  
The pre-Ottoman historical trajectory of the Turkish peoples was in a sense a struggle 
to assert their own identity, a process marked by cultural appropriations and political 
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reorientations. The term ‘Turks’ tends to refer to a homogenous community in Central 
Asia, which shared the same culture and religion. However, such a view is incompatible 
with the historical facts. The nomadic Turkish communities in the steppe constituted a 
group of people who shared their languages and some aspects of lifestyle, but who were 
also very diverse among themselves.3 Instead of assuming an ethnically ‘pure’ essence, I 
depart from the idea of a multi-ethnic and ‘multicultural’ steppe milieu, as there was a 
continuous ethnical and cultural exchange among the nomadic communities and with 
the neighbouring sedentary communities.4 
In the pre-modern era, the steppes of Central Asia served as one of the major 
crossroads of civilisation. Over time, various Turkish communities had undergone 
profound transformations as they migrated alongside sedentary cultures. During these 
migrations new communities were formed and old ones disintegrated, but they also 
projected their identity while some elements necessarily shifted. Many outsiders 
depicted them as not enough civilised or simply barbarians, because of their nomadic 
lifestyle and martial skills. But as the historical trajectory of the Turks progressed, they 
fused with and transformed the sedentary-agrarian societies they encountered. The 
Turks were the transporters and caravaners par excellence on the Silk Route from China to 
Byzantium. They interconnected with the neighbouring societies and often integrated 
with them. The dialectical interaction between the pastoral nomadic and sedentary-
agrarian societies was a multi-layered process, which in some ways echoed Ibn Khaldûn’s 
conception of the historical change in the pre-modern times.  
The Turkish communities in the Central Asian steppe were pastoral nomads whose 
basic economic activity was livestock production, carried out through the seasonal 
movement of animals. Pastoral nomadism, like sea navigation, was a dangerous trade. To 
make a living on the steppe as a pastoralist was a tour de force. Just like the sea, the steppe 
is a hostile natural environment. The nomad could not stay in one place for too long. 
Unless he kept moving, he would perish. The steppe provided grazing for domesticated 
animals on condition that the nomad kept moving them from one seasonal (winter and 
summer) pasture ground to another. This required skilled and masterful leadership and 
a disciplined execution of the commands of the leader. The nomad was in a permanent 
state of battle with the harsh steppe conditions, which trained their alertness and 
discipline as required in the war with an enemy. Many sedentary armies could not 
withstand the nomad armies that mastered highly advanced archery skills on the 
composite bow and high skills of horsemanship.    
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Nomadic life was harsh to those who could not maintain the minimum herd necessary 
for survival (usually 60-100 sheep, mutton, horses, cattle, goats and camels). Pastoral 
nomadism, supplemented with hunting and limited farming, allowed for little surplus, 
which was often exchanged with neighbouring communities. This economic basis left 
limited margins for the formation of any group that was not involved in production. 
Social cohesion was necessary for survival, for economic production and for migration. 
Social stratification entailed the existence of two social classes, the commoners and the 
aristocracy. But all in all, this seems to have been a relatively egalitarian set of relations, 
as even the members of aristocracy were often engaged in direct production. However, 
pastoral nomadism could not generate the great quantity and variety of foodstuffs to 
support as large a population as sedentary-agrarian economies did. There was a constant 
need for interaction with agricultural economies. The nomad’s diet essentially consisted 
of two basic elements: meat and milk products, with a supplement of vegetables. A 
disturbance in the pastoral environment, such as drought, overgrazing or epidemics 
could threaten the survival of the necessary size of herds to sustain the people. These 
difficulties could cause disturbing economic and social crises, leading to unmanageable 
conflicts among tribes; or entire tribes could mobilise for large-scale migration in search 
of new pasturelands and conquests.5  
Of course, economic need did not necessarily lead to political unity. The mobility of 
nomad communities gave its members freedom of residence and to some degree also 
freedom of political alliance. The dissatisfied and displeased could leave and attach 
themselves to a new leader. This permitted great flexibility; nomadic groups could easily 
regroup and re-unite. Statehood was not a necessary condition for a traditional nomad 
society.6 The nomads who were unable to find relatives willing or capable to help them, 
hired themselves as herders or were forced to settle into sedentary life. The more daring 
ones united into bands that raided nomad and sedentary communities alike. The 
breakdown of tribal bonds allowed for a greater degree of social mobility. Leadership 
ability counted more than birth or noble lineage. As in the Ottoman case, successful 
leaders could prove themselves and emerge at these times. These processes became 
catalysts for new political and social organisations.7 
Those Who Draw the Bow - the Nomad as Empire-Builder  
The nomad and sedentary interaction stretched over a broad spectrum of relationships, 
peaceful and hostile, depending on the political and economic needs of the two societies 
at a given period. In the fields ranging from state formation, army organisation, trade and 
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belief traditions, nomad and sedentary worlds tended to acculturate and to form original 
socio-political innovations. Conflicts with sedentary societies arose largely from access to 
the goods of agrarian and urban productions. It is often thought that nomads traded or 
raided for these goods and that the military strength of both parties determined the 
outcome.8 For instance, China often chose the prospect of trade as a means of control.9 
Such interactions or conflicts over agricultural and urban goods seem to have provided 
the impetus for nomadic state formation. However, some considerations review the 
validity of the thesis that Central Asian nomadic Empires were created merely for the 
purpose of forcing the farmers, by the sheer power of military force and threat, to 
surrender products the nomads needed or desired, such as cereals or luxury goods. 
Although the nomad’s need for agricultural goods might have resulted in a process of 
state formation, this was in some cases not the main factor. Archaeological findings show 
that some degree of farming was practised among nomads. The pastoral nomads 
consumption of cereals was minimal, for their main diet was based on meat, milk products 
and vegetables.10 Historical sources indicate that nomadic raiding of sedentary 
communities did often not arise out of the need to agricultural products; they usually 
took away animals and people as booty.11 The frontier zone was an area in which local 
economies and cultures were neither purely nomadic nor purely sedentary, but a 
combination of both.12 
The proto-Turkish nomads entered the history records, when by the late fourth 
century B.C.E the Chinese chroniclers mentioned the Central-Asian nomad groups, who 
then formed the Hsiung-nu Empire.13 This earliest nomadic empire was probably a poly-
ethnic confederation of tribes who were united more by common interests than by shared 
descent. It has been argued that the ruling elite might have had a Turkish origin, but this 
is still the subject of scholarly debate. Scholars have also suggested that the Huns, who 
have ties with the later Turks and Mongols, were an extension of the Hsiung-nu.14 In an 
important contribution on the nomadic steppe state formation that left its mark on 
Chinese culture, Thomas Barfield correlated the emergence of the Hsiung-nu empire as a 
reaction to the powerful rule in China, which had invaded into nomad’s territory.15 He 
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suggested that the nomads developed their state in response to expansions of a powerful 
sedentary state. Barfield argued that the political unification of the nomads was 
necessitated by the unequal power relation imposed by the emergence of a strong 
sedentary state in China, against which the small and dispersed communities of pastoral 
nomads were powerless. This forced them to organise themselves into one larger political 
entity.16  
Scholars have long argued that crises of various kinds led to the formation of steppe-
empires. Concerning the unification of the nomad tribes within the Hsiung-nu Empire, 
their state formation, however, cannot be explained by simply presenting it as a case of 
chronic aggressive behaviour.17 Recent approaches pointed out that the formation of the 
Hsiung-nu empire was not only related to the power relations with China. Its emergence 
was also stimulated by a social and economic crisis in the steppe that served as the 
catalyst for a new political organisation. Nicola Di Cosmo conceptualised the Central 
Asian nomadic state formation in terms of crisis, militarisation and centralisation. The 
initial momentum for nomadic state building came from an internal challenge to the 
present leadership at a time of economic and social crisis, followed by general chaos. 
Eventually, under a successful military leader, a process of power centralisation occurred 
that would lay the foundations for a state.18 We shall see that the theses of Barfield and Di 
Cosma on nomadic state formation provide the useful conceptual tools and background 
for the emergence of the Ottoman principality.  
2.2 The Kök Türk Empire 
From a broad perspective, the thirteenth-century Muslim Turkish states in Anatolia, such 
as the Ottomans, drew upon the influences of the political traditions that rooted in the 
pre-Islamic kaghanates or steppe-empires in Central Asia.19 Although there is earlier 
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evidence of Turkish polities in Chinese sources, the first Turkish state, the Kök Türk 
kağanate was founded around 552 by İstemi and Bumin on the Orhun river in Central 
Asia.20 The Kök Türks were in fact the first tribal nomad confederation who used the name 
‘Turk’ as a political name. Their successor states were the Uygurs (744-840) and the 
Khazars (630-965).21 The most important source for the Kök Türk period are the Orhun 
inscriptions from the eight century, carved on stone pillars near the Orhun river. The 
stone pillars are engraved with the old Turkish script, also known as Kök Türk or Orhun 
script, which is the alphabet used by the Kök Türks and other early Turkish empires to 
record the old Turkish language.22  
It was the first and only script that the Turks had created; after their conversion to 
Islam, they adopted the Arabic script. The Orhun Inscriptions, which are among the 
earliest products of Turkish intellectual history, reflect the self-awareness of these 
‘proto-Turks’, describing the lifestyle of their nomadic community, state form, cultic 
practices and belief systems.23  
Particularly, the political significance of the Kök Türk Empire was great. Its political 
system established norms for Turkish states for centuries.24 It was developed in the 
steppes of Central Asia and passed through the Oğuz communities into the Seljuk and 
Ottoman statecraft. Within the nomadic political constellation, at the top, the Kaghan 
(king) ruled by heavenly mandate (Kut), embodying and demonstrating ‘sky god’s (Kök 
Tengri) favour through military successes and through the performance of his functions 
as ruler.25 
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Figure 1: The Orhun Inscriptions carved on a stone pillar. 
Source: Wikipedia.  
The Kaghan had to ensure the welfare of his followers and subjects, share the war booty 
and redistribute tribute to feed and clothe them. His legitimacy depended on his ability 
to redistribute and mobilise resources, whether through trade or tribute. Here appears 
the state dominance over the economy, a characteristic of pre-capitalist world-empires 
in Wallerstein’s model. According to the steppe traditions of distribution of resources, all 
conquered lands belonged to the imperial dynasty and were distributed to relatives and 
state elite.26  
The investiture of the khan’s supreme sovereignty was seen as appointed by the 
‘eternal sky god’ (kök tengri). As a result, the authority of the assembly (the Kurultay, or 
the Populus in the Roman sense) that elected the leader was transferred to the person of 
the supreme leader, the Kaghan or Khan.27 As soon as this power investiture took place, a 
new set of social relations emerged. It required loyalty to the Kaghan and the ruling 
dynasty, which transformed the social and political relations from relatively egalitarian 
to hierarchical. After the authority of the Kaghan was recognised, a new governmental 
organisation took shape. This was made up by a standing army and bodyguard corps, an 
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administrative class of appointed military and civil officials.28 As I will discuss in Chapter 
3, some of these elements reappear in the discourse of the first Ottoman chronicles, which 
account that Osman was elected as the new Bey (prince) by the assembly (Kurultay) of the 
tribe.29 Thereafter, Osman Bey managed to create an independent political entity after 
defeating the Byzantine army at the Battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar) in 1302.30  
Furthermore, the Kaghan, as one of the Orhun inscriptions noted on the Kök Türk 
founders İstemi and Bumin, also furnished his people with both state and laws or Törü 
(töre/türe). They wrote that the ideal state is one governed in accordance with the törü.31 
The Turkish term töre corresponded to the nomadic custom and traditions codified, such 
as the yasa (laws) of Cenghiz Khan.32 Yasa and töre expressed Central Asian steppe 
concepts of impersonal justice, and derived their authority from custom and formal 
proclamation by the ruler.33 The Turkish nomadic tradition regarded justice as the 
objective application of the törü, a code of laws established by the founder of the state. 
Sovereignty and law were two interconnected terms.34 Adapted to life in the steppes, the 
Turkish nomad traditions also took a different attitude towards finance and taxation. The 
eleventh-century Turkish Mirror for Princes, Kutadgu Bilig (Wisdom of Royal Happiness), 
for instance, advised the sovereigns ‘to open their treasury and distribute their wealth’.35 
In Chapter 3, we will demonstrate that redistribution of wealth was also a pivotal duty 
that was expected to be carried out by the Ottoman Sultan. 
Following the collapse of the Kök Türk Empire in the eighth century and the diffusions 
of the nomadic tribes, a variety of transformations took place. Long established tribal 
unions, often of complex origins, broke down. Various communities and polities 
developed and re-emerged, such as the Oǧuz (see below), retaining elements of the ancient 
Turkish culture and at the same time growing into new directions. The creation of the 
Great Seljuk Empire in the Islamic world was situated within this historical context. The 
Great Seljuk dynasty of nomadic origin acquired power over an agrarian society with a 
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sedentary culture and they established the Great Seljuk Empire (c. 1040-1194).36 The 
nomadic, steppe origins of the Seljuks were of much greater importance in determining 
the early development of the empire than was previously assumed.37 A similar process of 
state building, which adopted elements of the settled cultures it had mastered, repeated 
in a great degree under the Ottomans as well.  
2.3 The Great Seljuk Empire 
In the middle of the tenth century, before the creation of the Great Seljuk Empire, the 
Muslim world was split into factions that openly contended or secretly intrigued against 
each other. The political unity was fragmented into a series of regional states and the 
power and prestige of the Abbasid Caliphs had declined. A shift occurred with the rise of 
Shi’ite groups such as the Zaydis and the Twelvers, who began to assert their power in 
Iraq and Iran under the rule of the Buyids.38 Since 969, the Isma’ili Fatimid Empire, who 
rejected the authority of the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, gained a base in Egypt, Syria and 
North Africa.39 
At about this time of political chaos, the arrival of the Turkish Oğuz nomads from the 
Central Asian steppes changed the fate and future of the Islamic lands. When in 980, 
Selçuk – the eponymous founder of the Seljuk dynasty – came with his followers to Jend, 
a Muslim frontier zone at Khorasan (in today’s Iran and Azerbaijan), he decided to convert 
to Islam, aiming to settle his tribe securely in a new Muslim habitat and setting.40 The 
conversion of Selçuk to Islam also proved to be a crucial step with longstanding political 
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consequences that not only transformed the Islamic history, but also the history and 
identity of the Turks.41 The conversion of the early Seljuks involved both the adoption of 
Muslim ideals in a new life environment and blending of Islamic principles with their pre-
Islamic traditions and ideas.42 We shall see in the following chapter that this specific 
ideological constellation would also be explicitly reflected within early Ottoman 
historiography. 
As the tribe of Selçuk had migrated out the world of the steppe, the old tribal links had 
fragmented. Those who deviated from ancestral tradition would have been left 
dangerously unprotected. In order to prevent the disintegration in such a situation, a 
nomad ruler was obliged to make radical changes for the existence of his community. 
Therefore, it was more assuring for the entire community to make the same change at 
once. For instance, Selçuk’s adoption of Islam led to a break of their ties with the other 
‘pagan’ Oğuz Turkish groups in the neighbouring areas, against whom Selçuk now 
undertook gaza-raids.43 The nomads who had followed Selçuk were thus forced to re-
organise and the role of the successful leader had become even more crucial in 
determining the identity of the group. As the leader, Selçuk’s position was dependent on 
his success in providing pasture and livelihood for his followers, who if dissatisfied could 
join a rival chief. We shall see that the early Seljuks borrowed the Islamic discursive 
register of gaza and turned it into a powerful political identity and motive, which 
legitimised their state building. The success of the early Seljuks rendered a certain aura 
of prestige to the ruling dynasty and this was reflected in the name of the emerging polity: 
the Selçuklu or Seljuks were the ‘men/followers of Selçuk’, precisely as in the case of 
Osmanlı or Ottomans.  
In one century, the Seljuk dynasty of nomadic gazi-warriors acquired power of an 
agrarian society of sedentary culture and they established the Great Seljuk Empire (c. 
1040-1194).44 The early Seljuks were initially caught up as auxiliary troops in the conflict 
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between the fading regional states of the Samanids, Ghaznavids and the Karahanids.45 
They were involved in the Karahanid takeover of Transoxania. In 1035 and in 1040, 
Selçuk’s grandson, Çağrı Beg routed several times the army of the Ghaznavids and led the 
Seljuk armies into Khurasan, where they expanded their control across Iran.46 After their 
victory against the Ghaznavids at the famous Battle of Dandanakan in 1040, Çağrı Beg and 
his brother Tuğrul Beg were aware that they had founded a state, which later was called 
the Great Seljuk Empire. Under Çağrı and Tuğrul Beg, the Seljuk realm was ruled according 
to ancient Turkish tradition, which was bi-partite. Çağrı and Tuğrul had agreed to divide 
and share the lands they conquered but they helped each other. There was only one 
overarching sovereign. Other members of the dynasty had to acknowledge the supreme 
authority of the ruler. Given the extent of the lands they ruled directly, the reigns of their 
successors can be referred to as an empire.47 
Çağrı Beg stayed in the east where he established his base in Marw and was succeeded 
by his son Alp Arslan when he died in 1060. Tuğrul Beg expanded westward and in 1055 
on the request of the Abbasid Caliph in Bagdad, who stood under dominion of the Shi’ite 
Buyid emir, Tugrul Beg seized Baghdad. Having freed the caliph from the supremacy of 
the Buyids (Buheyvî’s), the Caliph in turn honoured Tuğrul Beg with the title of the ‘Sultan 
of East and West’. By granting Tuğrul Beg the title of Sultan, the Caliph actually conceded 
him fullest power as the supreme sovereign, with the guarantee of the caliph’s 
authorisation. Hence, the Great Seljuk Empire was founded.48 The title ‘Sultan of East and 
West’ had never been used in Islamic history before. It had its roots in the nomadic 
steppe-concept of world governance – a symbol of Turkish principle of sovereignty, 
meaning that khan’s rule extended from where the sun rose to where it set.49  
Sultan Tuğrul then began to co-operate closely with the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, 
who legitimised the Great Seljuk hegemony in the Islamic world. To seal the union 
between the Seljuk and Abbasid dynasties, the Caliph married a niece of the Sultan, who 
married the daughter of the Caliph.50 However, his hegemony was not secure. He 
struggled with the other descendants of the dynasty to secure the tribal support of the 
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nomads.51 When Tuğrul Beg died in 1063, leaving no heirs behind, his nephew Alp Arslan 
succeeded him as Sultan ruling over a united Great Seljuk realm. During the reigns of 
Sultan Alp Arslan and his son and successor, Sultan Melik Shah, the Great Seljuk Empire 
was firmly established and became the dominant power in the eastern Muslim world.52 
Moreover, with the House of Selçuk, which in some ways formed the original roots of 
the Ottoman state, began the remarkable career of the Turks as empire-builders in the 
Islamic world. Indeed, the Great Seljuks represent the first independent Turkish dynasty 
ruling over a great part of the Islamic world. Most importantly, the creation of the Great 
Seljuk Empire brought a new political stability in the fragmented Muslim world, most of 
which was united under a single state for the first time since the early years of the Abbasid 
caliphate.53 At the end of the eleventh century, the Great Seljuk Empire, with its centre in 
Iran, controlled a vast area stretching from the Hindu Kush to eastern Anatolia and from 
Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. The process of Seljuk state formation accelerated the 
symbiosis of various ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural elements.54 
The Great Seljuk period was also the dawn of a new era in the history of Islam. It was 
under their rule that Sunni Islam revived; the scholar al-Ghazalî reconciled Sufism with 
Sunnism and it was then that the medreses or Islamic universities were established. It 
should be noted that the religious policies of the Great Seljuks varied at different times 
and places, according to the political circumstances.55 The Great Seljuks tried to create a 
lasting political presence by joining forces with scholars, such as al-Ghazali who enjoyed 
state patronage for teaching and research. This practice was also applied by the Ottomans 
through founding medreses and scholars. In order to legitimise their political power, 
Seljuk rulers presented themselves as champions of what they alleged was a Sunni and 
normative view of Islam. Their religious view was constructed by administrators in state-
sponsored arenas such as medreses, which illuminates the complex relationship between 
power and knowledge. The Great Seljuks can be seen as both benevolent Muslim rulers 
and patrons of the Sufi mystics.56  
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Figure 2: Great Seljuk Sultan Berk Yaruk ibn Malik Shah (r. 1093-1105). Miniature included in Rashid al- 
Din’s ‘World History’ or Jami’al Tevarih (c. 1314). 
 
After the death of Sultan Malik Shah in 1092, the Great Seljuk Empire decomposed into 
several regional states. The division of the Great Seljuk Empire was mainly caused by the 
rivalries among independent commanders, social revolts of the Turkish nomads and the 
succession struggles within the Seljuk dynasty. According to the Turkish political lore, a 
senior official was appointed as a tutor or atabeg (‘father-lord’) of a Seljuk crown prince. 
These atabegs held the nominal position of governor of a given territory, where they 
factually exercised the real power. The position of these atabegs would often become 
hereditary and sometimes, as with the most powerful of these atabeg dynasties, they 
would further boost their legitimacy by marrying into the Seljuk dynasty.57 Once the 
Seljuk dynasty became more and more divided because of the succession struggles, these 
atabegs began then to assert their own status independently, first as governors then for 
their own power. These atabegs and other commanders not attached to the Seljuks began 
to set up independent states in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. For instance, Nureddin 
Mahmud, the son of the Seljuk atabeg Zangi, his commander Salaaddin, and the Rum 
Seljuk Sultans in Turkey all rivalled each other in claiming the legacy of the universal 
sovereignty of the Great Seljuk Empire.58  
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2.4 The Seljuk Rum Sultanate of Anatolia (c. 1080-1308) 
The Seljuk Rum dynasty gathered all the Muslim and Turkish territories in Anatolia under 
one single monarchy. Conscious of their filiation to the Great Seljuks, they represented 
the Islamic urban high culture in Anatolia. They also aimed to transform Anatolia into a 
land that could rival the other Seljuk dynasties in north Syria and Iraq in wealth, culture 
and political power.59 At the frontier zone with Byzantium, the Seljuks also legitimised 
their claim on power by proclaiming that they as gazis safeguarded the gates of the Islamic 
world. While they fought against Byzantium and the crusaders, they also had to struggle 
with the Turkish dynasty of Danishmends, who ruled in central and eastern Anatolia. The 
following period was a succession of wars between the Rum Seljuks, Byzantines, crusaders 
and other Muslim states in Syria. The Byzantine defeat at the Battle of Myriokephalon in 
1176 against Sultan Kılıç Arslan II (r. 1156-1192) was the final and unsuccessful attempt of 
the Eastern Romans to recover the central Anatolian plateau.60  
The succession strife between the heirs of Sultan Kılıç Arslan II coincided with the 
Third Crusade, which gave the crusaders an opportunity to move easily into Syria and 
Palestine. However, despite their internal conflicts, after the initial setback the Rum 
Seljuks successfully defended their realm. For instance, while fleeing from the Seljuk 
armies after his defeat at the Battle of Konya in 1190, the German Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick Barbarossa drowned in the Silifke river and his army returned back to 
Germany.61 Neşrî described the occupation of Byzantium by the German crusaders as 
follows: ‘During the reign of Sultan Izzeddin Kılıç Arslan, the king of Serbia and the 
German [Alaman] Görgo [Frederick Barbarossa], a famous infidel who carried the title of 
despot, invaded the lands of Rome [bilâd-ı Rum] from beyond Constantinople with a huge 
army of 140.000 mounted warriors and countless infantry. He plundered all the lands of 
Rome [Rum-ili], came to Constantinople where he overthrew the tekvur [Byzantine 
emperor] and made him obedient to himself.’62 Interestingly, Neşrî referred to the 
Byzantine emperor as tekvur, meaning ‘governor’. He also uses the term despot, Serbian 
title for sovereign, when referring to the German king. 
During the Fourth Crusade in 1204, not the Seljuks, but Byzantium received a ferocious 
blow from Latin Europe. The crusaders turned against Christian Byzantium and their 
armies captured and sacked Constantinople. Byzantium would never recover from the 
Latin occupation, which endured until 1261 and had forced the Byzantine elite into exile 
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in Nicea (İznik).63 It is also then that the Seljuk prince Kay Hüsrev I, the son of Kılıç Arslan 
II, was released from his exile in Constantinople. Kay Hüsrev I acceded to the throne in 
1205 in Konya with the assistance of the gazis and re-united the Rum Seljuk state by 
ending the succession wars. On the other hand, the Ayyubid state had collapsed and was 
divided among Saladin’s successors.64 
During the first half of the thirteenth century, the Rum Seljuk state of Anatolia reached 
its brilliant zenith, achieving its cultural, political and economic apogee. Particularly, 
during the reign of sultan Alaeddin Keykubad I (1220-1237), the Anatolian Seljuks gained 
outlets to the Mediterranean at Antalya, Alanya and to the Black Sea at Sinop.65 These 
conquests were actually the result of the peace agreement with Byzantium, which was 
more concerned with the Latin occupation of Constantinople. Sultan Alaeddin Keykubad 
prevented the western gazis from attacking the Byzantines in Nicea (İznik). As a 
compensation for the gazis, he diverted their actions against the Byzantine Empire of 
Trebizonde, from which Sinop was conquered; against Antalya, that was seized from the 
Latins and against his rivals in Syria.66 Sultan Keykubad was a ruler fully aware of 
realpolitik and created a united and powerful state in central and eastern Anatolia and 
directed an active policy toward the east. Because his primary interests diverged from 
the Byzantine state of Nicea which was focused on the west, they were not conflicting 
with each other.67 As an example of this alliance, Sultan Alaaddin Keykubad I married a 
Byzantine princess and strengthened his relations with Byzantium to the west. He also 
lived for many years in Nicea and became acquainted with the customs at the Byzantine 
court.68  
This political balance enhanced the trade going as far west as Venice and north to 
Crimea. A network of Seljuk caravanserais in Anatolia strengthened the trade routes 
along which alum, salt, minerals and other goods began to flow as far as distant northern 
Europe. Sultan Keykubad granted commercial and legal treaties to the Genoese and the 
Venetians at the ports of Sinop and Antalya.69 Besides gold, there were substantial 
amounts of silver mines to strike coins. In the first half of the thirteenth century, Anatolia 
was a land of immense wealth, exploited to a degree unknown since the heyday of Rome 
and it earned the Seljuks the riches and power to support their state. The Rum Seljuks of 
Anatolia became one of the most influential dynasties of the thirteenth-century Middle 
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East, controlling some of the major trade routes of the period and playing a crucial role 
in connecting East and West of the medieval world.70 Hence, it was during this period that 
the real development of the Rum Seljuk state took place; cities, especially the capital 
Konya, were developed and medreses, mosques and caravanserais constructed. Islamic 
high culture thus began to take root in the Seljuk cities.  
The Disintegration of the Rûm Seljuk Sultanate  
However, this period of prosperity did not last long. As a result of the incompetent rule 
of Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev II (1237-1243), the Anatolian Seljuk state began to break down.71 
Until the rule of Keyhüsrev II, the state functioned as a confederation of provinces 
governed by emirs, who supported each other in order to prevent the increase of the 
power of the central government and hence of the sultan. The emirs assembled and 
debated when important decisions concerning the succession to the throne or military 
campaigns had to be reached. Keyhüsrev, who grew up in comfort and the ease of luxury, 
had become estranged to the toughness of nomad life and the strength of his ancestors. 
With his ascendance to the throne, the seeds of disintegration were sown. The desire of 
his vizier Köpek to gain personal control of the state power led to a conflict between the 
dynasty and emirs. The result of all this was that the rivalries among the Seljuk emirs 
increased so much that they had begun to intrigue against each other. Finally, the system 
of cooperation between the provincial emirs broke down and the Rum Seljuk state as a 
whole weakened.72  
At the same time, the cultural alienation between the nomadic Turkish communities 
and the Seljuk central government began to grow. The nomadic Turkish tribes that lived 
on the Byzantine marches, which were always fraught with difficulties and dangers, lived 
a harsh army life with their households. The women of these nomadic communities were 
also armed and exhibited great courage in battle.73 In the fifteenth century, we read from 
the Burgundian spy Bertrandon de la Broquière that the Turkish nomads in southern 
Anatolia still maintained their lifestyle and traditions. On his way to Bursa, he came across 
a group of armed Turkish nomad women, of whom he writes with great admiration 
concerning their martial skills and moral qualities.74 Moreover, the nomads recognised 
no political authority outside the tribal system and they despised the settled villagers and 
city dwellers. They opposed the settlement policies of the sedentary Seljuk government. 
Whenever the greed and abuse of tax collectors of the central government increased, 
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when the nomads lost their herds to drought or with the political ambitions of a tribal 
leader, they did not hesitate to rebel and to attack cities.  
The Seljuk state was then managed by bureaucrats and Muslim scholars (ulema) and 
favoured the interests of a sedentary administration. A great number of Persian 
bureaucrats, who fled for the Mongol outburst, had come to Anatolia. It is under their 
influence that the Rum Seljuk dynasty adopted the Persian-Islamic culture at court and 
introduced Persian as the court language. Concerning the private life of the Anatolian 
Seljuk Sultans, their names and palace ceremonial, the most definite influence was 
Persian. The names given to later Rum Seljuk sons and grandsons are almost all derived 
from the ancient epic Persian tradition and are the most visible testament for this. As a 
result, Sultan Keykubad I presented himself as an absolute monarch and laid special 
emphasis on the elements derived from the Persian model of sovereignty.75 
The religiously and ethnically diverse society in which the Seljuks lived was also 
reflected in the princely court of the dynasty.76 Not only the ruling Seljuk nobility, but 
also the Turkish communities in the cities and villages were in close contact with the 
Greco-Roman and local Christian traditions.77 The Seljuk Sultans publicly supported a 
sedentary model of civilisation. The Seljuk court style was deeply influenced by the 
Persian culture, their poets wrote Persian. By contrast, the Seljuk court did not support 
the culture and interests of the Turkish nomads whose martial skills had mastered the 
lands they governed. The growing cultural and political separation between the Turkish 
Oghuz nomads and the sedentary Seljuk government resulted in their mutual alienation 
and prepared the way for a series of revolts, that would shake the Seljuk state of Anatolia 
at the height of its power in the thirteenth century.78  
The nomads took their revenge, first without success during the Babai revolt in 1239, 
and then successfully during the Mongol invasion of Anatolia. The resentments of many 
nomadic Turkish groups resulted in a severe popular revolt led by a heterodox dervish, 
baba İlyas-i Horasani, who claimed that he was Resul Allah, a prophet. The figure of baba 
or ‘father’ was a continuation of the shaman character, typical for the syncretic Islam of 
the nomad Turkish communities. These baba’s guided their people as spiritual masters 
and sometimes as political leaders.79 Due to the growing tensions with the Seljuk central 
government, Baba İlyas proclaimed the jihad against sultan Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev II and 
led a growing mass of Turkish nomads, including women and children, into a ferocious 
rebellion. The Turkish nomads and the Gazis, who were very close to each other, appear 
 
                                                     
75 Mecit, ‘Kingship and Ideology under the Rum Seljuqs’, 69-70. 
76 Peacock and Yildiz eds., The Seljuks of Anatolia, 4. 
77 Köprülü, Early Mystics, 149. 
78 Lindner, Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory, 3-4.  
79 Claude Cahen, ‘Bâbâ’î’, Encyclopedia of Islam. Second Edition (online). 
 76 
to have allied. This so-called Babai Revolt shaked the Seljuk state of Anatolia in its 
fundaments. Sultan Keyhüsrev anxiously fled from the capital Konya and the government 
suppressed this uprising only with difficulty, among other things by employing Frankish 
and Georgian mercenaries and the troops that were preserved against the awakening 
Mongol assault.80 
2.5 The Arrival of the Mongols  
A year after this major political revolt, the Mongol Ilkhanids, who had settled in 
Azerbaijan, easily invaded Anatolia, defeating the Seljuk army at Kösedağ in 1243, and 
becoming the real suzerains of Anatolia. Although the Seljuk army was reinforced by 
Byzantine contingents and Frankish mercenaries, and although it was only a detachment 
of Mongol army that had entered Anatolia, defeat could not be avoided. The Rum Seljuks 
were too much assimilated into sedentary life and posed no match against the nomadic 
warrior skills of the Mongols. The Mongols made the Seljuk rulers their tribute paying 
vassals. After 1277, the period of the independent Seljuk state of Anatolia came to an 
end.81  
In the second half of the thirteenth century, during the last fifty years of its existence, 
the Rum Seljuk dynasty had lost all significance. It was in this chaotic environment that 
the famous mystics Yunus Emre and Jelaleddin Rumi lived. This was a time of successive 
political and social crises and confusion. There were rivalries between the Seljuk Sultans 
and their emirs, constantly collaborating with the Mongols against each other. There 
were revolts, punitive actions and wars followed the revolts. Sometimes the Mongol 
commanders also fought among themselves.82 Wishing to profit from this situation, the 
papacy also sent missionaries to Anatolia to convert the pagan Mongols to Christianity. 
One of these missionaries was the Dominican friar, Simon de Saint-Quentin, who left an 
interesting account of the social life and the Seljuk wealth in Anatolia at this period.83 The 
Mongols remained for a time indifferent to both Christendom and Islam. Eventually, the 
Mongol Ilkhanid ruler Gazan Khan converted to Islam in 1296. His conversion speeded up 
the spreading of Islam among the Mongol tribes. These Mongol tribes generally likened 
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the Turkish babas (spiritual masters) to their own shamans and gradually started to 
embrace Islam through the Turkish Sufis, to whom they felt close and adopted to 
sedentary life style.84   
Most importantly, the Mongol expansion had caused a new migration of Turkish 
nomad groups from Azerbaijan end even from distant Transoxania who came to Anatolia. 
They mainly settled in the western frontier regions. These western marches of the Islamic 
world proved to be the safest place from the Mongol invasion. All those who had to flee 
the Mongols sought a refuge on the frontier: nobles of the Rum Seljuk state who had 
organised the resistance against the Mongols fled with their entire families and followers; 
city-dwellers who settled in towns and marches; peasants whose villages were in ruin or 
who no longer endured the heavy fiscal burdens imposed on them by the Mongols. The 
Turkish villagers that came from western Turkistan brought much of their farming 
culture with them to Anatolia, established villages and began to till the land.85 The old 
Roman-Byzantine cities were revitalised and became more prosperous than before 
thanks to vigorous trading activity.86  
2.6 The Emergence of Turkish principalities in Anatolia 
Several developments had helped the Turkish nomads to rise as a polity. Despite the 
political turbulences and human catastrophes, Mongol hegemony created vast 
possibilities. The migrating Turkish nomads were accompanied by sheikhs and 
wandering dervishes, and a crowd of merchants and artisans who flowed in from all the 
provinces invaded by the Mongols. Sometimes, the sending of military forces to Anatolia 
for various reasons led to the establishment of a number of Mongol and Turkish tribes in 
different areas. They came with all their baggage and families to areas that had been 
granted to them as iqta (land grants as revenue for military service).87 Some principalities, 
such as the one of the Ottomans would emerge from such an iqta-fief. Although the early 
Ottoman sources anachronistically cast the first Ottomans into vassalage with the 
Anatolian Seljuks, it was probably the Ilkhanid Mongol government that sent Ertughrul, 
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father of Osman, together with his tribe with some Mongol nomads to settle and guard 
the western frontiers.88 It is probable that Osman Gazi recognised the Ilkhanid Gazan 
Khan as his overlord. The early Ottoman vassalage with the Mongol Ilkhanids is 
documented, as a budget document from 1350 identifies Orhan Gazi, son of Osman, as a 
lord of the Anatolian marches paying tribute to the Mongols.89   
While a large number of the Turkish Muslim population that came to Anatolia were 
nomadic tribes, some gradually settled on the steppe lands and in empty Byzantine 
villages or in villages that were inhabited by the local population. Apart from Turkish 
nomads, Mongol nomadic tribes also arrived after 1246. The Mongols also settled in the 
steppes of Anatolia and set up their own villages or settled in Turkish villages where they 
intermingled with the Turkish population. These Turkish and Mongol tribes gradually 
shifted from a nomadic existence to a semi-settled life and the Turkish and Mongol 
communities increased within a half century.90 There was also a significant amount of 
non-Muslim populations, made up of Orthodox Greeks, Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians 
or Syriacs, Jacobites and Jews living across entire Anatolia. The Seljuks and their successor 
Turkish principalities apparently did not force the Christian and Jewish population to 
convert, as they wished rather to maintain the existing social and economic structures. 
By implementing Islamic law and the principle related to co-existence with non-Muslims, 
the ahl al-dhimma, they adopted a policy designed to win the consent of the population, a 
policy known in the Ottoman period as istimalet.91 The local Christian and Jewish 
population were culturally and religiously untouched when the Turks took over the 
political power. They even regarded the wars that Turks won against Byzantines as 
punishing Byzantium, which had oppressed them culturally and politically.92  
For instance, in the early thirteenth century, the akritai, the Byzantine marcher-
warriors, found the fiscal policy of the Byzantine administration insupportable as it 
gravely affected their interests. These akritai, who were for the most part Armenians, 
were also deeply wounded in their religious sentiments by the Byzantine Orthodox 
Church, which attempted to assimilate the Assyrians and Armenians, and they frequently 
stood up in revolts.93 As the non-Greek Christian population of Anatolia resented the 
Byzantine policies, they were benevolent towards the Turkish conquerors, who replaced 
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the Byzantine rule and did not interfere in their religious traditions. This seems to have 
played an important role in easing the Turkish settlement in Anatolia and the acceptance 
of Turkish rule.94 The resistance towards the Turkish hosts that was shown mainly by the 
towns broke down almost everywhere. In many places they were even led into the 
country by the akritai themselves.95 
In spite of the clashes with Byzantium, life on those frontiers was marked by hybridity 
and accommodation, which were more usual outcomes. The conditions in these frontiers 
were quite analogous on both sides. The march-warriors, both the gazis and akritai, were 
continually ready to parry the raids of the foe and in turn also to undertake similar raids, 
penetrating deep into the territory of the enemy. Moreover, there were strong political 
and cultural tensions between the marches and the respective hinterlands. Aspiring to 
the greatest possible independence and fully conscious of their importance in their 
relations with their respective governments, the gazis and akritai tended to resist all 
administrative interference and detested taxation. The Assyrian, Jacobite and Armenian 
Churches that were forced to assimilate to the Byzantine imperial Greek Church, found 
in the Anatolian marches a secure place of refuge.96 Frontier life would also profoundly 
affect the Turkish experience as Muslims; there occurred certain exchanges in cultural 
life. Deriving their cultural features from the same conditions of life, both sides were in 
daily contact with each other and this contact was not always belligerent. Volunteers, 
prisoners, deserters and wives taken from the other side facilitated the cultural exchange. 
It is important to note that the Turks who arrived in Anatolia were not primitive nomads 
equipped with only a rudimentary culture, as it was often argued. It is now generally 
agreed that the Turks came and settled in Anatolia ‘as a group which had synthesised 
Islamic civilization, which infused their entire way of life, with Turkish culture and 
traditions.’97  
As a result of all this, the refugees in the frontier zones of Anatolia were saturated with 
migrations and experienced leaders awaited the opportunities for new enterprises. At 
this time, Byzantium was occupied with reconquering its lost provinces in Europe. The 
centre of gravity of Byzantine politics was no longer in Anatolia. As a result, the Turkish 
frontier advanced westwards until the shores of Marmara.98 The Mongols indirectly 
created a profitable conjuncture for these nomad Turks to assert their independence by 
breaking down the existing political structures of the Anatolian Seljuks.99 The Turkish 
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nomads and gazis began to set up new marcher principalities (beyliks) on the lands they 
conquered, such as the beyliks of Karaman, Menteshe, Karası, Aydın and Germiyan.100 
Byzantium had no strength to oppose these gazi lordships.  
Of the Anatolian Turkish marcher principalities, the earliest created, the longest 
existed and the most powerful rival of the Ottomans was the beylik of Karaman in south-
central Anatolia. By 1300, it had established itself in the former Seljuk capital of Konya as 
its seat of power. Their power resulted from the unification of the Turkish nomads living 
in the mountainous regions of Cilicia. They claimed to be the heirs of the Rum Seljuks and 
appealed to supremacy over the other principalities in Anatolia.101 On the south coast, 
around Antalya, lay the beylik of Teke. To the north of Teke and lying inland were the 
territories of Hamid, around Isparta, and the beylik of Germiyan, with its capital at 
Kütahya. The beylik of Germiyan was established by nomads who belonged to the Afşar 
branch of the Oğuz. During the early fourteenth century, the Germiyanids represented a 
powerful political entity. At the southernmost tip of the Aegean coast lay the principality 
of Menteşe.102 To the north of Menteşe were the beyliks of Aydın and Saruhan, with Tire 
and Manisa as their respective capitals. However, the beylik of Aydın soon came under 
the attack of crusaders; they lost their navy and key harbours, and were forcibly 
pacified.103 To the north of Saruhan, lay the maritime beylik of Karasi with part of its 
shoreline along the Dardanelles and with Balikesir and Edremit as main cities. The beyliks 
of Karasi, Saruhan and Aydın were founded by the emirs or commanders in service of the 
Germiyanid dynasty, to which, at least in their foundation period, they had obeyed. The 
Hamidoğulları too had to rely on the Germiyanids to seek protection against the 
Karamanids. Finally, to the north-west of Karasi, in the former Byzantine province of 
Bythinia, around Söğüd lay the tiny beylik of Osman. While its bigger and powerful rivals 
became targets of Byzantine and Ilkhanid attacks, the Ottomans stayed away from these 
dangers and benefited from their results.104  
All these beyliks were more or less acquainted with the administrative and military 
structures of the Harezmshahs and Rum Seljuks. Some of them had participated in the 
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Babai rebellion of the nomad tribes in 1238-41.105 A factor that helped the initial 
independence of Turkish beyliks was the intervention of the Mamluk sultan Baybars, who 
attempted to end Mongol rule. In 1277, Baybars defeated the Mongol army and advanced 
as far as Kayseri, but the beyliks did not rise against the Mongol Ilkhanids as he had 
hoped.106 These beyliks gradually built their own regional power, which gave them better 
prospects to negotiate with Byzantium.107 Their emergence augmented the regional 
redistribution of resources that otherwise would have been extracted by Mongol Ilkhanid 
imperial centres.108 As a result, new commercial opportunities were created by mixing the 
sedentary urban and agrarian economies with pastoral nomadism. This situation 
contributed to the coexistence between the Byzantine governors in Bithynia and the early 
Ottomans.109 At first the Ottoman principality played a very modest part among the other 
emirates. Nevertheless, it was exactly this modest principality that was to be transformed 
into the most important regional power in the next 150 years. 
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2.7 From Osman’s Beylik (principality) to an Empire (c. 1302-
1402) 
Turkish political control of Anatolia was achieved in two stages. During the eleventh 
century, nomad Turkish Oghuz tribes from Central Asia entered Anatolia, a region which 
did not only partly belong to the Seljuk Empire, but which was also divided among the 
Christian Byzantine and Armenian principalities. These polities made up the political 
structure of medieval Anatolia. At that time, the Turkish communities still constituted a 
minority in Anatolia.110 The Byzantines applied a relatively peaceful policy vis-à-vis the 
newcomers on their frontiers.111 During the period after the Battle of Manzikert (1071), 
about a million Turkish migrants entered Anatolia and settled throughout the region.112 
It was actually only two centuries later, after the second great wave of Turkish tribes from 
Central Asia, that Anatolia became a new homeland for the Turkish migrants.113 In this 
second phase, which began with the Mongol expansions, great numbers of nomad tribes 
migrated from Transoxiana, Khorasan and Azerbaijan. They were fleeing together with 
the Turkish city-dwellers from Merv, Tabriz, Balkh, Bukhara and Samarkand, seeking 
refuge in Anatolia. It is exactly in this second phase that Turkish demographic figures 
would increase and transcend the local population.114 The newly arrived found a milieu 
that was familiar to them. Their predecessors had to a certain extent already ‘turkified’ 
the marches. However, the Turkish conquest of Anatolia did not lead to a fundamental 
rupture in local cultural and religious traditions.115 A ‘melting pot’ of the various 
sedentary and nomad traditions and peoples came into being during this process.116 
Fuat Köprülü noted that in the late thirteenth century the material and cultural 
dynamics of Turkish society were sufficiently developed to cultivate the emergence of 
the Ottoman polity. The demographic push of the Turks into western Anatolia, fleeing for 
the Mongol assault, was a major factor in the early Ottoman state formation. Köprülü 
emphasised that the Mongol expansion had uprooted not only the nomads, but also the 
urban Turkish population from Central Asia. The early Ottomans could thus from the 
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beginning rely on an urban Turkish population. Although the other Turkish principalities 
also wanted to control these groups, the beylik of Osman had the best credentials, 
particularly due to its strategic location.117 Köprülü further argued that the early Ottoman 
beylik in the organisation of its administrative, military and juridical institutions built 
particularly on the administrative experience and knowledge accumulated by the 
dynasties of the Seljuks, Kharezmsahs and the Ilkhanids.118 
2.7.1 Before the founding of the Beylik (principality) 
The immediate ancestors of Osman Bey, the eponymous founder of the Ottoman dynasty, 
arrived in Anatolia during the second great migration wave, which took place after the 
Mongol expansions under Djengiz Khan during the 1220s. The Mongol expansions 
uprooted the nomadic Turkish tribes in Central Asia and Iran and forced them to migrate 
in several waves to the west, into Anatolia.119 The pressure of the Mongols forced many 
Turkish pastoralist nomads to seek new pastures in the west. The ancestors of Osman 
arrived in one of these waves to north-western Anatolia and settled in the Turkish-
Byzantine frontier land of Bithynia.120 Their actual arrival date is not known, but they 
must have established their presence around the 1260s under the leadership of Ertuğrul 
Bey, the father of Osman.121 
They constituted a community of Turkish pastoralist nomads. The Ottoman chronicles 
outlined the genealogy of the House of Osman to the epic ruler Oğuz Han, descending from 
the line of Kayı. The Oğuz Turks constituted the majority among the masses who came to 
Anatolia. However, their tribal structure and connections were probably very loose 
because of the settlement policy of the Seljuk State of Anatolia.122 The gradual breakdown 
of tribal bonds due to the migration must also have been important. Nevertheless, this 
disintegration allowed a greater degree of social mobility and reorganisation. During this 
brief period, the ancestors of Osman remained under the nominal control of the Çobanid 
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beys, who were the official governors general (beylerbeyi) of the Seljuk northwest 
frontiers.123 During the winter, the ancestors of Osman remained around Söğüd (i.e. ‘the 
willow tree’), close to the routes along the Sakarya river. Their summer pastures were on 
the slopes of the Domaniç mountain, which oversaw several vital routes. Their new 
homeland was situated in a favourable geographical location with strategic importance. 
It was close to all the great routes that linked the Marmara region with the Anatolian 
hinterland. They were also favourably positioned with relatively easy access to the 
eastern territories of the Byzantine Empire and to the trade routes.124 Their location 
provided them with great possibilities for wealth and expansion to the north and 
northwest. The early Ottoman conquests aimed to control the cities of Bythinia, the trade 
roads and the access to resources.125 
When the Seljuk commander Şemseddin Yaman Candar defeated and killed the 
Ottomans’ overlord Çobanoğlu Mahmud Bey in 1292, the Ottomans had become virtually 
independent.126 Until then the Ottomans had been under the nominal control of the 
Çobanid lords. But the real advantageous political circumstances were created with the 
rebellion of Mongol commander Sülemiş in 1298. Osman’s activities in the years 1298-
1301 coincided with the rebellion of Sülemiş, who became popular among the Turkish 
frontier warriors.127 Sülemiş gained the support of the Turkish frontier warriors, granting 
them symbols of independence, and he also gained control of the entire central and 
western lands of the former Rum Seljuk State. Osman might have cooperated with 
Sülemiş against the Ilkhanid Khans.128 In 1300, the Ilkhanids managed to defeat the 
rebellion and killed Sülemiş, however, they were unable to establish firm control on the 
western frontier lands.129  
2.7.2 Osman Gazi founds a dynasty and state  
Ottoman tradition asserts that Osman Gazi (r. 1302-1326) became a bey after he had been 
selected as the leader of the Kayı-line of the Oğuz when his father Ertuğrul died in 1299. 
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A silver coin bearing the inscription ‘Struck by Osman, son of Ertuğrul’ confirms that 
Osman’s father was Ertuğrul.130 The inscription on the coin further refers to Gündüz Alp 
as the father of Ertuğrul, which supports the Oğuz genealogy of the Ottomans. The 
chronicler Âşık Paşazâde notes that Osman first had to fight against the neighbouring 
Germiyan principality and against a settlement of Mongol nomads in order to secure his 
position.131 The power of the Rum Seljuks had declined, while the Ilkhanids lost their 
control of the western marches. Since the people in Sögüt were under pressure of several 
other Turkish principalities in the rear, Osman probably understood that he had to 
expand towards the west in order to survive and to secure a polity. 
 
Figure 3: Silver coins struck by Orhan Gazi (c. 1326).  
Reproduced in: Halil Inalcik ed., Osmanlı Uygarlıǧı (Ankara, 2009) 60.  
 
However, Osman’s position did not remain unchallenged. A competition with his uncle 
Dündar emerged after Ertuğrul had died. During the kurultay or assembly, some members 
of the tribe wanted Osman, and others his uncle Dündar, to succeed Ertuğrul and to be 
the new bey. Seeing Osman’s strong support, Dündar gave up and accepted his nephew’s 
leadership.132 The compromise seems to have been superficial. In a later chapter, Neşrî 
writes that Osman was angry about the patronising attitude of the Byzantine lord of 
Bilecik (Belekoma, in Roman time), who required Osman to kiss his hand, and in retaliation 
Osman wanted to seize him. However, Dündar disputed this plan: ‘while the Germiyan-
oğlu and the neighbouring infidels are hostile to us, we cannot afford to make any more 
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enemies.’ According to Neşrî, Osman felt intimidated and thought that his uncle intended 
to weaken his political rise. Thereupon, during that dispute, he shot him with an arrow 
and killed him.133  
Actually, Osman managed to create an independent political entity after defeating a 
Byzantine army at the Battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar), near the Sakarya river, on 27 July 
1302.134 Neşrî set this event as the foundation date of an independent beylik, and wrote 
that Osman’s victory gained him the charisma and legitimacy to found a dynasty and 
state.135 The account of the contemporary Byzantine chronicler Pachymeres also confirms 
this. Pachymeres wrote that the battle of Bapheus was a result of Osman’s attempt to 
capture İznik (Nicaea).136 Neşrî described that when Osman learned that the Byzantine 
emperor had prepared an army against him and was coming to relieve the siege of Nicaea, 
he first asked the help of the Seljuk Sultan in Konya. The Sultan instructed the frontier-
gazis of the Sahibin Karahisar region to go and assist Osman against the Byzantines.137 
Karahisar was the principal centre of the Seljukid frontier under direct control of the 
Seljuks. Osman had clearly not yet become a leader among the gazis in the area, who still 
acted independently. Prior to the Battle of Bapheus, Osman had to rely on alliances with 
local Turkish and Byzantine commanders, such as Köse Mihal.138  
When Osman decided to confront the Byzantine army, his allies and several warriors 
of the Aydın and Menteşe principalities joined him in this campaign. This alliance was the 
result of a defensive reflex against the major Byzantine reaction, which threatened all of 
them. İnalcık argued that Osman benefited in this way from the increasing advance of the 
Turkish marcher warriors in western Anatolia.139 With his victory over an imperial 
Byzantine army, Osman gained a tremendous reputation as gazi-leader and emerged as a 
charismatic leader able to arouse support from his followers. He welded more strongly 
his independent-minded nomadic followers and more warriors came under his 
leadership. The Byzantine court chronicler Pachymeres provides details on the blockade 
of Nicaea. He mentioned Osman for the first time, noting that after his Bapheus victory, 
Osman’s fame spread as far as Paphlagonia (Kastamonu).140  
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Figure 4: Miniature portrait of Osman Gazi.  
Included in the court chronicle of Seyyid Lokman, Zübdetü’t Tevârîh (c. 1583). 
 
According to Pachymeres, Osman’s military success alarmed the Byzantine 
government. The latter presented princess Maria as wife to the Ilkhanid ruler Ölceytü 
Khan in order to provoke a Mongol Ilkhanid punishment against Osman.141 The Byzantine 
government must have thought that the Turkish marcher lords were under control of the 
Ilkhanids and that their raids could be checked by the Ilkhanid Khan. However, the 
Mongol Khans had in fact lost the control of the western marches in Anatolia, where 
Osman’s victory at Bapheus had secured his political position. Soon, various Byzantine 
fortresses and towns were seized and all of Bithynia, except for the big cities, was 
captured. Osman’s successes also attracted more warriors, settlers, dervishes, scholars, 
unemployed Seljuk ulema-bureaucrats, refugee villagers, artisans and city dwellers from 
the Muslim hinterland. The religious scholars (fakihs) and former Seljuk officials brought 
sedentary traditions with them. More and more nomads began to settle and changed their 
lifestyle, and this affected the political organisation.142 All these very different people 
with various social backgrounds came to settle within the complex frontier beylik of 
Osman. At this stage, the Ottomans were obviously not a unitary nomadic tribe anymore. 
Indeed, we see an emerging Ottoman polity that blended a variety of identities and 
traditions whose prominence changed over time. 
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2.7.3 Early socio-political structures and institutions 
In the earliest period, the cavalry dominated composition of Osman’s forces showed that 
he had surrounded himself with nomadic warrior leaders composed of alps and nökers 
(comrades), who under his leadership took part in raids (akın) and conquests or gaza, in 
exchange for pasture land to live in (yurtluk).143 In the beginning, marcher lords such as 
Akça Koca, Konur Alp, Hasan Alp, Turgut Alp and Samsa Çavuş were acting independently. 
When Osman Bey excelled as the successful leader in the frontier region, they became 
members of Osman’s staff. The titles of alp and nöker appear to have been central 
institutions during Osman’s time. In the steppe empires of Central Asia, the alps were 
descendants of the noble Turkish families. The concept of nöker was essentially a Mongol 
institution and had become widespread as a common Central Asian usage, which enabled 
Osman to build an entourage of companions and a personal staff.144 The nökers consisted 
of individuals selected by the ruler himself. They were required to be independent of 
every social connection with tribal groups or powerful families and served the ruler with 
loyalty and obedience. They acted as royal guards with additional duties such as 
commander, messenger and envoy, but unlike royal pages they did not perform steward 
duties.145 Towards the end of the fourteenth century, the institution of nöker evolved in 
the Kapıkulu-officials, who were the conscripted servants of the dynasty serving in the 
army and administration (see below). 
According to the oldest texts, Osman’s entourage was mainly composed of loyal 
commanders who organised the newcomers (garibs) in the frontiers for gaza-expeditions. 
These ‘garibs’ were the have-nots in search of a livelihood (‘doyum’, i.e. booty); they were 
quasi ‘swing warriors’, who were ready to respond to calls of gaza by different leaders. 
The Turkish nomad warriors constituted the majority of these ‘garîbs’. As the word spread 
that those who fought with Osman won, more and more people were attracted to his 
banner. Successful expeditions brought fame, prestige and wealth, which attracted ever 
more people.146 Hence, individual warriors flocked to join Osman’s raids. However, there 
is no reason to assume that all those warriors became permanent additions to the 
Ottoman forces. Among the many volunteers, some of the well-rewarded stayed and 
became part of the emerging polity. Others whose expectations had not been met, might 
have joined another leader for a lucrative raid. In these circumstances, leadership 
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abilities counted more, becoming catalysts for new forms of political and social 
organisations.147 The successful leader also determined the identity of the hybrid group. 
As it was reflected in their name: the Osmanlı were the ‘men of Osman’.  
Despite fluctuations, Osman’s following and his leadership abilities must have 
attracted enough volunteers and gained enough momentum to grow. In the end, all those 
who stayed with Osman took part in the successful building of a state. The Ottoman socio-
political structure found its logic in the fact that it was created through the efforts of this 
small professional martial class, the warriors who were gathered around Osman Gazi. 
Later, the state preserved this central position of the martial class as a keystone of its 
entire socio-political organisation. The general principle was upheld that each individual 
should remain in his own status group in order to maintain the stability of the society and 
state. In time, two classes would emerge. The askeri class was the military or 
administrative group and officially exempted from taxes. The second class, the reaya – 
literally ‘the flock’ – entailed the Muslim and Christian productive groups that paid taxes, 
such as peasants, artisans and merchants. According to the ancient political traditions, 
the ruler was defined as the shepherd protecting his flock, the reaya, and governing them 
with justice and protecting the reaya’s rights against the abuse of state power by 
officials.148 
Finally, without some degree of long term vision, all the strategic advantages and 
circumstantial opportunities would not have brought the Ottomans much further. 
However, this vision was not a ‘master plan’ and was probably continuously redefined 
during the following phases of Ottoman state building. Osman Gazi and his followers 
acted with good tactical and strategic sense that eventually gained them the control over 
Bithynia. Halil İnalcık demonstrated that Osman Gazi’s conquests show a clear military 
rationality.149 At the same time, the composition of Osman’s followers kept changing. 
Already by the early 1320s, Osman’s polity had reached an administrative structure of 
enough complexity to strike coins, to assign offices to loyal commanders and to donate 
waqf-endowments. Already during the reign of Osman Gazi, former Seljuk scribes who 
wrote in Persian were employed and by 1350 they translated Persian and Arabic 
chancellery vocabulary into Turkish. Unlike the late fifteenth-century Ottoman 
chroniclers, who usually described the early Ottomans as naive nomads, the fourteenth-
century Seljuk and Ilkhanid chroniclers portrayed the Turks in the frontiers as being in 
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much closer contact with and influenced by the Seljuk, Ilkhanid and Byzantine 
administrative practices.150 
In any event, the most important achievement for Osman’s small beylik was that it had 
survived his death without a loss of the integrity of its territories. At a very early stage, 
the Ottomans abandoned the Turkish-Mongol practice of dividing the realms among 
different heirs, as the earlier Turkish states had done before. This practice was based on 
an idea that was particularly strong in the Turkish-Mongol steppe tradition: the belief 
that sovereignty is invested in every member of the dynastic family and both male and 
female members were able to claim a share in the exercise of sovereign power.151 In the 
succession of Osman, they did not follow this practice, as the other Turkish principalities 
around them did. Otherwise, this would have resulted in the partition of the principality 
among the sons of Osman Bey, who would have their own designated functions and 
domains. In any case, in the end Orhan’s inheritance was not contested and Osman’s 
patrimony was not divided. This shows that the Ottomans renovated the Central-Asian 
Turkish tradition according to their own vision of a strong centralised polity with 
undivided territories. An apanage became merely a princely fief. When one of the crown 
princes reached the capital to succeed their father, the others would be dispossessed or 
eliminated. Although in the next generations many succession wars took place between 
the crown princes, the Ottomans remained always reluctant to share government with 
other heirs, which made the political integration possible. The Ottoman succession 
practice finally culminated in legislating fratricide by sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481) in 
order to eliminate all tendencies toward fragmentation and to consolidate the centralised 
state. Eventually, no other dynasty ever emerged out of the House of Osman.152    
2.7.4 Dynastic marriages  
Already under Osman Bey, the Ottomans constructed a set of marriage alliances with the 
neighbouring dynasties as a strategy to extend their sphere of political influence. They 
built new networks through clientelism and marriage strategies. The first example of the 
dynasty’s nurturing of ties was with the spiritual Sufi leaders. Osman Gazi married 
Malhun, the daughter of Sheikh Edebali, one of the most influential Sufi leaders in 
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Bythinia. This marriage was of importance for the internal legitimisation of sovereignty. 
Even as the Ottoman dynasty engaged in various forms of ideological rhetoric to maintain 
the loyalty of its diverse following, the ruling house continued to foster close relations 
with the sheikhs. Their charismatic approval was invoked to support dynasty’s claims to 
sovereignty.153 Moreover, Sheikh Edebali became Osman Gazi’s spiritual guide and advisor 
in matters of Muslim law.154 Maintaining relations of patronage by Ottoman dynasty with 
Sufi dervishes and Sheikhs was imperative. The Ottoman rulers relied on the services of 
many of the Sheikhs and babas (literally ‘father’) – Muslim mystical leaders of the Turkish 
nomad and urban populations – and patronised them. These Sufi leaders seem to have 
captured the hearts and minds of the Turkish nomads as well as those of the local 
Christians. They appeased the acceptance of Ottoman rule and developed mechanisms for 
coexistence.155 Like the Ottomans, other Muslim dynasties who appealed to nomad 
Turkish-Mongol political principles also sought the blessing of popular spiritual 
masters.156  
The early Ottomans constructed political alliances and brought together Christian and 
Muslim frontiersmen and women, employing the cultures of both worlds to build a new 
enterprise. Until the mid-fifteenth century, the Ottoman rulers took both legal wives as 
well as concubines. Osman married his son Orhan Gazi to Nilüfer Hatun, the daughter of 
the Byzantine governor of Yarhisar.157 This liaison was part of Osman’s strategy to build 
alliances and ties. Marriages with neighbouring dynasties were not only a way to 
integrate the Ottoman dynasty into the ‘international royal community’, but they also 
served territorial expansion. The wives formed political intermediaries between dynastic 
families, as they maintained links with their families of origin.158 After his accession to the 
Byzantine throne in 1347, emperor John Kantakuzenos married his daughter Theodora to 
Orhan Bey, son of Osman. This marriage consolidated the Ottoman-Byzantine alliance 
that had already existed for a few years. The many visits of Orhan Gazi to Constantinople 
allowed the second Ottoman prince and his emissaries to assist directly in Byzantine 
ceremonies at the imperial court and contributed to the adaptation of Ottoman 
practices.159 Orhan’s wife, Theodora Kantakuzenos played a very important intermediary 
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role, which helped the early Ottomans to familiarise themselves with the Byzantine court 
culture.160 This does not seem a very odd practice as there are earlier examples of such 
marital unions reaching back to the Rum Seljuk period. For example, Seljuk Sultan 
Alaaddin Keykubad I also married a Byzantine princess and strengthened his relations 
with Byzantium. Keykubad lived for many years in Nicea and became acquainted with the 
customs at the Byzantine court.161 
In the second half of the fourteenth century, the marriages with the Christian Balkan 
dynasties increased. Previously, in the Balkans, marriages between Muslim and Catholic 
or Orthodox dynastic families had been unthinkable. In 1378, however, Sultan Murad I (r. 
1362-1389) married Kera Tamara, the daughter of Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Alexander Asen 
(1310-1371). Murad I became the brother-in-law of Ivan Sisman (r. 1350-1395), the future 
Tsar of Bulgaria. In 1391, Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) married Oliveira Despina, the 
daughter of Lazarus Hebeljanović, king of Serbia who was killed at the battle of Kosovo in 
1389. Hence, in his turn Stefan Lazarević (r. 1374-1427) became the brother-in-law and 
vassal of Bayezid I, allying his principality to the Ottoman state.162 
Dynastic marriages also played an important role in the expansionist policy of the 
Ottoman principality in Anatolia. Sultan Murad I married his son, crown prince Bayezid, 
to the daughter of Süleymân Şah, the bey of the Turkish state of Germiyan. Through this 
alliance, Murad not only formed relations with his southern neighbor, but also allied his 
dynasty with the leading Sufi families in Anatolia. Sultan Hatun, the daughter of 
Germiyanoğlu and the wife of Bayezid I, was the great-grand daughter of Mevlana Rumi - 
the famous Sufi poet from Konya. The Ottoman chroniclers presented this marriage as a 
result of the request by the Germiyanid lord, Süleyman Şah, who wished to protect his 
territory against annexation by the Karamanids. He proposed this marriage to Murad I 
and offered the city of Kütahya, the Germiyanid capital, and several other cities as dowry 
of his daughter. Murad agreed and acquired most of the Germiyanid principality.163 In 
1376, Alaeddin Ali Bey of Karaman asked for the hand of Melek Hatun, the daughter of 
Sultan Murad I, a request that was accepted. A few years later, the bey of Karaman 
attacked Ankara, which had recently been incorporated into the Ottoman realm. It was 
only thanks to the appeals of Sultan Hatun to his father Murad I that he renounced a 
punitive expedition against Alaeddin Bey.164 
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While royal marriages of the fourteenth century were contracted predominantly with 
Christian women, those of the fifteenth century were made primarily with Muslim 
women. This shift reflects the growing importance of the Ottomans as an Anatolian 
power. Marriage marked the submission of some Turkish dynasties to the Ottomans. 
Sultan Murad II (r. 1420-1451) married three times. His first marriage was with Alime 
Hatun, a princess of the Dulkadir principality. He also married Tacünnisa Hatice Hatun, 
the daughter of the prince of İsfendiyar. His last marriage was in 1433 with Mara 
Brankovic, the daughter of the king of Serbia.165 This was the last inter-dynastic marriage. 
With Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481) royal inter-dynastic marriages came to an end. The 
sultans no longer tied themselves into dynastic marriages. They no longer wished to share 
the political and symbolic power that they had accumulated with the conquest of 
Constantinople. Another reason for the cessation of inter-dynastic marriages was the 
drying up of the pool of neighbouring dynasties. With the conquest of Constantinople the 
last of the neighbouring dynasties was eliminated. The House of Osman contracted three 
more marriages with Turkish dynasties, but these were made for princes rather than for 
the sultan himself. In 1450, Murad II married his son Mehmed to Sitti, a princess from the 
south-eastern Turkish dynasty of Dulkadir. Mehmed II in turn married his son Bayezid to 
Ayşe, another Dulkadir princess. This marriage was most probably concluded to secure 
the neutrality of the Dulkadir ruler in the wake of Ottoman eastern campaign against the 
Akkoyunlus in 1468. Bayezid II married his son Selim to Ayşe Hafsa Hatun, the daughter 
of the vassal Crimean Tatar khan Mengli Giray in 1494. In this period, the principle that 
sultans did not contract legal marriages, but instead perpetuated through concubines was 
firmly established. It was Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520-1566) who broke the tradition with his 
formal marriage to one of his concubines, Hürrem.166 
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2.8 The Debate on the Origins and Nature of the Ottoman 
State 
The scarcity of Ottoman sources from the early fourteenth century has inevitably 
tempted the fantasies of scholars and led to a series of speculations on the origins of the 
Ottomans and their state formation. Early Ottoman state building was the most 
controversial and highly debated issue of this historiography. The central question 
focused on how the Ottoman state could develop in a few generations from a tiny 
principality into a world power and could survive for more than six centuries. Most 
importantly, to whom should this success be attributed? Some modern scholars suggested 
that the only possible explanation for the success of the Ottoman dynasty was owed to 
the Christian elements and influences. In 1916, the American theologian, Herbert 
Gibbons, initiated the debate by claiming that the foundations of the Ottoman state were 
laid by the Christian and Byzantine recruits and converts.167 He perceived the Ottomans 
as a ‘new race’, a mixture of Turkish, Greek and Balkan peoples, in which the Christian 
element was much more crucial. Gibbons saw the Ottoman state formation as the 
outcome of this ‘racial blending’ of a ‘wild Asiatic blood’ with the ‘European stock’, in 
which the Byzantine state structure and institutions were maintained under a Muslim 
guise. The underlying assumption of Gibbons’ approach was his belief that the powerful 
Ottoman Empire could simply not have emerged from Turkish and Muslim roots alone. 
Gibbons assumed that ‘nomadic Turkish tribes had no ability to establish the organisation 
for a state’.168  
In the Europe of his time Gibbons’ theory enjoyed a very broad recognition. Charles 
Diehl, a French Byzantinist, joined him and believed that the Turks were merely rough 
soldiers, but certainly no administrators and that they understood little from politics. 
Diehl wrote: ‘Les Turcs modelèrent donc en grande partie de leur institutions d’Etat et 
leur organisation administrative sur ce que leur offrait Byzance […] Les Turcs avaient 
besoin d'autre part d’administrateurs et de diplomates. Ils les trouvèrent en grand 
nombre parmi les chrétiens.’169 The Romanian medievalist, Nicolae Jorga, was also 
convinced that the ‘rough Turks’ had created nothing new and that they merely 
continued the existing Byzantine institutions.170 As a consequence, these authors 
overlooked the multiple connections of the nascent Ottoman enterprise with Seljuks, 
Mamluks, Byzantines, Venetians, Genoese and Mongol Ilkhanids. Fundamentally, they 
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expressed the consensus that the Turks were inferior to Europeans, an implicit or explicit 
assumption that still prevailed among Western scholars of this generation. This negative 
perception and description of ‘the Turk’ was actually a continuation of the historical 
pattern of thought, which was already developed by the humanists during the 
Renaissance.171 Even later in the twentieth century, often clearly without realising this 
themselves, implicitly or unwillingly, some authors still held similar perceptions.172 
2.8.1 Critical Voices: Giese, Köprülü and the Annales-methode 
In the early twentieth century, some more nuanced historical approaches appeared. In 
explaining the emergence and success of the Ottoman state formation, the German 
historian Friedrich Giese pointed to the structure of craft guilds and merchants in 
Anatolia, the network of Ahi-corporations.173 Predominantly, ahis were artisans who had 
passed through various stages in order to become masters in their craft.174 They had to 
produce qualitative goods and share the profits of their trade among themselves. The 
underlying idea was that arts, trade and artisanship were perceived as means to serve the 
people. Giese argued that the foundations of the early Ottoman administrative practices 
had to be sought in these urban guild-like ahi organisations that were active during the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Anatolia. The ahi-organisations provided for 
security and continuation of the social and economic life in the cities, when the 
overarching political authority of the Seljuks had collapsed due to the Mongol invasion 
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of Anatolia in 1248.175 The American historians, Blake and Langer also argued persuasively 
that the early guild-like ahi organisations in the Anatolian cities had provided the 
fundaments of the early Ottoman governmental practice. In the absence of an authority 
during the political chaos of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, these ahi 
federations and ‘brotherhoods’ provided not only solidarity between craftsmen, but also 
ensured services for the continuation of social life in the Anatolian cities.176  
Köprülü also rejected Gibbons’ reasoning and formulated a thesis focusing on Turkish 
nomadic lore. He demonstrated the extent to which the Ottoman institutions derived 
from Seljuk and Mongol Ilhanid administrative heritage.177 Köprülü argued that the 
Ottoman state derived from an amalgam of different Turkish tribes living in Anatolia. 
These Turkish groups were the inheritors of an administrative legacy passed to them 
from Muslim Seljuk and Mongol Ilkhanid roots. The Ottoman bureaucracy was formed 
according to these two inherited practices. Köprülü argued that urban life among the 
Anatolian Turks in the fourteenth century was sufficiently developed to attract Turks 
who had gained experience in the administrative organisation of the Seljuk, Ilhanid and 
Mamluk state.178 He shifted the focus from the military incidents to the social context, the 
cultural traditions and the institutional structures upon which the Ottomans built their 
polity.179 In this sense, Köprülü's work (1935) was already in line with the new approach 
of the Annales. An interesting fact, as it would still take some decades before this approach 
would decisively replace the traditionally dominant political-military narrative 
historiography in Europe itself.180 
2.8.2 Wittek’s gazi-thesis 
In 1938, the Austrian historian Paul Wittek published his famous gazi-thesis in a reaction 
to Köprülü.181 Wittek rejected the nomadic Oghuz-Kayı origins of the Ottoman dynasty 
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and sought the essence of the Ottoman state formation in the so-called gaza, a term which 
he translated as ‘holy war’. Paul Wittek claimed that the Ottoman state expanded because 
of its Islamic inclination to wage a holy war or gaza. For generations his thesis remained 
the dominant explanation of the Ottoman state and today it is still often quoted.182 
Although warfare is only one aspect of state formation, Wittek initiated a controversial 
debate and claimed that the gaza – which he understood as a continuous ‘holy war’ and 
as proselytism against Christians – was the central ideological motive of the Ottoman 
state. He described the Ottoman Turks as ‘fanatic warriors of Islam’ for whom ‘from their 
first appearance, warfare against their Christian neighbours was the principal factor of 
their political practice. This struggle never ceased to be of vital importance to the 
Ottoman Empire.’183 Initially, the Byzantine resistance was of crucial importance as it 
slowed down Ottoman expansion. In fact this delay made it possible for the Ottomans to 
build and consolidate their institutions. In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman state 
gradually began to decline after the gaza had struck in Western Europe. The final 
breakdown came after the loss of nearly all the European possessions due to Ottoman 
defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913: ‘This defeat obliged the Ottomans to resign 
definitely and forever any ambition of ruling over Christian countries and this meant the 
renunciation of the raison d’être of their state.’184 Wittek assumed that his interpretation 
of gaza had continuously driven the Ottoman state from its emergence until its demise. 
Recognising the scholarship of Wittek, I will nevertheless question his theory in several 
respects. 
Firstly, regarding warfare, it should be noted that waging war has always been an 
outcome and a crucial component of state formation. Both in medieval Western European 
history and during the early Ottoman period, the wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries were the products not only of violence, but also of conceptual and 
administrative developments; wars resulted in the growth of centralised jurisdictions, 
governmental intrusiveness and administrative capacity.185 To explain the politics of this 
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period in terms of war is, in a sense, to explain them in terms of state building. Charles 
Tilly’s pithy observation, ‘War made the state and the state made war’, echoes this point 
clearly.186 In order to legitimise their wars, both the Western and Ottoman sides referred 
to religious terms. The Ottomans justified their campaigns and mobilisation for war with 
references to the ‘chivalric’ gaza-ethos. The Ottoman court poet Ahmedî, who wrote the 
first historical text (c. 1410), presented the Ottoman rulers as gazi-sultans and defined the 
gazi as: ‘the servant of God’ (Tangrınun ferrâşıdur), ‘the sword of God’ (Hak kılıcıdur) and 
‘the support and refuge of the people of religion’ (püşt ü penâh-ı ehl-i dîn).187 
It is exactly on this oldest chronicle of Ahmedî that Wittek based his gaza-thesis and 
referred to the inscription (kitabe) from 1337 at the Şehadet Mosque in Bursa, where 
Orhan Bey in a canonical formulation is called ‘Sultan of the Gazis’. The composition of 
the titles in the inscription at the Şehadet mosque were for Wittek ‘absolutely unique in 
the Ottoman protocol and demonstrated that this peculiar formulation expressed a 
historical reality, which also dominated the chronicle of Ahmedi’.188 However, Feridun 
Emecen showed that taking the gazi-title and the political use of its ethos were not 
uniquely Ottoman, as Wittek had claimed. Other Muslim rulers in Anatolia before the 
Ottomans had also used the title of gazi. This was a legacy of the warrior culture and 
dynamics of the earlier Arab-Byzantine frontiers of Anatolia and the frontiers of 
Transoxania.189 Furthermore, the gaza was neither an uniquely Ottoman ideology nor 
necessarily a Sunni doctrine. The sixteenth-century Safavid dynasty, which promoted the 
Shia dogma as an instrument of their anti-Ottoman policies in order to split the Turkish 
nomadic communities under Ottoman control, also keenly portrayed themselves as the 
‘real gazis’.190    
Wittek’s main evidence, Ahmedî, was a fifteenth-century poet attached to the Ottoman 
court, as we have discussed in Chapter 1. To answer the Ottoman need for legitimacy, 
Ahmedî praised the Ottomans through the gaza-motive. In the eyes of many Muslims, the 
Ottoman military successes legitimised them as heroic warriors at the frontiers of Islam. 
The gaza-rhetoric was actually intended for an internal audience: as a vehicle for 
legitimisation. And so Ahmedî elevated gaza from the level of a religious concept to that 
of a political principle that legitimised the otherwise pragmatic conquests at the 
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frontiers. Indeed, gaza meant different things to different groups at different times, 
according to their political agendas. The fifteenth-century chronicler Neşrî noted that 
Osman Bey decided to undertake gaza, so that he could win his own bread and would not 
be dependent on any other king for his existence.191  
Wittek uncritically accepted the literary devices of Ahmedî. On this basis, he concluded 
that there was sufficient evidence that the gaza was the driving force of the Ottoman 
state. However, Ahmedî’s epic poem was not meant to discuss the history of the Ottomans. 
It was rather an example of the popular nasihatname-genre, a literary genre to educate 
and advise the princes, whereby he advised his patrons that the army should undertake 
warfare against ‘infidel’ states and not fight against fellow Muslim Turkish states. Ahmedî 
was aware that, although gaza might serve to justify the conquests of non-Muslim 
territories, it could be dangerously used to justify the conquest of Muslim states. It did 
not serve to win the loyalty of the other Muslim Turkish princes in Anatolia. He had 
witnessed how Sultan Yıldırım Bâyezid had lost the battle against Timur Lenk, the 
powerful Turkish conqueror from Central Asia. Earlier, Bâyezid I had seized the Turkish 
principalities of Anatolia, whose princes were displeased after they had lost their 
positions. Consequently, during the battle at Ankara they went over to Timur’s side, with 
catastrophic consequences. Timur restored the Turkish princes and divided the Ottoman 
territories. As I shall discuss more in detail in the following chapter, in his introduction 
to his chronicle, from which Wittek selectively cited, Ahmedî actually emphasised the 
Islamic principle of just rule or justice.192 
Furthermore, Linda Darling’s study of medieval Muslim frontiers in Central Asia, India 
and Anatolia demonstrated that gaza existed on all those frontier regions, where each 
group held a different understanding of gaza and its practices.193 Gaza could thus serve as 
a foundational concept in Ottoman discourse of legitimation, appealing to a wide variety 
of people. This did not necessarily imply that a ‘holy war’ was the engine of Ottoman state 
building. Interestingly, the confrontational ideology of gaza appeared predominantly on 
the popular level, especially among the converts, rather than coming from the Ottoman 
rulers themselves, who always seemed less enthusiastic.194 In fact, the tensions between 
the different groups who struggled for power and rewrote their history were reflected in 
the contradictions in the sources. Indeed, as we shall see, gaza meant different things to 
different groups at different times and circumstances. 
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2.8.3 Critics of Wittek’s thesis 
Wittek’s gaza-thesis was a narrative of which the dominant motif was conquest of and 
warfare against Christians. In other words, Ottoman historiography acquired a kind of 
exoticism, fabricated by European observers. Consequently, it was no surprise that for so 
long scholars fell for burlesque depictions of corruption and decline once the age of 
conquest came to an inevitable end. Wittek’s thesis remained very influential for a long 
time and only in the 1980s it first received systematic scholarly criticism. Among these 
critics, there existed a variety of answers to the question of gaza. Scholars came to 
opposing theories about the early Ottomans. Some regarded them as engaged in an 
Islamic ‘holy war’ activity and some as heterodox and inclusive, while others rejected 
their gazi identity as later fabrications of the princely court. 
Relying on anthropological studies on nomadism, the American historian Paul Lindner 
claimed that the early Ottomans had been predominantly motivated by a desire for booty 
and plunder.195 Lindner argued that the recruitment of Byzantine Christians in the 
Ottoman military ranks was inconsistent with the alleged ‘spirit of the exclusive gaza 
ideology’. According to him early Ottomans were rather ‘shamanistic nomads’, whose 
practices and traditions were inconsistent with the ‘essence’ of Islam. Consequently, he 
rejected the gaza motive in the Ottoman historical texts as ‘orthodox religious fantasies’, 
invented by the late fifteenth-century ‘court-chroniclers’.196 After Lindner, there 
appeared a number of articles which defended a similar perspective.197 However, the 
Turkish historian Cemal Kafadar clearly demonstrated the problematic aspects of 
Lindner’s viewpoint. According to Kafadar, his approach was the result of an Orientalist 
reading of the early Ottoman sources. He pointed to the distortions caused by the 
essentialist trap when one assumes such notions as the ‘real Islam’ or the ‘real gazis’ and 
apply them as criteria.198 In his work, Kafadar reconstructed a balanced picture of the 
Anatolian marcher culture and society during the early Ottoman period.199 He concluded 
that Wittek’s gaza-thesis was much more flexible than was recognised by its critics.200  
The British historians Colin Heywood and Colin Imber regarded Wittek as a kind of 
demon that had to be expelled. However, Imber did Wittek little justice by associating 
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him too easily with the German nationalist historiography, which is somewhat irreverent 
towards a scholar who fled to England when the Nazis came to power in Germany.201 
Heywood argued that Wittek's gaza-thesis is an ‘ideal type’, which says more about his 
own education in late Habsburg Vienna, than about early Ottoman history itself. He 
explained that a link existed with the German neo-romantic poet, Stefan George, as 
Witteks alleged principal inspiration. Heywood concluded that Wittek’s interpretation of 
Ottoman history was ‘mystically inspired and amoral’.202 Imber claimed that Wittek’s 
interpretation of the early Ottoman history was ‘a false analysis’ based on broad 
generalisations that did not stand. He suggested that the term gazi was already in the 
period of Osman Gazi a ‘hollow concept’. However, Imber also reasoned that the early 
Ottoman history was a ‘black hole’, about which nothing can be said due to the lack of 
reliable sources.203  
In response, the Turkish historian Halil İnalcık suggested a detailed chronology of the 
earliest history of the Ottoman Empire using both Byzantine and Ottoman texts written 
from different viewpoints.204 As we have already seen, İnalcık argued that the early 
Ottoman historiographical sources should be carefully interpreted instead of being 
entirely rejected from the onset. He also incorporated the Wittek-thesis in his work and 
emphasised the importance of the gaza-ideology as ‘a unifying factor that exceeded the 
tribal divides’.205 Inalcik confirmed that the gaza, for which he also used the term ‘holy 
war’, was an important factor in the emergence and expansion of the Ottoman state. He 
agreed with Wittek that the frontier society in the Anatolian marches conformed to 
specific cultural traits, imbued with the ‘ideal of continuous Holy War and the expansion 
of the realm of the Islam – the Dârülislam – until they covered the whole.’206 The gaza-
ideology accorded to the idea of universal rule that was inspired by Islamic political 
thought. However, the gaza was not aimed at proselytism against the Christians nor was 
it intended to destroy the infidel world – the Dârülharb – driven by an a priori religious 
hatred. The Ottoman state ideology used it as a legitimising rhetoric tool to cover its 
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endeavours to subdue their adversary Christian states, as well as the rival dynasties in the 
Muslim world.   
The final voice in this debate was that of the American historian, Heath W. Lowry, a 
specialist of the Christian peasants in the Ottoman state.207 Following the ideas of Lindner, 
Lowry claimed that gaza was not a ‘hollow concept, but it was well used by the Ottomans 
to gain booty and slaves’. The primary motivation of the Ottomans, according to Lowry, 
was a desire for booty and slaves. He held that the Ottoman state was founded by Christian 
and Muslim war lords, who organised themselves into a ‘plundering confederation’, open 
to everyone who could contribute to this goal of amassing booty, slaves and plunder for 
its followers.208 It was this desire for booty and slaves, rather than religious zeal, which 
attracted increasing numbers of warriors to the Ottomans. However, Lowry tended to 
treat the entire fourteenth century as possessing a single ethos, namely the desire for 
booty and slaves. He assumed that the Ottoman ‘war machine’ rolled into the Balkans, 
‘fuelled by the greed and ambition of a predatory confederacy’.209 Lowry concluded that 
the Ottomans were not gazis, but a predatory band. Furthermore, he ascribed the success 
of the Ottoman state formation to the integration of the Christian Balkan and Byzantine 
aristocracy into the Ottoman ruling elite.210 This integration would have been 
necessitated due to the lack of skilled human resources among the Muslim Turks, who 
were not able to build the structures of governmental organisation.211 In this sense, 
Lowry’s work is a reformulation of Gibbons’ old idea of the exaggerated role of the 
Christians in the Ottoman state building.212 
2.8.4 Gaza, Jihad and Holy War 
Scholars have debated the nature and origins of the early Ottomans, and particularly the 
definition and role of gaza for some time without closure. In order to clarify some matters 
in this complex debate, it seems better to firstly consider the semantic differences of the 
notions of gaza and holy war. Because the question still remains whether the concepts 
gaza, jihad and holy war can be used as equivalents. Are they interchangeable synonyms? 
Wittek interpreted the concept gaza wrongly as an equivalent to the western term ‘holy 
war’. He was the first historian who translated the term gaza in this way.213 This 
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translation was soon adopted by other scholars. However, this translation is problematic 
in the context of the fourteenth-century Ottoman history, since the early Ottoman 
sources did not use the term jihad. Furthermore, the gaza did not mean the same thing as 
jihad and it had different connotations than the Christian term ‘holy war’. Each of these 
terms appear in different semantic and historical contexts, which are to be explored in 
the sources.214  
The term ‘holy war’ is obviously a European Christian concept and mostly finds its 
origins, development and connotations in the context of medieval European history. 
From the European Christian perspective, religious difference was the main reason to 
start a holy war. The western idea of holy war was driven by proselytism and was 
characterised by religious intolerance, which usually made the coexistence of different 
creeds very difficult. The term implied a categorical hostility of Christianity towards the 
other religions. During the Crusades, which had the ultimate goal of liberating Anatolia 
and Jerusalem from the Muslim infidels, the use of violence was commonly justified by 
the hatred against ‘the infidel Turk and his heretical religion’. From 638 onwards, 
Jerusalem was under Muslim rule. In 1095, at the Council of Clermont-Ferrand, pope 
Urban II called for the First Crusade and summoned to take up the cross against the Seljuk 
Turks. Urban was a French nobleman who had served as grand prior of the monastery of 
Cluny before becoming cardinal-bishop and then pope. Guilbert of Nogent, an eyewitness 
chronicler of the First Crusade, observed: ‘In our own time, God has instituted a holy 
warfare, so that knights and common people have found a new way of winning 
salvation.’215 
According to Robert the Monk, an eyewitness writing after 1099, in his speech Pope 
Urban II denounced the Seljuk Turks as ‘an accursed race, utterly alienated from God’.216 
Fulcher of Chartres, another eyewitness who wrote after the First Crusade, reported that 
the pope called the Seljuk Turks ‘enemies of God’ and summoned that it was a Christian 
duty ‘to exterminate this vile race from our lands.’217 In declaring the Crusade, Pope Urban 
stated that the ‘Holy Sepulcher of our Lord is polluted by the filthiness of an unclean 
nation. Therefore, go forward in happiness and confidence, and destroy the enemies of 
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God.’218 Both the Christian and Muslim eyewitness accounts confirm that during the three 
days after the crusaders had captured Jerusalem, they massacred, in an orgy of killing, 
nearly every Muslim and Jewish inhabitant of the city.219 Norman Housley, a leading 
historian of the crusades, wrote: ‘The main characteristic of western Christianity [that 
undertook the crusades] was an a priori hostility towards the Turks and the desire for 
their destruction.’220 And since the late fourteenth century, the ultimate goal of the 
Crusades changed into the objective of expelling the Muslims, i.e. the Ottomans, from 
Europe and Anatolia. The idea of a Christian holy war against the Muslim ‘Turks’ was in 
this way embedded in a long cultural tradition. This intellectual tradition disseminated 
the old assumption of a relentless struggle between Christianity and Islam.221 As noted 
above, many humanist writers from the fifteenth and sixteenth-century imagined that 
the Turks originated from the Scythians and the Trojans, and assumed that this revealed 
crucial information about the ‘barbaric’ nature of the Ottoman Empire.  
The above discussed Western perception of the Islam and ‘the Turk’ in historical 
writings also somehow determined the viewpoint of Wittek. It is apparent that he 
interpreted the concept gaza exactly from this cultural background and intellectual 
heritage when he translated gaza as holy war. He understood and described the gaza as a 
kind of mirroring image of the Western crusade ideology. Consequently, the terms gaza, 
jihad and holy war were used as interchangeable synonyms in many scholarly works.222 
As Kafadar already remarked, however, neither gaza nor jihad originally meant holy war. 
The early Ottoman sources made a difference between the concepts gaza and jihad and 
the latter was not used in the early Ottoman narratives on campaigns. Studies have also 
shown that the concept jihad, once it was introduced in the late seventeenth century by 
the Ottomans, was not used in the sense of continuous warfare to expand the territories 
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of Islam.223 The originally Arabic word jihad literally means ‘striving in the path of God.’224 
The term jihad carried both the meaning of moral and spiritual self-improvement, as well 
as to struggle for the Muslim community or umma, if it was threatened from outside. Long 
after the medieval crusades, the second meaning once again became important and was 
reintroduced in the 1850s, during the resistance against the European colonial intrusion. 
It was firstly announced by the Muslims in India against the British colonisation, later in 
the Arab world and during the First World War proclaimed by the Ottoman Sultan and 
Caliph.225 Jihad in the sense of struggle against the European colonialism is a relatively 
modern meaning. The jihad differs from the concept of holy war, which is characterised 
by hostility based on religious difference and proselytism. 
Originally, the term gaza meant ‘a raid into enemy territory’; in this meaning, the term 
was taken over into Western languages as razzia.226 The concept had a belligerent 
connotation in the sense of expanding the political power. Many Muslim princes before 
the Ottomans had used the word gazi (i.e. a person who undertakes the gaza) as a 
honorary title.227 The Islamic principles considered the gaza as a lesser obligatory exploit 
or as farz-i kifaye: a battle waged by a group of warriors for the benefit of the whole society. 
However, in case of great danger for the Muslim community, the gaza was asserted as 
farz-i ayn: a general obligation and duty for every man of the community.228 The gazis 
before the Ottomans lived in the frontier regions of Khorasan under the rule of the 
Samanids, in the ninth and tenth centuries. They were active as a part of the armies of 
the Great Seljuk Empire. For instance, after his conversion to Islam, Selçuk, the 
eponymous founder of the Seljuk dynasty, led gaza raids against the non-Muslim Oǧuz 
Turks in Khorasan.229 
During the eleventh century, the term gaza gained importance, particularly under the 
influence of al-Nasir. This Abbasid caliph used the concept to legitimise the struggle to 
defend the Muslim world when it was attacked by the Crusaders and during the thirteenth 
century by the Mongols. Subsequently, gaza became a part of the futuvva movement, a 
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canon of ethical norms to achieve spiritual perfection and to pursue ‘chivalric’ heroism.230 
The futuvva idea was revived in the Turkish society in Anatolia by the guild-like ahi 
organisations. The gazis thus operated as part of the overarching futuvva movement.231 
Furthermore, the Ottoman interpretation of gaza was also rooted in the pre-Islamic, 
Turkish nomadic political traditions. In the sources, Osman and his followers were 
simultaneously referred to with the terms gazi and alp. For the pre-Islamic nomadic 
Turks, alp meant ‘brave warrior’, an honorary title adopted by nobility. After their 
conversion to Islam, the Turks used the title alp simultaneously with the honorary title 
gazi. According to Ashik Pashazade, around Osman Bey a group of warriors formed, 
consisting of alps and ‘comrades’ or nökers, who under his leadership took part in the 
gaza.232 The group that was mentioned by Ashik Pashazade as gazi were at the same time 
alps.233 The fourteenth-century Turkish poet and mystic Ashik Pasha (the grandfather of 
the chronicler) used in his Garibnâme the term alp, which he described as the ideal 
professional warrior. He used gazi and alp usually as synonyms.234 The Ottoman gazi 
groups grew out of this Turkish alp communities. Their struggle against both Christian 
and Muslim opponents was covered by the principle of gaza. The gaza idea worked 
somehow as a unifying factor that transcended the tribal rifts, and granted them a group 
solidarity under the leadership of the House of Osman. This was very similar to the way 
the first Seljuk princes managed to bring together different Oghuz tribes under their 
banner.  
The sources of post-Seljuk Anatolia and the early Ottoman chronicler Aşık Paşazade 
often invoked three social groups: namely the ahis, the abdal (Turkish Sufis and dervishes) 
and the gazis. Aşık Paşazade added a fourth and even a more enigmatic group: the baciyânı 
Rûm (‘the sisters of Roman lands’ that referred to the mounted women warriors).235 
Broquière, when passing through south-east Anatolia in 1432, encountered a group of 
armed and mounted Turkish women warriors. He was impressed by the sight of mounted 
women warriors and noted that these women were equally fine cavaliers and archers as 
the men: ‘They told me that there were thirty thousand female warriors, which is 
extraordinary.’236 It is most probable that the mounted women warriors whom Broquière 
saw, were the same baciyânı Rûm which Aşık Paşazade had mentioned. 
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In the Risalet'ül Islam, a Turkish theoretical handbook on the principles of Islam from 
the fourteenth century, there is a chapter on ‘the Ways of the Gazi’.237 The Risalet sums up 
nine criteria in order to become a gazi: a gazi must have the permission of his parents; he 
must have no debts, leave behind revenues for his family, and possess a profession that 
will allow him to earn his own livelihood. The gazi is not permitted to use violence against 
the local population and he must not flee from the battlefield. As an important detail, the 
handbook mentions that, when dealing with the redistribution of the booty, the Christian 
warriors also have to get their share of the booty if they have participated in the gaza.238 
The gaza was thus not considered as an activity that was reserved exclusively for Muslims. 
It is also very likely that the Turkish nomads have used the Islamic gaza-concept as a 
synonym for the steppe concept of akın. The noun akın is derived from the verb akmak 
which means to flow; in military terms it attained the meaning of ‘incursion into enemy 
territory’.239 It can be said that the Ottoman gazi-warriors were actually akıncı-raiders, 
who legitimised their military actions by referring to the gaza-ethos, in the meaning of 
expanding the power of their authority. The fifteenth-century historian Ahmedî also 
interchanged the term gaza with akın.240 Imber and Lowry also noticed this, but they made 
a problematic distinction between the two terms by categorising them as ‘secular’ akın 
and ‘religious’ gaza.241 Today, we undoubtedly tend to separate the political from the 
religious in a way that would have been unusual in the fourteenth-century historical 
context. Such a categorical distinction between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ dimensions did 
not exist in the Ottoman tradition; both were in fact entangled. During the early Ottoman 
period, the terms akın and gaza underwent a transformation and gaza began to mean 
‘conquest’. The methodology of Lowry is at times biased if not teleological. He tenaciously 
holds to the meaning of ‘desire to acquire booty and slaves’ and he therefore considers 
the Ottomans as merely a predatory confederation.242 However, the binary opposition 
between a ‘plundering band’ or ‘holy warriors’ is a false assumption. The gaza is to be 
considered on the level of warfare as a product of state formation, or as Tilly noted: ‘war 
makes the state and the state makes war’. It is rather revealing to explore how the 
Ottomans perceived their policy of expansion and legitimised it.  
Witteks methodology was not fundamentally wrong. He passed over the fact too 
readily that the gaza-rhetoric was rather intended for internal consumption as a tool for 
legitimation of Ottoman political formation. Certainly, the gaza-concept is extensively 
employed by the first chroniclers who produced a set of ‘Histories of the House of Osman’. 
 
                                                     
237 Şinasi Tekin, 'XIV. yüzyılda yazılmış Gazilik tarikası’, 143. 
238 Ibidem, 144-145. 
239 Decei, A. ‘Aḳınd̲j̲ı’ EI², Brill Online. 
240 Ahmedî, Dasitan-i tevârîh, 30. 
241 Imber, ‘The Legend of Osman Gazi’, 73; Lowry, The nature, 45.  
242 Lowry, The Nature, 46. 
 108 
Ahmedî was the first to present the gaza-motif as an important source of identity and 
legitimacy for the Ottoman dynasty. Ahmedî wrote his work after the Battle of Ankara 
(1402), at a time when the invasion of Timur in Anatolia led to chaos and fear. He 
addressed it to his patron, the Ottoman crown prince Süleyman Çelebi, the son of Sultan 
Bayezid I. Ahmedî advised to Süleyman to carry out gaza raids against Christian states in 
order to back off the Timurid threat and to unite the sons of Bayezid who were involved 
in a civil war. The poet Ahmedi raised gaza to the level of a political principle. It remained, 
however, merely one of the various elements that constituted the Ottoman ‘state 
ideology’. In this discursive and historical context, the self-image of the Ottoman princes 
began to form as gazi-sultans. 
2.9 The Policy of İstimâlet 
Another important difference of the term gaza with the notion of ‘holy war’ derives from 
the fact that the Ottomans applied pragmatic and inclusive policies towards the Christian 
and Jewish populations in the newly seized territories. The conquests were not focused 
on proselytism but on expanding the influence of Ottoman authority and neutralising its 
political opponents. In his discussion of the Ottoman methods of expansion, İnalcık 
pointed to the policy of istimâlet that focused on winning the consent of the non-Muslim 
population in the newly acquired territories.243 With this policy, the Ottomans kept the 
laws, traditions, status and privileges intact, as they had existed in the period before 
Ottoman rule. The non-Muslim military elite and the Christian leading clerics were 
included in the Ottoman administrative system.244 The extent to which the early 
Ottomans rather sought accommodation than they were bent on conversion can be 
illustrated by the following examples, which demonstrate the characteristics of the 
istimâlet process. As Kafadar and İnalcık convincingly argued, the Ottoman polity had 
emerged as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society that accompanied Ottoman 
tolerance, which was not a lapse on the part of a few individuals but another established 
characteristic of Ottoman identity. In the context of Muslim–Christian relations in 
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Anatolia, Tijana Krstić’s work also presents a significant contribution to the debate. She 
presented a new view at Islamisation and conversion in the Ottoman lands.245 
It is widely known that the early Ottomans allowed a great degree of religious and 
cultural diversity within their realm. This was obviously not a unique Ottoman practice, 
but the expression of a deeply rooted tradition in Islamic history. In this respect, the 
Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the Genoese colony in Galata retained their status and 
privileges after the conquest of Istanbul.246 The chronicler Aşık Paşazade wrote that 
Osman Gazi actively tried to maintain his good relations with the Christian neighbours. 
When his brother Gündüz Alp insisted to raid the neighbouring Christian villages, Osman 
Gazi rejected this proposal: ‘If we destroy the surrounding places, our city Karacahisar 
cannot develop.’247 A few passages further, when asked why he shows so much respect 
and pays attention to the ‘infidels’ of the city Bilecik, Osman Gazi replied: ‘Because they 
are our neighbours. When we arrived to this place, we found ourselves in a grim situation 
and they were nice to us. Now we have to make sure that they feel good.’248 And during 
the takeover of Bursa in 1326, Orhan Gazi accepted a ransom of thirty thousand florins 
for the surrender of the city instead of killing the Christian population or forcing them to 
convert to Islam.249  
The protection of the Jews, who in many parts of Europe were of course regularly 
persecuted and oppressed, was also a part of the Ottoman istimâlet policy. Since the 
founding years, oppressed and persecuted Jews found a refuge in the Ottoman realm. For 
example, Orhan Gazi found in Bursa a Jewish community which had been oppressed under 
Byzantine rule and gave them permission to build a synagogue in the new Ottoman 
capital, upon which the Jews welcomed the Ottomans as saviours.250 In 1394, Sultan 
Yıldırım Bayezid I granted refuge to the Jews in France, where they had been persecuted 
by King Charles VI. The most notable event is the evacuation of the Jews expelled from 
Spain in 1492 by the Ottoman fleet on order of Sultan Bayezid II.251 The non-Muslims in 
the Ottoman realm enjoyed the status of zimmi or recognised and protected Christian and 
Jewish subjects of the sultan. As it was a common policy under the earlier Islamic states, 
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the only requirement for non-Muslims was to pay an individual tax, djizye (or jizya).252 
They were exempted from military service and received a high degree of autonomy in 
regulating their own education, religious affairs, housing and social care. Many Christian 
peasants in the Balkans did therefore not regret to come under Ottoman rule, as they had 
previously been burdened by heavy taxes imposed by their feudal lords.253 This explains 
why the Ottoman government could rather easily settle in the Balkans without major 
resistance from the local Christian population. 
It is unlikely that the Ottomans conquered Christian countries merely because of 
religious hostility – as Wittek claimed – while they endorsed towards the non-Muslims a 
safe place in their society. Beyond the pragmatic considerations, the Ottoman inclusive 
attitude was based on two cultural elements. According to the standard conciliatory 
Islamic principle, the choice of faith is a personal preference and there can be no 
coercion.254 Furthermore, as it is generally known, the Islam considered the Christians 
and Jews as ‘people of the Book’ (ehli kitap), with whom the Muslims share common 
religious traditions.255 The Burgundian spy Broquiere, who visited Bursa in 1432, reported 
that the Ottoman charities (imarets) distributed ‘bread, wine [sic] and meat to the poor of 
the city for God’s will.’256 As a western Christian, he was astonished that his co-religionists 
were not excluded from the Ottoman social services.  
Wittek did observe and recognise the Ottoman tolerance towards other faiths, but he 
did not go deeper into this matter. For Wittek, the gazis were merely ‘the ruthless fighters 
for the faith, continuously stirred up by the fanatical dervishes to impose Islam on the 
Christians in the conquered lands.’257 He minimalized the Ottoman policy of 
accommodation as a purely ‘opportunistic measure’, only interested in the taxes they 
could collect from the non-Muslims. It is obvious that Wittek neglected to explore the 
Ottoman istimâlet policy, as this inevitably would have undermined his theory. His thesis 
was, after all, based on the assumption that the essence of the Ottoman state rooted in 
‘Islamic crusades’ and proselytism. 
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The second element that formed the basis of the Ottoman inclusive policy was the 
symbiosis of the nomadic steppe culture and the Islamic principles. The Central Asian 
Turks embraced Islam through the mediation of the Persian Sufi movements from 
Khorasan.258 The Persian sufi dervishes (mystics) travelled to the steppe and brought 
along their mystical Muslim ideas to the Turkish communities. However, the interaction 
between the Persians and various Turkish communities possessed a longer history. After 
the conversion of the Persians to Islam and the Turkish migrations westward, the Turkish 
communities were attracted by the Persian cultural production in art, literature and 
luxury goods.259 For instance, the eleventh-century scholar and lexicographer of Turkish 
languages, Mahmud al-Kashgari, commented that when the Oğuz mixed with the Persians, 
they had forgotten many Turkish words and used Persian instead.260  
Indeed, Sufism played a very powerful role in the popular forms assumed by Islam 
among the Turks. One reason for this sufi connection resides in the pre-Islamic mystical 
character of the previous religions that the different branches of the Turks adhered. 
Buddhism, Manichaeism, Shamanism and various forms of mystical nature worship were 
the most widespread traditions among the Turks of Central Asia in the pre-Islamic 
period.261 In time, Muslim Sufi movements spread steadily among the Turkish 
communities, as it flourished from the great Muslim centres like Bukhara and Samarkand 
and passed through ‘dervishes equipped with an ecstatic religious love’.262 
However, the old religions and traditions of the nomadic Oǧuz Turks continued to 
affect them, even after they had gradually adopted Islam. Their conversion to Islam did 
not mean that they were totally skinned of all of their old beliefs and traditions. For the 
nomadic Turks who came to the Muslim frontiers, conversion was a dual process. They 
constructed their own interpretation of Islam by blending it with the mystical aspects of 
the former religions, in which they preserved the ancient mythological traditions.263 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak pointed out that this interpretation of Islam developed quite 
spontaneously from the combining and fashioning of the remnants of several nomadic 
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traditions with Muslim principles. The result was that this interpretation of Islam was not 
characterised by the written and highly developed theological and canonical principles. 
The Turkish interpretation of Islam was rather compatible with the nomadic life under 
the severe natural conditions of the steppe.264  
The Turkish Sufi master, Ahmed-i Yesevî, was the first and most important 
representative of this early Turkish-Islamic mystical interpretation and his teachings 
marked the beginning of a tradition in Turkestan and Transoxania. His influence spread 
out until Anatolia and the Balkans.265 His thought was based on the influential idea of 
vahdet-i vücud (monism), which was formulated by Muhyiddin Ibn Arabî. This idea, often 
misunderstood and confused with pantheism, is a complicated conception. It can be 
roughly summarised as meaning that everything in the universe is a manifestation of God 
who is the sole creator, and since existence is God, all existence is actually nothing else 
than an expression of His existence. This line of thought became so influential that it not 
only affected the Sufi understandings of the time, such as Yunus Emre and Mevlana Rumi, 
but also the Sufi interpretation in almost the entire Islamic world until today.266  
The Muslim–Christian relations in the Ottoman world still appear to be a topic of 
undecided scholarly debate.267 In this respect, one can mention the recent approach of 
Krstić on Muslim-Christian relations in Anatolia and the Balkans. Krstić explored the 
degree of coexistence of Islam and Christianity in the early Ottoman period. She 
reinterpreted the shared ‘sacred space’ as ‘sites of intense inter-religious negotiation’, 
where ‘religious differences are upheld rather than collapsed’.268 She argued that these 
shared shrines are sites of perpetual competition and negotiation, which need to be 
understood in terms of local power relations: ‘the deeply competitive aspect of 
ambiguous shrines and thus as points of intense interfaith polemics rather than 
reconciliation is often lost to modern students of the Ottoman empire.’269  
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2.10  ‘Brokerage’ across networks and alliances 
To transcend the trap of the rhetoric of the sources, we need other approaches to the 
early Ottoman history. When Halil İnalcık described the Ottoman principality as ‘a true 
frontier empire, a cosmopolitan state, treating all creeds and races as one’, he at the same 
time highlighted an important feature of the Ottoman state building.270 A very fruitful 
approach was recently formulated by Karen Barkey. She noted that the conditions of the 
hybrid frontier promoted mutual assistance and concerted action not only in warfare, but 
also in festivity, gift exchange and building of reciprocity, often as ways of reducing 
uncertainty. Some of the social dynamics included ‘brokerage across networks’, 
recombination through alliances and moves from one network into another.271 According 
to Barkey, people who are located at the boundaries of cultural and political spheres can 
communicate across their divides by making use of these social practices. They become 
able to bring opinions, beliefs, and practices together and are likely to have innovative 
ideas and to promote change. As she put it: ‘the actors at the interstices of cultures can 
learn from both, connect them, find analogies between them, and exploit the best 
practices and beliefs of each end up innovating.’272 This model in the same way applies to 
early Ottoman state building. 
In the hybrid frontier zones, the cultural forms were mixed and much more complex 
than previously presented. As Wittek also pointed out, the early Ottomans built their 
polity within such a frontier territory, characterised by a high degree of cultural 
diversity, mobility, independence from the hinterland, sharing of lifestyles, ideas, 
institutional practices and epic tales.273 In this Turkish-Byzantine frontier, they told 
analogous narratives and increasingly adopting each other’s characteristics. In Anatolia, 
the frontier warriors – gazis and akritai – on both sides had for centuries been living in 
closer proximity to each other than to their central governments in their respective 
cultural hinterlands. Hence, it is not surprising to encounter the same type of motives 
and legends in the gests of Battal Gazi and Danişmend Gazi among Turkish Muslim epic 
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narratives, while similar Byzantine narratives were visible in the tales of Digenis Akritas. 
Their myths and legends often crossed geographical and cultural frontiers.274  
An example for the hybridity in the frontiers is the Muslim gazi epic of Battal Gazi, 
whose best friend and companion was his former foe on the Byzantine side. There also is 
the Byzantine tale of Digenis Akrites, whose father was a Muslim. Analogous to the 
European genre of the chanson de geste, these works told the heroic ‘chivalric’ and 
miraculous adventures of famous thirteenth-century gazi-leaders, such as the post-Seljuk 
heroes Seyyid Battal Gazi, Sarı Saltuk or Danişmend Gazi.275 These legendary-histories or 
‘pseudo-histories’ dealt with the legendary vitae of warriors and dervishes and were 
produced within the ‘knightly’ gazi values of the social and political life in western 
Anatolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The gests of Arab warriors, deriving 
from early Muslim history in the Arab-Byzantine frontiers, continued to play an 
important role in shaping the self-image and ‘knightly’ behaviour of the Muslim Turkish 
communities in Anatolia.276 
Furthermore, by creating local allies, the early Ottomans also managed to expand their 
authority. The Byzantine tekvur of Harmankaya, Köse Mihal, joined the ranks of Osman, 
becoming not only his brother-in-arms (nöker), but also his best friend (muhibbi). The 
fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicler Neşri writes that the ex-Byzantine Köse Mihal had 
joined Osman. Mihal was left in charge, which encouraged stability.277 His descendants, 
known as the Sons of Mihal or Mihal-oğulları, enjoyed one of the highest ranks among 
the gazis in Ottoman service.  
The fact that former Byzantine commanders and warriors were active among Osman’s 
followers indicates that the Ottomans were not driven by merely religious ‘holy war’. 
Although Osman took the Muslim warrior title of gazi, this did not contradict with the 
pragmatic inclusion of non-Muslim warriors (martolos, voynuk) into his ranks.278 They were 
first of all the followers of Osman, the Osmanlı. This indicates that one’s religion did not 
determine whether or not one could join Osman’s banner; one’s performance and merits 
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were more significant. In this light, the Ottomans were tolerant enough to accommodate 
the various religious and ethnic groups in an effective and pragmatic practice to 
incorporate manpower from rival dynasties. This was possible in the hybrid 
circumstances at the frontiers that gave a tremendous impetus for the early Ottomans to 
form ‘brokerage across networks’.279  
 
Figure 5: Sultan Yıldırım Bâyezid in a conversation with Molla Şemseddin Fenarî.  
Source: Şakayku’n Nu’mâniyye, Topkapı Palace Museum, H1263, folio 22a. 
 
There was another important element in the building of a network of alliances. Turkish 
Sufism (tasavvuf) was non-conformist and open to the traditions of the regions where the 
Turks arrived. As shown in the works by Köprülü and Barkan, Turkish mystical Islam, 
under the guidance of the Kalenderî, Haydarî and Bektaşî dervishes, who accompanied the 
Ottoman army, easily accommodated to the local Christian beliefs and traditions in 
Anatolia and the Balkan.280 Through their participation in military campaigns, the Sufi 
dervishes became familiar with the local, non-Muslim beliefs and rituals and selectively 
integrated some of them. This practice produced an atmosphere which facilitated the 
accommodation with the non-Muslim population and must clearly have enhanced the 
relatively easy acceptance of Ottoman rule by the mass of the population in the newly 
conquered territories in Anatolia and the Balkans. The successes of the early Ottoman 
 
                                                     
279 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 41-42. 
280 Köprülü, Osmanlı Imparatorluğunun Kuruluşu, 101-120; Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, ‘İstilâ devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk 
dervişleri ve Zaviyeler’, Vakıflar Dergisi, II (1942): 274-386. 
 116 
expansion were to a large degree due to the spiritual authority of dervish leaders who 
supported the Ottoman dynasty in its political endeavours. The many convents or 
‘abbeys’ (zaviye, tekke) formed the nuclei for Muslim Turkish settlements that grew into 
towns and garrison centres. This enabled cohabitation with and accommodation of the 
local, non-Muslim population within the early Ottoman realm. The inclusive nature of the 
Turkish Sufis supported the Ottoman expansion in Anatolia and the Balkans.281  
It seems that the role of the Sufi dervishes in the emergence and growth of the 
Ottoman state was equally important to that of the gazi-warriors. Although not directly 
linked to the Turkish sheikh Hacı Bektaş-i Veli, the Bektaşî Order (tarikat) was one of the 
most influential brotherhoods in the Ottoman villages and even cities in Anatolia and the 
Balkans. It was actually founded in the sixteenth century, although its roots are much 
older. Two other important orders were the Nakşibendiye and Halvetiye, with Central 
Asian origins and Sunni leanings. These two played a very important role in political, 
social and religious spheres. Particularly, there were the urban tarikats of Mevleviyye 
linked to Jelaladdin Rumi and the Kadiriyye mystical orde, which both represented the 
urban written Sufism. The Mevleviyye gained influence at the Ottoman court only after 
the mid-fifteenth century.282  
Following the Anatolian Seljuk Rum tradition, the early Ottoman state gradually 
adopted and implemented the Hanafi school of Muslim jurisprudence within its realm. 
The preference of the Ottomans for the Sunnî Hanafi jurisprudence (mezhep) coincided 
with the centralisation of state authority in the late fifteenth century. The Ottoman 
government was concerned to find out pragmatic and practical policies in order to govern 
over a multi-religious population. In this process, it showed enough rationality and 
openness to adapt to new situations in the recently seized territories and easily adapted 
to the practical needs of their particular social structure.283 This made the Hanafi school 
an ideal legal tool for a state which governed over different ethnic and religious 
communities. Compared to the dogmatic law systems of Shafism or Hanbalism, the Hanafi 
legal school used reason, logic, opinion (ray), analogy (qiyas), and preference (istihsan) in 
the formulation of religious laws.284 The legal policies of Hanafism were more liberal in 
respect to personal freedom, the corporal penalties were usually altered to the payment 
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of fines. It also rested on a more tolerant basis in regard to different religions and 
traditions.285   
Further evidence for Ottoman moderation and religious toleration can be found in the 
memoirs of Gregory Palamas (d. 1359), a Byzantine theologian and mystic, who was a 
captive at the court of Orhan Gazi in 1355. Palamas noted that he had participated at two 
debates, once at Orhan Gazi’s court and once with a Muslim scholar.286 Orhan Gazi, who 
had titled himself as the ‘Sultan of the Gazis’, made Palamas enter into a debate with 
Muslim scholars at his court about the doctrines of Islam and Christianity. According to 
Palamas, the debate was concluded with the comment of his opponents who said ‘the time 
will come when we will be in accord with each other’.287 It seems that the eclectic religious 
culture at the Ottoman court of the sultans can be observed at least until the first half of 
the sixteenth century. For instance, Sultan Yıldırım Bâyezid I in the 1390s patronised at 
his princely court among others Ellisaeus, a Jewish philosopher, and his Greek pupil 
Plethon, who was later persecuted by the Byzantine state on the accusation of being an 
activist of pagan Hellenism.288  
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2.11 Towards Centralisation and the Rise of Tensions within 
the Ruling Elites 
Ottoman territorial expansion was slower than the rapid rise of the Anatolian states 
around them or certainly than the swift rise of the Great Seljuk Empire. However, their 
slow expansion turned out to be an advantage in the long run, which gave them more 
time to institutionalise their state building. At the start of the fourteenth century, other 
Turkish states in Anatolia, such as Menteşe, Germiyan or Karaman were more powerful 
and politically advanced than the Ottomans. But their decentralised way of expansion 
would create many problems for themselves.289 While the beys of these states tried to 
remain independent of their Seljuk and Ilkhanid overlords, they were at the same time 
unsuccessful in controlling the ambitions of their own commanders (subaşı). In this 
process, subordinate commanders of these principalities became uncontrollable and 
carved out independent polities for themselves. For example, during the thirteenth 
century, several commanders of the House of Germiyan successfully seized the Aegean 
coastlands and hinterland independently of each other. Instead of remaining loyal to the 
Germiyanid dynasty, they proclaimed their independence on the lands that they had 
conquered. In this way, the frontier states of Karasi, Saruhan, Menteşe and Aydın were 
formed.290  
The Ottomans probably learned lessons from this fragmentation of power and inter- 
state rivalry in the neighbouring Turkish principalities. They seem to have successfully 
dealt with this decentralised way of expansion by keeping their commanders under strict 
control and using every opportunity to control the distribution of resources. Earlier than 
the other principalities, they were able to transform the independent warrior groups into 
a standing army, which was arguably the world’s first ‘modern’ army with standardised 
organisation, uniforms and weaponry. The emergence of this infantry-based standing 
army was one of the most crucial developments of Ottoman state formation. This standing 
army was led by a class of professional officers and it was centered on a specialised forces 
characterised by standardisation, of which the janissaries were the most well-known. 
From the 1300s until the middle of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman army developed 
into the most advanced and powerful landed armed force in Europe and the Middle East.291  
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With the conquest of the cities Bursa and Iznik, during the reign of the second Ottoman 
ruler Orhan Gazi (r. 1326-1362), the Ottoman beylik controlled all the major towns of 
Bythinia. The defeat of the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III and the Ottoman victory at 
the Battle of Pelekanon in 1329 represent a crucial event, which resulted in the surrender 
of Iznik in 1331.292 The Ottoman chroniclers do not mention this battle. But a 
contemporary Byzantine chronicler, Nikeforus Gregoras gives a detailed description of 
the event. In the account of Gregoras, it is clear that Orhan’s army fought according to 
the classic steppe military tactics. Orhan Gazi used effective intelligence about the 
Byzantine army, chose the battlefield and laid an ambush with the infantry in a valley. 
During the first two days of the campaign, using vanguard actions, the Ottoman cavalry 
harassed the Byzantine imperial forces with successive charges and arrow rains. The aim 
was to disorganise the Byzantine battle formations, to bring them towards the hills and 
finally destroy the disorganised and fleeing enemy by encircling him.293 This was the 
classic battle tactic of the Ottomans, with which Bayezid I would also defeat the western 
European crusader army at the battle of Nicopolis in 1396.294 Eventually, in the account of 
Gregoras: ‘the Byzantine forces began to panic, precisely as during the battle of Malazgirt; 
a great army was fleeing before 300 cavalry warriors of the Ottoman army, while carrying 
its wounded emperor in a blanket.’295 The Byzantine defeat at Pelekanon forced the 
emperor Andronicus III (1296-1341) to start negotiations with Orhan Gazi.296 However, in 
1339, Andronikos sent emissaries to pope Benedict XII indicating that he was willing to 
settle the Orthodox-Catholic religious differences in return for military support against 
the Ottomans.297   
2.11.1 Crossing into Europe 
Thus in the 1350s, the Ottoman principality (beylik) was one of the many Anatolian small 
states, but a series of developments after 1352 increased its position vis-a-vis its rivals. 
The most important event was the gaining of a bridgehead in southeast Europe, with 
 
                                                     
292 İnalcık, The Great Ottoman-Civilization, vol. 1, 28-30. 
293 Gregoras’ description as cited in: Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, vol. 1, tr. Nilüfer Epçeli (Istanbul, 
2005) 169-171. 
294 Kelly De Vries, ‘The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe 
from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohács (1526)’, The Journal of Military History 63 (1999): 539-599. 
295 Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, vol. 1, 171. 
296 Angeliki E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II 1282-1328 (Cambridge, 1972) 
312-314.  
297 Anthony Luttrel, ‘Latin Responses to Ottoman Expansion Before 1389’, ed. Zachariadou, The Ottoman Emirate, 
121. 
 120 
prospects of westward expansion. The crossing over to Europe initially seemed difficult, 
since the region was under Byzantine control. In 1335, the annexation of the Karasi 
principality, centered at the coast of the Gulf of Edremit and controlling the Anatolian 
shores of the Dardanelles, provided all the important components needed to cross the 
Dardanelles into Europe. The crossing over to Thrace enabled the Ottomans to enlarge 
their realms in Europe, while the other Turkish small states in Anatolia stopped to grow. 
The conquests in southeast Europe proved to be crucial for the transformation from a 
frontier polity into a state. 
The Karasi beyliği was a maritime principality and achieved many successes in sea 
warfare until the beginning of succession strife and the crusading expeditions of a Latin 
fleet.298 By intervening in the succession wars among the sons of the Karasid dynasty, the 
Ottomans annexed the Karasid lands one by one. Once the Karasid territories were 
captured, certain lands were left to the latter dynasty as timars (land fiefs) and the 
majority of the Karasid military elite was integrated into the Ottoman military class. The 
Karasi captains and sailors had the necessary maritime expertise and ships to cross over. 
And the Karasi gazi leaders such as Haci Ilbeyi, Gazi Evrenuz and Ece Bey were 
encouraging the Ottoman leadership for expeditions across the Dardanelles.299  
The Ottomans themselves also had several experienced veterans of the European wars. 
Many Turkish warriors had already participated in military operations into the Balkans 
as mercenaries of the Byzantine state. In these campaigns, the Turkish warriors became 
familiar with the terrain and learned the weaknesses of the local states. Already for some 
time, the Byzantine emperors increasingly depended on Turkish military services to stop 
the Serbian and Bulgarian invasions, and even for their own succession wars.300  
The gaining of the first settlements in Europe resulted from an alliance of Orhan Bey 
with the Byzantine claimant to the throne, John VI Kantakouzenos.301 After the death of 
emperor Andronicos III in 1341, Byzantium had plunged into succession wars. 
Kantakouzenos initially sought the aid of Umur Bey of Aydin, who had significant naval 
power. However, in 1344, Umur Bey lost his life in the battle when defending his seat in 
Izmir that came under the attack of a crusader fleet.302 Thereupon, Kantakouzenos sought 
the military support of Orhan Gazi. Although the Ottoman sources remain silent on this 
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matter, in 1346 Orhan formed an alliance with Kantakouzenos by marrying his daughter 
Theodora in a splendid ceremony.303 Ottoman chroniclers, such as Âşık Paşazâde and 
Neşrî must have been aware of the fact that including such fluidity and inter-religious 
liaisons in their account would undermine their ideological portrayal of a purely Muslim 
dynasty and state. After all, they primarily aimed to represent the Ottoman dynasty as 
the leading Muslim political power in the eyes of their intended audiences.  
 
Figure 6: Orhan Gazi gives a composite bow as a gift to the Byzantine prince Kalo-Ioannis.  
Source: Hünernâme, vol. 1, Topkapı Palace Museum, H1523, folio 72a.   
 
The next year, with the support of Orhan Gazi, Kantekouzenos was able to enter 
Constantinople and to proclaim himself co-Emperor. In this way, Orhan Gazi became an 
influential player in Byzantine power politics, taking Emperor Kantakouzenos, his father-
in-law, under his protection against John Palaiologos. Orhan Bey himself gained a lot from 
this arrangement. In 1352, he sent his son, crown prince Süleyman Paşa, to Europe to aid 
Kantekouzenos, who was trying to repel an invasion of the Serbian and Bulgarian troops. 
After defeating them near Edirne, on his way back home Süleyman Paşa captured the 
strategic castle of Tzympe (Çimpe) in Gallipoli. This was the first Ottoman territory in 
Europe. Two years later, Süleyman Paşa also seized the fortified city of Gallipoli and made 
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it a strong base from which he started the conquests in Thrace of which he was the 
architect.304  
The swift Ottoman settlement in Thrace was favoured by the conditions that had been 
created by a war between Genoa and Venice that lasted from 1351 until 1355. In this 
conflict, the survival of the Genoese trade colony in Galata or Pera came in danger under 
the attacks of Venice in alliance with Byzantium. In 1351, Orhan’s envoys were 
negotiating with the Genoese of Pera and providing information to them. To help the 
Genoese in Galata, Orhan sent thousand Ottoman archers. They fought alongside the 
Genoese in the battle for the defence of their colony against the Venetian-Catalan and 
Byzantine troops. In 1352, Orhan concluded a formal treaty with Genoa, the first one with 
a European state. The relationship between the Italian city-state Genoa and the Ottoman 
dynasty would last for many decades. Following this treaty, the Ottomans supplied the 
Genoese fleet with provisions and Genoese ships took shelter in Ottoman ports. In turn, 
the Genoese provided Ottoman forces with ships to ferry them across the Dardanelles. 
Venice and Byzantium sent envoys who, without success, tried to convince Orhan Gazi to 
abandon the alliance with Genoa. Confronted with this situation, the Ottomans chose the 
side of Genoa against Byzantium, while Genoa enjoyed the crucial Ottoman support as an 
ally in its fierce struggle against Venice.305 Meanwhile, the Ottomans established a 
permanent presence in Europe.  
After the sudden death of Süleyman Paşa in 1357, there was a decade of delay in the 
conquests, also due to the kidnapping of Orhan’s young son Halil by pirates. Eventually, 
the Ottomans secured their possessions in Thrace and eastern Balkans with the capture 
of Edirne (Adrianople) in 1361. Within a half century, the Ottoman rulers became the 
leaders of the gaza, and were called sahib al-ucat, the masters of the marches.306 The 
European frontier lands were organised under the command of crown prince Murad, who 
was sent to Europe to replace Süleyman Paşa after his death. The most important 
achievement of this period is the conquest of Edirne, which occupied a central place in 
the economic system of Eastern Thrace.307 It was seized by crown prince Murad.308 In 1362, 
Murad succeeded his father to the Ottoman throne and he transported his capital to 
Edirne in order to control the marcher lords. He appointed his trusted tutor Lala Şahin 
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Paşa to the office of governor general (beylerbeyi) of the European provinces, which the 
Ottomans named Rumeli (land of Rome).309 This was the first office of governor general in 
Ottoman administration. 
To secure the new conquests, Şahin Paşa resettled various semi-nomad groups (Yörük) 
from Anatolia into the conquered territories.310 As was the case with the Seljuk Empire, 
the Ottomans applied the policy of transfer of population to control a conquered area. 
The Ottomans also sought to reduce the nomad’s influence by resettling them to the 
frontiers in Thrace, where they could continue to expand the territories without 
interfering with the central authority. The newly arrived Yörük nomads in Thrace 
eventually adapted a sedentary life and founded Turkish villages and towns.311 The 
gradual transfer of population from Anatolia played an important role in the integration 
of the Balkans into the Ottoman realm.312  
2.11.2 Expansion in Europe 
In the acquisition of new territories, the Ottomans implemented various methods of 
diplomacy. For example, the Ottoman chroniclers noted that Kavala, Drama and Zihne in 
Macedonia were acquired through ale’l infirâd ’âhd ile (one by one, by consent) and after 
negotiation with the inhabitants (’ahd u eman [ve] halk ile söyleşerek).313 To maintain peace 
and political stability, the Ottomans left to the rulers of the conquered lands their titles 
and kingdoms. This measure promoted continuity and reduced the risks of disorder. This 
generally enabled a serene transformation of the local elites. In turn, they had to pay an 
annual tribute and deliver auxiliary troops to Ottoman campaigns. These vassal 
sovereigns were placed under the surveillance of the Ottoman marcher lords (uç beyleri). 
If any of these vassals showed disobedience to their agreements, their realm was raided 
by the akıncı march lords and they could lose everything they had. 
The policy of istimâlet (accommodation) was studied by Halil İnalcık in his article on 
‘Ottoman methods of conquest’.314 Contrary to the title, which evokes belligerent 
connotations, it rather explores the adaptation of the Ottomans to the political realities 
in the Balkans. Inalcik remarked that the Ottoman expansion went through two stages. 
The first phase aimed at establishing Ottoman suzerainty over the seized states. In this 
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transition period, the Ottomans did not strive for direct rule, but aimed at the recognition 
of a suzerainty relationship by the vassal state. While allowing its internal autonomy, the 
vassal state had to pay a tribute and join the Ottoman campaigns with a military force 
when asked for. During the second phase, instead of occupying the entire newly seized 
land, the Ottomans annexed a part of it, leaving the rest in the hands of the vassal dynasty. 
The next step in the long run was to establish direct dominion over these lands. During 
this incorporation process, the Ottomans integrated the local ruling elite into their own 
state organisation according to the needs of the moment.  
This policy was implemented mainly by Sultan Murad I (1362-1389) and his Grand 
Vizier Çandarlı Hayreddin Pasha. They also adopted a policy of pacification with the 
Orthodox Church. There are several examples of berat (letters) of investiture for the 
assembled Orthodox clergy, safe passage for prelates who wanted to visit their colleagues 
or documents certifying their tax immunity. The sultans also released fermans (decrees) 
that safeguarded the properties of the monasteries in Bithynia, Macedonia, Mount Athos 
or Serres.315 Balkan elites did not hesitate, often without converting to Islam, to integrate 
themselves into the Ottoman ruling class. They occupied different layers in Ottoman 
society. They could be sipahi (cavalrymen) or serve as auxiliary troops (martoloz, voynuk) 
in the military class.316 They could become scribes, secretaries and dragomans in the 
Ottoman chancellery.317 No pressure was put on them to become Muslim. Some members 
of the Balkan and Byzantine ruling elite embraced Islam. Mahmud Pasha Angelovič, the 
famous Grand Vizier of Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481), who originated from both the 
ruling dynasty of Serbia and that of Trebizond, is far from being an exception. He became 
a Muslim in the 1420s at the beginning of the reign of Sultan Murad II (r. 1421-1451).318  
Sultan Murad I subdued the greater part of the Balkans north to the Danube and turned 
the local dynasties into Ottoman vassals, establishing a centralised state with vassals in 
Europe and Anatolia. In 1371, the Ottoman army won a major victory over the Serbian 
king Stephan Dusan at the Battle of Çirmen, putting the whole Balkan, and in the long run 
Hungary and Venice, under their visor.319 These successes greatly weakened the regional 
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dynasts in the Balkans, capable of resisting Ottoman advances. In the end, the local 
Byzantine, Bulgarian and Serbian lords had to recognise Ottoman suzerainty and became 
vassals of the Ottoman state. After the Ottoman victory at Cirmen, the Byzantine emperor 
also became virtually an Ottoman vassal, as the ruling family sought Murad’s support to 
hold the Byzantine throne.320 In 1372, pope Gregory XI tried to form an anti-Turkish 
crusade.321 However, no major Christian state could oppose and participated to a crusade. 
Hence, the Ottoman advance continued. 
In 1383, an Ottoman army under Çandarlı Kara Halil Hayreddin Paşa took Serres and 
laid siege before Thessaloniki. Four years later, in 1387, the city surrendered. By 1387, all 
of southern Macedonia came under Ottoman control. Ottoman expansion continued in 
the direction of Serbia. In 1385, Sofia was captured. Nish followed the next year, giving 
the Ottomans access to the Morava river and the territory of the Serbian prince Lazar. 
Meanwhile, Murad’s absence in Anatolia because of his campaigns in the Balkans, gave 
Alaeddin Ali Bey, the prince of Karaman, the opportunity to attack Ottoman lands in 
Anatolia, and Murad had to campaign against Karaman in 1387.322 The same year, the 
Bulgarian king Shishman, who was also Murad’s brother-in-law, declared his 
independence from Ottoman suzerainty. This unleashed a campaign of the army under 
the command of Çandarlı Ali Paşa to force him to submission. In 1388, at the advance of 
Ali Paşa, Shishman surrendered, accepted Ottoman suzerainty and was left as vassal.323 
In 1388, Bosnian troops routed the troops of beylerbeyi (governor-general) Lala Şahin 
Paşa. This provoked a campaign of sultan Murad I in 1389. Murad gathered his army with 
reinforcements from his Anatolian vassals, but some Balkan vassals such as Shishman did 
not appear. Sultan Murad first aimed to punish Lazar of Serbia before continuing into 
Bosnia. But in the meantime, prince Lazar had concluded an alliance with the Bosnian 
princes. In 1389, at the Battle of Kosovo Polje, Murad encountered the Serbian-dominated 
allied army with Bosnians, Albanians, Bulgarians and units from Hungary and Bohemia.324 
In Neşri’s account, we read that the Ottoman army gained the upper-hand after the last-
minute counterattack of the right wing under the command of crown prince Bayezid.325 
The destruction of the enemy command cadres created chaos and the crusader units fled 
from the battlefield. Ottoman units captured many leading Balkan nobility, including the 
Serbian king Lazar, commander in chief, who was instantly executed. However, the 
Ottoman army also suffered heavy casualties and Sultan Murad was assassinated during 
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the ending phase of the battle.326 Both sides suffered great losses, however, in comparison 
to the Ottomans, the Balkan coalition did not have the means to replace its losses. The 
Battle of Kosovo put an end to the independent Serbian kingdom and fortified the 
Ottoman position in southeast Europe.  
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Political and social-economic factors of Ottoman success in Europe 
The expansion of Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans was facilitated by several factors. 
With the decline of Byzantine rule, southeast Europe was covered by a patch-work of 
small states divided among feudal lords. The Ottomans skilfully exploited the religious 
and social resentments and extended their authority over these local dynasts, first as 
their allies and later as their overlords. The feudal Balkan princes generally followed a 
pro-European policy, in return for military aid. As a result, the leading elite tended to 
recognise the supremacy of the Pope and the Catholic Church. However, this move 
alienated the people from the local feudal nobility. Their cooperation with Catholic states 
such as Hungary and Venice, who usually regarded the Orthodox Christians as schismatic 
apostates, led to growing resentment among the Orthodox population, whereas the 
Ottomans created conditions more favourable for them after their conquests. They 
accorded the local Orthodox clergy an official status in the Ottoman state organisation. 
This implied that henceforth the life and creed of the Orthodox Christians, as Ottoman 
subject, were protected by the Ottoman state. As a result, many local Orthodox priests 
cooperated with the appeasing political power of the Ottomans.327 
Before the Ottoman conquests, the social and economic conditions of the Balkan 
peasantry had deteriorated due to the wide-spread control of the land by various tiny 
feudal lords, who imposed heavy taxes and labour burdens upon the peasantry. These 
local feudal lords had usurped the power as the Byzantine rule in the Balkans began to 
decline. In pre-Ottoman medieval times the Balkan peasantry had to provide additional 
labour force services for their lords. As the peasantry resented these labour services, the 
Ottoman state ingeniously converted them into cash payments.328 Further, the Ottomans 
reorganised the land through the çift-hane system, of which the indivisible family farm 
(çiftlik) was its nucleus.329 The regular production unit of çift-hane was based on a peasant 
family household (hane) holding a certain amount of land (çiftlik), which was workable by 
two oxen. This formed the basis for the Ottoman state’s agrarian and fiscal survey of land. 
As a production unit, the Ottoman çift-hane corresponded to the Roman iugum-caput and 
the Byzantine stasis or zugokefalai.330 State ownership of land combined with a class of 
independent peasantry was a predominant characteristic in most ancient empires.331  
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As Deborah Boucoyannis has argued, the Ottoman land regime was also highly similar 
to the English tenurial system. Until now, no one had drawn the parallel between the two 
land regimes: all land belonged in theory to the ruler and there were leaseholds, not 
private ownership of the land. The property rights of the peasantry were under the 
protection of the Ottoman judicial system and differed little from those granted to English 
peasants. As she has further shown, representative institutions emerged where central 
authority was strong, not where rights were ceded in exchange for resources (taxation): 
such concessions happened only where taxation was already effectively imposed.332 
These revolutionary Ottoman measures in land regime eliminated the feudal domains 
and structures in the Balkans, which were particularly beneficial to the peasantry since 
it relieved them from many feudal obligations and heavy burdens. The Ottomans 
considered the peasants not as enslaved, but as both dependent and free. The peasants’ 
mobility and use of land were strictly regulated by laws issued by the central government 
in order to provide the amount of tax as recorded in the land survey registers (tahrir). He 
was ‘free’ in the sense that he was unrestricted to organise the production of his family 
farm and no one could extract his labor arbitrarily.333  
The obvious aim was to enhance the economic output abilities of the productive classes 
in order to diversify the revenues from taxes. In this process, the Ottomans restored the 
lands that were in the hands of petty feudal lords into state propriety, which was called 
miri land. The state became the only legitimate authority establishing propriety rights on 
land, through conquest and reclamation. The state retained the ownership of land, but 
the actual possession and usufruct rights were handed over to farmers.334  
The Ottomans thus established a centralised administration of the land and abolished 
the feudal decentralisation. The administration and control of this land system was 
initially entrusted to the beys or march lords. The lands were converted into tımars (see 
below) and distributed in return for military services to sipahi cavalry or to the yayas, 
Turkish peasants serving in the army. Under Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402), their control and 
management was increasingly executed by the appointed kul-administrators, who 
belonged to the household of the dynasty. Furthermore, landholding and taxation were 
treated as an area of civil administration, independent of religious laws. The state lands 
were placed under the responsibility of a bureaucrat of the chancellery, the nişancı, who 
ran them according to the sultanic law. It was this law code, a combination of Islamic 
legacy and Roman practices, which administered the relationship in landholding and 
taxation.335  
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Hence, the restoration of state ownership of land and the family farm system brought 
several improvements to the conditions of the Balkan Christian peasantry. The Ottomans 
enhanced effective centralised state control with considerable improvements in the lives 
of the productive and tax-paying classes. In this process, the social crisis in the Balkans 
eased the establishment of Ottoman rule. People seem to favoured Ottoman governance 
as it ended the age-old conflict between peasantry and feudal lords. The Ottomans 
succeeded to gain the support of the local Christian peasant groups. It is noteworthy that 
in the following centuries, many Ottoman defeats, succession wars or political crises did 
not seem to have created existential problems for the survival of the Ottoman state and 
dynasty.336    
2.11.3 Tımar-system  
The Ottoman military structure in the early fourteenth century still resembled the Seljuk 
system. The mounted warriors – called sipahi – constituted the majority of the Ottoman 
army. As mentioned earlier, during Osman’s reign, conquered territories were divided up 
among the gazi leaders as personal domains, known as yurtluk, but they had to remain 
loyal to their overlord to continue providing military service.337 A half century later, this 
system apparently did not work well. Most of them settled in their domains and ceased 
to take part in campaigns.  
During the reign of Murad I, a transition took place. The gazi marcher warrior leaders, 
whose military services had supported the Ottoman expansion, were firstly appointed as 
uç beyleri, lords of the frontiers.338 Later, they were gradually and systematically rendered 
into fief-holder (tımarlı) commanders and their duties were regulated by the central state. 
This measure enabled the Ottoman administration to control and transform the nomad 
cavalry. The relation with the marcher gazi-lords in Ottoman service gradually evolved 
from egalitarian partnership into vassalage in new hierarchical structures. In the course 
of this process, the Ottomans developed the tımar system that was tailored to the Seljuk 
iqta system, i.e. giving land as a source of revenue to military elite for their services.339 An 
essential element of the Seljuk state structure was its system of revenue producing land 
grants or iqta to the military commanders or emirs who governed over a province under 
Seljuk rule. These iqta-holders commanded forces, who were integrated into the Seljuk 
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imperial army (Hassa Ordu), and stood on the payroll of state treasury.340 It was the Seljuk 
Grand vizier Nizam al-Mülk who restructured the iqta-system, by merging the military 
and administrative fiefs into single units.341 During the fourteenth century, nearly all 
Anatolian Turkish principalities tried to develop their own iqta-systems.342 Osman Turan 
observed the distinction between the large iqta’s given to leading commanders by the 
Great Seljuks and the modest tımars placed at the disposal of commanders in Anatolia by 
the Rum Seljuks.343 In both cases, paying commanders with revenue assignments 
gradually weakened the Seljuk central government’s control over both the land and the 
military, as iqta-holders frequently usurped it. This weakening of the government made 
the holding of the provinces very difficult. 
The Ottoman tımar institution may also be related to the Byzantine pronoia system.344 
A pronoia was a type of conditional grant from the emperor, often to soldiers, of various 
properties and privileges. In large measure the institution of pronoia characterised social 
and economic relations in later Byzantium. The pronoia-system determined the 
Byzantine agrarian relations, taxation, administration and the economy, as it structured 
the relations between the ruler, monastic and lay landholders, including soldiers and 
peasants.  
After the Ottoman expansion into the Balkans, a new land system was gradually 
established. The newly seized territories, which belonged to state property, were divided 
according to their tax value (tımar) and given to the warrior cavalrymen, the so- called 
tımarlı sipahi, according to their merit and contribution in the campaigns. They lived in 
the villages and had the right to collect the tax revenue from the land, but were not 
allowed the ownership of the land itself. This was a temporary allocation in which the 
state retained the right to change these ‘fief holders’ if the sipahi were not able to provide 
the appropriate military service. The most important distinction from a European type of 
patrimonial feudalism or hereditary landed nobility was that all personal dependencies 
between the sipahi and the peasants were eliminated. The relation between them was 
strictly regulated by sultanic laws and remained under tight control of the agents of the 
central state. The sipahis represented the sultan’s authority in the village and they were 
prohibited to take possession of the land reserved for the farmer. There was also a 
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deliberate policy behind it to prevent the emergence of rival foci of power. The regular 
rotation system in the holding of a tımar disallowed the sipahi to acquire complete and 
independent control of the land and peasantry. Otherwise, his control of the land and the 
revenues could have enabled him to build his own independent power.345 
According to his successes on the battlefield, a sipahi might increase his tımar by 
gaining additional lands, but if he failed to perform his tasks or fled from the battle, he 
would certainly lose all his rights. However, he retained the title sipahi and could gain 
another tımar on condition that he participated in the campaigns. If a dismissed sipahi 
recycled himself into a peasant and did not join the army for seven years, he lost his title 
of sipahi and all the privileges of the military class altogether. The effectiveness of the 
tımar system was one of the main reasons behind the Ottoman military successes. 
Expansion through conquest provided new sources of revenue in the form of tımars and 
became a stimulus for expansions.346     
2.11.4 Expansion in Anatolia 
The conquests and expansion into southeast Europe (Rumeli) increased the Ottoman 
power vis-à-vis the other Turkish principalities, but expansion into Anatolia also required 
to make it the leading political power. Already since their emergence, there had been a 
relentless competition between the Turkish principalities in Anatolia. The gradual 
development of Osman’s tiny principality into a centralised state within a few 
generations and its rapid extension in Europe caused uneasiness among the neighbouring 
Turkish beyliks. While the pursuit of gaza and growth reached its limits in the other 
principalities, the Ottomans had gained new outlets by crossing over into Europe and 
became the unquestionable leaders of all gazis. Even the powerful principality of Karaman 
was unable to parallel the Ottoman success, when it imitated the Ottomans by trying, 
without success, to conquer Byzantine castles in Anatolia.347 
The Ottoman policy of incorporation of the neighbouring Turkish Muslim states in 
Anatolia was similar to their policy towards the Christian states in Europe. In both regions 
they applied the method of gradual integration of these entities into the Ottoman political 
hierarchy. The gradual annexation of Karasi Beyliği in 1341-1344 had brought another 
principality, the Saruhan Beyliği into the direct neighbourhood of the Ottoman state. The 
Ottomans tried, exactly as their rivals, to control and annex the principalities bordering 
their territories. The principality of Saruhan had its capital in Manisa and was involved 
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in sea warfare on the Aegean islands and on the shores of Rumelia. However, as a result 
of the decline in sea warfare and the decrease of the resources, after the Latin capture of 
Izmir, the Saruhanids were deprived of incomes and were inclined to maintain good 
relations. Eventually, the Saruhan beyligi accepted Ottoman sovereignty and became a 
vassal state, like the other Turkish principalities. During the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the 
forces of the Saruhan beyligi fought the Ottoman army. Nevertheless, directly after the 
succession of Bayezid I (1389-1402) to the throne, the Saruhanids played a significant role 
in the revolts of the Anatolian beyliks that forced sultan Bayezid I to undertake a 
campaign.348  
During the reign of sultan Murad I (1360-1389), there occurred a shift to a policy of 
directly controlling and turning the Anatolian begliks into vassal states.349 Several Turkish 
local states, such as Germiyan and Hamid, accepted Ottoman suzerainty and forged ties 
through dynastic marriages. The Ottoman chronicles present Murad as the overlord of all 
the Anatolian beyliks, with legitimate grounds to incorporate the beyliks of Germiyan and 
Hamidili. Âşık Paşazâde, whose source was the contemporary Yahşi Fakih, accounts that 
Süleyman Şah, the Germiyanid lord, sent an envoy to sultan Murad I, proposing a 
marriage between his daughter, Sultan Hatun and crown prince Bayezid in 1378. The 
Germiyanid lord, Süleyman Şah, who wished to protect his territory against the invasions 
of the Karamanids, had proposed this marriage and had offered, as a dowry to his 
daughter, Kütahya, his seat of power and several other Germiyan cities. Murad agreed 
and acquired most of the principality.350  
Neşrî accounts this episode as follows: ‘The Germiyan oğlu [son of Germiyan] 
understood that he had reached an old age, he called his son Yakup Bey and said to him: 
‘My son, if you wish that this land remains in your possession, try to forge an alliance with 
the son of Osman; marry one of my daughters to him.’ (…) Ishak Fakih [the Germiyanid 
envoy] came to Murad Khan with some exceptional presents and said: ‘If our sultan judges 
that one of our daughters is suitable for his son Bayezid, please accept her as wife to his 
son. We furthermore offer you as a dowry several castles, such as Kütahya, Simav, Eğrigöz 
and Tavşanlı.’351 
Concerning the festivities during this marriage, the accounts of Âşık Paşazâde and 
Neşrî testify of the riches that was displayed during the wedding feast of crown prince 
Bayezid and Sultan Hatun, daughter of the Germiyan bey. This act seems to have served 
as diplomatic propaganda to demonstrate Ottoman economic and political power to the 
beys of the neighbouring states. Envoys from the Karamanids, Hamid-oglu, Menteshe-
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oglu, Saruhanids, Isfendiyarids and an envoy of the Mamluk sultan were all present at the 
wedding feast. The chroniclers describe the valuable presents brought by Gazi Evrenos, 
the Ottoman marcher lord (akıncı uç beyi) in Europe, to the wedding of Bayezid, which 
included among other items cloths of gold, two hundred gold and silver trays filled with 
gold florins.352  
Âşık Paşazâde noted that during the wedding feast, the envoy of Hüseyin Bey, the lord 
of the Hamidili principality, offered to sell his beylik to Murad. When, afterwards, Murad 
came to Kütahya, Hüseyin Bey sent his envoy to conclude the formalities of the sale. In 
his words: ‘The envoy of Hamid-oğlu was also present at the wedding. It was agreed with 
him that Hamid-oğlu Hüseyin Bey would sell his lands to Murad Khan Gazi. According to 
this arrangement, Murad Khan Gazi came to Kütahya. Hamid-oğlu understood that he was 
coming to him, he sent an envoy who confirmed that ‘he was loyal to his oath’. 
Thereupon, they arranged the sell and purchase formalities of the six cities (...) according 
to the Sharia. Murad Khan Gazi sent then his men who took the control of the cities that 
were purchased by him.’353   
The purchase of territories from other principalities is an indication of Ottoman 
wealth. The main sources of this wealth were control of trade, territorial expansion and 
booty. During the reign of Murad I, the Ottomans controlled networks of international 
trade, which was of great importance for their treasury. They had acquired important 
trading ports and took cities on trade routes under their control. Bursa was the center of 
silk trade in Anatolia. The Ottoman control of the trade zones of western Anatolia, Aegean 
Sea, Marmara and northern Black Sea resulted in the development of mercantile relations 
with the Venetian and Genoese trade families. Commodities such as alum, cloth, carpets, 
grain, timber, soap and spices were of major importance in the trade partnerships 
between the Ottoman and Italian merchants.354 
The incorporation of the Hamidili territories brought yet another principality, the 
Beylik of Karaman, centred in south-central Anatolia, into the direct vicinity of the 
Ottoman state. From the 1300s until its fall in 1483, the Karamanid dynasty or 
Karamanoğulları, was one of the oldest and most powerful Turkish states in Anatolia. 
During the last decades of the thirteenth century, the Karamanids had increased their 
power and influence, largely aided by the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, especially during 
the reign of Baybars. The Karamanid state developed after the fall of the Ilkhanid Empire 
in the early fourteenth century.355  
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The Ottoman expansion towards south-east Anatolia would make a conflict for 
supremacy with the Karamanids inevitable. The clash occurred in 1386, when Karaman-
oğlu Alâeddin Bey attacked Ottoman territories while Sultan Murad I was on campaign in 
southeast Europe.356 Karamanid forces marched into the territories of Hamidili, a disputed 
territory that had recently become an Ottoman vassal state. Murad decided to 
counterattack and moved his army. Because warfare against a fellow Muslim state posed 
difficulties, Murad had to justify his action against the Karamanids. According to the early 
Ottoman chroniclers, Murad legitimised his endeavour by proclaiming that the 
Karamanid act of aggression not only ‘impeded the Ottoman gaza efforts’ in Europe, but 
also that the Karamanids brought ‘tyranny upon Muslims’. So, it was legitimate to act 
against the Karamanid rebellion and to wage gaza against it. We find the details of this 
conflict in the history of Neşrî, which I will discuss in the next chapter.357  
It was on these grounds that the Ottomans legitimised the incorporation of the other 
Turkish beyliks into vassal states, as narrated by Ottoman chroniclers. The first step in 
establishing Ottoman sovereignty was to make rivals into vassals. However, Murad was 
soon confronted with the difficulty of motivating his army. The Ottoman Muslim 
contingents were hesitant to fight against Karamanid forces, who shared the same 
backgrounds and belief. Moreover, due to the strict Islamic regulation on warfare among 
Muslim states, material gains and booty prospects were limited. Islamic law regulated 
that the defeated Muslim soldiers could not be taken captive to purchase ransom and 
their possessions could not be taken as booty.358 These factors tempered their willingness 
to fight the Karamanids. Murad solved this problem by employing Christian forces of his 
vassals in the Balkans – the Serbian despot and the Byzantine emperor – who contributed 
decisively to the defeat of the Karamanid troops. Nevertheless, when the Serbian troops 
began to plunder in Karamanids territories, and disobeyed Murad’s instructions, they 
were executed. This would become one of the important reasons for the later rebellion of 
the Serbian despot Lazar.  
After his defeat at the Battle of Frenkyazısı in 1387, the Karamanid prince withdrew to 
his capital Konya, where Murad I besieged him. Sultan Murad I’s daughter, Nefise Sultan, 
who was married to the Karamanid ruler Alaeddin Bey, came and begged her father to 
forgive her husband. Thereupon, Murad pardoned Alaeddin and gave him his territory 
back on condition that he had to come and kiss his hand, a gesture that symbolised the 
acceptance of the vassal relation. Murad’s success had effective results. The independent 
princes in Anatolia, such as the Karamanids and the Candarids in Kastamonu, recognised 
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Ottomans suzerainty. Only Kadı Burhaneddin, who had replaced the dynasty of Eretna in 
Sivas, still remained independent and prevented Ottoman expansion towards Amasya, an 
important city on the silk-road.359 However, by then, Sultan Murad I had established an 
empire that consisted of various vassal states in Anatolia and Europe.    
2.11.5 Standardisation and centralisation 
Initially, the Turkish communities in Anatolia had employed Central Asian nomadic 
command and control systems. Combined with strong leadership, these produced a 
decentralised but powerful political unity in the foundation period. However, these 
systems changed as the early Ottomans selectively started to appropriate elements from 
the Islamic and Byzantine military and administrative systems. These encounters 
introduced new ideas into the Ottoman state formation. Eventually, the loosening of the 
group solidarity (the asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun’s words) within the equal partners of the 
early period, coincided with the divergence of their interests with that of the House of 
Osman. This ensued in tensions between the centrifugal and centripetal political forces 
within the ruling elite. In the initial stage of state building, the Ottoman dynasty relied 
on the semi-independent Turkish aristocracy for the conquests and acquisition of new 
territories. After a few generations, the dynasty began to implement policies aimed at 
centralisation of state power and the control of the distribution of the resources. In this 
conflict-ridden process, the Turkish aristocracy was marginalised from the central foci of 
power and brought under the central authority. Gradually, a new ruling elite – with cross-
cultural backgrounds – replaced them as bureaucrats and military commanders loyal to 
the House of Osman. They emerged as a bureaucratic elite which was conscious of its own 
function within the state, identifying itself with a specific set of ideological narratives, 
serving as symbolic power. During the fifteenth century, the actual power of the House 
of Osman depended largely on this new ruling elite.  
The capture of Thrace and expansion in Europe represented a major line of tension in 
early Ottoman state-building. The conquest of the towns in Thrace leading into the 
control of the Balkans, constituted one of the successes of the Ottomans, and it ultimately 
sealed the fate of Byzantium while strengthening Ottoman rule in southeast Europe. 
However, the decades after the crossing into Europe were also tension-ridden. During this 
period, the fledgling Ottoman state would face the risk of fragmentation. 
The marches allowed building up alternative centres of power. Some early gazi leaders, 
such as the former Karasi warrior leader Hacı Ilbegi, questioned Ottoman claims to being 
in charge of the marches and he was killed.360 Although the anonymous chronicler does 
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not clarify by whom Hacı Ilbegi was killed, we can assume that the Ottoman dynasty 
probably had eliminated him when he begun to claim independent power. Indeed, the uç 
beyleri or the lords of the frontiers were more independent of the central government 
than those closer to the capital. These marcher warrior dynasts, such as Mihal-oğulları, 
Turahan-oğulları, Malkoç-oğulları or Evrenos-oğulları, were initially equal partners in 
the original conquests and held their positions on a hereditary basis. Therefore, the 
frontier martial nobility tried to use every opportunity to remain independent or to 
obstruct the mechanism of central control. Their position was similar to that of Osman 
Gazi under the Rum Seljuks and the Ilkhanids. Although during the early period of 
principality the Ottoman dynasty inevitably had to ally itself with these warrior leaders, 
they later became ‘elements of instability’ in the stage of empire-building.361 Moreover, 
the gazi mounted warriors were loyal only to their own leaders and remainedfiercely 
independent; They were rather interested in booty than in empire-building. This led to a 
tendency of the marcher warrior leaders to create autonomous political entities.  
It was for this reason that Murad I (r. 1362-1389) did not trust the frontier nobility 
during the conquests in Europe.362 It was probable that they would carve independent 
polities for themselves. The Ottomans must have been aware of the fragmentation of 
power in the neighbouring Turkish principalities, where the princes failed to control the 
ambitions of their own commanders. Many of their subordinate commanders had become 
uncontrollable and created independent polities for themselves. The Ottomans probably 
learned lessons from these challenges and withstood the pressures of dissolution. Hence, 
the relationship of the Ottoman central government with the marcher lords was always 
tension-ridden. While the semi-independent marcher aristocracies wished to continue 
the decentralised way of partnership in conquests and control of resources, the Ottoman 
dynasty tried to concentrate power in the center. In this light, Murad I moved the 
Ottoman capital from Bursa to Edirne, where he established a second centre of state 
power.363 Murad I entrusted the command of major campaigns in the Balkans to officials 
who were close to him, such as Çandarlı Halil or to his tutor Lala Şahin Paşa, whom Murad 
appointed to the newly created office of governor general (beylerbeyi) of Rumeli. Murad 
aimed to give greater cohesion to the expansion in the Balkans. Thereafter, the office of 
beylerbeyi of Rumeli was the most important one. In 1393, Sultan Bayezid I created the 
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second office of beylerbeyi of Anatolia. These two positions formed the basis of the 
provincial structure.364 
As to institutions, already in 1331, the first Ottoman medrese (college for high 
education) was established by Orhan Gazi in Iznik and started to train scribes, scholars 
and judges. The influx of Muslim scholars, such as Çandarlı Kara Halil, an ulema-
bureaucrat and member of an old Anatolian Muslim family, also occurred at this time. 
Çandarlı Hayreddin Kara Halil Paşa occupied administrative positions as kadı (judge) 
successively of Bilecik, Iznik and Bursa. Sultan Murad I, shortly after his accession in 1362, 
appointed Halil to the newly-created office of ḳadı’asker or ‘judge of the affairs of the 
military-administrative class’ and later made him vizier and his political advisor.365 The 
creation of the new office of ḳadı’asker can be attributed to the influence of traditions from 
previously established governmental structures of the Seljuks. The joint supervision over 
army and administration made Çandarlı Kara Halil actually the first grand vizier of the 
Ottoman state. The grand vizier’s status as a military commander and the sultan’s 
absolute deputy in administration, something which had not existed in the earlier Islamic 
states, became a standard in the Ottoman practice. The sultan entrusted the grand vizier 
with his own seal, as a symbol of his status as the absolute representative of the ruler. On 
campaign, the power of the grand vizier as commander in chief of the army reached its 
zenith and he could take decisions without consulting the sultan, make appointments and 
dismissals.366 The office of vizier was not new. Before Çandarlı Halil, the sources mention 
the existence of three viziers in the chancery. Nevertheless, until 1453, three generations 
of the Turkish clerical or ulema-originated Çandarlı family monopolised the top offices in 
the administration. The Çandarlıs played a major role in the building of new institutional 
structures, which reinforced the centralising tendency of the Ottoman dynasty, much to 
the resentment of the gazis and their supporters.367  
Murad I’s appointment of the first ḳadı’asker is an another indication that the gazi 
egalitarianism of the early days was being replaced by a social hierarchy, which consisted 
of a military-administrative (askeri) ruling class and a subject class (reaya).368 This 
hierarchy between the elite and the common people echoes the differentiation found 
already in the Gök Türk Empire, with a difference. The Ottoman elite increasingly 
consisted of officials loyal to the dynasty, not tribal or aristocratic leaders with 
independent power bases, something the Ottomans persistently avoided. This 
development of a centralised administrative apparatus was severely criticised by the 
 
                                                     
364 Itzkowitz, The Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, 42. 
365 Oruç Beğ Tarihi, 22. 
366 İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 95. 
367 İnalcık, Fatih Devri Üzerinde, 81-85. 
368 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 142. 
 138 
early chroniclers. The members of the Çandarlı family, along with other ulema-scholars 
who had sophisticated administrative expertise, are blamed for the introduction of ‘evil’ 
practices such as a treasury and regular bookkeeping.369  
Despite the criticism, together with bureaucrats such as Çandarlı Kara Halil, Rüstem 
Paşa and Kara Temürtaş Paşa, sultan Murad I reinforced the institutional organisation of 
centralisation. Lala Şahin Paşa was appointed to the newly created office of governor 
general (beylerbeyi) of Rumeli. Kara Temürtaş Paşa was employed as the second vizier next 
to Çandarlı Kara Halil. As beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Lala Şahin Paşa was the supervising agent 
of the central administration and exercised effective control and command over the 
march lords in Rumeli, who were converted in sancak beyi. The sancak was an 
administrative provincial unit under a military commander – sancak beyi – who received 
a banner from the sultan as symbol of authority.370 In this way, the provincial military-
administrative hierarchy headed by the beylerbeyi (governor general) and governors 
(sancak beyi) took shape.  
The kapıkulu (dynasty’s household) institution 
With the loosening of the social bonds (the asabiyya, as Ibn Khaldûn would have 
formulated it) that held the nomad gazi warriors together when Osman was one of them, 
the House of Osman gradually tended to accumulate power in itself by creating a standing 
army, the so-called ‘Kapıkulu ocakları’ – literally ‘hearts of the slaves of the gate’. The term 
‘slave’, however, is misleading. The status and role of these people differed drastically 
from the common image of enchained slaves, deported for agricultural slavery-labor. As 
mentioned earlier, the Ottoman Kapıkulu institution had evolved from the Central Asian 
tradition of nöker. The Ottomans certainly adapted the practice of training young men for 
the Palace service and the service of the state from the Seljuḳ Sultanate of Rûm.371 In 
Seljuk practice of the ghulam-system, the ghulams were originally more a palace guard.372 
Further, the systematic recruitment of military ‘slaves’ had begun earlier during the reign 
of the Abbasid caliph Al-Mamun (813-833). It became a common practice in the Muslim 
states, which collected ghulams (‘young men’) or mamluks (‘those wo are owned’) through 
purchase or capture. Mostly, they were selected among Turkish nomad mounted archers 
from Central Asia. They became an army unit loyal to the ruler and to each other.373 The 
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military ghulam-system provided the Abbasids with a solid power instrument, paid by the 
central government and with no other loyalty or connection to political actors in the 
society. The highly centralised Abbasid regime, funded by agrarian taxes and maintained 
by a conscripted army, became the ideal government for the bureaucrats and 
administrators of later Islamic history, such as the Great Seljuk Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire.374  
The institution of kapıkulu was an Ottoman innovation of the ghulam system. The 
establishment of the Ottoman kapıkulu institution started after the crossing into Europe. 
At first, it consisted of prisoners captured during the raids or in battle. In Europe, the 
warriors at the frontiers seized many captives and for the first time a special tax, called 
the pençik, was introduced. It instructed to take one of every five captives from the gaza 
booty for the treasury of the central government. According to the early chroniclers, the 
idea for the pençik-tax on captives was suggested by Kara Rüstem of Karaman, whom they 
called ‘one of those who filled the world with all kinds of cunning tricks’. Kara Rüstem 
Paşa was an ulema-bureaucrat who probably had knowledge of Seljuk administration. In 
the 1370s, he proposed it to Çandarlı Hayreddin Kara Halil, who was serving as kadı’asker 
(judge of the affairs of the military and administrative class). Halil Paşa consulted sultan 
Murad I, who authorised this innovation (ihdât) of taking duties (bâc), after having been 
assured that this was indeed the provision of the shari'a. Thereupon, Kara Rüstem 
installed himself at Gallipoli and collected 25 akçe per prisoner.375 After a certain period, 
the physically fit and young captives were selected and sent to Turkish farmlands in 
Anatolia to work in the fields and to learn the Turkish language and culture. Finally, they 
came back to the dynasty’s household to serve as yeni çeri (janissary) or new soldier.376 
These conscripts (devshirme) formed a part of the larger ruling classes of military and 
bureaucratic officials (kapıkulu), who administered the central government.  
The building of new institutions and the adopting of sedentary practices contradicted 
the norms and demands of the Turkish nomad gazi warriors. The Turkish nomad cavalry 
had formed the bulk of the Ottoman forces until the time of Orhan Gazi (1324-1362). These 
nomad gazi warriors had received lands as a reward for their military services during the 
conquests and were bound to serve in the campaigns of the sultan. As already noted, in 
time, they had evolved into the provincial landed cavalry (timarlı sipahi), which was 
formed by various timar-holders within the realm. The provincial landed cavalry 
constituted the backbone of the Ottoman army and their numbers during Murad II’s reign 
amounted to circa 30.000 soldiers. However, every now and then their reliability in battle 
was questioned by the central government.377 The sipahi’s possessed a relative degree of 
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independence in the marcher lands that were assigned to them within the Ottoman 
governmental system. In contrast to the officials of the kapıkulu or dynasty’s household, 
they did have hereditary positions, in which their sons succeeded them. The Turkish 
nobility and the gazi marcher lords (uç beyleri) possessed their own military retinues and 
household, whose loyalty was with their own bey, who led them in war and provided for 
their livelihood. However, as Halil İnalcık argued, since all the timars (land fiefs) were 
granted directly by the sultan, they were not comparable to the European feudal lords 
who had an independent economic power base and private armies. The sultan possessed 
after all the largest household of military retinue and was able to check the power of the 
marcher lords.378  
Sultan Murad I (r. 1362-1389) tried to place some limitations upon the power and 
influence of the older Turkish nobility over the provincial tımarlı cavalry. He therefore 
enlarged his household retinue through the kapıkulu-institution and army, which formed 
the second important group of the Ottoman army. After some time, a new mode of 
recruitment came into being, the well-known system of boy-conscription known as the 
devşirme (literally ‘to collect’) was introduced.379 The youths of Ottoman Christian subjects 
were conscripted during their childhood to be educated and trained for the Ottoman 
administration and army. The conscription of boys with cross-cultural backgrounds was 
a result of the need to create troops and administrators who were independent of every 
social connection with the Turkish nobility. The Christian peasant boys were usually 
enrolled because they lacked political connection and stood outside the loyalties towards 
Turkish ruling elite. Their sole loyalty had to be to the head of the House of Osman. This 
institutional novelty accelerated eventually the success of the Ottoman state vis-à-vis the 
other Turkish principalities of Anatolia. It is a common mistake to regard the janissaries, 
devşirme and kapıkulu as one and the same. The devşirme conscripts made up a subgroup 
of the larger kapıkulu institution (conscripted servants of the dynasty’s household). The 
famous sub-unit of the devşirmes was the infantry troops, known as the yeniçeriler or 
Janissaries (new soldiers). The janissaries formed merely one part of the kapıkulu army.380  
Created as an institution to counteract the independent power of the Turkish nobility, 
no Ottoman institution has aroused more discussion than the kul institution. This was 
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certainly one of the most important innovations of the fourteenth and fifteenth-century 
Ottoman state formation.381 The devşirme was the primary way for recruitment into state 
service, in which they were integrated into the dynasty’s household. The education of the 
kapıkulu-conscripts was intensive, competitive and selective. They were divided 
accordingly in those who were suitable for courtly service and those who were not. For 
the novices (acemi) who were qualified for the higher offices, it was a comprehensive one. 
In one of the outlying palaces, they lived for seven years under a disciplined schedule of 
learning and physical exercise. In the higher grades their training included a literary 
education in Arabic and Persian, in the same way as the Ottoman crown princes. They 
were also trained in the fine arts and in the arts of war. No pressure was put on these 
novices to become Muslims; but they invariably did so. The influence of Bektashi mystical 
Sufis who introduced them into the principles of Islam, might have encouraged them to 
conform their values and behaviours to group norms.382 Separated from their family 
background, the influence of the Ottoman palace school or Enderun-i Hümâyun, in which 
the most intelligent had been selected, was appealing to make a career in higher 
administration.383  
Roughly categorised, the least intelligent of the enrolled cadets were for example made 
into palace gardeners (bostancı). At the next level of intelligence, they were drafted into 
the Janissary corps, the elite infantry corps. At a higher level, the trainees were drafted 
into the household cavalry or imperial sipahi. The most intelligent and talented were 
selected for staffing the imperial administrative offices (has oda başı, silahdar, sır katibi, 
etc).384 As their names suggest, many of them had official functions at court distinct from 
their military duties. This last group of the kul-institution could rise to the highest offices 
in the Ottoman administration. They could become vezir or minister in sultan’s state 
council; or the premier of the council, the grand vezir; or else become governors, army 
commanders, jurists and scribes at the chancery. Their membership in the household of 
the Ottoman dynasty gave them prestige and privileges and they therefore demanded the 
respect of Ottoman subjects, both Muslims and non-Muslims. They were paid salaries and 
were rewarded for their merits in the form of ranks, power and wealth. They did not 
constitute a heriditary nobility as in Europe; their career lines were based upon 
meritocracy and were not defined by aristocratic descent.385 The Ottoman practice of kul 
did certainly not possess the same pejorative connotations and meaning as the western 
concept of ‘slave’. 
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Figure 7: The conscription of Christian boys (devshirme) for the kul institution, probably in the Balkans.  
Source: Süleymannâme (1558), Topkapı Palace Museum H1517, folio 31b. 
 
Once the shocking novelty of devşirme had passed, many Christian peasant families 
volunteered their children for such a potentially good career. It was reported that many 
Christian peasants tried to offer bribes so that their children would be conscripted.386 In 
the early Ottoman period, the relatives of the children levied for the Janissaries were 
exempted from paying the jizya-tax (levied on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects). To 
conscript a son through the devşirme-system seems to have been regarded as a quasi-
military service, comparable with the other services, such as guarding bridges and passes, 
could also bring exemption from jizya-tax.387 
Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481) had firmly established the kapıkulu-class on an equal 
footing with the Turkish aristocracy. For instance, Sultan Mehmed purposefully allocated 
the final victorious assault on the walls of Constantinople to the janissaries in order to 
render his household infantry prestige and reputation. He also publicly proclaimed their 
role in the prestigious conquest. The unfortunate auxiliary troops, who were decimated 
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during the earlier attacks in order to fatigue the enemy, received no public recognition.388 
In the second half of the fifteenth century, the kapıkulu became a new ruling elite, 
conscious of its common interests and powerful positions within the Ottoman 
administrative and military system. The members of the kapıkulu were made up by 
people of various origins (Turkish, European, Balkan, Arab etc.) who lived together and 
shared a cross-cultural background. The notion of the ruling elite was reconstructed as 
‘Ottomans’ and the list of admission to the ruling class was elaborated. The term askeri 
(military class) applied to all members of this ruling class, even though many did not serve 
as soldiers. Because the identity of the ruling elite was culturally defined, it opened itself 
for newcomers and made up a strong force of integration. The general criteria for entry 
into the ruling class included loyalty to the House of Osman and the state, embracing 
Islam (although an element less important than has often been assumed) and knowledge 
of the ‘Ottoman way’, a set of practices, customs and language of the ruling elite. The elite 
also maintained and conserved classic Islamic civilisation. It was based on the knowledge 
of classic works on literature, history, philosophy, religion, sciences, etc. And a new code 
of conduct or adab was shaped, based on the ideas of intisab (relation between master and 
protégé), şeref (personal dignity) and hadd (personal limit). These ideas formed the basis 
of the new households that relied on new networks and master/protégé ties.389 The 
sixteenth-century multi-ethnical and multi-cultural Ottoman Empire was a result of 
these developments.  
With regard to military organisation, already during the reign of Murad II (r. 1421-
1451), the janissary corps had become the most important unit of the standing kapıkulu 
forces of the Ottoman army, particularly in terms of combat effort. Their number at the 
field during the reign of Murad II is assumed to be around 6.000 janissaries.390 As we shall 
observe, in the pitched battles during the major campaigns of Nish and Varna in 1443 and 
1444, the provincial cavalry had turned and fled the field in the early stages of the battle. 
It was primarily through the withstanding of the janissary corps that the Battle of Varna 
was won against the invading crusader army. Their role had been decisive. They provided 
an anchor for the army and an unshakable centre around which the left and right wings 
of cavalry could operate and rally to in time of need. The organisational structure, 
command and control system of the janissary corps became in time stable.391 The élan and 
cohesion within each janissary regiment were very strong. They were proud of their own 
regiments and generally identified themselves with their units that each regiment 
became something of a great family. Most of these warriors tattooed the symbols of their 
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respective units on their arms and shoulders. Their distinctive uniforms and high white 
bonnets were other symbols of their prestige and identification. Obviously, the Ottoman 
government understood the importance of uniforms to promote élan, raise morale and 
discipline. The colours of the uniforms and shoes showed the status and the rank.392 
The Ottoman state also employed other means to create identities and cohesion. The 
Ottoman government established an intimate connection between the janissary corps 
and the Bektashi mystical order and promoted the activities of the Bektashi dervishes 
within the corps. Indeed, the professional soldiers who sharing the harsh life of a warrior, 
facing dangers at battlefields, shared also their identities as being a member of the 
janissary corps. The Bektashi mysticism helped them to self-sustainment and to create 
strong traditions. Indeed, the harshest punishment for any janissary was to be sacked 
from his regiment.393 This unity proved to be very successful during the combats at the 
battlefield, but it had also the result that janissaries stood together against other groups 
and units, even occasionally against the sultan. The solidarity within the corps later 
became very dangerous for the government after the ‘politicisation’ of the corps, which 
made use of this unity to start uprisings and launch coups.394   
In conclusion, it was only after the Ottomans successfully withstood the tremendous 
pressures to dissolution during the early period of decentralised expansion that they 
began to build their state institutions, such as a bureaucracy, an ulema and a standing 
(kapıkulu) army. The creation and acceptance of new institutions could only be possible 
when it made sense, when society required or could easily accommodate that change. The 
transformations took place between the 1360s and 1450s. Sedentarisation, which entailed 
distancing from nomadic practices, was only one aspect of this conflict-ridden 
transformation process. The trajectory of Ottoman state-building was a history of shifting 
alliances and conflicts among various social forces, some of which would eventually drop 
out of the enterprise or be subdued and marginalised. The social forces themselves 
underwent swift changes as well while continuously negotiating their position within the 
state. In this rapidly changing socio-political order, the reign of Sultan Murad I (r. 1362-
1389) represents the first major turning point in the standardisation and 
bureaucratisation of the Ottoman administration.395  
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This is reflected in the fact that Murad I was the first Ottoman ruler to take the title of 
Sultan. This change is very similar to the fact that the Great Seljuk rulers also showed less 
interest in their nomad roots and sought legitimacy largely through appealing to the 
ideals of Islamic rulership, by claiming the title of sultan. In both the Seljuk and Ottoman 
cases, the Persian Islamic concept of absolute sovereignty of the sultans did not impress 
the Turkish nomad nobility (begs). Following the Turkish administrative system, the 
opponents considered the state as common property and power had to be shared.396 The 
Turkish Oghuz princes in the entourage of Seljuk sultans and the Turkish nobility around 
the Ottoman sultan were accustomed to regard him as primus inter pares. The title of sultan 
had placed the ruler above all these begs of the Turkish nobility. They were annoyed by 
the centralisation of power that was surrounded by the members from the household of 
the dynasty, precisely as in the Seljuk case.397 The Great Seljuks gained a reputation for 
having betrayed their group solidarity with the Oghuz nomads. The critics of the Ottoman 
gazi-chroniclers expressed similar resentments. Eventually, sultan Murad I succeeded to 
establish a centralist state, similar to certain states of western Europe in the fifteenth 
century.398 An Ottoman Muslim imperial state, with a sultan and administration, a 
standing army, provincial cavalry and gazi frontier defenders had begun to emerge.  
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2.12  The First Empire, 1389-1402 
By 1389, the Ottoman dynasty had founded a state of vassal principalities in Anatolia and 
the Balkans, the two heartlands of the Ottoman Empire. In 1389, in the Battle of Kosovo-
Polje, the attempt of the assembled Balkan states to stop Ottoman expansion ended in 
their absolute defeat. Losing his father Murad I at Kosovo, Sultan Bâyezid I (r. 1389-1402) 
assumed government on the battlefield. However, he still had to secure his power. After 
a short strife for succession, Bâyezid eliminated the challenges raised by his brothers. 
During this brief period of confusion, some Anatolian Turkish begliks tried to make use of 
this opportunity to annex Ottoman possessions. Alaeddin Beg of Karaman took Beyşehir 
back, which he earlier ceded to sultan Murad I. The prince of Germiyan dynasty tried to 
recapture the cities that his father had given to Murad I.  
By the end of 1389, Bâyezid I secured his authority and led his army into Anatolia to 
repress the revolting Turkish vassals. As a result, the Ottoman chronicles list the 
complete annexation of the beyliks of Saruhan and Aydın, followed by the capture of 
Germiyan and Menteşe in south-west Anatolia. Bâyezid now marched against the 
Karamanids, recaptured Beyşehir and forced them into a treaty. The lord of Menteşe fled 
and sought refuge with Timur Lenk.399 In 1390, the Venetians were renegotiating with 
sultan Bâyezid I on their earlier treaties with the begs (lords) of Aydın and Menteşe, 
indicating that these principalities were controlled by the Ottoman state.400 One of 
Bâyezid’s vassals, Süleyman Pasha of Kastamonu, shifted his allegiance to Kadı 
Burhaneddin, ruler of Sivas in central Anatolia. Bâyezid defeated him and seized 
Kastamonu, but in Amasya he was confronted by Kadı Burhaneddin, a powerful rival.401 
However, the events in Europe forced Bâyezid I to return westwards. The situation in 
Serbia was alarming. After the death of the Serbian despot Lazar at Kosovo in 1389, his 
vassals Vlk Brankovich and Stracimirovich refused to recognise the rule of Lazar’s widow 
Milica. This succession strife led to the involvement of the Hungarian king Sigismund who 
wanted to impose his own sovereignty on Serbia. After Sigismund had invaded Serbia, 
Sultan Bâyezid I abandoned his campaign in Anatolia and came to Rumeli to check the 
Hungarian ambitions in Serbia. To this end, in 1392 Bâyezid proposed to Milica to protect 
her against Hungary and they concluded a marriage agreement between her daughter 
Olivera and Bâyezid. After accepting these terms, Bâyezid resettled Lazar’s son Stephen 
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to the Serbian crown as an Ottoman vassal. As he acquired suzerainty over the Lazarevich 
dynasty, Bâyezid also subjugated Brankovich and other nobles. In this way, he secured 
control over all Serbian domains and prevented Hungarian rule in Serbia.402   
 
Figure 8: The enthronement of Sultan Yıldırım Bâyezid I in Kosovo in 1389.  
Source: Hünernâme, vol. 1, Topkapı Palace Museum H1523 folio 96b.   
When Sultan Bâyezid I departed to Rumeli, he appointed Kara Temürtaş as beglerbegi 
(governor-general) of Anatolia, with his seat in Ankara. In Bâyezid’s absence, Alaeddin 
beg of Karaman attacked Ankara and imprisoned Kara Temürtaş in Konya. This provoked 
Bâyezid Khan, who on his return from Europe, rejected the excuses and gifts sent by 
Alaeddin and led an army against him. The Karamanid forces were defeated, Alaeddin’s 
sons, Mehmed Beg and Ali Beg, were captured and imprisoned in Bursa. Bâyezid left the 
fate of Alaeddin to Kara Temürtaş, who captured and killed him, apparently against 
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Bayezid’s wishes.403 Alaeddin’s widow was in fact Bâyezid’s sister. He took his sister and 
his nephews with him to Bursa. The Ottoman army advanced further and seized several 
other Karamanid cities. With these conquests and the removal of Alaeddin’s heirs, the 
principality of Karaman lost its independence. 
In the winter of 1394, Bâyezid had invited the Byzantine emperor Manuel II and the 
other Christian vassals from the Balkans to an assembly in Serres in order to strengthen 
relations of vassaldom between them. In particular, he wanted the Byzantines, who 
tended to unite with Venice, to hand over their main cities in the Morea or the 
Peloponnese peninsula. However, Manuel left with the impression that Bâyezid intended 
to eliminate him and conquer Byzantium. As soon as he came back to Constantinople, 
Manuel broke off relations with Bâyezid and sent messengers to Hungary for military 
aid.404  
In the summer of 1394, Bâyezid ordered the siege and blockade of Constantinople, 
which continued until 1402. He hoped to take it by means of a long blockade. As a part of 
the siege and to control the passage in the Bosporus, Bâyezid built the watch fort of 
Güzelce Hisar on the Anatolian side.405 In the meantime, he led an expedition against the 
Hungarians and Wallachia (Eflak) and subjugated the Wallachian voyvoda Mircea in 
1395.406 Thereafter, Bâyezid crossed the Danube river and seized the fortress of Nicopolis 
(Niğbolu), which controlled one of the passages over the Danube. There, he captured the 
Bulgarian king Shishman and executed him. In this way, Bâyezid ended the Bulgarian 
kingdom that was transformed into an Ottoman sancak or province under direct Ottoman 
rule.407  
Bâyezid I’s swift conquests in the Balkans caused commotion in Europe. Hungary and 
Venice, who had already concluded an alliance in 1394 and pleaded for a crusade against 
the Ottomans in several European capitals. Their calls and the continuous Byzantine 
requests for aid eventually caught the attention of the Western European states, such as 
the Valois dukes of Burgundy, who involved themselves heavily in a project of holy war.408 
The Burgundian duke Philip the Bold became the chief architect of a crusade to 
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strengthen his own political position and therefore sent his son, Count Jean de Nevers, as 
the nominal head of the French forces.409 The count and a coterie of Burgundian vassals 
formed a contingent of the larger crusader army, which consisted of knights and 
crusaders from Flanders, Germany, England, Italy, Spain, Scotland, Hungary, Poland, 
Rhodes, Lombardy and Wallachia. The allied Christian army counted around 120.000 
men.410 When in 1396 the crusaders under king Sigismund of Hungary came to lay siege 
to Nicopolis, Bâyezid was besieging Constantinople.411  
As soon as Bâyezid received the news that the crusaders had crossed the Danube into 
Ottoman territory, he abandoned the siege of Constantinople and rushed with then 
thousand cavalrymen to Nicopolis, the scene of the famous battle.412 The next day, at the 
Battle of Nicopolis, he destroyed the crusader army, which signalled a first blow to the 
European crusader ideology.413 This battle was the first major encounter between the 
Ottoman state and the Western European states of the later Middle Ages.  
The outcome of this western crusade is well-known and I shall not consider the details 
of the battle. It is sufficient to note that the defeat shocked and discouraged the Western 
nobility for a long time to undertake again such a project against the Ottoman state.414 
Yıldırım Bâyezid’s crushing victory at Nicopolis had ensured Ottoman control of the 
Balkans and raised his fame and prestige in the Muslim world. To announce his victory, 
Bâyezid sent some of the crusader war prisoners to the Mamluk sultan in Egypt.415 
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Furthermore, his victory at Nicopolis re-enforced the Ottoman position in its claim to 
pre-eminence over the other Turkish dynasties in Anatolia.416 The leader of the Christian 
army, count Jean de Nevers, the future Burgundian duke John the Fearless, and several 
other noblemen were taken prisoner by Bâyezid.417 All over Europe, kings and dukes were 
engaged in raising money and paying ransoms for the captive knights and noblemen, 
which led to the first diplomatic contacts between the Ottoman and European states.418  
At the height of his power, Bâyezid returned to Anatolia in 1398 and annexed the 
Turkish principality of Karaman and that of Kadi Burhaneddin.419 With this, the ‘sultan of 
Rûm’ (sultan of Roman lands), Bâyezid I created a centralised Ottoman Empire stretching 
from the Balkan to Anatolia. In Anatolia, he replaced the native Turkish princes with 
appointed state servants to establish direct control.420 Meanwhile, Manuel II sought 
assistance at various European courts and capitals for several years. His quest for military 
aid brought no results.421 Eventually, Constantinople escaped the Ottoman conquest by 
Sultan Bâyezid I through an unexpected event. The unforeseen defeat of Bâyezid I against 
Timur Lenk in 1402 ended the first, short-lived empire of the Ottomans. The conflict arose 
after the deposed and unhappy Turkmen princes defected to the powerful Central Asian 
Turkish ruler, Timur Lenk, who captured the Ottoman city Sivas in 1400. On 28 July 1402, 
at the Battle of Ankara, Timur’s army delivered a fatal blow to Bâyezid and dismantled his 
empire.422 Bâyezid’s decisive defeat against the armies of Timur in 1402 showed Bâyezid’s 
impulsiveness and the fact that he did not make effectively use of diplomacy in order to 
build alliances which may have prevented his failure.423  
It is also noteworthy that Bâyezid’s policy of centralisation and establishing direct rule 
over the vassal princes had made him very unpopular. The chroniclers noted that Bâyezid 
had lost the battle mainly because the auxiliary forces of the annexed Turkish 
principalities defected to their princes who stood at the side of Timur.424 Furthermore, 
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the semi-independent gazi marcher lords also resented Bâyezid’s centralist policies and 
the increasing employment of kapikulu administrators in the decision-making process. All 
of these diminished their own positions and threatened their control of resources. They 
wanted a polity in which the old traditions assured the high position of their social class 
and in which they could keep their control of resources. After the battle, Timur returned 
the various lands in Anatolia to the Turkish dynasties whom Bâyezid had disposed to 
install direct Ottoman governance. He left the Ottoman dynasty only the lands in Europe 
as he considered these legitimately theirs. Timur also sent letters of victory to king 
Charles VI of France and king Henry IV of England, saying ‘I succeeded to defeat our 
common enemy, the Ottoman ruler, whom you failed to rout at Nicopolis’.425 
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2.13 The Civil War, 1402-1413 
After Bâyezid’s defeat at Ankara, the Ottoman state could very well have completely 
disintegrated during a decade of unprecedented political crisis. A civil war between the 
Ottoman princes was the main result of Bâyezid’s defeat.426 To punish the Ottomans, 
Timur restored the lands of the Turkish principalities of Anatolia.427 The rule of the 
remaining Ottoman lands was divided between the sons of Bâyezid, all of whom apart 
from one were able to escape from the army of Timur. In 1403, the eldest son, Süleyman 
made extensive territorial concessions (including the strategic cities of Thessaloniki and 
Mesembria) to Byzantium and other Christian states in order to establish his power. He 
had essentially given up the control of the straits to Byzantium and the Christian league 
and was allowed to keep a limited number of ships. Süleyman promised that his ships 
would not sail through the Dardanelles without the permission of Byzantium or the 
Christian signatories of the treaty.428 Although in the 1370s Byzantium was reduced to the 
de facto status of an Ottoman vassal, the political turbulences following the Battle of 
Ankara in 1402 marked a turning point. Byzantium regained the upper hand in its relation 
with the Ottoman state.429 For example, in the text of the Byzantine-Ottoman treaty of 
1403, Çelebi Süleyman addressed the emperor as his ‘father’, assuming a subordinate 
position.430 The elevation of the Byzantine ruler’s status from vassal to that of ‘father’ was 
an obvious expression of the reversal in the Ottoman-Byzantine power relations after 
1402. Throughout the next decade, Byzantium exploited the rivalries among Bâyezid’s 
sons and maintained its ascendancy.431  
After he had signed such a humiliating treaty, Süleyman crossed the Dardanelles to 
Edirne in the company of Çandarlı Ali Pasha, the vizier of his father. Bâyezid’s other two 
sons, Mehmed and İsa, established their power respectively in the cities of Amasya and 
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Bursa. Bâyezid’s remaining son, Musa, was captured alongside his father. Knowing that 
without the unification of the Ottoman lands in the Balkans and Anatolia the Ottomans 
could not survive for long, both Süleyman and Mehmed sought to extend their power in 
the Balkans and Anatolia.432  
In 1403, Bâyezid’s youngest son, Çelebi Mehmed managed to defeat his brother Isa 
Çelebi and took control of Bursa.433 In 1404, Mehmed sent a ‘letter of commitment’ 
(sevgendname) to Yakub Beg, the lord of Germiyanid principality, who was at that time 
under the protection of Timur himself.434 In 1391, Bâyezid had seized the Germiyanid 
principality and Yakub had escaped to Timur for support. After the Battle of Ankara in 
1402, Timur restored Yakub’s territory and he even stayed for a while in Kütahya, the 
Germiyanid capital.435 In the account of Neşrî, Çelebi Mehmed requested from Yakub Beg 
the delivery of the body of his father together with his brother Musa. Thereupon, Yakup 
sent Bâyezid’s body together with Musa to Bursa, where the unfortunate sultan was 
finally buried in the ancestral city.436 Most importantly, the delivery of his brother Musa, 
who formed a political danger as a rival to the throne, must have formed the most delicate 
matter for Mehmed. In the perilous situation, to back off the Timurid danger, Mehmed 
applied a wise and discrete approach and waited for his time to restore the shattered 
authority.     
During the following decade of Ottoman civil wars, Byzantium, the Balkan lords, the 
Venetians and the Genoese, also attempted to take advantage of the situation and 
preferred a divided Ottoman rival to a united one.437 They all followed a policy of 
supporting the weaker party against the stronger. However, these regional power brokers 
played a dangerous game. Their loyalties were always shifting so that they might find 
themselves owing allegiance to more than one master at the same time. For instance, in 
1410, with the support of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II, Süleyman managed to route 
his brother Musa, who enjoyed the support of the gazi-warriors. After his victory, 
Süleyman returned to Edirne, while Mehmed filled the power vacuum that had been 
created in Anatolia. Musa fled to his main power base in the north-eastern Balkans, where 
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he continued to enjoy the support of his gazi followers and Christian allies, including the 
Serbian vassal, Stefan Lazarevic. The Ottoman struggle for the throne in the Balkans at 
this time was directly related to the power struggles between rival Serbian lords, Stefan 
Lazarevic (who supported Musa) and George Brankovic (who remained loyal to 
Süleyman). It was, among other reasons, through the support of Stefan Lazarević and his 
gazi warriors that Musa was finally able to eliminate Süleyman and seize from him the 
throne in Edirne.438 
Musa resumed an expansionist policy in the Balkan. At the same time, he also forged 
alliances with local lords in an effort to gain new vassals and extend Ottoman influence. 
Musa formed such an alliance with the Italian prince, Carlo Tocco of Cephalonia, against 
the Albanians and he married Tocco’s daughter to seal this pact.439 Since Byzantium had 
supported Süleyman, Musa besieged in 1411 Thessaloniki, Constantinople, and Selymbria. 
However, Musa’s imprudent centralising policies, which aimed at undermining the semi-
independent power of the influential frontier lords (uç begleri) and replacing them with 
the members of his own household (kul), gradually alienated many of his influential 
followers.440 The Anonymous Chronicle accounts this episode as follows: ‘Çelebi Musa had 
put his own men (kuls) forward and the Rum [marcher] lords fell from grace. He saw how 
they had betrayed his brother and knew that they would also betray him. Indeed, this was 
an old characteristic of the Rumelian people. He decided to kill or imprison the lords 
whom he distrusted. The Rumelian lords understood this and they lied off, they watched 
what the wind would bring forth.’441 Eventually, the powerful marcher lords Evrenos Beg 
and Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Beg and even the commander of the Janissaries had defected to 
the side of Çelebi Mehmed. Only the akıncı-raiders stayed with Musa.442 
The resentment against Musa caused his enemies to overcome their disputes and band 
together against him. Meanwhile, his brother Mehmed had signed agreements with the 
Beyliks of Anatolia, whose lands were restored by Timur after the Battle of Ankara. 
Reinforced by the troops of his father in law, the Bey of Dulkadiroğlu, Mehmed I crossed 
the Dardanelles. In the Balkans, he joined his forces with the marcher lords, who had 
defected to him, and with the Serbian troops under the command of Stefan Lazarevic. 
Ultimately, on 5 July 1413, at the Battle of Çamurlu near Sofia, Mehmed’s army routed the 
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forces of his brother Musa.443 This event marked the formal end of the civil war and the 
beginning of an era of recovery and reunification during the reign of Çelebi Mehmed I (r. 
1413-1422). Mehmed I intelligently made use of diplomatic instruments. He gained the 
cooperation of the local Muslim and Christian powers, and he pursued a policy of 
accommodation through commercial treaties and political alliances. Mehmed I was able 
to restore the state and reunite its former lands in Anatolia and in the Balkans.444 The 
Ottoman state began to restore its position as a powerful actor in the political system of 
the Balkans and Anatolia. 
In 1414 and 1416, the Byzantine emperor Manuel II again attempted to restart the civil 
war by sponsoring rival claimants to the Ottoman throne. However, Mehmed routed them 
all and the attempts of Manuel failed. He instigated a Karamanid invasion of the Ottoman 
territory in Anatolia.445 Concerning the recovery and reunification after the disastrous 
crisis of the civil war, Halil İnalcık asked a fundamental question: ‘how could the Ottoman 
state re-emerge as the dominant power in Anatolia and the Balkans under the most 
hostile conditions of the dynastic wars, crusader invasions and other crises that 
threatened to destroy it altogether?’446  
There were several powerful factors that worked in favour of the Ottoman unity. 
Probably, one of them was the fact that Timur was probably not interested to enforce his 
hegemony in Europe and he left the decision in the hands of the local Balkan rulers. 
However, they were unable to strip the Ottomans of all their gains in Europe. Despite 
military dissolution after the battle of Ankara, the Ottomans continued to be the major 
military power in both regions. The Ottoman dynasty was able to create an imperial 
tradition which was considered the only source of legitimation for the feudal lords and 
dynasts in this area. In 1405 and 1413, for example, Serbian princes sought the resolution 
of differences among themselves through the intervention of the Ottoman ruler.447 
Perhaps equally important was the fact that the military groups of the central state 
(kapıluku, sipahi), as well as the peasantry, saw that the confirmation and legitimation of 
their status and rights in the land were dependent on the existence and functioning of 
the Ottoman government. This opportunity gave the sons of Bâyezid a space to re-emerge 
and make a second conquest possible, which occurred even faster. However, because of 
the hostile policies of Byzantium and Venice, Mehmed I realised that it was too early to 
revive the centralised empire of his father Bâyezid and he pursued a policy of 
 
                                                     
443 Ayhan Güldaș, ‘Fetret Devri’ndeki Şehzadeler Mücadelesini Anlatan İlk Manzum Vesika’, Türk Dünyası 
Araștırmaları 72 (1991): 99-110; Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 188-194. 
444 İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, ‘Mehmed I’, İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7, 496-506.  
445 Aşıkpaşazâde, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, 357; Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 238-44. 
446 Halil İnalcik, ‘Mehemmed I’, EI²; Ibid, The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London, 2003) 17. 
447 Kastritsis, ‘Religious Affiliations and Political Alliances’, 222-242. 
 156 
appeasement.448 A semblance of peace and friendship was preserved between Byzantium 
and the Ottoman State.449 
Finally, the political crisis of this decade had brought to the surface the political 
tensions caused by the centralist policy of the dynasty. The civil war even more 
intensified the tensions between the dynasty and the anti-centralist groups, particularly 
the marcher lords and the gazis.450 For instance, Turahan Beg, according to the 
chroniclers, acted negligently during the Battle of Varna (1444) and misled Sultan Murad 
II.451  
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2.14  The reign of Sultan Murad II, 1421-1451 
Most scholars concentrate on the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) and on his 
consolidation of the imperial state power through economic centralisation, legal and 
administrative consolidation.452 However, such measures would not have been possible 
without the reinforcement of Ottoman sovereignty during the reign of Murad II (r. 1421-
51). During Murad II’s reign, the Ottoman state had mostly recovered its earlier political 
and military prowess. Its realm again stretched almost to the territories under sultan 
Bâyezid I. Ottoman control of Eastern Europe and Anatolia was firmly reinforced. Murad 
developed his father’s aims through centralising the administration. 
His reign was also marked by an elusive transition from the Turkish nomadic 
organisation to a centralised model of governance, of which the fundaments were 
consolidated by Sultan Mehmed II, after the conquest of Constantinople. As a matter of 
fact, the near destruction of the state in 1402 and its reconsolidation within half a century 
both occurred through the effects of the centralist policy of the government and its 
control mechanisms. This centralist policy can be considered as the main cause of the 
tensions within the Ottoman ruling classes. They were divided into two groups: the 
supporters and the opponents of the central authority or dynasty. The oppositional 
stance of the gazi milieu and marcher lords to the centralising policies of the Ottoman 
dynasty was a matter of fact. Sultan Murad II’s reign went through times of turbulences, 
crusader invasions and even abdication of the throne.  
In 1421, Murad II mounted at the age of seventeen the throne of the Ottoman state, as 
Mehmed I’s eldest son.453 He was named successor to the throne by Mehmed I himself. As 
crown prince he had resided at Manisa, where he had acquired experience in governance 
and taken part in the suppression of the revolt of Simavna-Oğlu Bedreddin.454 Sultan 
Murad II was the sixth ruler of the Ottoman dynasty, born in 1404 in Amasya and died in 
Edirne in 1451. In terms of his physical appearance, according to the Burgundian spy, 
Bertrandon de la Broquière who saw him in 1433, Murad II was ‘large in build but short in size, 
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with Tatar features. He has a large, round nose and rather small eyes, is dark in 
complexion, with large jowls and a round beard. He has a deep toned voice.’455  
In the following passage, Bertrandon wrote down his eyewitness account when he saw 
Murad nearby the capital of Edirne: ‘I saw the Great Turk coming, who entered the village 
of Yenipazar [Yeniköy] in a shower of rain, having only fifty horsemen attending him and 
a dozen archers walking on foot before him. His dress was a robe of crimson velvet, lined 
with sable, and on his head he wore, like the Turks, a red hat to save himself from the 
rain, he had thrown over this robe another, in the manner of a mantle, after the fashion 
of the country. […] In the afternoon he came out of his pavilion to go to the bath, and I 
saw him at my ease. He was on horseback, with the same hat and crimson robe, attended 
by merely six persons on foot. He is about twenty eight or thirty years old.’456 
Murad’s disposition to peace always seemed to be praised by the contemporary 
chronicles. According to de la Broquière, Sultan Murad II appears to conform to the ideals 
of the age: ‘they told me that he [Murad II] hates war, and I think it is true, because if he 
wanted to use the immense wealth at his disposal it will be easy for him to conquer many 
places in Europe.’457. In Ottoman, Byzantine and western sources, Murad II is usually 
described as a ruler who did not like wars either, but he was an excellent army 
commander in the most critical moments. He is portrayed as an able statesman, with a 
clear insight of the political situation, but by no means a man who found satisfaction in 
war. The contemporary Byzantine chronicler Doukas spoke of him as a friendly and 
trustworthy man and praised him for his maturity of judgment and tolerance.458 
Kritovoulos, another Byzantine chronicler wrote on Murad: ‘He was a kind, generous, 
majestic ruler of high character, skilful in military leadership and purely noble in 
descent.’459 Bertrandon again commented in his narrative: ‘Every now and then Amurad 
beg [Murad II] makes great examples of justice, which gains him perfect obedience at 
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chose à en conquester une grant partie.’ 
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home and abroad. He likewise knows how to keep his country in an excellent state of 
defence, without oppressing his subjects by taxes of other modes of extortion.’460 
 
Figure 9: Miniature portrait of Sultan Murad II.  
 
Through his character and deeds, as reflected in the chronicles, there emerges an 
image of ‘an ideal ruler in the late medieval Muslim world’. His reign was very significant 
for the future political and cultural development of the Ottoman state. After the first 
critical years of dynastic struggles, Murad II continued his father’s work of consolidation. 
His aim was mainly to live on peaceful terms with the vassal princes, of whom the bey of 
Sinop at the Black Sea and the despot of Serbia gave their daughters to him.461 Murad’s 
nature, which tended toward Sufism, marked his interest for a spiritual life. In his early 
years, Murad also enjoyed wine and courtly life and had himself encircled with musicians, 
poets and scholars. Because of his taste for the arts, he acted as a patron for the 
production of many literary, historical and musical works. The mystical tradition was 
strong in his surroundings, as is proved by the great influence of Sheikh Emir Buhari. 
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Many other sheikhs came to his court from Iran and Iraq. This also determined the 
direction which the Ottoman literature was to take in the following period.  
The court of Murad II was a vivid centre of politics, arts and culture, precisely as at the 
courts of his contemporary Turkish princes in Anatolia (see Chapter 1). The first Ottoman 
capitals Bursa and Edirne also benefited from Murad’s architectural constructions: 
mosques, medreses, soup kitchens, hospitals, hamams, bridges, streets and monasteries for 
dervishes.462 When visiting Bursa, Broquière was overwhelmed by the city: ‘Cette ville de 
Bourse est bien marchande et plus riche et mieux peuplée que Constantinople et est la 
meilleure ville que le Turc aye (…) Et sont assés beaulx lieux ainsy que hospitaulx, et de 
ceulx cy, en a trois ou quatre où on donne souvent de pain, de la char et du vin à ceulx qui 
le veulent prendre pour Dieu.’463  
The circumstances of the time, the crusader invasion at Varna and the renegade viziers 
such as Şihabeddin Paşa who favoured the policy of conquest, as well as the domestic 
political conflicts, enforced Murad II into a different way. He became one of the most 
brilliant sultans with a series of crucial military and political successes. He left much of 
the action to his military commanders seeking conquest in Eastern Europe. His most 
influential viziers were not yet the renegades (devshirme) of later times. They belonged to 
the old Turkish aristocratic families that had supported the cause of Murad’s forefathers 
and were becoming a kind of hereditary nobility, such as İbrahim Paşa and Halil Paşa of 
the Çandarlı family.464 Furthermore, there were other influential marcher gazi lords from 
Rumeli (the Balkans), such as Turahan Beg, Ḥacı İvas Paşa and other members of the 
marcher gazi dynasties such as Timurtaş, Evrenos, and others.  
2.14.1 Central Administration during the reign of Murad II 
As the state expanded, the Ottoman central administration further developed. The term 
kapı, translated in western languages as ‘the Porte’, originally referred to the place where 
the Ottoman sultan heard complaints and conducted governmental affairs. This word 
eventually came to mean the Ottoman government.465 During the reign of Murad II, the 
dîvân-ı âli or state council served for various functions without observing a specific 
regularity of its meetings or stability of its composition. The meetings of the Ottoman 
state council (divan) can be reconstructed as follows: the Ottoman ruler called it together 
at the place where he was at that moment; the council heard complaints of the people 
and set right injustices; the sultan invited the beys or lords whom he chose to consult 
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about the issues he had beforehand defined on the agenda. Major holidays or weddings 
were preferred as occasions for these meetings. Furthermore, when the sultan went to 
the Friday prayer, rode to hunt or during a campaign, he would listen in person to the 
grievances of the people. Nothing escaped the authority of the divan, whether it was 
foreign policy or domestic affairs, financial issues, judicial or administrative matters. 
These issues were debated and decision were taken on all governmental affairs and 
appointments. The results were presented to the sultan. The divan or the council 
administered vast territories and it functioned as the supreme court of the state.  
The changes in the council started with the growing technical complexity of the land 
register books (tahrir). The administrative system of financing, accountancy and judiciary 
became increasingly complex. As a result, the marcher lords (uç begleri) and the other 
officials in the decision-making process lacked the capabilities to adequately deal with 
these issues. Therefore, for the daily administration of the affairs, the sultan relied ever 
more on technically specialised staff members who were skilled in financing and in 
Shari’a law.466 Although the decisions on state policies were reserved for the sultan, in 
practice they were made by the State Council or the divan-ı hümayun. This new practice 
was wrongly understood by the contemporary western observers as that the real power 
and authority rested with the dîvân or council, while the sultan continued to exert 
control over the way the state was run.  
In principle, the dîvân or the state council counted a few members and formed the 
nucleus of the Ottoman central administration.467 Oruç Bey notes that there were usually 
three viziers or ministers during the reign of Murad II: Mahmud Paşa, İshak Paşa and 
Çandarlı Halil Paşa, who was the grand vizier. The Çandarlı dynasty provided grand 
viziers during four generations until 1453 the Ottoman. The enlarged divan consisted 
besides the viziers, as well as governors of the most important provinces, head of the 
chancellery (nişancı), the state treasurer (baş defterdar), and the ağa or commander of the 
Janissaries. In some sessions, other dignitaries such as the chief official of Islamic affairs 
(şeyh ül-İslam) and the judge of the military and administrative affairs (kadı asker or 
kazasker) were also invited. The Sultan frequently delegated his political and executive 
authority to his viziers.  
The grand vizier was appointed directly by the sultan as his ‘absolute deputy’ and 
received the sultan’s golden ring of the imperial seal (tuğra). Sāḥib-i mühr or the ‘holder 
of the seal’ was another term used for the sadrazam. The grand vizier could not take major 
decisions without consulting the Imperial Council or divan-ı hümayun, the centre of 
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Ottoman administration. Neither could he make expenditures from the treasury without 
the permission of the treasurer or dismiss him without the approval of the sultan. 
However, he did have supreme control of the administration.468 It was Murad II’s 
successor, Mehmed II, who consolidated with his renowned Laws or kanûnnâme the 
composition of the divan and the decision-making procedure. The ḳânûnnâme or laws of 
Sultan Meḥmed II specified the grand vizier’s position as the ‘head of the viziers (vüzerâ) 
and commanders (ümerâ)’. It implied that his authority was limited to military-
administrative matters and did not extend to ulemâ (clerical) affairs and appointments. 
Practically in the same breath, the kânûnnâme referred to the sadrazam as: ‘He is greater 
than all men, he is in all matters the sultan’s absolute deputy (cümle umûruñ vekîl-i 
muṭlaḳıdır). The defterdar is the deputy for my treasury, but under the supervision of the 
grand vizier. In all meetings and ceremonies the grand vizier takes his place before all 
others.’469  
The title of grand vizier or Sadrazam, which strictly meant ‘the greatest of the high 
dignitaries’, appeared around 1360.470 At this time, the title had been used to refer to the 
highest ʿulemāʾ official or the ḳaḍı ʿasker (literally, judge of the administrative and military 
affairs), who were promoted to serve as viziers. Later, because the vizier came to operate 
as military commander in the absence of the sultan, the sadrazam was appointed from the 
ranks of the commanders (umerāʾ). Unlike most viziers in Islamic history, the Ottoman 
first minister was also a military commander. The role of the Grand Vizier in the Ottoman 
governmental practice evolved over time. From the time of Murad II, during the first half 
of the fifteenth century, the sources reveal that the viziers began to play a significant role 
in decision-making. Brocquière noted that the ambassador of Milan, before being 
received by Sultan Murad II in 1433, had to make visits to the three viziers as well as to 
other state officials.471 A decade later, in 1444, Cyriac of Ancona, who negotiated a truce 
between the king of Hungary and Sultan Murad II made his talks mostly with the Grand 
Vizier, Çandarlı Halil Pasha.472 We also know that Halil Pasha led the negotiations on 
behalf of Sultan Mehmed II with the Byzantine envoys in 1453 during the siege of 
Constantinople.473 
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Outside the purview of the grand vizier, the ulema or the clerical scholarly class had 
the greatest power. The two ḳaḍı ʿaskers (judges) for the provinces in Anatolia and in the 
Balkans were responsible for the administration of Shari Law throughout the realm. The 
Şeyh ül-Islam was the chair of the ulema class. He was not actually a state official as he 
received no government salary and had no political authority. He was paid consulting 
fees and frequently received lucrative appointments as administrator of charitable 
foundations or waqf. The Şeyh ül-Islam was an authority on the Shari Law. He advised the 
grand vizier for the appointment, promotion and dismissal of the ulema-staff.474  
Many of the administrative class or ümerāʾ were members of the devshirme institution. 
This change in the vizierate from the religious scholars (ulema) to the military-
administrative officials (ümera) also implied a change within the ruling elite. It came along 
with an ethnic shift away from the Turkish-Muslim-born nobility to those of the imperial 
household or kapikulu class, who shared cross-cultural Balkan, Greek, Turkish, and Arab 
origins. As such, this shift was a prominent feature in the centralisation of power and it 
enforced the position of the sultan.  
During the reign of Murad II, members of the provincial military elites and the 
devshirme, served in the central administration. The Turkish aristocratic family of the 
Çandarlıs dominated the administration until 1453.475 Their fall marked the beginning of 
an elite change, in which the central administration was staffed by the members of the 
devshirme. Some freeborn Muslims, mostly with ulema-scholarly background, held 
important offices. Members of the ruling elites of the annexed states were integrated into 
the Ottoman ruling class and some of them considerably contributed to the Ottoman 
government. For example, both Mahmud Pasha Angelovic and Gedik Ahmed Pasha 
belonged to Byzantine nobility. Mahmud Pasha served as the Grand Vezir under Sultan 
Mehmed II, in the years following the conquest of Constantinople.476  
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2.14.2 The Succession War, 1421-22 
During the first years of his reign, sultan Murad’s main concern was to consolidate the 
internal order of the state, threatened by a series of pretenders to the throne and to heal 
the wounds caused by the turmoil of the civil war after Bâyezid’s defeat against Timur. 
Although Mehmed I had pronounced Murad’s name to avoid possible conflicts after his 
death, Murad was not able to acquire the throne in tranquillity. During the first three 
years of his reign, the young sultan had to deal with internal conflicts. Immediately after 
his accession, Murad II had to face a succession strive, caused by a rival claimant, his uncle 
Mustafa, known as ‘Düzme’ (pretender) Muṣṭafa, and the latter’s ally Cüneyd.477 Both were 
supported by the Byzantines in exchange for important territories. In order to exploit the 
uncertainties of the succession, the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II released Mustafa from 
custody in Thessaloniki. Mustafa Çelebi was actually a son of Sultan Bâyezid I, whom he 
accompanied at the Battle of Ankara (1402). When Bâyezid fell captive, he asked to Timur 
to find his two sons, Musa and Mustafa, who were together with him at the centre of the 
army.478 Although Musa was found, his brother Mustafa was not found and the Ottoman 
tradition suggested that Mustafa was lost during the battle.479 The Ottoman chroniclers 
led us to believe that Mustafa was only a ‘pretender’ (düzme) and not actually a son of 
Bâyezid I.480 However, in the fethnames (letters of victory), Timur mentioned that Bâyezid 
was taken prisoner together with his two sons.481 The historian Enverî also noted that 
Çelebi Mustafa was caught by Timur and that he afterwards appeared to claim the 
throne.482  
The Byzantine Emperors, Manuel II and his son John VIII, saw the death of Mehmed I 
in 1421 as an opportunity to foment a strife within the dynasty. They requested Murad II 
to deliver Bâyezid’s two remaining sons to them as hostages and threatened to install 
Mustafa as ruler in the Balkans.483 When Murad refused to deliver his brothers to the 
emperor, they concluded a treaty and freed Murad’s uncle, Mustafa, who agreed to cede 
the important fortress of Gallipoli, the rich coastal plains of Thrace and the Black Sea 
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coasts to Byzantium. In exchange, the Byzantines offered military help to Mustafa.484 
According to the Burgundian diplomat, Ghillebert de Lannoy, Çelebi Mustafa promised 
not only to surrender the important base of Gallipoli, but also his fleet to Byzantium. 
Furthermore, he guaranteed not to cross to Anatolia, but to settle in the Balkans and fight 
Murad from there.485 The Byzantines clearly envisaged to prevent Murad’s control of the 
Balkans, while a state in Anatolia would be rendered powerless, since Timur’s son 
Shahruh, still threatened the Ottomans and guaranteed protection to the Turkish prince 
of Karaman, who was a rival of Ottoman rule in Anatolia.486 
 The Byzantine policy was a result of the events of the earlier period. Shortly after the 
coronation of Manuel II’s son, John VIII, as co-emperor in 1421, a crisis within the 
Byzantine court started. This also led to a greater crisis in Byzantine-Ottoman relations. 
Manuel did not wish to interfere in the Ottoman succession issue and accepted the 
designated successor, Murad II as sultan. His son, John VIII, however, suggested to support 
a rival claimant to the throne, Murad’s uncle Mustafa, whom the Byzantines held in their 
custody at Lemnos since 1416. John VIII advocated a more aggressive policy and he won 
the upper hand.487 However, John was aware that he could not defeat the Ottoman state 
on his own. He decided to rely on creating strife within the Ottoman dynasty and explored 
the possibility of aid from the Christian states in Europe and the Turkish princes in 
Anatolia.488  
At his release, Mustafa was initially successful in the Balkans, where he was recognised 
as sultan by some marcher lords in Rumelia. The Turkish princes in Anatolia, which Timur 
had restored to their principalities also rebelled. The young sultan Murad II received the 
support of the Janissaries and the ulema at his ascension to the throne in the capital Bursa. 
However, in the final encounter in 1422, at the Battle of Ulubat, the frontier lords defected 
to Murad’s side and the latter defeated his uncle Mustafa. The Byzantine chronicler 
Doukas also gave voice to the argument of the unsuitability of Mustafa for the throne. He 
recorded a conversation between İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Beg, an ally of Mustafa, and his 
brother Hamza Beg, who since childhood resided in the entourage of Murad.489 
Mustafa managed to flee across the straits to Gallipoli, where he blocked the straits 
with the ships he had received from the Byzantines. In this time of need, the Genoese 
 
                                                     
484 John Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425). A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship (New Brunswick, 1969) 357-
358; Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 136. 
485 Ch. Potvin ed., Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy. Voyageur, Diplomate et Moraliste (Leuven, 1878) 66. 
486 İnalcık, ‘Byzantium and the origins of the crisis of 1444 under the light of Turkish sources’, Actes de XIIe Congrès 
International des etudes Byzantines, 2 (Belgrade, 1964): 159-160. 
487 Necipoğlu, Byzantium Between the Ottomans and the Latins, 34-35. 
488 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 133. 
489 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 154.  
 166 
governor of New Phokia – an alum-producing Genoese colony – Giovanni Adorno, ferried 
Murad’s army across the straits of Gallipoli.490 Because of their mutual interest and enmity 
with Venice and Byzantium, the Genoese had been allies of the Ottomans since the reign 
of Orhan. According to the Byzantine historian Doukas, who in the 1420s served as 
secretary to the Genoese colony, Adorno had received the rights by Mehmed I to exploit 
the alum mine in Phokia. However, he had suffered great losses due to the Genoese-
Catalan war, which prevented him from sailing to Italy, France, Spain and England. 
Consequently, the alum could not be sold in Europe and lay unused. As Adorno fell heavily 
in debt, he sought an audience with Sultan Murad to receive new decrees and to pay the 
tribute that had not been paid for six years. Adorno sent two letters to Murad, which were 
composed by Doukas in Turkish, saying: ‘As your faithful servant, I am eager to offer you 
my assistance by ferrying you with my warships. I can provide you with better service 
than any other person. Only command me and your request will be swiftly carried out.’491  
Murad was pleased with this offer and asked Adorno to send a trusted servant to 
discuss the details. The Genoese dispatched a certain Demetrios Aga with letters, which 
were again composed by Doukas, addressed to Murad and his viziers. They concluded an 
agreement and Murad sent one of his officials, Hatib, ‘one of the most learned and prudent 
of the Turks, with the sum of fifty thousand gold coins to fit out a fleet which would take 
the Turks over the straits.’492 As Mustafa was worried about this agreement with Murad, 
he promised to give Adorno fifty thousand gold coins on the condition that he would not 
transport Murad’s army. However, according to Doukas, Adorno refused.493 Murad, who 
was concerned that the Genoese would disregard their commitment to him, had taken 
the precaution of taking on board five hundred janissaries with him. At sea, in the middle 
of the straits, Adorno kneeled before Murad and informed him that Mustafa had proposed 
to deliver him, which he had rejected. He requested if Murad might absolve his heavy 
debt about twenty-seven thousand gold coins owed for his lease of the alum mines. 
According to Doukas, Murad embraced Adorno and said: ‘from this day you are my 
brother and trusted friend’ and he gladly granted Adorno’s wish.494 This pact laid the base 
for a long-lasting relationship between Sultan Murad II and Adorno, the governor of the 
Genoese colony.495  
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Remarkably, the Ottoman chroniclers are silent about Murad’s cooperation with 
Adorno at the Battle of Ulubat in 1422. Neşrî and Aşık Paşazâde, when accounting the 
conflict between the young Sultan Murad and his uncle Mustafa, emphasised his release 
of the marcher lord Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Bey from the prison in Tokat. Earlier in 1413, 
after defeating Musa, Murad’s father Çelebi Mehmed had put Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Beg in 
prison, for supporting Musa against Çelebi Mehmed. Since Mustafa enjoyed the support 
of the powerful marcher lords of Rumeli, Murad attempted to divide Mustafa’s forces by 
releasing Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Beg, a respected leader of the marcher lords in the Balkans. 
The chroniclers unanimously accounted that this plan worked well. Aşık Paşazade writes 
that Mihal-oğlu Mehmed approached the shore and shouted: ‘Ahoy, Turahan the Turk! 
He also called the other marcher lords, Kömlü-oglu and Evrenos-oglu. All the Rumelian 
marcher lords came to the shore and welcomed him, spoke with him and became aware 
that Mihal-oğlu Mehmed was still alive.’496 After stirring confusion among Mustafa’s 
troops, Murad landed on the shore and he routed Mustafa, who fled towards the Danube 
where he was finally caught after a long pursuit. Meanwhile, Murad seized the fortress of 
Gallipoli and entered Edirne, where he gave a rich banquet to which he invited Adorno 
and the Genoese ship captains.497  
For Murad II, Manuel’s attempt to foment internecine war formed the pretext to lay 
siege to Constantinople and Thessaloniki in 1422. The siege lasted until September, when 
Sultan Murad withdrew due to renewed dynastic strife. The cause was the appearance of 
his younger, thirteen year-old brother ‘Little’ (Küçicek) Mustafa, who had revolted and 
laid siege to Bursa.498 At the same time, the princes of the Germiyanids, Karamanids and 
Çandarlis in Anatolia rose in revolt. They responded favourably to a Byzantine diplomatic 
move for an attack on the Ottoman territories in Anatolia. These Anatolian emirs and 
Byzantium had encouraged Murad’s brother Mustafa.499 The Byzantine chronicler Doukas 
wrote that emperor Manuel secretly posted letters to the tutor of Mustafa, şarabdar İlyas, 
a wine cupbearer in rank, to bring the child to Bursa and provided İlyas with a large 
amount of gold to hire a mercenary army.500 Making their way to Bursa, Neşrî accounts 
that two nobles of the ahi-guilds of Bursa, Ahi Yakup and Ahi Kadem, went to şarabdar 
İlyas and pleaded to him that he should do everything he could to prevent the devastation 
of the city by their troops. They also paid a large amount of money to İlyas, which they 
had gathered from the citizens of Bursa. İlyas accepted their request and took küçicek 
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Mustafa to Iznik, where they installed themselves. Meanwhile, Murad raised the siege of 
Constantinople and Murad’s pasha’s send an envoy to şarabdar İlyas saying that he was 
appointed to the office of governor-general of Anatolia. They demanded İlyas ‘to keep the 
young boy busy until they arrived.’501 Murad’s marcher lords, Mezid Beg and Mihal-oglu, 
came in advance and besieged the fortress where İlyas had took shelter. İlyas delivered 
the child to Mezid Beg and ‘little’ Mustafa was instantly executed.502  
2.14.3 The International situation 
It was only after the internal troubles had ended that Murad could turn against external 
threats. When Murad was occupied with dynastic strife, Drakul, the Voyvoda of Wallachia, 
had crossed the Danube and harassed Ottoman Balkans. At the same time, Isfendiyar-oglu 
of Sinop had seized the territories in Kastamonu. Murad personally led his army to 
Kastamonu and recovered the lost territory and its copper mines.503 At the same time, he 
ordered Firuz Beg, the Rumelian marcher lord to lead a punitive campaign into 
Wallachia.504 The outcome of both campaigns was to reduce both Drakul and Isfendiyar-
oglu to vassalage. As a result, Drakul came to Murad’s court accepting Ottoman vassalage 
and leaving his two sons as hostages. One of these boys would later become the famous 
Drakula who caused great troubles in Wallachia. The bey of the İsfendiyar dynasty also 
became a vassal and married his daughter to Sultan Murad II. These campaigns restored 
the stability of Ottoman territories, and within twenty years Murad II had, with the 
exception of Karaman and the upper Euphrates valley, recovered the territories lost after 
the Battle of Ankara. In 1422, a series of raids into the Peloponnesus led by the Ottoman 
marcher lord Turahan reminded the Christian league of the 1403 Treaty of Gallipoli that 
their advantages over the Ottomans had faded.505 
In the Balkans, Murad II was confronted with the great power struggle with Venice and 
Hungary and there was always the looming threat of an allied Christian invasion from 
Europe.506 Due to the unfavourable conditions of the treaty of 1403, the most significant 
loss in Europe had been the loss of Thessaloniki, which Süleyman Çelebi had surrendered 
to Byzantium. In 1387, the Byzantines had surrendered the city to the Ottomans. In order 
to recapture Thessaloniki, Murad’s forces blockaded in 1422 the city. The Byzantines once 
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again were not able to defend it and in 1423 ceded the city to Venice.507 The same year, 
co-emperor John VIII travelled to Europe in search for aid. However, John’s anti-Ottoman 
policy based on expectations of military help from Latin Europe proved fruitless attempts. 
In 1424, after John’s departure and probably without his knowledge, Manuel II took 
advantage of his absence and concluded a peace treaty with Sultan Murad II. The terms 
of the treaty held that Byzantium had to surrender the territories which Süleyman Çelebi 
had ceded in 1403. About twenty years later, the Byzantine emperor was once again 
reduced to the status of a tribute-paying Ottoman vassal.508 De la Broquière noted in the 
early 1430s that the ‘emperor of Constantinople’ was under great submission of the ‘Grant 
Turc’: ‘car il me fut dict qu’il luy paye tous les ans dix mille ducatz de tribute seulement 
pour le corps de la ville de Constantinople.’509  
The events of the Ottoman siege of Thessaloniki between 1423 and 1430 show 
interesting indications about the reception of Ottoman rule by the people of the Eastern 
Roman Empire. Manuel II’s negotiations in the 1380’s with the papacy to unite the Roman 
and Latin Churches had alienated the clergy and the popular classes of the city. They were 
inclined to accommodate with the Ottomans. As a result, in 1387 they forced Emperor 
Manuel II outside the city, surrendering it to Sultan Murad I.510 The same antagonism 
reached a climax when Murad II launched a siege in 1422. The common people rioted in 
1423 against the transfer of the city to the Venetians. However, the pro-Latin nobility 
arranged the transformation to Venice.511 The option of accommodation with Ottoman 
rule remained strong among the popular classes. As pointed out earlier, the Ottomans 
acted according to the principles of Muslim Law, which offered the Christian enemies the 
option of surrendering while keeping their rights as an alternative to conquest by force. 
Consequently, many inhabitants of Thessaloniki showed a preference for a peaceful take-
over of their city in order to avoid enslavement. Many citizens fled and joined the 
Ottoman forces.512  
The diffusion of the conciliatory attitude towards the Ottomans among the 
Thessalonians must also be attributed to the discontentment with the repressive 
Venetian regime, which even dissatisfied the upper class of the city. Therefore, the 
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support for surrender to Ottoman rule considerably increased.513 Doukas informed us 
that: ‘the Latins were afraid that the Romans would rise up and revolt and introduce the 
Turks into the city to expel the Venetians.’514 He noted that the Venetians expelled ‘the 
Roman nobility who were suspected of cooperating with the Ottomans outside 
Thessaloniki, and deported them to Crete and Venice.’515 Because of increasing poverty, 
hunger and shortage of rations, many Greek guards and soldiers also fled to the 
Ottomans.516 The salaries they received from Venice were insufficient to meet their basic 
needs and the Venetian paymasters who distributed their salaries often extracted heavy 
taxes. According to Byzantine chronicles, the Venetian cavalry guard of the duke was 
infamous for molesting the citizens.517 All this evidence clarifies the vague references to 
the bad relations between the citizens of Thessaloniki and Venice found in the text of 
Doukas, who wrote that ‘those who remained in the city were maltreated in countless acts 
of violence and others were tortured as infidels.’518 The Venetian regime also interfered 
with the religious freedom of the Orthodox community. The difference between the 
religious policies of the Ottomans and the Latins was widely known in the Eastern Roman 
Empire, where the trauma of the Fourth Crusade (1204) and the following plunder and 
occupation of its capital never were forgotten. The anti-unionist monasteries in the city 
were in favour of an Ottoman take-over. Suffering from poverty, hunger, mistreatment 
and exhaustion, the citizens of the city became less and less willing to continue the war 
against the Ottoman army. This was the point especially, when Murad II in 1430 sent them 
letters guaranteeing the right to maintain their immovable together with their sources 
of incomes.519  
Following the Venetian take-over, the Ottomans had considerably increased the 
pressure on the blockade of Thessaloniki. Murad II viewed the city’s cession to Venice as 
a transgression of his rights on Thessaloniki by virtue of its former belonging to Ottoman 
dominion.520 He argued that: ‘This city is my ancestral property. My grandfather Bâyezid, 
by the might of his hand, wrested her from the Romans. But as you are Latins from Italy, 
why have you trespassed into these parts? You have the choice of withdrawing. If you do 
not, I will come post-haste.’521 The take-over of Thessaloniki involved the Venetians in 
the war with Murad Han, which they could not sustain alone. One of the Turkish princes 
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whose assistance Venice could bring in was Cüneyd, a pretender to the principality of 
Izmir who had joined earlier the rebellion of Mustafa.522 Cüneyd planned to send an 
Ottoman pretender to Rumelia, but Murad secured a Genoese aid to block him from the 
sea. With his elimination Venice looked for other allies and began negotiations with king 
Sigismund of Hungary. Venice offered him to support an invasion of Ottoman territory in 
the Balkans by cutting Ottoman communications at the straits. However, Venice failed to 
engage Sigismund in a joint action against Murad Han. After seven years of Venetian-
Ottoman war for Thessaloniki, a principal centre of the Venetian colonies in the eastern 
Mediterranean, the city was recaptured by the Ottomans in 1430.523 In the words of 
Doukas: ‘Murad issued instructions that if any of the Romans wished, he was allowed to 
come and dwell again in the city. He also ordered that the church should remain in the 
hands of Christians.’524  
After the decline of the Eastern Roman Empire, Venice had emerged as the dominant 
commercial power in the Levant, with colonies and outpost in Dalmatia, the Aegean, Black 
and Mediterranean Seas. It controlled the shores of the Balkan Peninsula and claimed the 
monopoly of the Eastern Mediterranean trade.525 Therefore, the principal concern of 
Murad II was to change the imbalance of economic control in the region. Murad sought 
to implement policies to weaken the Venetian commercial hegemony through taking 
over the control of the Levantine trade routes, combined with alliances with Venice’s 
rivals such as Genoa or Ancona.526 The Venetians needed to adapt their commercial and 
colonial policies to accommodate with the Ottoman expansion. The Ottoman expansion 
alarmed these Latin colonists in the Aegean region, who rightly feared that they would 
lose their colonies.527 
Sultan Murad II also had to move fast to counter Venetian claims in Albania, which was 
vitally important for Venetian relations with the world outside the Adriatic Sea. Albania 
received support from Venice, Naples and the papacy against the establishment of 
Ottoman rule.528 The Ottomans encountered in Albania a long and stiff resistance and the 
years after 1430 saw the uncertain establishment of Ottoman rule in central and southern 
Albania. Ottoman diplomacy took advantage of the struggle between Venice, Naples and 
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the papacy. Very close to Italy, Albania was perceived by the Ottomans as a bridgehead to 
conquer Italy and by the Italian states as their first defence line.529  
The zeal of the papacy to organise a crusade against the Ottoman state was related 
more to this direct menace to the Vatican than to the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem.530 In the 
1430s, anti-Ottoman crusade plans were constantly discussed in the west to stimulate 
Christian enthusiasm. Broquière observed that Sultan Murad II had immense resources at 
his disposal to conquer Europe if he wished to do so.531 However, until 1479, the Ottoman 
state did not consider to conquer Italy without first taking control of the Albanian coasts. 
From the 1430s, the Aragonese kings of Naples fought in Albania the Ottomans.532 By this 
time, Alfonso V of Naples had securely established a state in eastern Spain. He revived an 
old ambition of his predecessors, namely the reestablishment of a Latin empire in eastern 
Mediterranean. However, as his fleet suffered losses in the war with Genoa and with 
Venice and Milan, Alfonso did not feel safe to commit large overseas campaigns.533 He 
maintained diplomatic relations with the rivals of the Ottomans such as the Mamelukes 
in Egypt, Christian rulers in Cyprus and Rhodes and with the Turkish emirs in Anatolia.534  
Geopolitically, while the Ottoman state was struggling with the Italian city-states and 
the papacy in Albania, the Hungarians were striving to extend their influence into 
Wallachia and Serbia. The middle Danube was actually the real front between Christian 
Europe and the Ottoman state. The competition for control of Serbia and Wallachia, which 
lay between the two powers, marked the struggle between the Ottoman state and 
Hungary for dominance in the Balkan. With much of Albania under his control, Sultan 
Murad II now extended his attention to Serbia and Bosnia.535 In 1435, Murad married 
Mara, the daughter of the Despot George Brankovic, establishing her father as his vassal. 
Meanwhile, unable to come to terms with Murad II, the doge of Venice continuously 
proposed logistic support if Hungary would invade the Ottoman lands.536 However, 
Hungary plunged into a civil war after the death of king Sigismund in 1437 and the 
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peasantry rose in revolt against the excessive exploitation by their feudal lords. The next 
year, Sultan Murad II led a campaign into Hungary to restore Ottoman control of the 
Danube.537 It seems that the Transylvanian peasantry profited greatly from Murad’s 
expedition, which safeguarded the Balkan peasants from vengeance by their feudal 
lords.538  
Believing that the Hungarian menace was eliminated, Murad captured the Serbian 
despotate in 1439. And in 1440, he made the commercial city of Dubrovnik (or Ragusa) on 
the Adriatic Sea an Ottoman vassal, which accepted to pay an annual tribute. This alliance 
with the Ottoman state enabled Dubrovnik to develop an alternative trade route to the 
Venetians, which damaged Venetian commercial hegemony in the region.539 The Serbian 
silver mines at Novo Brdo, of vital importance for silver supplies to Italy via Dubrovnik, 
were conquered and the export of silver to Europe was prohibited.540 In 1441, Murad II 
attempted to capture Belgrade, the gate to central Europe, which had been fortified by 
the Hungarians. He failed and the pendulum swung in the reverse direction. During the 
debate about the union of the Latin and Orthodox Churches at the Council of Florence in 
1439, a campaign against the Ottomans was then under negotiation and to turn the 
discussions into action the Christian league needed prospects of success. Hungary was the 
key to any allied Christian invasion of the Ottoman lands.541  
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2.14.4 The Crusade project at the Council of Florence, 1439 
Since the so-called Eastern schism between the Eastern Roman Orthodox Church and the 
Latin Roman Catholic Church in 1054, their relations had long been antagonistic due to 
theological differences and disputes. The schism occurred when the pope and the 
Byzantine patriarch excommunicated each other following the dispute concerning the 
liturgical customs of the Greek churches in Italy.542 The Council of Florence in 1439 formed 
the ultimate attempt to reunite the two churches. The union was declared in Florence on 
July 1439, but no effective unification was realised.543 The Council of Florence in 1439 also 
formed the first step in the organisation of an anti-Ottoman crusade. The Venetian 
Condulmer, who in 1431 became pope as Eugenius IV, had a strong motive for organising 
a crusade. His position as head of the Church was not secure, but a successful crusade 
would make it unassailable. Nor did he have difficulty in raising support for the project. 
The Doge of Venice supported the unionist initiatives of the Pope, as Venice was also 
eager to participate. Venice hoped through a successful crusade to recapture Thessaloniki 
and other lost colonies to the Ottomans.544  
The Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, whose realm was not directly pressured by the 
Ottoman expansion, also sent representatives to the council in Florence. The duke’s 
willingness to support the crusade is at first glance puzzling. Hungary, Venice, 
Byzantium, etc. all had a direct strategic and political interest in fighting the Ottomans. 
The Ottoman expansion in no way threatened Burgundy and only indirectly affected its 
trade interest in the Mediterranean. Yet, Duke Philip had its own reasons in participating 
in an anti-Ottoman campaign. The Hundred Years War was ongoing and although the 
Duke of Burgundy allied with the English against the French king, he remained despite 
his wealth and power a subject vassal of his enemy the king of France. He had an eye on 
a royal crown and he intended to rise his status to a king through participating in a 
successful crusade. In return, Philip hoped to endear himself with the Pope, the only 
authority able to legitimise a Burgundian crown. However, his interests were more than 
only political calculations. For him, the crusade-idea served as a symbolic instrument to 
justify his rule. A half century before, his dynasty participated in the Crusade of Nicopolis 
(1396) but suffered a humiliating defeat and Philip’s father, John the Fearless, had been 
taken prisoner by Sultan Bâyezid I. His interests were related in large part to his family’s 
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participation in the crusade-tradition. One of his ancestors, Count Baldwin of Flanders 
was crowned as the emperor of Constantinople in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade. The 
Burgundian dynasty saw itself as the standard-bearer of the crusade movement in 
Western Europe. Philip liked to style himself as the athleta Christi and wished to uphold 
this image by patronising the crusade ideology that took an important part in the 
chivalric culture of his princely court.545  
According to the Burgundian chronicler Jehan de Wavrin, in 1442 the duke received at 
his court the Byzantine ambassador Karystinos, who was exploring the possibility of 
receiving military aid against the Ottomans. Philip promised him to supply seven galleys 
if Venice and the papacy would also enter the alliance: ‘to bring aid to Christianity, I have 
offered the [Byzantine] Emperor three galleys and a galliot as well as a great ship and a 
caravel (…) since I know that the Venetians have innumerable galleys and that they are 
more than ready to oblige me, I shall arm the four galleys in Venice (…) You should tell 
the Emperor of Constantinople that I shall send them to the assistance of him and 
Christianity.’546 In 1444, the crusader fleet counted twenty-two galleys, which were 
provided by Burgundy, Venice, the papacy, Dubrovnik and Byzantium.547 
As the anonymous author of the Campaign of Sultan Murad (Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad) 
informs us, the union of the Churches at the Council of Florence (1439) was the first step 
in the organisation of an anti-Ottoman expedition. The Gazavat started by noting that the 
Byzantine Emperor John VIII sailed to Florence together with the patriarch of 
Constantinople and with the high clerics: ‘He summoned all his priests, Bans and Royal 
Metropolitans to a council. They decided to go to the accursed and irreligious man called 
Pope of Rome to tell him the situation and to take counsel with him; they were ready to 
accept every wish of the pope.’548 The anonymous author of the Gazavat emphasised that 
John VIII was not attending the Council of Florence to discuss the theological issues, but 
rather to obtain the pope’s military and financial support against the Ottomans: 
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‘Then the Pope said: ‘My son, what do you want? Speak and we will listen.’ The tekvur 
[emperor] replied: ‘O head of our religion, the son of Osman is no longer confined to his 
Anatolia or Bursa, but has set foot in Rumelia and conquered Sofia, Plovdiv, Edirne and 
many other cities and lands […] We therefore urge you to admonish all the kings and the 
Christian community, so that we can punish these sons of Osman and remove them from 
our lands, turn their mosques into churches and others into taverns, destroy their 
minarets and hang bells. If we let these Turks be, they will utterly dig out the Christian 
community by the roots […] Now you are the glory of the Christians, the leader of our 
religion. You should never cease from admonishing and warning every Christian and 
every king to prevent that the torch of the religion of Jesus should be extinguished in 
your time […] The Pope of Rome knew that he could stir up immense trouble and 
immediately gave orders that the king of Hungary, the despot [Serbian ruler] and others 
should be summoned. He wrote letters and posted them to all quarters, calling the 
aforementioned execrated men. They all set out and gathered around the pope of Rome 
and he said them: (…) You should expel the son of Osman from the Balkans and then, when 
your army is rested, proceed to take Bursa and all the lands up to Jerusalem.’549   
As the author of the Gazavat shows, the Ottomans were informed about the plans that 
were being put forth at the council in Florence. He saw the council not merely as a 
religious meeting between churches in dispute, but as a forum for planning war against 
the Ottomans and the Muslims. As the Gazavat-author implies, the crusade and the 
Church union of 1439 can equally be attributed to the ambitions of the Byzantine Emperor 
John VIII. Since the papacy, Venice, Burgundy and Hungary participated in this crusade 
against the Ottomans, it also formed a general European issue. The Byzantine diplomacy 
succeeded in  altering the priority towards the Ottomans instead of Jerusalem. The 
initiative and planning of the expedition came from the Hungarian king Sigismund. 
Byzantium and Hungary felt the direct pressure of the Ottoman expansion. The Eastern 
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Roman Empire had been reduced to a shadow of its former self. The once-mighty Roman 
empire was cornered and encircled. Since the recapture of Thessalonica in 1430, the 
Ottoman state was regaining its former powerful position and had re-established its 
authority in the Balkans. The only way to achieve a breakthrough, John VIII thought, was 
requesting military support from the West. Manuel II’s earlier attempts for union in 1369 
had failed, because the Orthodox clergy was reluctant and did not even attend the 
negotiations in Rome. Whereas, Manuel II was extremely cautious on this issue, John VIII 
agreed to the union in 1439.550 
Indeed, the question of western aid to Byzantium was inextricably linked with this 
council in Florence.551 However, western assistance came with a price. The union was 
accepted on papal terms, implying the subordination of the Byzantine Church to the 
Vatican. Therefore, it was bitterly resented by the citizens of Constantinople, who 
regarded it as betrayal of their faith.552 John VIII was willing to swallow this act of humility 
in return for what he desperately needed, an allied Christian attack on the Ottomans. 
George Scholarius, a Byzantine representative in Florence, emphasised that ‘the primary 
purpose of this union is the hope of military aid and there remains no other salvation for 
us.’553 However, for the following fourteen years until the conquest of the city in 1453 by 
Sultan Mehmed II, the inhabitants of Constantinople were torn by controversy about this 
matter.554 The union was so unpopular that John VIII’s successor, Constantine XI, avoided 
imposing it on his subjects, until the very eve of the city’s capture by Ottomans. According 
to Doukas, the Byzantine chief minister, grand duke Loukas Notaras who was one of the 
anti-unionist leaders, would have said against the Latins: ‘It is better to see the turban of 
the Turks reigning in the centre of the city than the Latin mitre.’555  
The anti-unionist feelings were strongly related to the sack of Constantinople in 1204, 
during the Fourth Crusade. The hostility took firm root after the West European crusaders 
and Venetian merchants sacked Constantinople, looting the Hagia Sophia, violating 
Orthodox churches and monasteries and converting them to Latin Catholic worship. The 
altars had been smashed and torn to pieces for their gold and marble. The crusaders had 
also destroyed the Imperial Library of Constantinople, the last of the great libraries of the 
ancient world which preserved many Greek and Roman manuscripts. The civilian 
population of Constantinople was subjected to massacres, humiliations and 
depredations.556 The Byzantine emperor had been replaced by Count Baldwin of Flanders, 
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who was appointed as the new emperor and the imperial lands were divided into feudal 
provinces. The Latin occupation of Constantinople lasted until 1261 and had left a heavy 
mark on the Byzantine historical consciousness. Bertrandon de la Broquière took note of 
the enmity when he travelled through the Ottoman lands in 1433. He recorded that the 
Greeks at the port of Uskudar initially thought that he was a Turk, because he was 
disguised in Turkish clothes, and paid him honours. However, when the Greeks 
understood that he was a Latin Christian, they wanted to overcharge him for his passage 
and cheat him: ‘They would have happily beaten me, as at this time they despised [Latin] 
Christians.’557 From the perspective of Latin Christianity, the Byzantines were seen as 
heretics, as Petrarch put it: ‘The Turks are our enemies but the Greeks are schismatic and 
worse than enemies. They hate us in their guts’558   
However, there were some Byzantines, such as the chronicler Sphrantzes, who were 
not opposed to the Church union on merely religious grounds. For them, it represented 
the initial catalyst for a series of events that caused the downfall of the empire. 
Sphrantzes criticised Emperor John VIII for his over-ambition and his choice to court with 
Latin Europe, which invited the fall of Constantinople.559 As he rightly feared, a sense of 
threat was felt at the Ottoman court when the news reached of the union in Florence, 
which the account of the Gazavat elucidates. Sphrantzes noted that Murad II expressed 
his concerns about the council to the Byzantine envoy who was sent to inform him on 
John VIII’s participation to the assembly: ‘It does not seem a good idea to me, to work so 
hard and to spend so much money. What will he win? I am here: if he is in need of money 
for his expenses or for any other funds for his maintenance, I am prepared to help him.’ 
A long discussion and debate ensued at the Byzantine court over whether to follow 
Murad’s offer or to attend the council. Finally, Sphrantzes noted ‘our emperor’s desire, or 
rather our evil fortune, prevailed in the end.’560   
We find the details on the debate on this matter among the members of the Ottoman 
divan in the Byzantine chronicles; the Ottoman chroniclers are silent on the Church 
union, except the Gazavat-ı Murad. Sphrantzes writes that the members of the divan 
intensely debated and decided to send an expedition force to Constantinople in light of 
Byzantium’s alliance with the Latins. Yet, the grand vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha who had 
great influence at the princely court, argued that sending an army to Constantinople 
would only drive the Byzantines further into the arms of Western Europe. And even if the 
union would come about, Halil Pasha trusted on the ‘treaties and friendly relations with 
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the Romans’. This seems to have been convincing to Murad and he called off the siege.561 
The account of the Castilian traveller Pero Tafur who at that time was in Constantinople, 
confirms that an Ottoman army was underway and that a skirmish was fought before the 
walls of the city. However, the Ottomans struck the siege and marched home.562 
2.14.5 The Battles of Varna (1443-1444) and Kosovo (1448) 
The historical circumstances that led to the Battle of Varna were longstanding. This battle 
was actually the continuation of the international power struggle in the Balkans between 
the Ottoman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire, Venice, Hungary, the papacy and other 
minor Christian states by means that had already been used before. In this sense, the 
events of 1444 were also significant for the general history of Europe.563 The invasion by 
the allied Christian powers, which was organised as a crusade, signalled a serious threat 
to the Ottoman state, precisely during a period of recovery under sultan Murad II. Surely, 
it is hazardous to relate the recovery and consolidation of the Ottoman state to the 
coincidental outcome of one single battle. The Ottoman state had proven to be able to 
survive many severe political crises in the previous period and had accumulated pivotal 
experiences in statecraft. One should also take into account its social and political 
institutional organisation (for example, the tımar land regime) that made it possible to 
recover after the defeat against Timur and the ensuing civil war. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Nicopolis in 1396, the Battle of Varna was perceived as a 
crucial event in the early Ottoman historical texts. This crisis of 1443-1444 severely 
threatened the Ottoman realm in Europe. The possibility that Byzantine or the Eastern 
Roman capital, Constantinople, would fall in the hands of Latin Europe was acute. This 
meant a disaster for the Ottomans. If Constantinople was conquered by Latin Europe, then 
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Anatolia and Rumelia, the two heartlands of the Ottoman state, would be definitively 
separated and finally result in its disintegration. This threat was brought to an end by 
Murad’s successful routing of the Western crusader army at the Battle of Varna, and a 
second threat at the Battle of Kosovo (1448).  
To turn the discussions on crusade into action, the Christian league needed prospects 
of success. The failed siege of Belgrade in 1440 signalled the beginning of a crisis of 
Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Over the next four years, the Ottomans were forced to wage 
defensive campaigns at great expense. In 1441, John Hunyadi, the Hungarian marcher 
lord, defeated a raid of İshak Pasha. In 1442, he routed another raid by Mezid Bey in 
Transylvania and defeated a second raid under the command of the governor-general of 
Rumelia, Shehabeddin Pasha, whom Murad II had sent to avenge the earlier defeat. These 
were not full-scale expeditions of the Ottoman army but raids (akın) by the marcher lords, 
which Hunyadi had overcome. Against the western perception of invincibility of the 
Ottoman armies, these victories were seen like miracles that raised the hopes for an anti-
Ottoman crusade. Western European powers and Byzantium were convinced of and 
rejoiced the idea that ‘the Turks’ would soon be thrown out of Europe.564 In Venice, 
Hunyadi’s skirmishes had been announced as ‘the most felicitous and triumphant victory’ 
won against the Ottomans’ and the senate ordered a procession at San Marco’s square to 
celebrate it.565 The Burgundian chronicler Jehan de Wavrin prefaces his account of Varna 
with these minor victories of Hunyadi.566  
According to the Gazavat, Murad II wished to retaliate Shehabeddin Pasha’s defeat in 
1442. He led personally his army into Wallachia and brought the country once again under 
firm Ottoman control.567 However, the invasion of the Karamanid prince, İbrahim Bey, 
into the Ottoman lands in Anatolia overturned his plan. Both Aşık Paşazade and Neşrî 
noted that İbrahim Bey launched an attack emboldened by the defeat of Shehabeddin 
Pasha (Kula Şâhin).568 They stated that İbrahim Bey was acting according to his alliance 
with the Serbians, which foresaw that the Hungarians attacked from the west and 
Karaman from the east.569 According to the Gazavat, İbrahim Bey also concluded an 
agreement with the Byzantine emperor to launch an assault when requested. In 1442, 
John VIII had sent ambassadors to Hungary, Rome and as the Gazavat informs us, he also 
sent an envoy to his Turkish and Muslim ally, İbrahim Bey of Karaman: ‘One day the 
emperors ambassador met with the son of Karaman and spoke: you should assemble your 
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troops and set out on a campaign to grab Bursa from the son of Osman. If Sultan Murad 
tries to come against you, we shall prevent him crossing over the sea.’570  
The principality of Karaman was in fact a buffer state between the Ottomans and the 
Mamluks in Egypt. The policy of İbrahim Bey of Karaman (r. 1422-1464) was in many ways 
similar to that of the Balkan Christian vassals, such as Brankovic or Vlad Dracul. He hoped 
that events would deliver him a political salvation. Earlier, during the Ottoman civil war, 
the Karamanids had scrambled to grab every land they could. However, when Murad II 
succeeded to recover the lost territories in Anatolia and to re-establish Ottoman 
authority, he had to acknowledge Murad’s suzerainty. As İbrahim Bey was an ardent rival 
of the Ottomans, it is not unconceivable that he willingly cooperated with the Christian 
league against the Ottomans. He must have been aware that he could not compete on his 
own against the Ottomans, as the latter continued to extend their territories by 
incorporating other Turkish principalities.571 
For the Karamanid dynasty, the only breakthrough was to extend its own lands by 
either seizing Ottoman territory or that of neighbouring Turkish principalities. However, 
such opportunistic expansion could only succeed when the Ottomans themselves were 
distracted by conflicts elsewhere. İbrahim readily cooperated with the plan of the 
crusader invasion.572 After the Karamanid ruler had attacked Sultan Murad II in the east 
and drew him into Anatolia, the Venetian, Burgundian, papal and Byzantine galleys would 
block the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and prevent Ottoman army from crossing the 
Straits to meet the Hungarians as they simultaneously invaded the Ottoman lands in 
Europe.573 A try-out of this plan was carried out with no success in 1443. Ibrahim launched 
an attack on Ottoman cities in Anatolia. However, neither the crusader fleet nor the 
Hungarians were ready. Sultan Murad II and his son, crown prince Ala’eddin Pasha, forced 
Ibrahim into submission before turning to Europe and stopping the crusader advance at 
the Zlatitsa Mountain pass in the Balkans.574 
Among the fifteenth-century Ottoman historical texts, the Gazavat-i Murad gives the 
fullest and most accurate account of the Ottoman campaign against the invasion of the 
crusaders. Murad’s campaign against Karaman had taken the entire summer. On Murad’s 
approach, İbrahim had fled and Murad had sent Tatar troops to devastate his lands. With 
no help coming from his Byzantine ally, John VIII, İbrahim sent an ulema-delegation to 
Murad pleading mercy. In light of the looming crusader attack in the Balkans, Murad 
agreed to conclude peace with İbrahim on the condition ‘to never again instigate sedition 
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and treachery’ and he gave the Karamanid his lands back.575 Murad knew that the 
Hungarians were gathering a large army and that an assault could come at any time. His 
agreement to peace with the Karamananids should also be related to the menace of the 
Mamluk sultan, who claimed authority over south-eastern Anatolia. It is reasonable to 
assume that Murad was cautious to give neither Ibrahim nor his potential ally, the 
Mamluks, any pretext for starting a war in the east.  
In the autumn of 1443, after his return to Amasya, Murad received the tragic news of 
the death of his eldest son, Ala’eddin. The young prince was eighteen years old and had 
been Murad’s chosen heir and favourite son.576 Murad was, according to the Royal 
Calendars, still in mourning when the news came that the king of Hungary, the despot of 
Serbia and Hunyadi had crossed the Danube with a heavily equipped army.577 Events left 
Murad no time to mourn his loss. Murad stroke a deal with Vlad Drakul. He released him 
on the condition of peace and to assist Murad in fighting his enemies. So he neutralised 
the Wallachian support for the crusade expedition.578 However, the Serbian despot George 
Brankovic was willing to take Vlad’s place as an eager participant in the crusade. Due to 
the power struggles between the Ottoman state and Hungary, Brankovic had lost nearly 
all his lands and dominions. With nothing more to lose and everything to gain, the Serbian 
despot put his full effort into supporting the crusade.579  
When the invasion began, the Ottomans knew from their informants that the crusader 
fleet was not ready and the naval expedition would not take place.580 Murad ordered his 
viziers, Halil Pasha, Şehabeddin Pasha and Fazlullah, to make preparations. However, 
Murad’s divan was confronted with a shortage of troops primarily due to the late season. 
Based on the reports of Kasim Pasha, the viziers informed Sultan Murad II about the 
insufficient numbers.581 According to the Gazavat, the viziers had already mobilised the 
janissaries and the household cavalry (kapıkulu sipahi), who were assembled and ready.582 
Although the household army (kapıkulu) formed a standing army and could be mobilised 
at any time, the vast majority of the Ottoman army was composed of cavalry forces and 
auxiliary troops (azabs, voynuks, martalos, müsellem-infantry, etc) from various provinces 
(sancaks) of Anatolia and Rumelia.583 The timariot cavalry from the provinces wished to 
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return to their farms and manage their duties there. Because the winter was approaching 
and the normal campaigning season had ended, most of the regiments had returned to 
their homes and were reluctant to mobilise. And since this was a full-scale war, the risks 
were great and the gains minimal. All these factors had a daunting effect on the majority 
of the troops, who remained hesitant to fulfil their duties of military services. Murad’s 
divan was faced with a difficult challenge. While the mobilisation for a standard raid took 
several months, the court was now forced to mobilise for such a great campaign all from 
Rumelia and Anatolia in a matter of weeks.584  
To meet the looming threat of the crusade, Sultan Murad declared the unusual nefiri 
am or general mobilisation, which obligated all Muslim men in the Ottoman realm to join 
the army. The Gazavat noted that even the Christians were invited to military service, as 
Murad said: ‘let everyone in Rumelia who is capable of wielding a mace set out, whether 
on foot or horse.’585 According to the Gazavat, Murad issued a ferman or royal decree 
stating the obligation of all able men to join the army. This declaration was sent out to 
the judges or kadis in Rumelia and Anatolia, who were responsible for local 
administration. In return for their assistance, Murad promised them to grant whatever 
they requested, ‘whether a timar-land, whether a post in the janissary corps or household 
cavalry or whether release from yörük (nomadic) status, I have accepted.’586 This generous 
incentive indicates the great need of the Ottoman government. Thereafter, Murad left the 
capital Edirne and advanced towards Sophia, in the company of the household troops.  
In the meantime, the grand vizier Halil Pasha was left behind in Edirne to help ease the 
increasing panic among the citizens of the capital, who were frightened by the 
approaching crusaders. Murad had also ordered Halil Pasha to manage the passage of 
troops from Anatolia to the Balkans and to safeguard the rear from any possible attacks 
from the Byzantines or the Karamanids. Arrived in Sophia, Murad once again ordered to 
send decrees to the kadis to hasten the general mobilisation.587  
After a truce with the Hungarians, Murad made an unprecedented decision.588 
Saddened by the death of his favourite son Alaeddin and the horrible events of the winter 
war, and with all his borders apparently secure, he abdicated in favour of his twelve-year-
old son, prince Mehmed II.589 This was an opportunity that the Pope did not let pass. To 
allow the crusade to continue, he absolved the king of Hungary from his oath and, in the 
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autumn of 1444, king Vladislav and John Hunyadi led the Hungarian army on a march to 
Varna, on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria.590 The grand vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha recalled 
Murad from his retirement in Manisa. However, the allied fleets had blocked the Straits. 
Murad chose to cross at the Bosporus and, as he set up cannons on the Asian shore, the 
Genoese of Pera established a shore battery on the European side. Under the cover of 
these guns, and in boats which the Genoese had supplied, his army crossed the Straits. In 
1444, the Ottoman army met the crusaders at Varna, where they decisively defeated 
them.591 The Ottoman victory ensured that the largely Orthodox Balkan Peninsula came 
under the rule of the Ottomans. Another crisis in 1446 brought the aged Murad again out 
of retirement. A Janissary rebellion, which the very young Sultan Mehmed II could not 
control, terrorised Edirne. The grand vizier Halil Pasha recalled Murad II.592 After his re-
accession, Murad received the news that the Hungarian warlord John Hunyadi had again 
invaded Ottoman lands with Hungarian and Vlach troops. In 1448, Sultan Murad II 
encountered Hunyadi’s army on the Plain of Kosovo. After a two-day battle, the crusaders 
were again crushed. While their commander Hunyadi fled the battlefield. The threat from 
Hungary was decisively removed.593  
When Sultan Mehmed II ascended the throne for the second time in 1451, his father 
Murad II had already established the control of western and northern Anatolia and a large 
part of the Balkan peninsula. Furthermore, the Ottomans dominated the major overland 
trade route between Asia and Europe. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 cemented 
the status of the Ottoman State as the preeminent power in the eastern Mediterranean.594 
Thereafter, Sultan Mehmed II secured the surrender of Pera, the Genoese colony opposite 
the Byzantine capital, across the Golden Horn. In 1456, Pope Calixtus III and king Alfonso 
V of Aragon managed to assemble an anti-Ottoman fleet that in 1457 captured the islands 
Imbros and Limni.595 The success of Pope Calixtus’s crusader fleet alerted Sultan Mehmed 
II about the dangers of the Latin interventions in the Aegean and the Balkans. In 1458, 
while both Alfonso and Calixtus had died, Mehmed II not only brought the Peloponnesos 
under Ottoman control, but he also recaptured Imbros and Limni. Only the Venetian 
colonies in the area remained now independent of the Ottoman State.596 
 
 
                                                     
590 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 430-433; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 129-130; Setton, The Papacy,  84-94. 
591 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 434-439; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 130-137.   
592 İnalcık, Fatih Devri, 71-75. 
593 İnalcık, ‘The Ottoman Turks and The Crusades’, 319-320. 
 
595 İnalcık, Rönesans Avrupası, 30-32. 
596 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power (London, 2009) 26-30. 
  185 
Chapter 3 The Discursive Registers of Fifteenth 
Century Ottoman State Ideology  
In order to describe and explain the development of the Ottoman state ideology in the 
fifteenth century, the focus of this study, this chapter will analyse the discourse of the 
earliest Ottoman historical texts. Ottoman political language was created through 
blending ideas from various political cultures available in the Muslim world during the 
fifteenth century. A closer reading of the early Ottoman chronicles reveals that they 
mostly rely on two traditions: nomadic Turkish political ideas and Islamic political 
thought. The influence of the Byzantine tradition obviously occurred in other ways, as it 
is invisible in the discourse of the early Ottoman historical texts. No significant 
ideological concept seem to be appropriated from the Byzantine political thought. As the 
discourses of the Ottoman historians mainly derived from nomadic Turkish-Mongol and 
Islamic traditions, I will shed more light on these two. Therefore, I will explore how the 
various political cultures were blended together as the needs for legitimacy developed 
with the shifting historical context. I will reconstruct the particularities of each of those 
traditions that endured in the discourses of the Ottoman chronicles. 
The methodology of this chapter has already been discussed in detail in the 
introduction to this dissertation. Summarising the most important points that I have 
already outlined, I will focus on the concepts that represented paradigmatic ideas and 
constituted value systems which formed the powerful legitimising pillars of Ottoman 
political discourse. I will consider the semantic meaning of the concepts and how they 
were used and understood by the Ottoman chroniclers. I will therefore explore the key-
concepts used by the Ottoman authors themselves. Hence, I will consider the meanings 
of the central concepts or discursive registers, their semantic development and the senses 
in which they were applied in the early Ottoman historiographical texts. This will allow 
me to find out which political principles and ideas of sovereignty became the ‘central 
signifiers’ of Ottoman political language. In the typical discourse of the chroniclers, some 
of these ‘central signifiers’ frequently recur. These concepts constituted ‘knots of 
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signification’ that dominated and determined the other concepts and directed political 
action.  
This chapter thus forms an attempt to reconstruct the fifteenth-century political value 
system of the Ottomans. What concepts and ideas formed the dominant legitimising ideas 
of sovereignty in their discourse? What does the discourse of fifteenth-century historical 
texts reveal on Ottoman ideals of sovereignty and on the relations of state and society? 
Hence, the general focus is on the shifting ideas and images of Ottoman sovereignty and 
legitimacy as revealed in the fifteenth-century chronicles.  
The late fifteenth-century historian Neşrî, formulated the dominant concepts of the 
Ottoman ideological matrix, such as the gaza-ethos, adl or justice, emr-i siyaset (political 
verdicts), nizam-i alem (right order of the world) and the Sultan as ‘the shadow of God on 
Earth’ (zillu’llah fî’l arz). Similar views on political philosophy and perception of power 
realities are reflected in a number of ways in other early Ottoman historical texts. As 
Rhoads Murphey has warned, ‘in seeking the roots of Ottoman sovereignty traditions and 
ideals of rulership, one must be cautious of identifying a single, pure and uncorrupted or 
clearly dominant source of inspiration.’1 After all, the construction of Ottoman state 
ideology was a long process of experimentation and blending that took more than a 
century and a half.  
The concepts defining sovereignty and the image of the ideal ruler are important as 
they express the value systems of a society. Sovereignty can be understood as the claim 
by a group, an individual or an institution to rule. This claim must be legitimate to gain 
the acceptance or consent of the people to those in power. Legitimacy thus forms the 
outcome of negotiations between the ruler and the ruled. The prince who claims the right 
to rule has to win the consent of his subjects by ensuring them justice, personal security 
and continuity of social order and cultural and economic prosperity. This means that 
every sovereign had to justify his claim to rule over territories, people and resources to 
different social groups by deploying a set of ethical concepts. Through these ideas, we can 
distinguish what rulers, state officials and various other social groups thought was 
important in the political organisation of the society.  
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3.1 The Nomadic Political Tradition in the Early Ottoman 
Chronicles 
Historians have formulated a variety of theories about the nomadic legacy from the 
steppe. For some modern scholars, such as Fuad Köprülü, the Ottomans descended from 
the Oğuz Kayı-tribe.2 Other authors, such as Colin Imber, rejected the nomadic Oǧuz 
descent as later inventions of the fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicles.3 However, the 
early historical texts reveal influences of the nomadic tradition on the Ottoman principles 
of succession to the throne.4 Most importantly, as I will demonstrate, the tension between 
the nomadic elements and the Ottoman dynasty’s inclination toward sedentary state 
formation ran through the entire Ottoman history during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. The nomadic polities, with their tribal bases and political traditions of 
collective sovereignty (see Chapter 2) of the ruling group, were often unstable. As a result, 
the nomads were accustomed to the fragility of large political structures based on tribal 
polities. While ‘statelessness’ was for the nomads an acceptable condition, the Ottoman 
dynasty aimed to establish a sedentary model of centralised state.  
3.1.1 Mongol Djenghizid influence 
It was Djengiz Khan who introduced some radical changes in the world of the steppe. He 
broke up the tribal confederations, which had been his rivals, and apportioned them 
among princely armies as units. In return for their loss of political power, the tribal 
leaders received ‘greater or more steady economic resources and a society open to 
talent.’5 Of the greatest consequence was the dismantling of Turkish nomadic polities by 
Djengiz, who tried to split up the tribes and reform them as soldiers of his dynasty 
(nökers). Tribal loyalty, based on bonds of kinship, real and imagined, of course, was often 
changeable. Nomads were only willing to follow a leader who was militarily successful 
and generous in his redistribution of the spoils. Djengizid policy aimed at replacing this 
tribal organisation with dynastic and personal loyalty to a charismatic ruler. The 
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elimination of the centrifugal tendencies of the tribes was one of the cornerstones of 
Djengizid policy.6 As discussed in Chapter 2, similar patterns occurred in the early 
Ottoman state building and the establishment of its institutions. Both Djengiz and the 
first Ottoman rulers sought to break up the tribal bases as the tribes were stripped of their 
traditional leadership. In Chapter 2, I have noted that this method of control had been 
used by earlier nomadic empires such as the Kök Türks, who, however, kept the tribes 
intact. Previously, the nomadic empire of the Kök Türks, although often at war with 
disobedient nomads, never attempted to break up the tribal system. The result of the 
Djengizid policy was a shuffling of the principal Turkish groups, such as the Oǧuz, Kıpcak, 
etc. within their already established territories.7 To varying degrees, early Ottoman state 
building resembled the Djengizid one. For example, in return for submission to the 
Djengizid state, the tribesmen could profit from a meritocratic system with careers open 
to talent and merits. In addition, the redistribution of spoils and rewards, now 
systematised, would encompass all who participated, rather than filtering down through 
the tribal elites.8 The breakup of tribal armies and their transformation into more flexible 
components of state formation was hardly unique to the Mongols. Similar patterns of this 
process can be observed in early Ottoman society and state building. Particularly, the alp-
gazis under the command of the marcher lords (uç beyleri) owed loyalty to the House of 
Osman. However, it would take more than one century and a half to remove the 
centrifugal tendencies of the marcher lords. 
In the Muslim world, the influence of the Djengizid principles of hegemony was a direct 
consequence of the execution of the last Abbasid Caliph al-Mustasim in Baghdad in 1258 
by the Mongol ruler Hülegü.9 The Mongol conquest of Baghdad not only put an end to the 
Abbasid Caliphate. The demise of the Abbasid Caliphate also coincided with a period of 
great political fluidity that permitted the polities subsequently established, such as the 
Ottoman state, to assert multiple claims to legitimacy.10 Henceforth, the principles of 
sovereignty and legitimation in the Muslim world were radically altered with the rise of 
 
                                                     
6 Golden, ‘I Will Give the People unto Thee’, 24. 
7 Ibidem, 25. 
8 Ibidem, 24. 
9 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 273-274. 
10 On the political openness of the post-Mongol Islamic world, a case in point is the political experimentation in 
the Turkish nomadic Akkoyunlu state, see: Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, 2-7. 
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the Mongol Empire.11 As a result, the concept of a universal Caliphate had lost its political 
significance. The Mamluk Sultanate in Cairo was one exception to this tendency.12  
The sixteenth-century Ottoman bureaucrat and historian Mustafa Ali divided Islamic 
history into Arab Caliphal and Turkish-Mongol post-Caliphal periods.13 Before the Mongol 
conquest, the political life of the Islamic world had been dominated by the idea of 
universal Muslim Caliphate. The institution of Caliph (see below) represented the sole 
legitimate locus of political authority in the Muslim world. It symbolised the unity of the 
community of believers (the umma) and the integral universality of the Sharia. The 
dynasty of the Seljuk Sultanate of Anatolia, for instance, drew its legitimacy from the 
dispensation of the Abbasid caliph. The Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258 deprived the 
Islamic world of its unifying force and opened the way for new formulations of legitimacy. 
The Mongols radically changed the claims to sovereignty and legitimacy. Initially, they 
installed their own ideology of universal rule, which held that divine dispensation to rule 
the world was given to Djenghiz Khan (r. 1206-1227) and his descendants.14 It is 
noteworthy that the Djengizid conquests were carried out largely by nomad troops drawn 
from Mongol and Turkish populations which had to varying degrees participated in the 
building of the earlier steppe empires. Consequently, the Muslim states established after 
the Mongol conquests, drew on a greater or lesser degree on Turkish and Mongol political 
ideas and models of sovereignty. Simultaneously, different principles of legitimacy 
received greater emphasis and attention than they had before the middle of the 
thirteenth century.15  
In Mongol historiographical texts, Djenghiz Khan is represented as the ‘emperor of the 
world’, who was sent to this position by the ‘Eternal Sky God’ (in Mongol: Möngke 
Tenggeri).16 Djenghiz Khan’s investiture of supreme authority was described in terms of 
universal rule with the powers mandated to him by the sky god. Any member of the ruling 
class who intended to retain his independence was considered a rebel against the 
 
                                                     
11 Togan, Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş, 106-110; 277-285; Halil İnalcık, ‘Osmanlılar’da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk 
Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle İlgisi’, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 14/1 (1959) 82-85; İnalcık, The 
Ottoman Empire, 64-69. 
12 On the Mamluk ideology, see: Anne F. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds (New 
York, 2008) 12-26. 
13 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 286. 
14 Ibidem, 273. 
15 Particularly, the Turkish nomad communities of the Qarluqs and Kıpçaks took part in the Mongol armies. For 
a thoughtful essay, see: Golden, ‘I Will Give the People unto Thee’, 21-41. 
16 Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan: his Life and Legacy, ed. and tr. Thomas N. Haining (Oxford, 1991) ; Broadbridge, 
Kingship and Ideology, 6-11.  
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Djengizid dynasty and the ‘Sky God’.17 According to the Chinese chronicles, the Mongol 
ruler Temuçin received the name of ‘Djinghiz’ or ‘ocean’ and the title of khan or emperor 
by the assembly (kurultai) he had gathered in 1206.18 Mongol historical tradition also 
asserted that Djenghiz descended from the ‘Sky God’ because as a princess his mother was 
impregnated by a light coming from the sky.19 It is very likely that Mongol tradition was 
indirectly influenced by the sixth-century Gök Türk political principles. Indeed, before 
their conversion to Islam, the Oğuz Turkish principles of government for instance were 
also shaped by naturalistic sacral and cosmological images and ideas of sovereignty.20  
In the post-Mongol period, the claims to sovereignty and legitimacy were to a great 
degree based upon the Central Asian steppe traditions of hegemony separate from, but 
not necessarily contradictory to the classical, sedentary Islamic tradition of 
government.21 After the conversion of the Mongol Ilkhanids to Islam at the beginning of 
the fourteenth century, an acculturation of legitimising principles evolved. The Ilkhanids 
blended the Islamic Law of the eliminated Abbasid Caliphate (1258) with the concepts and 
ideals of the disintegrating nomadic Djenghiz Khanid world-empire.22 However, the 
discontinuity in political organisation and theory between a pre-Mongol and a post-
Mongol age does not seem very strict, as nomadic traditions from central Asia had already 
been imported to the sedentary Islamic world from the tenth century onward. This took 
particularly place through the political practice of several dynasties and their military 
commanders, who were often of Turkish origin (see Chapter 2). These Turkish dynasties, 
such as the Karakhanids, the Ghaznavids and the Great Seljuks, had to a significant degree 
integrated their own traditions into Islamic political thought and practice before the 
conquest of the Caliphate by the Mongols. For instance, the political system of the Kök 
Türk Empire was passed through the Oğuz communities into the Seljuk and Ottoman 
statecraft. In this Turkish nomadic political constellation, at the top, the Kaghan ruled by 
heavenly mandate (kut), embodying and demonstrating Sky God’s (Kök Tengri, in Turkish) 
favour through military successes and through the performance of his functions as 
 
                                                     
17 Igor de Rachewiltz, ‘Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan’s Empire’, Papers on Far 
Eastern History 7 (1973): 21-36. 
18 Osman Turan, ‘Cingiz adı hakkında’, in: Belleten, (1942) 267. 
19 Marie-Lise Beffa, ‘Le Concept de tenggeri “ciel” dans l’Histoire secrète des Mongols’, Etudes Mongoles et 
Siberiennes 24 (1993): 215-236. 
20 De Weese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde, 37, 46.  
21 For the problems encountered in the post-caliphate age in constructing theories of legitimacy, see: H.A.R. 
Gibb, ‘Lutfi Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate’, Oriens 15 (1962): 287-295. 
22 Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, 4-7. 
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ruler.23 Another example is the Seljuk ruler Tugrul Bey, who was formally confirmed in 
his position as the ‘Sultan of East and West’ by the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. 
The Ottoman historiographical texts of the fifteenth century were careful to make a 
distinction between the Ottoman and Mongol traditions. In his panegyric chronicle, 
Tursun Beg summarised Mongol sovereignty as örf (customary law).24 This seems to be the 
only case wherein a Mongol friendly tone was expressed. Generally, in almost all other 
fifteenth-century chronicles, Djengiz Khan is perceived as a ruler whose polity, governed 
by customary law and laws promulgated by the ruler, was inferior to a state regulated by 
Sharia. Furthermore, the Ottoman chronicles frequently emphasised the cruelty and 
oppressive acts of Djengiz Khan and contrasted this with the ‘just and Muslim Ottoman’ 
political system. For instance, in his Selâtin-nâme (Book of Kings), the fifteenth-century 
historian Kemal noted that Djengiz captured east and west by force, burning down 
Samarqand and Belh. He had given Baghdad to one of his men and that official continued 
to oppress (zulm) the people. The tyranny of Djengiz became everlasting; the whole land 
was damaged and people were driven away. Ertugrul was one of those who left his land 
with his people in order to escape the cruelties of Djengiz Khan’s lot.25  
Another chronicler, Oruç Beg provided a similar account of the Djengzid incursions of 
the Muslim lands. Oruç noted that after destroying and sacking the city of Balkh, Djengiz 
expelled the Shah of Khwarezm from his land. He died there and in Arabic Oruç added his 
condemnation of Djengiz: ‘may he be cursed in Hell’.26 
A similar topoi of the ‘terror of Djengiz’ is visible in a passage that Neşri provided when 
he spoke of Timur Lenk, who claimed lineage from the Djengizid dynasty. In his 
description of Timur’s invasion of Ottoman lands, Neşri noted that the ‘tyrant Timur’ 
(Timür-i gaddar) committed many oppressive acts in Rûm (Anatolia): ‘his soldiers 
plundered, burnt and destroyed the land; they attacked the Muslims; many fathers lost 
 
                                                     
23 Golden, An Introduction, 71, 146-153; ibid, ‘Imperial ideology’, 39-73; Denis Sinor, ‘The Establishment and 
Dissolution of the Türk Empire,’ in: The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge, 1990) 
313-316. 
24 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 12: ‘mücerred tavr-ı akl üzre nizâm-ı âlem-i zâhir içün, mesela tavr-ı Cengiz Han 
gibi olursa, (…) siyaset-i sultanî ve yasag-ı padişâhî dirler ki, örfümüzce ana örf dirler.’ 
25 Kemal, Selâtin-nâme, ed. Necdet Öztürk (Ankara, 2001) 22-23, 25: ‘Zamân-ı evâyilde var idi bir han, Ki Cingiz 
Han’idi ismi anuñ iy can (...) Alup cebrile ol şarkı vü garbı/ Semerkand ile Belh’i yakmışıdı, Çerisi şarka garba 
akmışıdı/ Virür Bagdâd’ı bir kulın kılur han, Anuñ zulmı kılur ol yiri vîran/ Azîm ol yirleri incitmişidi, Tagılup 
ol vilâyet gitmişidi/ Kırar nâ-hak yere beş yüz bin âdem, Esir itdi anun dişisin ol dem/ Ol zâlim zulmı kıldı bî-
nihâyet, Tagıldı kalmadı il gün vilâyet/ Kamusı el çeküp başın aldı gitdi, O zâlim ol yire bu işi itdi (…) Bu Er-
tugrul ki andan göçdi geldi, Biñ üç yüz kırk kişisi bile geldi.’  
26 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 3: ‘Cingiz Han kim, Belh şehrini harâb itdükde, Hurozım Şâh’ı memleketden çıkarup, ol hînde 
Cingiz Han vêfat idüp, fî’in-nâri fi’s-sakar.’ 
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their sons, many mothers were separated from their daughters; there was famine and 
people died of hunger.’27  
While Tursun Beg expressed a Mongol friendly tone, Kemal, Oruç Beg and Neşri – who 
were members of sedentary social groups – usually wrote in negative terms about the 
nomads, whether Turks or Mongols. Their criticism of Djengiz Khan and Timur Lenk, 
whose alleged ‘oppressive acts’ resulted in deserted lands, can be situated in these ages-
old sedentary-nomadic tensions. From the sedentary point of view, the productive 
population of the realm was driven away due to occupation by the nomads, which created 
problems for economic balances and political instability. However, there was more at 
stake. These chroniclers were writing in the period after Bâyezid I’s traumatic defeat 
against Timur, which had forced the Ottoman dynasty to rebuild its shaken legitimacy. 
These authors retrospectively constructed their past in such a way as to prove themselves 
descending from the noble Kayı-branch of the Oǧuz Turks (see below). In the construction 
of these genesis stories, the fifteenth-century chroniclers seem to be quite concerned 
with erasing the memory of the early relationships with the Mongol Ilkhanids as 
overlords. They rather depicted the early Ottomans as vassals of the Anatolian Seljuks. 
Modern scholars, however, recognised the possibility of early Ottomans’ relationship of 
vassalage with the Mongols.28 There is even documentary evidence for this vassalage 
relationship, as suggested by a copy of a document from 1350 that identifies Orhan Bey as 
a lord of the Anatolian marches, paying tribute to the Ilkhanids.29  
However, the Mongol connection is not recognised and is conveniently omitted from 
Ottoman historiography. Probably, this was the result of a historical process. After the 
Mongol Ilkhanid power faded away and left Anatolia permanently in the fifteenth 
century, the Ottoman historians erased the memory of Ilkhanid authority and 
emphasised the alleged vassalship to the Anatolian Seljuks. 30 
 
                                                     
27 Neşrî, Cihan-nümâ, 163: ‘Andan Timür-i gaddâr, Rûm’da çok zulmler idüb, ol kışı Aydın-elinde kışladı. Ve çerisi 
Rûm vilâyetini yağma idüb, yakub, yıkub, müslümanlaruñ ehlin, ıyâlin elden geçürüb, iy nice atalar oglını yâvı 
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olmışdı.’ 
28 For a recent discussion of Mongol-Ottoman associations, see: Baki Tezcan, ‘The Memory of the Mongols in 
Early Ottoman Historiography’, in: ed. Erdem Çipa and Emine Fetvacı, Writing History at the Ottoman Court. Editing 
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sur les actes des règnes des sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I, 66-70.  
29 Zeki V. Togan, ‘Moǧollar Devrinde Anadolu’nun İktisadi Vaziyeti’, Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası 1 (1931) 
31. 
30 For a thoughtful essay on the Djengizid background of the Ottomans, see: Isenbike Togan, ‘Ottoman History 
by Inner Asian Norms’, The Journal of Peasant Studies 18/3-4 (1991): 185-210. 
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As Baki Tezcan already remarked, the account of Aşık Paşazade on the founding period 
reflects a slightly different narrative about the Mongols.31 Aşık Paşazade integrated into 
his chronicle the old source of Yahşı Fakih that transmitted this memory loss.32 He relied 
for this early period on the text of Yahşı Fakih, which echoes remnants of a past in which 
the early fourteenth-century Ottomans still saw themselves as closer to the Mongols. As 
it was characteristic for the early Ottoman chronicles, Aşık Paşazade also blended 
memory with invention, i.e. what was transmitted through oral narratives and what was 
clearly tendentious. He suggested that the forefathers of Osman arrived in Anatolia in the 
company of the Mongols. For instance, he made Osman assert the moment of his 
declaration of independence from the Seljuks by claiming to descend from the first 
settlers, both Mongol and Turkish nomads who arrived before the establishment of the 
Anatolian Seljuk state.33 He created a symbolic character, Sultan Alaeddin, who 
represented the whole Seljuk history and he collapsed two and half centuries of Seljuk 
history into the lifetime of this sultan Alâeddin.34 Aşık Paşazade probably referred to the 
Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin Keykubad II (r. 1239-1254).  
Belonging to the gazi-dervish circles, Aşık Paşazade to a certain degree endorsed the 
semi-nomadic point of view, at least in his account of the events of the fourteenth 
century. However, he situated the arrival of Osman’s ancestors within the context of 
Islamic history. In a brief description of Islamic political history, Aşık Paşazade noted that 
first the Arabs ruled over the Persians: ‘From the time of the Abbasid House until 
Süleyman Şah, the Arab people were victorious over the descendants of Japheth [Yafes35]. 
Even Byzantium [Rûm] and the Persians were dominated. The Persian kings [i.e. the Seljuk 
Sultans] decided to employ the nomads who were offspring of Japheth and so succeeded 
to overpower the Arabs.’36 In this passage, Aşık Paşazade brought the nomadic Turks and 
Mongols together, who allegedly under Süleyman Şah, supposedly the grandfather of 
Osman Gazi, were sent to the frontiers in Anatolia:  
‘Since the Arabs had been subdued, the land of the unbelievers was disobedient. 
Now the rulers of Persia took precautions and guarded themselves against these 
 
                                                     
31 Tezcan, ‘The Memory of the Mongols’, 32-33. 
32 On Yahsi Fakih’s text, see: Chapter 1.  
33 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Yavuz, 289. 
34 Tezcan, ‘The Memory’, 34. 
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36 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 273: ‘Âl-i Abbâs zamanından tâ Süleyman Şah zamanına degin nesl-i celî 
Arab galib-idi nesl-i Yafes üzerine. Rum dahı maglûb-ıdı ve Acem dahı maglûb-ıdı nesl-i Yafes oldukları 
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kendülerine sened idindiler. Ol sebebden Arab’a galib oldılar.’  
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nomads. They sent Süleyman Şah Gazi, who was one of the great men among the 
nomads, forward. They gave him about fifty thousand nomadic Turkish and Tatar 
[Mongol] household under his command. They said, go and perform the gaza in 
Rûm.’37  
In other words, the nomadic households, who had helped the Seljuks gain military 
ascendancy, were sent to the marches in Anatolia. Aşık Paşazade goes on as follows: 
‘the mountains and valleys of Rum caused them damage, for the nomad’s sheep 
suffered from the valleys and peaks. So they intended to go back to Turkistan. They 
did not go by the way they had come. They set forth to the land of Aleppo and 
arrived before the Ja’ber castle.’38 Afterwards, when Süleyman Şah had deceased, 
‘they buried him before Ja’ber castle, and even now they call that place ‘the Turkish 
tomb’. In any event, these nomads were scattered in different directions. Some 
went to the desert, those who are now called the ‘Turks of Syria’. Others returned 
to Rûm, some of them were Tatars [Mongols], some Turkish nomads. The Tatars and 
Turkmen now in Rum [Anatolia] descend from this latter group.’39 
With the ‘Persian kings’, Aşık Paşazade referred to the Seljuk Sultans, who had 
undergone deep influences of Persian culture at their court and were culturally alienated 
from their nomadic followers. Curiously, Aşık Paşazade did not explicitly mention the 
Seljuks. Most probably, because he descended from the heterodox Sufi spiritual leaders 
who had led the nomadic Babaî rebellion against the Rum Seljuk Sultanate in 1239.40 As 
discussed in Chapter 2, separation between the nomadic lifestyle and the sedentary model 
of Rum Seljuk court culture had played an important role in this revolt. The core of Aşık 
Paşazade’s account deals with a group of Mongol and Turkish nomads, who came to 
Anatolia, where, however, they suffered a lot. After the death of Süleyman Shah, they 
were scattered in different directions.  
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historian Aşık Paşazade was the great-grandson of the famous poet and mystic Aşık Paşa (see Chapter 1), Ocak 
argued that Aşık Paşazade’s lineage was also related to Baba İlyas-ı Khorasanî, the Sufi leader of the nomadic 
Turkish Babai rebellion against the Rum Seljuk State. On the Babai rebellion in general, see: Ahmet Y. Ocak, La 
révolte de Baba Resul ou la formation de l’hétérodoxie musulmane en Anatolie au XIIIe siècle (Ankara, 1989). 
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In this respect, one has to keep in mind that earliest Ottoman historical texts are not 
entirely independent of each other. Due to their highly intertextual composition, the 
chroniclers mixed and matched different versions. Consequently, this raised some 
confusion about the dynasty’s exact origins. As demonstrated by Imber, in some other 
versions of this genesis story, the father of Ertugrul was not Süleyman Şah, but Gündüz 
Alp.41 For instance, the chronicler Enverî indeed noted that Ertugrul was the son of 
Gündüz Alp.42 This version is also supported by a recently found silver coin. It bears the 
inscription ‘Struck by Osman, son of Ertuğrul’. The inscription on this coin confirms that 
Ertuğrul was the father of Osman Gazi and Gündüz Alp his grandfather.43  
However, most Ottoman chronicles rather reported the version, which suggested  
Süleyman Şah as the grandfather of Osman Gazi. This version had become an official 
account, after Neşrî had homogenised the different versions. He mainly relied upon the 
chronicles of Aşık Paşazade and the anonymous author.44 However, Neşrî made some re-
editing. For instance, Aşık Paşazade had suggested that the ancestors of Osman had 
migrated together with the Mongols. By contrast, Neşrî noted that the forefathers of 
Osman Gazi came to Anatolia, fleeing the Mongol outburst and hoping to build a new life.45  
Whether the ‘proto-Ottomans’ arrived with the Mongols or in advance fleeing the 
Mongol outburst is not our concern here. Indeed, there are different historiographical 
traditions containing divergent story elements. The background of these versions may 
have been a recollection of events that actually have happened. It is both possible that 
the ancestors of the Ottomans arrived with the Mongols or in the wake of Mongol 
conquests. The point is rather that the ancestors of Osman were nomads, who made their 
way into the revised memories of the later generations due to the oral tradition of 
transmitting history through accounting stories.  
Whereas the Seljuks did not figure prominently in Aşık Paşazade’s chronicle, Neşrî 
provided a rather different narrative of some parts of the earliest period. The ulema-cleric 
historian gave a relatively extensive account of the histories of the Great Seljuks and the 
Rûm Seljuks.46 He briefly described the history of the Oǧuz Kınık tribe and the arrival of 
Selçuk – the eponymous founder of the Seljuk dynasty – to Jend, a Muslim frontier zone 
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at Khorasan (in today’s Iran and Azerbaijan).47 Neşrî’s sources for this period were the 
Arab and Persian chroniclers of the Seljuks and Ilkhanids. In particular, he probably relied 
on the ‘World History’ of the early fourteenth-century Persian chronicler and vizier to 
the Ilkhanids, Rashid al-Dîn.48 In his account of the Mongol Djengizid invasions of the Rûm 
Seljuk realm, Neşrî represented the Mongols as cruel and ruthless. He wrote:  
‘when the Mongol invaded Iran, peace in the world had vanished. Security of life 
and peace still existed only in Anatolia [Rûm]. He [Alâeddin Keykubad] had fought 
against the ruthless Tatar [Mongols] and had defeated them. During the reign of his 
son Gıyâseddîn Keyhüsrev, the Tatar intended to attack the realm of Rûm. Their 
army was commanded by Baycu Noyan. Gıyâseddîn was gravely defeated, the Tatars 
invaded Anatolia, killed most of the people, plundered and sacked their goods. […] 
After the death of Gıyâseddîn, the rule of the House of Selçuk in the realm of the 
Rûm had ended and the state of the Seljuk dynasty collapsed. The following [Seljuk] 
rulers were crushed by the overwhelming might of the Tatars and came under their 
command and orders.’49  
We can observe from this passage that Neşrî was better informed on this early period 
than Aşık Paşazade. He provided detailed information on the Seljuk Sultans and also on 
the Mongols, referring to Baycu Noyan, the commander of the victorious Mongol armies 
against the Seljuks at the Battle of Kösedaǧ in 1243. As Neşrî wrote from the Muslim 
scholarly point of view and as he addressed his narrative to a sedentary audience in court 
circles, he clearly preferred to call the Mongols in terms of ‘cruel and ruthless pillagers’. 
As such, the image of the Mongols in Neşrî’s history endorsed the general Muslim 
perception. Due to the sack of Baghdad in 1258 and the killing of the last Abbasid Caliph 
by Hülegü Khan, the image of the Mongols in Islamic historiography was generally 
represented in negative terms. Undeniably, the Mongol sack of Baghdad had been a shock 
to the entire Muslim world. This represented a landmark event that changed the course 
of Islamic history. Although the Mongol sack of Baghdad is not explicitly mentioned by 
Neşrî, the anti-Mongol tone of his account can be related to a great degree to this incident.  
 
                                                     
47 Ibidem, 13-14. 
48 ‘Rashid al-Din Tabib’, Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition (Brill Online); Shiela S. Blair, A Compendium of Chronicles: 
Rashid al-Din’s Illustrated History of the World (Oxford, 1995). 
49 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 21: ‘Zîrâ Mogol İran’a müstevli olup, âlemde huzûr kalmamışdı. Emn ü emân hemân Rûm’da 
vardı. Tatar-ı gaddârla merâren muhârebe idüp, gâlip olmışdı. […] Bunun eyyamında Tatar bilâd-ı Rum’a kasd 
itdi. Leşker-keşleri Baycu Noyan idi. Gıyâseddîn andan akbeh-i hezimetle münhezim olup, Tatar Rûm’a dâhil 
olup, halk-ı kesîre katl idüp, emvâl-i azîme gâret itdiler. […] Bunuñ mevtiyle bi’l-hakîka salatanat-ı bilâd-ı Rûm, 
Âl-i Selçuk’dan münkazî olup, Devlet-i Âl-i Selâçıka münkariz oldı. Bundan soñra mâlik olanlar Tatar’uñ taht-ı 
tasarrufında hükminde makhûr olup, maglûb olmışlardı.’ 
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Interestingly, the author of the Anonymous Chronicle, who was farther removed from 
the courtly circles and gave a voice to the concerns and expectations of the gazi 
environment, did describe the rise of Djengiz and the sack of Baghdad: ‘Djengiz Khan left 
the realm of Khitay and devastated the city and country of Balkh and the land of 
Khorasan. […] When Djengiz Khan had laid Balkh waste and drove the Seljuk people from 
their lands, and after he himself perished, his son Ögetey Khan became ruler. He came 
and destroyed Baghdad, ended the Abbasid dynasty and took the Abbasid throne from 
them. The Djengizids occupied their lands. All people went pell-mell.’50  
Neşrî accounted the defeat of the Mongol armies against the Mamluk Sultan Baybars. 
In 1277, Sultan Baybars had invaded the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm, controlled by the 
Ilkhanid Mongols, and defeated a Mongol army at the Battle of Elbistan and captured the 
city of Kayseri. Again this event has been omitted or was not mentioned in the chronicle 
of Aşık Paşazade. In his account of this battle, Neşrî noted that not one soldier from the 
Rum had participated, as the Mongols did not trust the ‘people of Rûm’, i.e. the Turks of 
Anatolia.51 During the battle, the left wing of the Mongol forces attacked ‘the banners of 
Sultan [Baybars]. Thereupon, the entire army of the Sultan of Egypt at once attacked the 
Tatars and a great fight began. God helped the Muslims who encircled the Tatar forces 
and killed an unmeasurable amount of Tatars. Their commanders Tuda and Toga were 
also killed. […] The ruler of Egypt, the magnificent king Baybars Bundukdârî came to 
Kayseri in 1277. And on the Friday prayers, the hutbe (public preaching in the mosque) 
was delivered in the name of the Sultan of Egypt.’52 
Remarkable in this passage is that the Mongols are denoted solely as ‘ infidel Tatars’, 
without any esteem. By contrast, the Mamluk Sultan Baybars is referred to with the royal 
title of ‘Majestic King’ or Meliküzzâhir. Curiously, Sultan Baybars and his army are not 
called as the Mamluks. Neşrî used the title of ‘Sultan of Egypt’ (sultan-ı Mısr) and described 
his soldiers as Muslims (mü’minler), ‘who with the help of God succeeded to defeat the 
infidel Mongol forces’. Neşrî also accounted that the Ilkhanid ruler, Abaqa Khan, was 
deeply saddened by the defeat of his armies. According to him, Abaqa Khan visited the 
battlefield. When he saw the dead Mongol soldiers on the field, he ordered to punish the 
 
                                                     
50 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniǧi, 8-9: ‘Cingiz Han kim Hitay vilâyetinden çıkup gelüp Belh vilayetini ve şehrini ve 
Horasan vilâyetini harâb itmiş idi. […] Cingiz Han Belh şehrini harâb itdükde, Âl-i Selçuk tâyifesini 
memleketlerinden çıkarup sonra kendü helâk olup oglı Ögtey Han pâdişah olup gelüp Bagdad’ı harâb idüp tahtı 
Âl-i Abbâsiler’den alup, memleketlerin Gingiz Haniler dutup âlem halkı karış murış olup…’  
51 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 23: ‘[…] Rûmîlere i’timâdı olmamagın leşker-i Mogol’dan ifraz itmiş. Şöyle ki, bu askerüñ 
içinde Rûmîlerden bir kimse yogıdı.’ 
52 Ibidem, 23: ‘Tatar, sultan-ı Mısr’un sancaklarına kasd idüp, asker-i sultân dahi bir kezden Tatar üzerine hamle 
idüp, kıtâl-i azîm olup, Hak ta’âlâ mü’minlere fursat virüp, leşker-i Tatar’ı her cânibden ihâta idüp, bî-kıyâs Tatar 
maktûl oldı. Mukaddemleri Tuda ve Toga maktûl oldı. […] Sahib-i Mısr Meliküzzâhir Baybars Bundukdârî, 
Kayseri’ye dâhil olup, Cum’a gün hutbe Kayseri’de sultan-ı Mısr adına okundı.’ 
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Seljuk governor, Pervâne Süleyman, whom he suspected of collaborating with Sultan 
Baybars as both were Muslims.53  
Among the fifteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers, Neşrî was the only one who 
recorded a brief history of the Karamanid dynasty, the most ardent adversaries of the 
Ottomans in Anatolia. He noted that ‘according to the narratives, when the Mongols had 
invaded Iran, a group of Turks had fled for the Mongols. They came and settled 
themselves around Ermenek [southeast Anatolia, near Konya] and maintained good 
relations with the infidels of Varsak.’54 As he was previously attached to the Karamanids 
before he came in the service of Ottoman court, Neşrî most probably had information on 
Karamanid history as well.  
As a preliminary conclusion we might say that in constructing the themes and 
discourse of their account, the early Ottoman historiographical texts assembled the 
elements and notions deriving from the steppe nomadic and Islamic traditions. This 
fusion was obviously constructed in order to cope with the fifteenth-century challenges 
of the House of Osman. These earliest chroniclers attempted to establish a basis for the 
legitimacy of the ruling dynasty and to produce a state ideology. In this respect, the 
chroniclers selectively appropriated discursive registers from the avalaible traditions and 
blended them into a political language of their own.  
 
  
  
   
  
 
                                                     
53 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 23-24. 
54 Ibidem, 24: ‘Rivâyet olunur ki, Mogol gelüp İran’a müstevlî olıcak, Etrak’dan bir taife Mogol’dan kaçup gelüp, 
Ermenâk civârında mütemekkin olup (…)’ 
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3.1.2 The Turkish Oğuz legacy as reflected in the Early Chronicles 
The influence and importance of the Turkish Oǧuz legacy and tradition gained a 
momentum after the fall of the Mongol Ilkhanids in the middle of the fourteenth century. 
By then, the Djenghizid prestige had declined. With the rise of the Turkish Empires in 
Anatolia and Azerbaijan, the Oğuz genealogy and traditions replaced the Djenghizid 
ideology as a source of political legitimation. In the Turkish political tradition, the central 
figure was the mythical ruler Oğuz Khan, who in the epic of the Oğuzname [the Book of 
Oğuz] was portrayed as a universal ruler who allegedly had conquered the world together 
with his six sons.55 In the fourteenth and fifteenth century, nearly all Turkish princely 
dynasties in Anatolia created their own Oğuz genealogies.  
The Oğuz genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty was for the first time created by the court-
poet Ahmedî, who wrote (c. 1410): ‘Gündüz Alp with Ertugrul; Gök Alp and many of the 
Oǧuz became his companions on this path’.56 This means that already since the very start 
of the fifteenth century the Ottomans considered the Oǧuz as their ancestors. Ahmedî 
solely noted that the Ottoman dynasty descended from the Oǧuz, but gave no concrete 
reference to a tribal branch. He did not spoke of the Oǧuz Kayı tribe. He portrayed 
Ertugrul as a comrade-in-arms to Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin, together with Gündüz Alp and 
Gök Alp, who appear as companions of Ertugrul. Ahmedî probably chose to record this 
version, as this direct link between persons of near equality must have served his goal to 
promote the prestige of the dynasty. This implied a higher phase of legitimation than 
distant endowment or appointment could do. As Bayezid I had as first officially claimed 
the title of ‘Sultan of Rûm’ – a title which previously the Rum Seljuks had deployed for 
themselves – Ahmedî’s choice for this version cannot be arbitrary.57 The Oğuz genealogy 
of the Ottoman dynasty became a tradition that with some variation was included in 
almost every later historical text. 
After him, the ulema historian, Şükrullah, elaborated on the Oğuz genealogy and 
explicitly suggested that the House of Osman descended from the Oǧuz through its Kayı 
line. In his Behcetüt Tevarih (c. 1458), Şükrullah based his claim on the Oğuzname-book, 
which he reportedly had consulted during a diplomatic mission to the court of the 
Karakoyunlu ruler, Mirza Cihan Şah. Indeed in 1449, Sultan Murad II had sent him as his 
envoy to Mirza Şah. At the request of Mirza, his court historian, Mevlânâ İsmâil showed 
Şükrullah the Book of Oğuz, which was written in the Mongol alphabet (i.e. in the Uygur 
 
                                                     
55 See: Zeki Velidi Togan, Oğuz Destanı. Reşideddin Oğuznâmesi, Tercüme ve Tahlili (İstanbul, 1982).  
56 Ahmedî, Dasitan-i Tevârîh-i Mülûk-i âl-i Osman, 27 :’Gündüz Alp Ertugrul anuñla bile; Dahı Gök Alp ü Oğuzdan 
çok kişi, Olmuşıdı ol yolda anuñ yoldaşı.’ 
57 Pal Fodor, ‘Ahmedî’s Dasitan as a Source of Early Ottoman History, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum 
Hungaricae 38/1-2 (1984) 49-50. 
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language). Reading from this book, Mirza allegedly told Şükrullah: ‘Oğuz had six sons: Gök 
Alp [Sky Prince], Yer Alp [Earth Prince], Deniz Alp [Sea Prince], Gün Alp [Sun Prince], Ay Alp 
[Moon Prince] and Yıldız Alp [Star Prince]. The lineage of my brother sultan Murad 
descends to Oğuz Han through his son, Gök Alp.’58 Thereafter, Cihan Şah summed forty 
five generations for the sons of Gök Alp that reached to Ertuğrul, Osman’s father. And he 
linked the lineage of his own dynasty to Deniz Alp through forty one generations. Then 
he allegedly said: ‘the lineage of my brother Murad is as outstanding as the difference 
between the sky and the sea.’59 The Oğuz-genealogy obviously fulfilled the political need 
of the Ottoman dynasty to have a legitimate basis for its authority and to gain the consent 
and support of its Turkish nomad followers.60The late fifteenth-century historian, Neşrî, 
also began his History of the House of Osman with a summary of the Oğuzname-epic and 
traced Osman’s genesis to the mythological ruler Oğuz Han.61 The early historical texts 
thus devotedly and explicitly emphasised the Oğuz Kayı-descent of the Ottoman dynasty.  
The popularity of the Oğuz lineage as one of the dominant forms of self-identification 
for the dynasty seems to have developed as a response to two major events. Firstly, it was 
related to the event that had changed the course of Ottoman history. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, at the famous Battle of Ankara in 1402, the Ottoman Sultan Yıldırım 
(Thunderbolt) Bâyezid I (r. 1389-1402) was defeated by Emir Timur Lenk (r. 1370-1405) – 
the powerful Turkish ruler from Central Asia.62 Secondly and the most importantly, 
Bâyezid I’s defeat against Timur had led to a crisis of legitimacy and a loss of prestige for 
the Ottoman dynasty.63  
Before the Battle of Ankara in 1402, Timur Lenk and Bâyezid I had exchanged a series 
of letters, in which Timur legitimised his conquest and rule by claiming authority in the 
name of the Djenghiz Khanid Çağatay dynasty. He associated himself with the House of 
Djenghiz and the charisma attached to it.64 Timur and his successors claimed as their 
foundation both Islamic law and the Mongol customary law, the yasa of Djengiz Khan. 
Timur claimed that he had a ‘natural right to rule’ as the reviver of the majestic 
Djenghizid legacy.65 He denoted Bâyezid as a mere regional ‘Sultan of Rum’ (Roman lands) 
and called Bâyezid a ‘descendant of Turkmen sailors’ and rejected the Kayı genealogy of 
 
                                                     
58 Şükrullah Efendi, Behcetüt Tevârih, 376. 
59 Ibidem. 
60 İnalcık, ‘Osmanlı Padişahı’, 68-69. 
61 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 6-12, 30. 
62 Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne de Timur en Anatolie, 1402 (London, 1977).  
63 Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 197-199. 
64 Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, 106-109. 
65 Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge, 1989) 56-58. 
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the Ottoman dynasty. Therefore, Timur demanded obedience of Bâyezid; he had to 
acknowledge his over-lordship if he wished to avoid a war.66  
To rival the Islamic Turkish-Mongol model of Timur Lenk, Bâyezid I drew upon much 
older Turkish Oǧuz tradition.67 Yıldırım Bâyezid reacted to Timur’s challenge by offering 
refuge to two Turkish princes, who had fled from Timur. In his letter to Timur, Bâyezid 
produced a genealogy, which went back to the ancient Turkish khans of Central Asia. He 
claimed descent from Oğuz Khan, thereby holding on to his right of sovereignty.68 He also 
cultivated and used the title of khan probably to strengthen his legitimacy among the 
Turkish semi-nomadic audience.69 As is known, the title of khan appears in the Ottoman 
tradition as early as the reign of Bâyezid I.70 The Ottoman use of the title khan before the 
advent of Timurid threat seem to have been a vaguely invoked title that referred to a 
distant past.71 Furthermore, as Bâyezid’s defeat had created a crisis of legitimacy and a 
loss of prestige, the first half of the fifteenth century seem to be marked by 
experimentation with varieties of political ideologies.  
During the reign of Sultan Murad II (r. 1421-1451), the epic stories about the first 
Ottoman rulers were re-edited, reproduced and preserved in the earliest historical texts. 
During Murad II’s reign, the Timurid threat had faded and the Ottoman territories were 
mostly recovered. This time, the challenge came from another Turkish state. The 
Akkoyunlu dynasty was the principal rival of the Ottomans in eastern Anatolia. The 
Akkoyunlu ruler, Kara Osman (r. 1403-1435) and Karakoyunlu prince, Mirza Cihan Şah (r. 
1436-1467), claimed their descent from the ancient Turkish khans of Asia.72 Conscious of 
the force of the rival Akkoyunlu claims to Oğuz-genealogy, Sultan Murad II reacted by 
tracing the lineage of the House of Osman to Oğuz Han’s son, Gök Alp, who allegedly 
inherited the right to universal rule and to make up an imperial dynasty.73  
On the request of Murad II, the epic of Oğuzname was also reproduced in the History of 
the House of Selçuk, written in the 1430s by the historian and scholar Yazıcı-zâde Ali (see 
Chapter 1).74 He correlated the link between sovereignty and the House of Osman again 
by referring to the Oğuz tradition:  
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70 Yinanç, ‘Bâyezid I’, 390.  
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73 Aşık Paşazâde, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 272-273. 
74 Yazıcı-zâde ’Ali: Tevârîh-i Âl-i Selçuk, ed. Abdullah Bakır (Istanbul, 2009); Yazıcı-zâde ’Ali: Tevârîh-i Âl-i Selçuk, 2 
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‘The news arrived that Osman Beg, the son of Ertuğrul, of the Kayı was selected as 
the sovereign (khan) by the Turkish lords (begs), who had came together in a council 
(kurıltây) and agreed upon following the Oğuz custom (töre). This story actually goes 
as follows: the Turkish lords from various Oğuz tribes feared the Tatar [Mongol] 
cruelty. In time, growing number of people had came to the marches fleeing the 
Tatar tyranny. These lords gathered and went to Osman Beg’s princely court, where 
they discussed (meşveret kıldılar) and finally ascertained that Kayı Han was the ruler 
and leader of all the Oğuz tribes. By requirement of the Oğuz traditions as they were 
handed down from Gün Han, so long as the line of Kayı survives, the khanate and 
sultanate (padişâhlık) must not pass to the line of the rulers of any other clan. 
Moreover, the Seljuk Sultans also cannot help us, as they have lost most of their 
lands and are subjugated by the Tatars. As such, the lords asked Osman Beg: ‘be our 
ruler (khan) and we will carry out the gaza in the name of our Sultan.’ Osman Beg 
accepted their offer. […] In those old days, the Oğuz traditions were known and 
respected, and not forgotten as today.’75  
Remarkably, Yazıcızade Ali bemoaned that the Oguz tradition was mostly forgotten in 
his own time at the Ottoman princely court. He thus tried to restore the ties between the 
Ottoman dynasty and their nomadic Turkish Oğuz followers. In general, the first half of 
the fifteenth century seem to be a period in which the Ottoman dynasty recalled its actual 
or supposed roots from the Kayı tribe of the Oğuz tribal confederation. Furthermore, the 
inscription of the Kayı emblem IYI (arrow-bow-arrow) or the tamga on Ottoman weapons 
and various outfits also started precisely in this period.76 This practice was obviously 
effected by the political circumstances of the early fifteenth century. Indeed, the princely 
court of Murad II tried to adjust the dynasty’s identity to the ideals and expectations of 
the nomadic social groups that could potentially challenge the sovereignty of the House 
 
                                                     
75 Yazıcı-zâde Ali: Tevârîh-i Âl-i Selçuk, ed. Abdullah Bakır (Istanbul, 2009) 872-873: ‘Bu esnâda uc etrâfından haber 
vardı ki; ‘Kayı'dan Ertuğrul oğlı Osmân Beg’i ucdağı Türk begleri dirilüp, kurıltây idüp, Oğuz töresin sürişüp hân 
dikdiler!’ diyu. Ol hikâyet bu minvâl üzerineydi ki; ucdağı Türk begleri ki, Oğuz’uñ her boyından uc etrâfında 
Tatar şerrinden korkup yaylar ve kışlarlardı, rûzigârla karşu Tatar’dan incinenler uca gelüp çoğaldılar. Fî’l-
cümle ol illerüñ begleri-kethüdâları cem’ olup Osmân Beg katına geldiler ve meşveret kıldılar. Çün kâl-u kıylden 
soñra sözlerinüñ ihtiyârı bu oldı ki, eyitdiler: ‘Kayı Hân hôd mecmû-ı Oğuz boylarınuñ Oğuz’dan soñra ağaları 
ve hânlarıydı. Ve Gün Hân'uñ vasiyyetin[c]e, Oğuz töresi mûcebince hânlık ve pâdişâhlık Kayı soyı var-iken özge 
boy hânlarınuñ soyına hânlık ve pâdişâhlık degmez! Çün şimden-girü Selçuk sultânlarından bize çâre ve meded 
yokdur, memleketüñ çoğı ellerinden çıkdı, Tatar üzerlerine geregi gibi müstevlî oldı. Çün merhûm Sultân 
'Alâ’ü’d-dîn’den dahı size safâ nazar olmışdur. Siz hân oluñ ve biz kullar Sultân’umuz hizmetinde bu tarafda 
gazâya meşgûl olalum!’ didiler. Osmân Beg dahı kabûl itdi. Pes mecmû’ı örü turup Oğuz resmince üç kerre 
yükinüb baş kodılar. Ol zamânlarda Oğuz töresinden bakiyye varıdı, şimdiki bigi top unudulmamışıdı.’  
76 In nomadic tradition, the tamga was the emblem of the ruling dynasty, a sort of ‘coat of arms’. 
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of Osman. In this respect, the Oǧuz genealogy and legacy were of primordial importance 
for the dynasty as devices of legitimation, especially during Murad II’s reign.77  
Likewise, Neşrî highlighted the Central Asian Turkish history of the khanates. He not 
only traced the origins of the Ottoman dynasty to the legendary ruler Oǧuz Khan, but in 
his summary of the Oğuzname, Neşrî also depicted Oğuz Khan as the first Turkish ruler to 
convert to Islam.78 He obviously elaborated both elements to enhance the Ottomans’ 
principal identity as Muslim sovereigns. According to Neşrî, Oguz fought after his 
conversion against his father Kara Han, whom Neşrî called an ‘irreligious and tyrant 
infidel’ (kâfir-i bî-dîn-i ve cebbârdı).79 When Oğuz began to preach Islam to his people, a 
conflict arose with his father, who ordered him to be killed. Thereupon, Oğuz fled with 
his children, women and followers towards the south, in what is now Turkestan.80 From 
there, Oğuz expanded his rule in the whole world from east to west (şarkdan garba dak 
bilad-ı arza vardı, rûy-i zemîne müstevlî oldu): ‘from China to India, to Turkistan and the 
kingdoms of Hitay, Uygur and Gazne, to Babylon and Rome, to the lands of Franks and 
Russians, to Damascus, Hejaz, Yemen, Soudan (Habeş) and the lands of Berbers.’81 Neşrî 
placed these events in the lifetime of the Prophet Abraham. He also noted that the Turks 
assumed and used to say that Oǧuz was the same Alexander (Zülkarneyn) to whom the 
Koran referred as the ruler who had built the wall against Gog and Magog (Yecuc ve 
Mecuc).82 
It is known that Neşrî based his work on the Book of Alexander of Ahmedî, the early 
fifteenth-century Ottoman court poet (see Chapter 1). Consequently, Neşrî adopted 
elements from the canonical sources of Islamic poetry as inspiration for his narrative of 
the mythical history of the Oǧuz Turks: i.e. the Qur’an and the already established Islamic 
historiography. Obviously, the Alexander legend was also adopted by Neşrî as a 
convenient ideological device. As already discussed, in the Muslim historical tradition, 
Alexander was known as Zülkarneyn in Turkish and in Arabic as Dhul-Qarnayn, literally ‘the 
Possessor of Two Horns, as he was mentioned in the Quran.83 Furthermore, Neşrî 
 
                                                     
77 Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, 5; Halil İnalcık, ‘Periods in Ottoman History’, in: ibid., Essays in Ottoman History (İstanbul, 
1998) 21; Şükrullah Efendi, Behcetüt Tevârih, 47.  
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suggested that Oguz Khan’s conversion took place in the lifetime of the Prophet Abraham 
(İbrahim-Halil). 
Relying on ‘eminent histories’ (tevârîh-i muhtârda eydür), of which the names or titles 
he did not mention, Neşrî also integrated a brief history of the Oguz. Most remarkably, 
Neşrî represented the legendary Oǧuz Han as a Muslim ruler. He probably built upon the 
existing Oguzname-texts in the Arab and Persian chroniclers produced at the Seljuk and 
Ilkhanid courts. Particularly the ‘World History’ of the early fourteenth-century Persian 
chronicler and vizier to the Ilkhanids, Rashid al-Dîn was probably one of Neşrî’s sources.84 
This Jami’üt-Tevarih or ‘World Histroy’ of Rashid al-Dîn is considered as the most 
important source from the Ilkhanid period. It is conceived as a ‘universal history’. As such, 
it includes a history from Adam to the Prophet Muhammad and the Caliphs, dwells upon 
the Islamic dynasties of the Umayyads, Abbasid and Fatimids; the Turkish Islamic states 
of the Ghaznavids, Karahanids and the Shahs of Khwarezm; the Turks and the Mongols in 
Central Asia, a history of China, India and the Jews; as well as of ‘the Franks’ (primarily 
the Papal state and the Holy Roman Empire).85  
In his account of the Turkish tribes, Rashid al-Dîn also included the history, legend and 
genealogy of the Oguz.86 Although the Oguz epic relates the history of the Turks in the 
pre-Islamic period, Rashid al-Dîn had also depicted Oǧuz Han as a Muslim. Reportedly, 
after his conversion to Islam, Oǧuz Khan had to fight against his ‘infidel’ father and uncles, 
whom he ultimately defeated and subsequently established his rule.87 According to Zeki 
V. Togan, Rashid al-Dîn had read various versions of the Oguzname in Persian and in 
Mongol languages. Obviously, he copied the available texts in Persian integrally and even 
added some verses from the Koran and historical information. Stylistically, he 
ornamented it with poems from the famous Persian mirrors-for-princes Shahname or The 
Book of Kings, written by Firdawsi (ca. 1010).88 Thus, Neşrî had most probably 
incorporated this account of Rashid al-Dîn into his own chronicle.  
Following Rashid al-Dîn’s text as his source, Neşrî noted that the Oghuz people 
descended from prophet Noah (Nûh Nebî aleyhi’s-sêlam).89 Neşrî is one of the few fifteenth-
century Ottoman chroniclers, who integrated a rich history of the pre-Islamic Turks as 
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well as a description of the Great Seljuk dynasty, the Rûm Seljuks and a brief history of 
the Karamanids. As he used various sources, his work was certainly more informed than 
the chronicles of Aşık Paşazâde, Oruç and the ‘anonymous author’. In his brief description 
of the history of the Turks in Central Asia, Neşrî wrote: ‘The current Turks branch out in 
various groups. Some of them possess cities and castles; some others live in tents, i.e. in 
transportable houses in the steppe or at the top of mountains. Some of them worship the 
sun and fire, others worship idols, cows, trees or stones; some of them even do not know 
what a religion is, some others imitate Judaism. The Turks call their rulers hakan, who are 
dressed in silk robes and wear a crown. They are extraordinarily valiant. They all descend 
from prophet Noah – peace be upon him, through Bulcas Han, son of Yâsef.’90  
Interestingly, Neşrî did not portray the Turks in Asia all as Muslims, but as a mosaic of 
pagan, Tengrist, Jewish, Muslim and various other religious traditions. He probably 
referred to the Khazar rulers who became famous for apparently converting to Judaism 
at the turn of the ninth century.91 The Khazar Khanate (660?-1048) had emerged as the 
most powerful state after the breakup of the western part of the Kök Türk Empire.92 The 
Kök Türk Empire disintegrated in 639 when the Eastern Turkish emperor or kaghan was 
captured by China. The Chinese armies marched west as far as Persia, defeating the 
western Türks in 657.93 The breakup of the western Türk Empire led to a series of states 
forming in its wake, such as the Pechenegs, Khazars and the Oǧuz. In the rivalry between 
the Arab, Byzantine and Russian rulers, the Khazar kaghans played an important role. 
Their conversion to Judaism was probably due to their attempts to remain unaligned in 
the Islamic-Christian rivalry. The Oǧuz had once been allies of the Khazars. In the late 
ninth century, the alliances shifted and some of the Oǧuz turned against them and helped 
the Russian princes of Kiev and Novgorod to defeat the Khazars.94 It is to this historical 
context that Neşrî selectively and briefly referred to in his account of pre-Ottoman 
history.  
 
                                                     
90 Ibidem: ‘Bu Etrâk ki vardur, esnâf-i kesîredür. Ba’zı ashâb-ı müdün ve husûndur ve ba’zı ashâb-ı verbedür; yani 
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urunurlar. Bu taife gâyet bahâdur olur. Ve bunlarun mecmû’ı Bulcas Han bin Yâfes bin Nûh Nebî aleyhi’s-selâm 
evlâdındandur.’  
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93 Ibidem. 
94 Thomas Noonan, ‘The Khazar Kaghanate and its impact on the Early Rus state’, eds. Anatoly Khazanov and 
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He made a distinction between various tribes of which the Turks were composed: 
‘Bulcas Han had three sons, one was Türk, another Oǧuz and a third was Mogol. Their sons 
and descendants are so numerous that only God knows their precise number. They lived 
in the region between China and the Ceyhun River [Amu Derya], which is called 
Turkistan.’95 An interesting feature of this family tree is that Neşrî represented the 
Mongols as nephews of the Turks. The sons of Oǧuz are also depicted as Muslims and as 
just and wise rulers. For example, Neşrî wrote: ‘Gün Han succeeded his father Oǧuz 
according to his testament. Just like his father, he also believed in God, he was just and 
wise. He restored the lands in south and north with his justice. He also was the ruler who 
established in Turkistan the succession principle upon kinship.’96   
In a later passage, Neşrî asserted that Çanak Han was the first Turkish ruler to convert 
to Islam.97 According to Neşrî, Çanak Han, a grandson of Oǧuz, took the name of Kara Han 
and in 999 he embraced Islam together with his followers consisting of two thousand 
nomadic households. Neşrî probably referred with this Kara Han to the founder of the 
Muslim Turkish Karahanid dynasty (c. 840-1242).98 His account here aligns with some 
variation with the chronicles of the earlier Muslim historians, upon which he probably 
relied. For instance, in 960, according to Ibn Miskawaih and Ibn al-Athir, there was a mass 
conversion reportedly of two hundred thousand tents. Circumstantial evidence suggests 
these were the Karakhanids.99 Neşrî took this number back to two thousand.  
In what followed, Neşrî gave an etymological description of the term ‘Türkman’. He 
noted: ‘the Turks who converted to Islam were called ‘Türk-i imân’, meaning ‘the Turk 
who believes’; its pronunciation evolved and became ‘Türkman’. As such, the name 
Türkman emerged.’100 Indeed, the word Türkman started to be used after the Turks 
converted to Islam. It later became a general term to denote the Turkish nomadic 
communities. For a long time, the Oğuz themselves did not adopt this new name. 
However, in the thirteenth century, the association to Oğuz was progressively replaced 
by the term Türkmen. The Ottomans generally used the term Türkman to denote the 
nomadic Turks in Anatolia; in the Ottoman Balkans, they were called yörük (meaning 
nomad in Turkish).101  
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96 Ibidem, 9.  
97 Ibidem, 10: ‘Mülûk-i Türkden evvel Islâm’a gelen mü’min olan budur. aña Çanak dinilür. Kara Han dimekile 
mülakkabdur. Hicretin üç yüzinde Etrâkdan iki bin hargâhla İslam’a gelüp, müttekî ve ahsenü’l-İslam oldılar’ 
98 Peter Golden, ‘The Karakhanids and Early Islam’, ed. Denis Sinor, The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia 
(Cambridge, 1990) 343-370. 
99 Golden, ‘The Karakhanids and Early Islam’, 354. 
100 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 10: ‘Andan ötüri buña Türk-i îman dinildi. Lafzda tahfif idüp, Türkman didiler.’  
101 Erkan Göksu, ‘Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşunda Gaza ve Türkmen (Oğuz) Ananelerinin Rolü Üzerine’, in: ed. 
Ismail Özçelik, Oğuz Geleneği Çerçevesinde Tarihten Günümüze Karakeçililer (Kirikkale, 2003) 29-30. 
  207 
 
Figure 10: A Turkish nomadic mounted warrior with the composite bow. 
 
The legendary Oğuz Khan survived in the memories and epic narratives as a glorious 
legacy. The Book of My Grandfather Korkud or the Kitâb-ı Dedem Ḳorḳud Alâ Lisân-ı Tâife-i 
Oġuzân is the most famous among the epic stories of the Oghuz Turks or Türkmans.102 
Dede Korkut, for instance, is a heroic destan or legend, which starts out in Asia, continues 
in Turkey and Iran, and centres most of its action in Azerbaijan. An older substratum of 
these oral traditions probably dates to conflicts between the Oguz and their Turkish 
rivals, the Pechenegs, the Kipchaks, and others. However, this substratum seems to be 
covered in references to the fourteenth-century campaigns of the Akkoyunlu Oguz 
nomads against the Georgians, the Abkhaza Circassians and the Byzantine Empire of 
Trebizond.103 In the nomadic culture, the ‘Dede Korkud stories’ passed from generation to 
generation in an oral form. These epic stories told by Dede Korkud were a product of a 
long series of narrators, any of whom could have made alterations and additions, right 
down to the two sixteenth-century scribes who produced the oldest extant 
manuscripts.104  
The stories appeared after the Turks converted to Islam in the tenth century. The 
heroes are often portrayed as valiant Muslims, while the villains are referred to as 
‘infidels’. But there are also many references to the Turkish pre-Islamic traditions. The 
stories carry morals and values significant to the social lifestyle of the nomadic Turks in 
 
                                                     
102 The Book of My Grandfather Korkut, transl. and comments by V. Barthold (Moscow and Leningrad, 1962) 6. 
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the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Dede Korkud, meaning ‘Grandfather Korkut’, is a 
respected fortune-teller and bard who links the stories together. The figure of Dede 
Korkud appears as the ak sakallı (literally ‘white-bearded’ or the respected elder), 
representing the sage advisor who solved the difficulties faced by the Oǧuz tribes. As the 
‘white-bearded elders’ or the ak sakallı were respected for their wisdom and experience 
in solving problems; they were generally called dede (grandfather).105 According to the 
Anonymous Chronicle, for instance, Murad II gave importance to having old wise men in 
his council. After the Battle of Varna in 1444, he was inspecting the battlefield. When he 
saw the dead crusaders lying on the ground, he called his ak sakallı lord Azeb Beg, and 
asked him whether there were any white-bearded elder men lying on the ground. Azeb 
Beg replied: ‘Such was their end because they did not have even one old and wise man (ak 
sakallı pîr) among them.’106  
Finally, it can be argued that the style and themes of the epic stories of Dede Korkud 
and similar narratives also influenced the style of the early Ottoman chroniclers. This is 
especially the case for Aşık Paşazade and the anonymous author, who both addressed an 
audience composed in great part of Oǧuz Turkmans.  
3.1.2.1  The Dream Narrative  
Another theme within early Ottoman political discourse was the Kök Türk identification 
of sovereignty with the control of sacred sites and images, which was elaborated on the 
symbolism of the hearth (ocak).107 The Ottoman dynasty used the image of ‘hearth’ when 
describing one of its crucial state institutions, the Kapıkulu Ocakları (hearths of the ‘slaves’ 
of the Porte). The symbol of the hearth roots back to the sixth-century Kök Türk Empire. 
It not only represented familial continuity but also expressed spatial and cosmological 
significance.108 Dug out by the mother, the hearth implied a gate opened to the ancestor’s 
netherworld. Centrally located in the yurt, the round felt tent of the nomad, the hearth 
symbolised the centre of the world. The sacred images of the Mountain, Moon, Tree, Cave, 
Water and Female Spirit were all identified with the ocak through its cosmic orientation 
and through its connection with the netherworld of the ‘grandmothers’, the ancestral 
female spirits.109 Nearly all these elements, as well as the themes of emergence and 
enclosure that run through Turkish and Mongol origin myths reappear in the miraculous 
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dream of Osman Bey, which retrospectively predicted the future destiny of the House of 
Osman. 110 
This dream is one of the significant mythical narratives that contain important 
elements about the Ottoman perception of sovereignty and the fundament on which the 
dynasty grounded its legitimacy. In the version of Aşık Paşazâde, while Osman was a guest 
of the popular spiritual master, Sheikh Edebali, Osman allegedly dreamt that a moon rose 
out of the chest of the Sheikh and set in his own chest. Then a tree sprang from Osman’s 
navel, spread over the world and extended its shade over mountains from which waters 
sprang. People drank from these waters and used them for their gardens to build 
fountains. When Osman Bey informed the Sheikh of his dream, the latter interpreted it as 
follows: ‘Son, kingdom (pâdişahlık) is yours, may it be blessing to your descendants.’ 
Thereafter, he married Osman to his daughter Malhûn.111  
There are some differing versions of this dream story but in very similar terms. The 
fifteenth-century historian Oruç Beg ascribed the dream to Ertugrul, the father of Osman. 
Oruç relates that one night Ertugrul dreamed a strange dream. In the morning he 
pondered the dream and went to Konya. There lived a Sheikh, named Edebali, who was 
also an interpreter of dreams (mu’abbir şeyh) to whom he told his dream. Ertugrul told 
him that he saw a moon rising from the sheikh’s chest and enter his. Then a tree sprang 
from Ertugrul’s navel; there were mountains in its shade, and from them streams flowed 
to water the land. The Sheikh said:  
‘You will have a son named Osman, and I will have a daughter named Rabia. Your 
son will marry my daughter and they will have a son named Orhan. A line of kings 
[pâdişah] will be born from your stock. Son, rulership [pâdişahlık] is given to your 
descendants, may it be blessing. Ertugrul was very pleased with the interpretation 
of his dream and prayed to God in gratitude.’112 
The account of Oruç Beg is very close in verbal detail to that of the version above of 
Aşıkpaşazâde, but there are also some important differences. The dreamer is not Ertugrul 
but Osman, the girl is named Malhun, not Rabia, and Sheikh Edebali is living near Sögüt, 
and not in Konya. In making these modifications to the story, Aşıkpaşazâde perhaps 
changed it after what he had been told by Mahmud Paşa, a descendant of Edebali.113 The 
Turkish dervish orders dominated the spiritual life at the frontiers, and consequently 
Osman or Ertugrul sought legitimisation through Sheikh Edebali. Edebalı was a master of 
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great spiritual influence and a respected Sufi Sheikh of the Vefaiyye-order, the mystic 
order that descended from Baba Ilyas who led a popular nomadic revolt against the Rum 
Seljuks.114 Predicting that Osman’s descendants would build a universal empire, Sheikh 
Edebali girded him with a gazi sword. The idea that Osman Gazi’s rule was justified by his 
personal connection to God’s favour, mediated by Sheikh Edebali, was a nomadic concept 
of sovereignty.115  
Myths are usually concerned with concerns on origins and genesis. For example, the 
Seljuk chronicles also predicted the future destiny of the Great Seljuk dynasty through a 
dream attributed to Selçuk, the first Seljuk ruler. The interpreter of Seljuk’s dream 
predicted that his descendants were destined to rule the whole world.116 This 
mythmaking process in both the Seljuk and Ottoman chronicles were apparently 
designed to legitimise the new rulers of the Islamic world. The early Ottoman chronicles 
heralded universal rulership not only to Osman but to his whole house through this 
dream. 117  
Osman’s dream narrative also suggested that the rise of Osman as a supra-tribal leader 
(bey) was recognised as enjoying God’s favour. However, such a sacral investiture required 
unconditional subordination to the bey and his dynasty. This meant a radical change of 
the social and political relations from a relatively egalitarian to a more hierarchical set of 
class relations. It is hardly believable that during the reign of Osman Gazi, his followers 
could have consented to such a hierarchical subordination. In early Ottoman society, the 
relations of equal partnerships must have been of greater importance for the emerging 
polity. Although Osman Gazi, as the eponymous founder of the dynasty, had succeeded to 
place his dynasty in control of the emerging polity, this did not yet mean that the first 
rulers were absolute rulers. 
Through this dream story, fifteenth-century chroniclers suggested that the utopian 
goals of the dynasty were realised. Ideologically, this story implied that Osman Gazi was 
successful to place the House of Osman in control of the emerging state. Otherwise, the 
foundation of the political organisation would have remain weak and the beylik itself 
might have easily vanished at his death.  
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3.1.2.2 Kut or divine dispensation 
The term ‘kut’ often recurs in the narratives of the earliest chroniclers. The concept 
referred to the idea of a divinely favoured dynasty that appealed to the belief in ‘Sky God’s 
favour (kut).118 This idea of a divinely mandate for rulership originated from the Turkish 
concept of kut. According to nomadic custom, the kaghan ruled as he personified the 
favour of the ‘Sky God’s. This favour (kut) was demonstrated in his military successes and 
in the performance of his functions as ruler. The steppe-nomadic Turkish tradition held 
that sovereignty was to be granted by the divine fortune (kut) to a family chosen for 
political rule.  
However, there was always the danger of a ‘reversal of fortune’ as the divine favour 
or kut did not necessarily last forever. In other words, God could withdraw the support he 
gave to a ruler, for instance, when the ruler lost battles and his throne. For example, 
Tursun Beg accounts that directly after the conquest of Constantinople Sultan Mehmed 
II, when looking at the former Byzantine capital, contemplated on the volatility of 
fortune. In these reflections, Sultan Mehmed uttered the following verses in Persian: ‘The 
spider is curtain-bearer [perde-dâr] in the window of Kisrâ / The owl sounds the relief in 
the castle of Afrasiyab.’119 Aşık Paşazade also included a poem contemplating on the 
changeable fortune, when Sultan Bâyezid I had laid siege on Constantinople, after having 
crushed a crusader army at Nicopolis: ‘This fortune is changeable and tosses sideways 
glances. […] Every hour she turns and bonds thousand mysterious affairs. She takes the 
crown off the head and looks with a coquettish glance. Some do not give up precaution, 
but end up in the sky flying. […] All men are a son of a father. Yet, why do they have long 
talks about their fighting.’120  
The early chronicles, which generally seem to have been conceived in the form of 
moral stories with a primarily function of ethical advices, indicate that the mistakes or 
vices of a ruler may cause the heavenly favours or fortune to turn away. The first Ottoman 
ruler who lost the favour of the kut was Bâyezid I. The Anonymous Chronicle accounted 
an imaginary conversation between Timur and Bâyezid, after the former had defeated 
and captured the latter. Timur said that they had both been given rulership by God but 
Bâyezid lost it because he did not know how to treasure it.121 The anonymous chronicler 
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implied that Bâyezid lost the battle because he failed to satisfy the needs of his followers, 
which he should have known better in order not to lose divine support and to behave 
accordingly. 
The civil war between the sons of Bâyezid following the death of their father were also 
described in terms of struggle over kut between the brothers. According to Neşrî, after 
the youngest son, Çelebi Mehmed, won a battle against his brother İsa Çelebi, their oldest 
brother Süleyman Çelebi, who then reigned in Edirne, did not agree with the outcome 
and saw Mehmed not suited to rule as he was ‘a little boy’. When Süleyman revealed his 
intention to fight Mehmed, his viziers remarked: ‘O king, you say it well but the verdict 
emanates from God and He gives the land to whomever he wants. Mehmed may be still 
young of age, but he stands firm with his state power [devletde]. Everyone who confronted 
him is defeated. He even deluded lord Timur in many ways and succeeded to keep his 
position.’122 In a later episode of the civil war, Neşri accounted that, in an attempt to 
support Isa, the lord of Kastamonu, İsfendiyar Beg, decided to fight Mehmed. Neşri noted: 
‘Thereupon, the sultan summoned to beat the drums, the banners were untied and the 
sounds of the wooden pipes (zurna) filled the air. […] When İsfendiyar saw Mehmed’s 
army, his kut dried up.’123 Neşri’s account of the civil war relied on the anonymous short 
chronicle, written by a scribe attached to the princely court of Çelebi Mehmed I. 
Consequently, the anonymous source of Neşrî told the events from Mehmed’s 
perspective, clearly glorifying the deeds of his patron who came out of the succession 
strife as the winner.124 
Hence, despite the profound influence of the Muslim historiographical tradition, the 
earliest Ottoman historical texts still kept drawing on concepts from Turkish steppe 
tradition, such as the widely used term kut. As expected, in the construction of their 
discourses, fifteenth-century historians created a political language that was a synthesis 
of terms that derived both from the nomadic tradition and from the Muslim political 
thought (see below).   
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3.1.2.3 The Principles of Succession 
In the fifteenth century, no fixed rules governed the succession procedure of the 
Ottomans.125 Already at a very early stage, the Ottoman sultanate abandoned the nomadic 
practice of dividing the realms among different heirs (ülüsh-system), as previous Turkish 
states had done before them. The practice of ülüsh was based on the nomadic principle 
that perceived the state as the mülk or ‘joint possession and inheritance’ of the ruling 
dynasty. This idea was particularly strong in the Turkish and Mongol traditions.126 
According to these political traditions, sovereignty was invested in every member of the 
dynastic family and every male and female member of the ruling dynasty had the right to 
claim a share to exercise sovereign power.127  
The Ottomans gradually renovated the Turkish ülüsh-system according to their own 
vision of a strong centralised state with undivided territories. From the time of Osman 
Bey, it had been customary for all the sons of the ruler to serve in a governorship (sancak) 
in Anatolia, and for each son to have an entitlement to the succession.128 According to the 
chronicler Neşri, Osman Gazi kept his youngest son Alaeddin Pasha with him at the 
centre, while giving his elder son Orhan Gazi the sancak of Karacahisar near Bursa, which 
he captured in 1326, and to his brother Gündüz another governorship (sancak).129 Already 
during the reign of Çelebi Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421), the custom of apanage (yurtluk) or 
assigning the governorship of a province (sancak) to uncles and brothers had been 
abandoned. Governorship merely became a princely fief (sancak). The actual political 
control in these sancak-provinces rested in the hands of the tutors (lâlâ), who 
accompanied the crown princes to their governorship. The position of these lâlâs was 
similar to the one of the atabegs in the Seljuk administration (see below). The lâlâ-officials 
were men of the state who were usually members of the kul-institution who belonged to 
the household of the dynasty.130 For instance, as a crown prince, Murad I (r. 1362-1389) 
was assigned to take control of the newly captured province in the Balkan, in the 
accompany of his tutor, Lâlâ Shahin.131  
At this point, it is important to mention another method of succession mainly 
encountered in the Turkish-Mongolian tradition. This second succession principle was 
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based upon the nomadic view that none of the heirs of the ruling dynasty enjoyed 
primacy or privilege. The selection of a ruler from within the dynasty seems to be a 
‘combined’ method, originating from Kök Türk practice. The worthiest member of the 
family, whether a son or a brother, would be recognised as ruler. Among the Kök Türks, 
the succession to the throne was perceived as a matter of destiny, left in the hands of God 
who chooses to whomever he grants his favour (kut) to rule. The Orhun Inscription noted 
that Bilge Khan had allegedly said: ‘Because it was God’s will and my destiny, I took the 
status of Khan.’132 The inscription also recorded: ‘Because God is gracious and I was 
fortunate, I mounted the throne and brought together all the poor people, and I made the 
poor people rich.’133 According to the inscription, Bilge Khan also assured his people: ‘As 
long as the blue sky above and the earth beneath you do not vanish, who can ruin the law 
[törü], the land and the people of Turk’.134   
The ambiguity of the Ottoman system of royal succession reflected the ambiguity 
inherent to the nomad political tradition. Any sons or brothers of the kaghan had a 
legitimate right to succeed him, for the entire dynasty shared jointly in the possession of 
the realm/state. No fixed rules governed the succession among the Mongols and Turks, 
who both continued the traditions of the Central Asian steppe lore. The principal means 
to acquire the throne were achieving priority by timely arriving at the kurultay (assembly) 
and, most important of all, securing the support of influential tribal leaders through 
personal relations and negotiations. The fundamental principle was always that the 
succession to the throne was left to divine dispensation or kut. The long failure to resolve 
the question of orderly succession threatened the existence of many polities, opening the 
way for civil wars.  
Neşrî wrote that Gün Khan succeeded his father Oǧuz according to his testament and 
established the principle of succession upon kinship.135 However, there are also many 
examples of struggles for the throne. Neşri accounted that Osman Gazi killed his uncle 
during one of the succession related disputes. He accounted that at the council or kurultay, 
some members of the nomads [göçer evler] wanted Osman to be the new Bey and others 
preferred Dündar. Noticing the strong support for Osman, his uncle Dündar gave up and 
accepted his nephew’s leadership.136 The compromise, however, seems to have been 
insincere. In a later episode, Neşrî wrote that Osman was offended by the Byzantine lord 
of Bilecik, who required of Osman to kiss his hand, by which he wanted to impose a 
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superior position. In requital, Osman wanted to seize him. Dündar rejected this plan and 
said: ‘while the Germiyan-oğlu and the neighbouring infidels are hostile to us, we cannot 
afford us to create more enemies.’ Osman accused his uncle of disloyalty and killed him 
with an arrow.137 
When compared, we see some similarities with the historiographical accounts of 
emergence in other political formations. The Secret History of the Mongols, written after the 
death of Djengiz Khan, recounts in detail a biography of Djengiz, who as teenager was 
called Temujin. After his father was assassinated, Temujin’s half-brother Begter exercised 
full power on the family. During a hunt, Begter seized a lark that Temujin had shot, 
probably to enforce his claim as the head of the family. Soon thereafter, when they were 
fishing, Begter again snatched the fish that Temujin had caught. Angered and frustrated, 
Temujin and his full brother Hazar ran to their mother. Instead of taking sides with her 
own sons, she reportedly sided with Begter, telling them they should be worrying about 
their enemies and not fight with their older half-brother. Temujin decided not to tolerate 
such a situation with Begter. He went back, shot an arrow and killed Begter. Although he 
had freed himself from the grip of his half-brother, he committed an act of taboo that put 
his family in greater dangers. This killing gave their enemies an excuse to hunt them 
down. Temujin found no ally, he became a renegade and had to flee.138 This Mongol 
historical text presents Djengiz Khan at a young age as someone who already played the 
game of life to win. He is portrayed as willing to violate custom, disobey his mother and 
kill whoever obstructed his decisions, even if it was his own family member.   
Although these historical accounts on Djengiz Khan and Osman Gazi are not fully 
comparable, they nevertheless give an idea of this kind of post factum ideological 
fashioning. The historical texts portray both the actors as determined to lead and not to 
obey when insulted. Djengiz Khan would lead the Mongols only after years of being 
hunted down and imprisonment. Unfortunately, it is not possible to check whether 
something like this really happened or whether it was completely invented afterwards by 
the author.  
In Osman’s case, he had already obtained a position as leader. According to the 
Ottoman texts, the conflicting ideas on the orientation of the emerging principality were 
at stake. The chroniclers suggest that after Osman had freed himself from the grip of his 
aged uncle, he drastically changed the fate of the beylik. The image of Osman Gazi is 
fashioned as a young and dynamic political leader who started to expand towards west, 
at a time when the Seljuk and Ilkhanid control of the marches had declined. However, 
since the Ottoman chronicles were produced more than a century after the events they 
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described, there is obviously good reason to read them as legitimatising narratives post 
factum and to be extremely cautious with taking such stories at face value.  
Remarkably, other fifteenth-century chroniclers, such as Oruç Beğ and Âşık Paşazâde 
do not mention this earliest episode of dynastic strife. The obvious argumentum ex silentio 
would be that these chroniclers, in order to sustain the moral message of their narratives, 
had probably omitted the killing of Dündar. The logic of their account appears to 
emphasise the alleged rupture in the moral uprightness of the Ottoman dynasty during 
the reign of Bâyezid I (r. 1389-1402). The rule of Sultan Bâyezid I was characterised by the 
development of a centralised political system, which was resented by the semi-
independent Turkish aristocracy and their follower gazis and dervishes. They were the 
intended audience for whom Âşık Paşazâde wrote his history. This public, the circle of the 
gazis and dervishes, tribal nomads and Turkish aristocracy, expected to read or hear some 
values and events being accentuated. They were inclined to resist a centralisation of 
power which did not directly favour their own interests. In this respect, the chroniclers 
rewrote the facts after more than one and half century and reformulated them within a 
discourse in which they attributed the fratricide and all other deviations from the early 
egalitarian time of Osman Gazi, to the rule of Bâyezid.139 As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
problem of early Ottoman historical texts is highly complex, and each account must be 
compared with others and its circumstances of composition must be explored. The same 
is true of the early period of the beylik (principality) as a whole. 
Probably, Neşrî had access to some oral traditions about this conflict between Osman 
and his uncle Dündar and wrote these down. Another fundamental reason is possibly that 
the ulema historian Neşrî saw the infra-dynastic killing as an accepted measure of political 
life, because the alternative was fragmentation or civil war among heirs in which many 
lives and properties would perish. Presumably, the tax-paying people (reaya), ulema-
scholars and men of the state all looked up with approval upon the measure of infra-
dynastic execution that prevented the warring among brothers with destructive 
consequences for the society.  
The only peaceful case of accession appears to be the account of the way Osman Gazi 
was succeeded, after he had died. Both Neşrî and Âşık Paşazâde drew their information 
about this earliest period on a source that was written in the years 1422–23, at the time 
of the succession wars at the beginning of the reign of Murad II. They accounted a story 
in which Osman’s son, Alaeddin Ali Pasha, voluntarily renounced the throne in favour of 
his older brother Orhan Gazi. In the conversation between Orhan and Alaeddin about the 
succession of their father Osman, Alaeddin said to his brother: ‘You have the right to this 
realm. There needs to be a ruler to shepherd it, to protect the realm and the reaya and to 
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observe the conditions of the soldiers (sipahi).’140 However, Orhan suggested to his brother 
Alaeddin to be the shepherd. Alaeddin, who was apparently disinterested in worldly 
power and wished to spend a spiritual life as a dervish, refused the offer as it was their 
father who had preferred Orhan Gazi to succeed. In Neşri’s version, Alaeddin replied: ‘In 
his lifetime, my father has granted the sovereignty to you. While you are here, there is no 
duty for me. My great brother, [I consider] you as a father to myself.’141 In the version of 
Âşık Paşazâde, Alaeddin answered: ‘Brother! The prayers and blessings of our father are 
with you. Therefore, during his lifetime, he gave the soldiers under your command. As 
such, you also must be the shepherd.’142  
Drawing on the ‘shepherd’ allegory of the time, Neşri and Âşık Paşazâde represented 
Osman and his son Orhan as the ‘founding sultans’ through the image of the shepherd 
who protects the reaya (the people) against all kinds of power abuses, tyranny or 
harassments. In Ottoman political thought, the metaphor of the shepherd derived from a 
Tradition of the Prophet addressing the rulers: ‘You are all shepherds and are responsible 
for your flocks’.143 Likewise, the Murâd-nâme or the advice book dedicated to sultan Murad 
II counselled that whoever becomes the ruler of the world, he also becomes its 
shepherd.144 Most important in the passage above is that both Neşri and Âşık Paşazâde 
suggested that the ascension of Orhan Gazi to the throne was a peaceful one and that the 
patrimony was not divided. Neşri had noted that Osman had designated Orhan Gazi to 
succeed. Osman Gazi wished so because he wanted to make sure that the people showed 
obedience to his son and to see Orhan gain power and majesty in his lifetime.145 Before he 
passed away, Osman Gazi had left rulership into the hands of Orhan Gazi. Though not 
explicitly stated, this passage on the succession of Osman Gazi suggests that the historians 
actually wished to see that the claimants to the throne should find a peaceful way out.  
The author of the Anonymous Chronicle also recorded this conversation between 
Alaeddin Ali and Orhan and remarked that ‘at that time, rulers came together with 
brothers and counselled each other.’ He explicitly reproached the practice of fratricide: 
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‘brothers did not kill each other until the reign of Yıldırım Khan [Bâyezid I]. The practice 
of killing brothers became a custom during the reign of Yıldırım Khan .’146 Important to 
note here is that the anonymous author was the only chronicler who openly criticised the 
practice of fratricide. As discussed in Chapter 1, the anonymous author, who belonged to 
the gazi circles, often directed the bluntest criticism towards Sultan Bâyezid I. His attempt 
to create a centralist state was immensely resented by the gazi milieu, who feared to lose 
their resources and positions of power.  
In any event, the succession of Osman Gazi seems to be the only case of peaceful 
succession in early Ottoman history. Both Murad I and Bâyezid I eliminated the rivalling 
male members of the dynasty to avoid civil war. When Sultan Murad I was assassinated 
by the enemy during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the viziers kept his death silent until 
Bâyezid had arrived to the tent of Murad I. Oruç noted that they preferred to support 
crown prince Bâyezid by informing him as first about his father.147 Yakub Çelebi, the other 
son of Murad, who was still pursuing the fleeing enemy and had remained unaware of his 
father’s death, was called back only later and was strangled in order to secure Bâyezid’s 
accession.148 Aşık Paşazade noted that this event had caused ‘great agony and sadness 
among the soldiers. The next morning, however, they accepted Bâyezid Khan as their new 
ruler. And he ascended to the throne.’149  
Although fratricide was indeed acknowledged as a bad thing, according to some of the 
chroniclers this severe measure seemed to have been necessary to avoid chaos during the 
succession of the new sultan, especially in this case, as the Battle of Kosovo still raged on. 
According to Oruç, only after the succession of Murad I was secured, the state officials re-
joined the ongoing battle.150 Oruç suggests that the reason for the killing of crown prince 
Yakub was to avoid chaos and tumult in the army, as the battle still endured. One had to 
prevent that the officials and soldiers, who supported Yakub Çelebi as the rival claimant 
to the throne, would not recognise Bâyezid’s accession. The state officials feared that the 
battle could be lost if the news of Murad’s death would spread in the army. The army 
would split in two parties, leave the battle against the enemy and return to the main camp 
in order to back up their own candidate to the throne. As such, a battle that was won 
could end up in a defeat. In his chronicle, Karamani Mehmed Pasha, a chancellor and 
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vizier to Sultan Mehmed II, commented on the execution of Yakub as follows: ‘As will not 
be hidden to those of sound intelligence, there was the possibility of great evil in Yakub 
Çelebi’s continuing to live. The Sultan dealt with him as was necessary and removed his 
body. Necessity justifies what is forbidden. As such, the adversity and hostility of a rival 
opponent was removed and the land that he had inherited from his ancestors remained 
in the possession of the generous and great Sultan.’151  
In the account of Sa’addin, the state officials had decided to offer the throne to Bâyezid. 
They grounded their decision by referring to the Qur’anic verse: ‘sedition is more 
dangerous than murder’152 and by taking into account the earlier peril caused by Murad 
I’s son, Savcı Beg, who rebelled against his father. The gathered officials argued that ‘since 
it was experienced that several members of the dynasty who claimed the throne had often 
destabilised the order of the society and state affairs (nizâm-ı âlem) and since the position 
of Sultan is conceived as the ‘Shadow of God’, the one who sat under the shadow and the 
shadow itself had to be equal to each other. On these grounds, they decided to make 
Yakub Çelebi a martyr.’153 The above quoted verse from the Qur’an usually served to 
legitimise the Ottoman practice of politically motivated fratricide. This verse was 
commonly interpreted by Ottoman scholars and jurists in the following meaning. They 
argued that although murder was in se an immoral and forbidden act, ‘sedition’ (fitne) was 
evaluated as a greater evil and more violent event, as a civil war ruined the lives of many 
and caused the perishing of many people. Therefore, the principle was maintained that 
‘damage to one person was permissible if that avoided the damage to the whole society 
and public interest.’154 This damage to ‘one person’ was usually directed at the member(s) 
of the dynasty, who had lost their right to the throne during the process of succession.  
This practice was usually legitimised by referring to the concept of nizâm-ı âlem, the so-
called ‘right order of the world’ in favour of the public interests. The chroniclers tried to 
justify and explain the practice of fratricide. Tursun Beg defined the ‘order of the world’ 
(nizam-ı âlem) as an ideal political organisation which serves the public interest and 
prevents chaos.155 As the protector and maintainer of the nizam-ı âlem, the Ottoman ruler 
was denoted ‘the Padishah the Refuge of the World’ or Pâdişâh-i âlem-penâh. In this 
ideological point of view, the Islamic Law or Sharia was considered as a control balance 
for altering the power of the Sultan. The discursive register of nizam-ı alem was indeed a 
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central motive of Ottoman ideology.156 The elimination of one individual from the dynasty 
was preferable to the death of many and to the devastation of the society due to 
internecine wars. This destabilised the nizam-ı alem or the social order. Several members 
of the Ottoman dynasty were rather sacrificed to prevent political chaos or to avoid the 
death of thousands soldiers and civilians in civil wars. In the implementing of political 
affairs, the customary or örfü law was mostly used. In this respect, one can refer to the 
article on fratricide in the Law Book or Kanunname of Sultan Mehmed II. This clause 
explicitly legitimised fratricide for the sake of eliminating all tendencies toward 
fragmentation, to prevent civil war and to consolidate central authority: ‘To whoever of 
my sons the sovereignty shall be granted by God, it is permissible to kill his brothers for 
the good order of the world [nizam-ı alem]. Most of the ulema have declared this 
permissible.’157  
During the civil war of 1402-1413, the Ottomans had intensely witnessed the chaos and 
continuous violence their society went through, caused by the succession wars for the 
throne between the members of the dynasty. When accounting the succession struggles 
between Bâyezid’s sons, Neşrî wrote that Çelebi Mehmed I sent a letter to the Germiyan 
lord, Yakub Beg, requesting the transport of the dead body of his father together with his 
brother Musa. Thereupon, Yakup sent Bâyezid’s body together with Musa to Bursa.158 
However, Neşrî did not provide any clues about the content of this letter. We understand 
from its modern edition by the historian Şinasi Tekin that it was actually a ‘letter of 
commitment and oath’ (sevgendname, an earlier form of ahdname). In this letter, Mehmed 
referred to the ‘earlier agreements between them’ (ol aramuzdagi kavl ü karar üzerine) and 
vowed ‘to be henceforth friend and ally of Yakub Beg’ (ba’de’l-yevm Süleymanşah oglı Yakub 
Beg ile dost, müttehid olam), and ‘to end his relations with the other lords and not to 
interfere in their affairs’ (girü kalan beglerden sözümi kesem ve elümi çekem).159 The text 
further stated that this letter was sent and transferred personally by the ‘master of 
aristocrats, our Taceddin’ (seyyidü’l-emacid bizüm Taceddin hidmetiyle). The person who is 
named as Taceddin was most probably the respected and influential poet Ahmedî – who 
 
                                                     
156 See: İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 65-69; ibid., ‘The Ottoman Succession’, 44-61; ibid., ‘Decision making’, 113-
121; ibid., ‘State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân’, eds. Cemal Kafadar and Halil İnalcık, 
Süleyman the Second and His Time (İstanbul, 1993) 55-92; Boğaç Ergene, ‘On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in 
Conflict (1600-1800)’, Law and Society 8, 1 (2001): 52-87; Gottfried Hagen, ‘Legitimacy and World Order’, eds. 
Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, Legitimizing the Order. The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power (Leiden, 2005) 
55-83. 
157 Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman, ed. Özcan, 18. 
158 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 199: ‘Andan sultân buyurdı ki, Germiyan-oglı Yakub Beg’e mektûb yazup, âdem viribidi ki, 
atası Yıldırım Han’un tâbutın, karındaşı Mûsâ Çelebi birle göndere. Mektûb Yakub Beg’e yetişüp, mazmûn-ı şerîfi 
mûcebile amel idüp, Yıldırım Han’un tabutın tamâm tazîm ve ikrâm birle oglı Musa Çelebi’yle, bu tarafdan varan 
âdemlere yarar âdemler koşup gönderdi. Alup gelüp Bursa’da olan mevzi’i şerifde defn itdiler.’ 
159 Tekin, Ottoman Manuel I, 9. 
  221 
had earlier been attached to the Germiyanid court and enjoyed the patronage of Yakub’s 
father, Süleymanşah. He was sent by Mehmed on a secret diplomatic mission to Yakup 
Beg as a person who was highly respected by both sides. The secrecy of their agreement 
was probably not only related to the transport of the dead body of his father Bâyezid. The 
delivery of his brother Musa, who formed a political danger as a rival to the throne, must 
have formed the most delicate matter for Mehmed I. 
As Timur had empowered the Anatolian princes with his royal seal (al-tamga), which 
officially made them Timur’s regional governors, Mehmed followed a prudent policy in 
order not to upset Yakub Beg and to prevent retaliation from Timur. He must also have 
understood the urgency of preventing Yakub to use his brother Musa against him and 
instigate a civil war. Therefore, he used utterly humble terms to emphasise his oath and 
commitment in order to appease Yakup Beg so that he would deliver his brother Musa. 
For instance, Mehmed wrote: ‘As a witness for my oath, I recall upon God, his angels, his 
Prophets, the four Caliphs, the Imams who guide us to the right way and upon all the 
humankind. […] As long as I live, for thirty years I shall not revert from my commitment 
and decision. I shall allow no one to interfere and goad me to change my oath and 
commitment…’160 These pleading terms written by Mehmed I are to be situated within the 
perilous context following to Bayezid’s disastrous defeat against Timur and his 
occupation of Anatolia after 1402. In the difficult situation of civil war, to back off the 
Timurid danger, Mehmed seems to have chosen for a humble tone as the Ottoman power 
was still fragile. 
After Çelebi Mehmed I had ended the succession wars and had re-unified the Ottoman 
provinces, he sent an envoy to the princes of Isfendiyar and Germiyan in the wake of his 
campaign against the Karamanids. The threatening tone of his message to Yakup Beg of 
Germiyan is remarkable: ‘You see for yourself the ill-judged attitude of the son of 
Karaman. Now, I go upon him. If you wish to remain in friendship with me, then you 
should immediately send provisions to my victorious army. And also gather your troops 
and come instantly. If you show negligence, then wait for your turn. For, I will come first 
upon you and thereafter upon Karaman. You must know this. When the son of Germiyan 
heard the news, he said: Ay sir! I will come and send provisions. He sent abundant 
provisions, gathered his troops and welcomed the king. During the campaign, the 
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mugallazayı, bu ahd ü misaki tebdil ve tegyir itmegiçün bu andumdan dönmeyem.’  
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Germiyanid provisions were never deficient.’161 The harsh and intimidating tone of 
Mehmed’s message to the Germiyan ruler differed profoundly from the courteous one 
sent to the prince of Isfendiyar. The obvious reason is Yakub’s earlier defection to Timur, 
with whom the Germiyan ruler kept close relations. Mehmed I had not forgotten this. 
Obviously, he was requiting the humble terms which he had earlier to write down and for 
the affronts that his father had suffered. 
Neşrî accounted an example in which the potential claimants to the throne and threats 
to the political stability were blinded to render their claims invalid. When Mehmed I came 
out as the ultimate winner of the civil wars, his nephew, the son of his brother Süleyman, 
was used by some raiders who wished to continue the war. When Mehmed marched upon 
them, these instigators fled and the young boy was caught. Mehmed I ordered to blind his 
nephew and send him to Bursa and granted him a land for his livelihood. He also married 
the daughter of Suleyman to one of his commanders. Neşrî described how Mehmed I used 
to bring gifts to his nephew whenever he went to Bursa and took affectionate care of his 
nephew and said: ‘he is the son of my brother, he placated and pleased the boy’s little 
heart. And he also cared after his sister like a father.’162 Though blinding a beloved nephew 
seemed a cruel act, to the criteria of his time, Mehmed had actually committed an act of 
mercy. Instead of ordering the execution of the boy in order to eliminate any potential 
civil war, he blinded his nephew to remove any possibility that opponents could use him 
to claim the throne and to create another war and chaos. Aşık Paşazade also spoke of the 
incident in very kindly terms: ‘Sultan Mehmed opened the spiritual eye of the boy by 
closing the earthly one.’163 
In this period, Shahrukh, the son of Timur, sent Mehmed I a letter.164 The 
correspondence between the two monarchs is reproduced in a sixteenth-century 
handbook for chancellery scribes by Feridun Beg.165 Shahrukh implicitly criticised the 
Ottoman system of succession, in which the claims of brothers to the throne were 
 
                                                     
161 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 245: ‘Karaman-oglı’nuñ nâ-ma’kul hareketin hod gördüñ, üşde üzerine varırın. Eger 
benümle dostluguñ varısa, İnşa’allahu’r-Rahman, Seyyid Gazi yüzünden togru çıksam gerekdür. Sen dahi asakir-
i mansurıma vilâyetinden erzak gönderesin ve sen dahi ‘askerüñi tizcek cem idesin, gelesin. Ve eger bu bâbda 
tekâsül iderseñ, vaktüñe hâzır olasın. Evvel saña varup andan Karaman’a varuram. Bilmiş olasın!’ didi. Germiyan 
oglı bu haberi işidicek, ‘sem’an ve tâ’aten ben dahı varayın ve hem azuk dahı göndereyin’ diyüp, mübalaga 
azuklar gönderdi ve gendü dahi ‘askerin cem idüp hünkar’ı karşulamak ardınca oldı. Ta hünkar ol memlekete 
varup gelince Germiyan oglı’nuñ azukçısı egsük olmadı.’  
162 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 244: ‘Karındaşımun oglıdur diyüp, hoşça tutup, gönülcügin ele alurdı. Ve kız karındaşına 
dahi hayli nesne atâ ederdi.’ 
163 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 117: ‘Sultan Mehmed dahi oğlanun gönlü gözünü açdı. Bu dünya gözünü örtdü.’ 
164 For a discussion of the correspondance between Mehmed I and Shakrukh, see: Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 
203-205. 
165 Feridun Beg, Münşe'at al-Selatin, vol. 1 (İstanbul, 1857). 
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removed and this meant a rupture with the Ilkhanid or Turkish-Mongol tradition. 
Mehmed I answered by emphasising the Ottoman principle of indivisible sovereignty: 
‘Your advice with regard to brothers is well taken. However, from the very beginnings of 
the Ottoman state [Devlet-i Osmaniyye], our ancestors resolved to solve their problems 
guided by experience. And there is no doubt that the ‘state power’ [saltanat] does not 
admit division [cannot shelter two rulers].’166  
One can easily assert that the Ottoman practice of succession differed in many ways 
from the earlier Turkish and Islamic practices of succession and it was developed as a 
measure due to necessities of specific historical contexts. This was based upon the idea 
that state power and control of territories were indivisible. Although many succession 
wars took place among the members of the dynasty, the Ottoman rulers always seem to 
remain reluctant to share state power with other heirs in order to prevent political 
disintegration. As discussed, the sons of Bâyezid I rather fought each other than to split 
up the lands that remained to them after Timur’s invasion of Anatolia. 
Concerning the fratricide, even if it was carried out out of precaution, the execution of 
heirs who had not demonstrated any signs of rebellion, raised the critic and reprimands 
of the people. For instance, immediately after his accession in 1421, Murad II had to face 
with a succession strife, caused by a rival claimant, his uncle Mustafa. Following a short 
war, Mustafa was caught. Aşık Paşazade noted that Murad II decided to execute Mustafa 
‘the impostor’ as a common criminal by hanging him on the tower of the fortress, so that 
all the people of Edirne could be convinced that Mustafa was not a son of Bâyezid.167 Aşık 
Paşazade obviously endorsed the official version of the court when commenting: ‘that is 
how deceitful impostors come to their end.’168 Although Mustafa was truly Bâyezid’s son, 
a member of the dynasty, the official version of Murad’s princely court clearly intended 
to clear out all hesitations by treating Mustafa as an impostor, created and supported by 
the Byzantine Emperor to cause sedition and civil wars.  
Shortly afterwards, there was a renewed dynastic strife when Murad II’s younger 
brother ‘Little’ (Küçicek) Mustafa claimed the throne, but lost and was executed.169 
According to Neşrî, the tutor of Mustafa, Sharabdar İlyas, who delivered the child to the 
viziers of Murad II, justified his deed by arguing that he avoided the ‘sedition’ or fitne: 
‘some might consider that I committed treason, however with a reason. If I had let these 
two fight each other then the entire land would have collapsed into ruins. Damage to one 
 
                                                     
166 Feridun Beg, Münşe'at al-Selatin, 151-152. For a translation of Mehmed’s letter, see: Kastritsis, The Sons of 
Bayezid, 204-205. 
167 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 133. 
168 Ibidem. 
169 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 262. 
 224 
person is better than damage to the society. This principle is an ancient tradition since 
long before.’170  
He also legitimised his deed by grounding it on the Islamic principle of ‘damage to one 
person is better than damage to the society’. Neşrî included a story as if he wished to 
soften the image of Murad, who was deeply saddened with the death of his little brother 
Mustafa, whom he loved very much:  
‘It is said that Sultan Murad loved little Mustafa very much. After he had ordered 
his execution, he always commemorated his brother. Every time that he [Murad] 
was intoxicated at courtly gatherings, he always said to Mezîd Beg: ‘You are my 
blood vendetta, I will revenge [the murder of my brother].’ Mezîd Beg lost himself 
each time when he heard these words. Mezîd Beg saw that the Sultan always 
threatened him when he was intoxicated. Once, during such a banquet, at risk of 
his life, Mezîd Beg swore that he never had any intention of hurting the child. This 
answer satisfied the Sultan, who very much appreciated Mezîd Beg and did not wish 
not to kill him. After being convinced of the loyalty of Mezîd Beg, Murad Khan 
ordered to find the executioner of his little brother, who was instantly 
decapitated.’171  
Whether this story was invented or not, it is self-evident that even the sultans 
themselves had great troubles and pricks of conscience, caused by the practice of 
fratricide. It is clear that this practice was most severely experienced by the members of 
the dynasty, who most bore the burdens of fratricide. By telling this story, Neşrî possibly 
expressed the desire of his early fifteenth-century audience for a peaceful succession to 
the throne. In a previous passage on the allegedly peaceful succession of Osman Gazi, he 
had already indirectly criticised the practice of fratricide. He had suggested that the 
ascension of Orhan to the throne was a peaceful one and the patrimony was not divided. 
However, he noted that Murad II left the throne to his thirteen-year-old son Mehmed, 
only to regret it later.172 Sultan Murad’s decision had precedence. Osman Gazi had left the 
throne to his son Orhan Gazi during his lifetime to ensure that his son would attain 
 
                                                     
170 Ibidem, 263: ‘Egerçi sûretâ ben hıyânet itdüm; ammâ ma’nen isâbet kıldum. Eger kosam bu ikisi ugraşup, 
yüriyüp, iklîmi harâba virürleridi. Zarar-ı âmmdan zarar-ı hâss yigdür. Bu fi’l asldan âdet-i kadîmedür.’ 
171 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 263-264: ‘Şöyle rivâyet olunur ki, Küçicek Mustafâ’yı Sultan Murâd gâyet severdi. 
Öldürtdükden sonar dahı dâyim añardı. Sohbetde mest olıcak, Mezid Beg’i görüp: ‘Mezid sen benüm kanlımsuñ’ 
dirdi. Mezid Beg bu sözi işidicek, kendüden giderdi. Mezîd Beg, gördi ki, hünkâr mest oldukça, bu sözi âdet idindi. 
Bir gün yine diyicek, Mezîd Beg dahı başını ortaya koyub eyitdi: ‘Haşa Sultânum! Ben anun bir kılına zarar idem’, 
didi. Hünkâr bu sözden gâyet sevindi. Zîrâ Mezîd Beg’i severdi, öldürmege kıyamazdı. Andan hünkâr, Mezîd 
Beg’e eyitdi: ‘Bi’llâhi Mezîd, sol sözinde gerçek misin?’, didi. Mezîd Beg dahi yemîn idüp hünkârı inandurdı. 
Andan Murâd Han Küçicek Mustafâ’yı öldüreni teftiş idüp, buldurup boynın urdurdı.’  
172 Ibidem, 64: ‘Nitekim Murâd Han dahı Sultan Mehemmed’i tahta geçürüp, kendi Magnissa’da müteka’id oldı. 
Gayeti bu soñra peşîmân oldı’. 
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leadership and success. However, the chroniclers did not mention that Osman Gazi had 
repented his decision. 
This comparison between Osman Gazi and Sultan Murad II by Neşri brings to mind the 
difference between the two situations. Why would one ruler’s resignation in favour of his 
son be regarded as favourable while another one’s would not? The problem appears to be 
the age of the successors. While Orhan Gazi, who succeeded Osman Gazi was an 
experienced man of about forty-six, Mehmed II was a twelve-year old boy. The chronicler 
seemed to be implicitly criticising Murad for abdicating in favour of this under-aged child 
in 1444. According to Aşık Paşazade, upon hearing the news of Murad II’s abdication in 
favour of his son Mehmed, the Karamanid ruler and the European kings were overjoyed 
and made use of this opportunity by launching a crusade. The young Mehmed was too 
unexperienced to handle the situation and panic broke out in Edirne. Aşık Paşazade noted 
that Karamanoğlu provoked the Serbian king, the Hungarian king and the Hungarian 
commander Janos Hunyadi, judging Murad’s abdication as insanity. He urged them not to 
lose time to turn the situation to their favour, saying: ‘a better opportunity cannot be 
found against the Turk.’173  
 
Figure 11: Miniature Portrait of Sultan Mehmed II (c. 1480), by Ahmed Şiblizâde.  
Source: Topkapı Palace Museum, H2153, folio 10a.  
 
 
                                                     
173 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 404: ‘Osmanoğlu delü oldu. Tahtını bir oglana virdi. Kendü çalıcı 
avratlar ile bağlar ve bahçalar bucağında yeyüb içib yürür. Vilayetden elin çekdi. İmdi fırsat sizün ve hem 
bizümdür. Yürimek gerek. Türke bundan yeg fırsat elüñüze girmez.’ 
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On the perilous situation in 1444 created after Murad II’s abdication in favour of his 
too young son Mehmed, Tursun Beg commented that ‘two rulers in a land cause sedition 
and chaos’.174 He noted that the Hungarians took advantage of Mehmed’s young age and 
inexperience and invaded the Ottoman Balkans, ravaging and burning as they moved on 
toward Edirne. According to Tursun Beg, some of the courtiers even criticised Murad II’s 
abdication during banquets. He included a quatrain that one used to say during those 
gatherings: ‘O man, what a weird thing have you done; you turned your gold into silver. 
You brought a twelve-year old calf, put him in your place and made him a buffalo.’175 
Tursun Beg noted that Sultan Murad II had later regretted his decision, but he concealed 
his remorse and entrusted the affairs into the hands of the grand vizier Halil Pasha.  
According to the Gazavat, when the crusader invasion had started in 1444, the pashas 
consulted together and informed Sultan Mehmed II about the situation. Mehmed II 
ordered to inform his father and to bring him to Edirne: ‘because we must go against these 
infidels. But Edirne must not be abandoned. One of us must stay here, and one of us must 
go.’176 In spite of his very young age, Mehmed appears in this passage as a young ruler 
who bore the responsibilities of a monarch. He even implied that, despite his tender age, 
he was ready to go to war against the crusaders. And as the head of the state, he found it 
necessary to call his father back to the capital. Murad II was initially reluctant to come 
back, as he possibly did not wish to diminish the authority of his young son. Only after 
the insistence of the viziers on the urgency of the crusader’s invasion, Murad decided to 
come back from his withdrawal in Manisa.  
Murad II crossed the straits and reached the surroundings of Edirne, but did not wish 
to enter the city. Murad waited outside and Mehmed did not directly abdicate from the 
throne. Mehmed welcomed his father and was relieved that the latter was waiting outside 
the city.177 At this time, it was still not clear who should stay in Edirne and who would lead 
the army into battle. The young sultan Mehmed made his move first. According to the 
Gazavatname, Mehmed told Halil Pasha to ask his father to stay in Edirne and to defend 
the city against the Byzantines, while he would lead the army against the crusaders. 
However, the grand vizier kindly refused this suggestion and argued that he was too 
young: ‘My prince, I cannot say this to His Majesty the Padishah. Praise be to God, our 
Padishah has come. From now on it is for him to decide. We do whatever he says. This 
enemy is a heavy one and you, my prince, are still a fresh rose. It suits you only to act as 
 
                                                     
174 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 34: ‘Bir memlekette fitne olur iki pâdişâh.’ 
175 Ibidem, 35: ‘Be kişi hey ne turfa iş ittün; İşün altun iken gümiş ittün. Getürüp on iki yaşar tanayı, Geçürüp 
yirüne kömiş ittün.’ 
176 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 42: ‘Tiz babama haber edüp ve her nice mümkün ise babamı getürün ki, zîrâ ol küffar 
üzerine gitmek lâzım geldi. Ammâ bu Edrene yalnız olmaz, birimiz bunda oturub ve birimiz gitmek gerekdir.’  
177 Ibidem, 47-49. 
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the Padishah commands and do nothing contrary to what he says.’178 However, Mehmed 
did not seem to be convinced by this advice. He went to his father and asked Murad to 
take him to the battle. Murad admonished the young prince: ‘No, my son, do not say this. 
You do as I tell you. The enemy is tough and when I march against him, you defend this 
city from the infidels of Istanbul, for who knows how things will turn out. You just offer 
prayers.’179  
Assuming that it was Halil Pasha who had advised the young prince to say this, Sultan 
Murad II reproached the vizier: ‘Tutor [lala], you should act as a wise and prudent 
minister. Is it for you to advise my son to go on this campaign? You know that this world 
is full of trouble and sedition, so why did you put such words into the boy’s mouth?’180 
Halil Pasha replied that he knew nothing of this. He said that Mehmed had asked him 
earlier to say this to him, but he had not consented. His advice had clearly no effect that 
the prince asked Murad himself. Halil said: ‘However, my padishah, there is no harm done. 
He is young and knows no better. He means nothing else by it, otherwise I would have 
known.’181 Therafter, while Mehmed was instructed to protect the Ottoman capital, 
Murad himself led the army and defeated the crusaders at the Battle of Varna in 1444.  
This passage in the Gazavat clearly reveals that the young prince Mehmed II wished to 
demonstrate to his father that he was the monarch. Initially, Mehmed had not revealed 
his intention to lead the campaign. He offered his father to cooperate. But in the end, he 
explicitly conveyed his wish to his father. This implied that Mehmed dared to go against 
his father though in a courteous way. The dialogue between father and son was probably 
a little softened by the author of the Gazavat.  
The fact that despite his age the young prince Mehmed dared to go against his father 
can also be related to the struggle between the various ministers at the court. The young 
pashas Zaganos and Shehabeddin, backed Mehmed II, while the old vizier Halil Pasha 
openly chose the side of Murad II.182 This was clear as when Halil Pasha admonished 
Mehmed by pointing to his father Murad as the actual sovereign and that all decisions 
 
                                                     
178 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 49-50: ‘Şâhzâdem, Pâdişâh hazretlerine ben bu sözi demeǧe kadir deǧilim, hele 
Pâdişâhımız geldi, şimden gerü tedbîr anundur, ol nice dirse öyle olur deyüb cevâb verdi. Zîrâ bu düşman aǧır 
düşmandır ve Şâhzâdem sen dahi bir taze gülsün, hemân sana lâyık olan budur ki, Pâdişâh’ın fermânı üzere 
hareket edüb ve sözünden taşra çıkmayasın.’ 
179 Ibidem, 50: ‘yok oğul bu sözü sen söyleme. Hemân sen benim dediğim gibi eyle. Ol düşman bek düşmandır ve 
ben ona karşı vardugumda sen bu tahtı İstanbul keferesinden hıfz ede-gör ki, kim bilür iş niye varacakdır. 
Hemân sen du’âda ol.’ 
180 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 50 : ‘Lala, sen bir tedbîr sâhibi âkil vezîr olasın, sana düşer mi kim, oğluma öğredirsin, 
bu seferi taleb eyliye? Sen bilürsin kim, bu âlem fîtne ile mâlâmâldir, niçün bu asıl sözü ol oğlanın ağzına 
verirsin?’ 
181 Ibidem: ‘ammâ Pâdişâhim zarar etmez, delikanlıdır, bilmez. Yohsa gayrı bir murâdı yokdur. Olsa elbette ben 
kulun haberdâr olurdum.’ 
182 İnalcık, Fatih Devri,  
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were to be taken by Murad. This was the first disagreement between Mehmed II and his 
father Murad II. The Gazavat is the only source that recorded this intra-elite contention. 
Murad probably became aware of the fact that his son had a more arduous temperament 
than he had imagined before. However, Murad did not give a lot of attention to it and 
instead interpreted his young son’s act as an expression of his adolescence and 
inexperience. And as Mehmed was aware of the fact that the state officials did not take 
him very seriously because of his inexperience and young age, he probably felt the need 
to demonstrate that he was indeed capable to possess the throne and carried things a 
little too far.   
Nearly all chroniclers did not favour a ruler who was too young, due to lack of 
experience in life and insufficient training in leadership. As Mehmed II was at that time 
considered as a child, so was Çelebi Mehmed I as well considered when he struggled 
against his brothers in the succession strife for the throne. According to Neşrî, various 
rulers reproached him on the grounds of his youth. In trying to recover Ottoman control 
in Anatolia, Mehmed I challenged various Turkish princes. He was scolded by Kara Devlet 
Shah as follows: ‘You are still a baby boy. Your mouth still smells of your mother’s milk. 
On what grounds do you dare to call yourself Sultan and to claim land!’183 In a following 
passage, Mehmed I was also reproached by İnal-oǧlu: ‘You are still a baby boy. It does not 
fit you to slam with your paws and to call yourself a Sultan.’184 His brother İsa also did not 
take Mehmed I very seriously: ‘Now, I am his older brother and the throne is in my 
possession. He is still a young boy. For what purpose does he needs to become prince?’185 
It has also become clear that the harsh practice of fratricide was not an expression of 
the personal whims or the ‘despotic cruelty’ of the Ottoman monarch. As already noted, 
the Ottomans had abandoned the nomadic practice of dividing the realm among different 
heirs, as the previous Turkish states (in the first place the Seljuks) had done before them. 
The practice of ülüsh was based on the nomadic principle that perceived ‘the state’ as the 
mülk or ‘joint possession and inheritance’ of the ruling dynasty. However, as this nomadic 
practice often led to the decentralisation of power and realm, dynastic states often 
collapsed after a few generations. Probably by drawing lessons from history and learning 
from their own experiences, the Ottomans modified the nomadic principle and practiced 
the succession issue in a sense that each heir had an equal right to the throne, but only 
the most deserving one who had acquired the most and effective support of the ruling 
class could successfully succeed. The rulers’ sons would have their own designated 
functions and domains (sancak). The Ottomans experienced that living rival heirs not 
 
                                                     
183 Neşri, Cihannüma, 172: ‘Sen henüz bir tıfl oglan olup, anañ südi dahi agzuñda kokar. Ne liyâkat ve ne isti’dâd 
ki aduñı Sultan koyub, memleket taleb idesin?’ 
184 Ibidem, 179-180: ‘Sen henüz bir tıfl oglansın; aduñı sultan koyub, eyle pençe urmak sana mülayim degüldür.’ 
185 Ibidem: 196: ‘şimdi ben ulu karındaşım, taht benüm elimdedür. Ol henüz bir genç oglandur. Beylik anuñ 
nesine gerekdür.’ 
  229 
always accepted and recognised the authority of the new ruler, which often led to 
succession wars. In order to prevent the tumult and deadly clashes, they introduced the 
custom of fratricide. Situated within the specific fourteenth and fifteenth-century 
political realities, one has to admit that this practice effectively worked. Eventually, no 
other dynasty ever emerged out of the House of Osman. Osman Gazi established a dynastic 
state (ca. 1300) that was maintained by thirty-six of his descendants ruling in unbroken 
succession for more than six hundred years. It is noteworthy that although there were 
numerous social and political revolts, none of these rebellions questioned the right of the 
Ottoman dynasty to govern or tried to replace it by another House. The Ottomans 
modified the available traditions and practised the succession issue in the sense that each 
heir had an equal right to the throne, but only the most deserving one who acquired the 
most support of the ruling class could be successful.  
Indeed, during its long existence, Ottoman self-representation and the ideological 
components of Ottoman sovereignty constantly shifted. The discourses of the fifteenth-
century chroniclers demonstrate an enduring blending of nomadic and Islamic traditions. 
This synthesis was obviously not an easy process, as at some points they conflicted. For 
instance, concerning the fratricide, a field of tension and ambiguity existed in the state 
ideology as expressed in the chronicles. Though fratricide was generally perceived as a 
‘necessary evil’ to avoid civil wars, this was also criticised and resented. Discursively, the 
chroniclers justified and explained the Ottoman state practices and institutions by 
referring to the concept of nizâm-ı âlem, a term that derived on Islamic political thought 
and which meant the ‘right order of the world’ in public interest.  
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3.2 Islamic Political Thought 
As we will demonstrate, many of the Islamic and Ottoman concepts and ideas on 
sovereignty and legitimacy were analogous. The work of fifteenth-century scholars and 
chroniclers, both Ottoman and Islamic, covered a set of ideals of rulership either 
explicitly expressed or suggested between the lines. They deliberately discussed rulership 
and arrived at firm conclusions on what princely duties and attributes should be, in the 
form of both political treatises, the popular genre of mirrors for princes and the 
chronicles.  
The Ottoman state was formed during the ‘post-Mongol’ period, which saw a great deal 
of experimentation with varieties of political theories that in large measure reflected the 
progressive synthesis of nomadic and Islamic traditions.186 As discussed above, after the 
execution of the Abbasid Caliph in 1258, the ideal of universal Caliphate was first replaced 
by Djengizid ideology, which was later rivalled by the Turkish tradition of political 
legitimacy of the Oǧuz. In the fifteenth century, the Ottomans attempted to exploit both 
Muslim principles and ancient Turkish notions of state ideology. The period from 1300 to 
c. 1453 was marked by a process of mixing the political norms of the steppe with the 
sedentary ideals of Islamic tradition. The centralisation of political power, as conceived 
by the chroniclers, required an unconditional subordination to the sultan and his 
household. This meant a fundamental reversal of the social and political relations from 
relatively egalitarian to hierarchical sets of class relations.  
However, the first Ottoman rulers could barely demand such an unconditional 
submission from their followers in the decentralised and relatively egalitarian milieu of 
the mainly nomadic society in which the early beylik took shape. When over time, the 
power of the Ottoman dynasty was firmly established, unconditional sovereignty could 
be claimed and early-day companions turned into clients and vassals. The emergence of 
new political institutions and ideologies accompanied this process. It is important to note 
that the chroniclers wrote at a time when a new governmental organisation took shape. 
The Ottomans tried to reconcile the regulations of the Shari’a with the Turkish law codes 
or törü/töre (yasa), which derived its authority from tribal custom and formal 
proclamation by the ruler.187 This process was not self-evident as the two traditions were 
on certain points difficult to blend. For instance, a khan had the authority to proclaim 
laws and possessed in theory more power than the caliph who could only uphold and 
submit to the Shari’a. Especially in the fifteenth century the Ottomans tried to reconcile 
their Muslim identity with their Turkish nomadic origins and traditions. In this process, 
 
                                                     
186 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 274. 
187 Togan, Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş, 106-110; İnalcık, Ottoman Empire, 65-69.  
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they blended various political theories and created a new state ideology, which reconciled 
the ideological principle of ‘dîn ü devlet’ (or the unity of religion and state, see below) with 
the promulgation of customary law code (kanun) separate from the Shari’a. According to 
early Ottoman chroniclers, the Ottoman sultan had to be a just ruler and good Muslim, 
paying notice to the obligations of rulership in customary law (kanun or yasa) and at the 
same time uphold the spirit of the Sharia. 
Already at the end of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman state ideology had accorded 
to a more sedentary model, deriving on the Islamic political thought. The Ottoman 
inclination towards Islamic political principles was most visible during the reign of 
Bâyezid I. For instance, Bâyezid had named his sons after the five Prophets. From the 
oldest to the youngest one, the crown princes were called Mûsa (Mozes), Süleyman 
(Solomon), İsa (Jesus), Mustafa (another name of Prophet Muhammed) and Mehmed 
(Muhammed). This is not at all odd, as Islam perceived the previous monotheistic 
religions as true religions and accepted the previous prophets as true Prophets of God. 
Moreover, the choice of Bâyezid I for Qur’anic names to his sons suggest that during his 
reign the Ottoman ideology was more strongly deviating from the nomadic traditions. 
Other indications for this differentiation are demonstrated by the fact that Bâyezid I had 
asked from the ‘shadow caliph’ in Cairo to recognise him as the ‘Sultan of Rum’. And this 
is also shown by the fact that he attempted to organise his realm as a ‘Sultanate’ with a 
highly centralised administration. However, when Timur appeared on the scene, this last 
measure proved to be one of the causes for his defeat. The central state system was very 
unpopular among the local Turkish princes, who had defected to Timur’s side. The 
centralised governance was only later restored and consolidated during the reigns of 
Murad II and Mehmed II. 
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3.2.1 Early Islamic Political Thought 
In what follows, I will give a brief survey of the development of those elements in Islamic 
political thought, which deeply influenced the discourse of early Ottoman chronicles. 
After having discussed the nomadic tradition above, the following very concise and 
selective introduction to some elements of Islamic political thought seems necessary. 
This general background will provide the reader a better understanding of the analysis of 
the ideological discourse of the Ottoman chronicles.  
Like each utopian system, Islamic thought also suggested that its principles and ideas 
would establish the best and most desired social order of which humankind was capable. 
In this view, the Qur’an provided people with a ‘utopia’, i.e. rules of moral behaviour and 
practical conduct or a program for action, aimed at the creation of a society favoured by 
God. Consequently, the life of Prophet Muhammad was to a great part devoted to 
establishing this divinely authorised political society.188 Central to this was the transfer 
of political authority from an Empire to the prophetic message of God’s communication 
and his laws. God issued laws. Adam received a set of them, as did later prophets, and 
finally Prophet Muhammed received the last version of this revelation. In this respect, 
the word Sharia was often used to mean the revealed message and laws of God.189  
The forging of the Muslim community or umma was both a spiritual and political 
matter. The relative egalitarianism of early Muslim society, as it was presented in the 
Qur’an and the Hadith, upheld universal ideas and was theoretically detached from tribal 
or ethnical connections. The unity of umma emerged as the social norm, whereby all adult 
members shared the same rights and duties.190 Situated in the historical context, this was 
a revolutionary ideology that overthrew the hierarchical relations of the previous state 
systems. Judaism and Christianity respectively preached a set of law and a universal 
brotherhood, but neither directly addressed the issue of political authority. By contrast, 
Islam preached universal brotherhood, an all-embracing law and a universal political 
authority. Islamic political thought was based on the unity of ‘religion’ and politics, one 
of its main principles.191 In this respect, Muslim political theorists asserted that the 
Prophet had established a form of political authority. The state of Medina included a 
territory, a community and a form of sovereignty entrusted with governing the affairs of 
that community. The Prophet exercised both religious leadership and temporal 
authority. He acted as a spiritual master and guide, a ruler, judge and military commander 
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and appointed officials to represent him in the faraway provinces. In short, this model of 
the Prophet represented a clear unity of spiritual leadership and political functions.192  
In general, the origins of Islamic political thought can be traced back to the Qur’an, the 
traditions of the Prophet (hadith) and the practices of the first four Caliphs. However, 
Islamic political thought was not a monolithic theory. During its long history, various 
formulations have been constructed due to different interpretations and disputes. For 
example, the Caliphate had emerged in 632 with the election of Abu Bakr, a senior 
companion of the Prophet, to lead the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death. The 
election of the first three caliphs had been peaceful, but the period afterwards was 
conflict-laden. After the decease of the Prophet, there emerged conflicting opinions 
about who should succeed Him as the Leader (Imam) of the community and as the Deputy 
of the Prophet (Caliph), and also on how the leader should be chosen. The dispute was a 
result of the fact that there were no explicit principles or laws about political authority 
or state structure in the Qur’an.193 The Qur’an only stipulated: ‘O believers, obey God and 
obey his Messenger and those who have the authority among you.’194 At the same time, 
the notion of mülk or political rule by a sovereign was bitterly reproached by the Prophet. 
Because to call a human being ruler meant trespassing the Qur’anic sanction which 
asserted that the only basis for human pre-eminence was piety and knowledge.195  
However, the assassination of the third caliph Uthman in 656 and the controversial 
succession of Ali, the cousin and son in law of the Prophet, led to the first civil war (or 
fitna) among Muslims in 657 at the Battle of Siffin (near the Syrian-Iraqi border).196 This 
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civil war split the Muslim community into factions, and the Shi’ites begun to formulate 
views on Imamate as the ideal state.197 Although the historical reports demonstrate that 
the Prophet did not specify a successor, the Shi’ites believed that the Prophet had 
designated Ali to succeed him.198 As such, the Shi’a Imamate doctrine repudiated the 
Caliphate of Abū Bakr, Umar and Uthman. They maintained that leadership was reserved 
for the descendants of Ali, until the arrival of Mahdi or the ‘messiah’. The idea of 
messianism had emerged after the death of the eleventh imam in 873 without an apparent 
son to succeed him. This crisis was resolved by the claim of the existence of a son and the 
doctrine of the mystical absence (ghayb). The radical branch of the Shi’a, the Twelver 
Imams and the Isma’ilis, upheld the belief that this twelfth or ‘hidden’ imam actually 
continued to live in concealment on earth and could fulfil the essential functions of the 
imamate.199 He was identified as the Mahdi, whose return before the end of the world is 
expected.200 In Shi’a doctrine, the Imamate was founded on the idea of permanent need of 
mankind for a divinely guided, infallible leader and authoritative teacher in religion. The 
imamate was thus raised to the level of prophecy. The only difference between the 
messenger Prophet (rasul) and the imam was that the latter did not transmit a divine book. 
To ignore or disobey the divinely invested imam was infidelity equal to ignoring or 
disobeying the prophet. Although the imam was entitled to political leadership as much 
as to religious authority, his sovereignty did not depend on his actual rule.201 
As is generally known, the Ottoman political thought drew mainly on Sunnî political 
theory. For instance, as already mentioned, both the Seljuks and the Ottomans adopted 
the relative tolerant and mild Hanafi School of Islamic law. As also demonstrated above, 
in the fifteenth century, the Ottomans still carried the influence and far memories of the 
Turkish nomadic tradition. At the same time, they had also appropriated elements from 
various sedentary traditions, in particular from Islamic political thought. The Sunnî 
tradition emphasised that the leader or Caliph of the umma had to be elected and referred 
to the first four caliphs as a model of political morality.202 As such, the Sunnî tradition 
recognised the first four caliphs as the Prophet’s rightful successors. In contrast to the 
Shi’ites, the Sunnî convention conceived the state built by the Prophet as an earthly, 
temporal dominion and regarded the leadership of Islam as being determined not by 
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divine order or inspiration, but by the prevailing political realities of the Muslim world. 
This led to Sunnî acceptance of even foreign Caliphs, so long as their rule accorded to the 
proper exercise of religion and the maintenance of order. The Sunnî school accordingly 
held that the Caliph had to be a member of Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh, but devised a 
theory of election that was flexible enough to permit that allegiance be given to the de 
facto caliph, whatever his origins. The Caliphate was central to the Sunnî political theory 
on government and society.203  
3.2.2 The Introduction of Monarchy    
Between the seventh and ninth centuries, interaction and acculturation with Roman and 
Persian traditions in the conquered lands brought about many influences in terms of 
political practice. In particular, during the reigns of the Umayyads and the early Abbasids, 
the idea of monarchy was incorporated into Islamic political thought.204 The early Muslim 
political philosophers during the reign of the Abbasids translated and reformulated the 
Persian Sassanid tradition and the teachings of Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato. 
Gradually, a coherent set of political principles compatible with the basic ethical codes of 
the Qur’ân and prophetic tradition was created.205 By the tenth century, these cultural 
and political borrowings from these older civilisations were blended into a political 
culture that became distinctively Islamic. In this respect, the Abbasid Caliphate reflected 
the legacy of the ancient empires in the region and not anymore the original state of 
Medina during the lifetime of the Prophet. There had emerged a centralised and 
bureaucratic regime and a standing army paid by the government. This Abbasid 
transformation of the Caliphate into an imperial monarchy was regarded by some Muslim 
scholars as a betrayal of the original Islamic idea about state and society.206  
The Abbasids were also reproached for having corrupted the notion of Caliphate. The 
term Caliph originally denoted the ‘deputy’ or ‘successor of the Prophet of God’, (khalifat 
rasulullah); the word did not mean the status of an absolute monarch, but implied only 
temporal political and administrative functions. During the Abbasid period, under the 
influence of Persian political tradition, the office of Caliph acquired the status of a 
monarch who ruled over an empire, and became to mean ‘the deputy of God’ 
(khalifatullah). This shift in connotation was severely criticised as a corruption of the early 
Islamic political norms.207  
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A second major transformation and acculturation occurred after the arrival of the 
nomadic Turks and later the Mongols into the heartlands of Islamic world, from the 
eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. Unlike the Persians or the Greeks and Romans, the 
Turks and Mongols had not been conquered by the early Muslim Arab states. On the 
contrary, they had moved into the Muslim world as conquerors. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the Turks converted along their way through their interaction with the Persian Sufis. 
The Mongols, arriving in the thirteenth century, initially imposed their nomadic belief 
and political system, but they also soon converted to Islam. In the following ten centuries, 
the Muslim world was dominated by states, dynasties and armies of predominantly 
Turkish origin.208  
This was a period in which a new and different pattern of government and political 
thought was established which reached its zenith in the Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, 
Mughals and Safavids, stretching from Europe to India.209 The cultural and political 
borrowings from ancient Arabic, Persian, Greek and Turkish traditions and civilisations 
were blended into a vigorous political culture that became distinctively Islamic. This 
distinctive political ideology was even more pronounced in for example the Siyasetnâme 
or political treatise of Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1098), the famous vizier of the Seljuk Sultans 
Alp Arslan and Malik Shah.210 The Ottoman Empire, as the main successor to the Seljuk 
Empire, was generally ruled by the same traditions, that saw the powerful ruler as the 
active promoter of the common good.211  
One of the main genres of Islamic political treatises consisted of Fürstenspiegel or 
mirror-for-princes literature. Al-Farabi was one of the most influential Islamic political 
philosophers in the tenth century.212 Most of his preserved works are introductions to or 
commentaries on Aristotle’s logics.213 Before al-Farabi, neo-Platonic ideas had influenced 
Islamic political language when dealing with the purpose and structure of the society. For 
example, the Islamic idea of the umma or the Muslim Community reflected the influence 
of Neo-Platonism.214  
In his philosophy, Al-Farabi interconnected knowledge and leadership. He argued that 
politics required knowledge and power. As we will observe below, the Ottoman historians 
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Neşrî and Tursun Beg clearly seem to have been influenced by his ideas, as they 
formulated similar principles. Al-Farabi’s discussion of political organisation was based 
upon views on knowledge, happiness and virtues. He followed Aristotle in identifying 
happiness as the goal of human action and of politics. Right conduct leads to happiness; 
wrong conduct is what prevents happiness. This idea also reappears in the Kutadgu Bilig 
or The Wisdom of Happiness, the tenth-century Turkish Fürstenspiegel or advice literature 
for princes. Based upon an empirical description of human life, Al-Farabi showed that the 
division of labour makes it necessary to human beings to live in a society: ‘Every human 
being is by his very nature in need of many things which he cannot provide for himself. 
Therefore men cannot attain perfection, because of their inborn nature, unless many 
societies of people cooperate and come together.’215 Therefore, in a political society 
virtues and vices were of key importance. Al-Farabi indeed seems to have been influenced 
by the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato. For instance, in his Politeia or the Ideal State, Plato 
said: ‘A human being is simply by his very nature egoistic and thinks only of his self-
interest. Only the law can enforce him to take others into account. […] I believe that a 
society emerges because none of the people is self-satisfied and they cannot provide 
many of their needs by themselves.’216 It was a commonly shared idea that man was 
created to live in society and could survive only if he was part of a society. As we will 
observe, this idea explicitly recurs in the work of Tursun Beg.  
3.2.3 The concepts Caliph and Sultan 
I will now describe the historical development of the concepts ‘sultan’ and ‘caliph’, in 
order to provide the reader with the necessary general background when dealing with 
the explanation of several text fragments I have selected from the earliest Ottoman 
chronicles. Another important political writer who influenced the discourse of the 
Ottoman chroniclers was al-Mawardi (974-1058), the Chief Judge in Baghdad during the 
reign of Seljuk Sultan Tugrul Bey (see Chapter 2). Al-Mawardi sought to reconnect the de 
facto rulership of Seljuk Sultans with the Abbasid Caliphate.217 His restatement of the 
Caliph-Sultan relationship provides a legal base for the Seljuk conquest of Baghdad from 
the Buyids. Al-Mawardi suggested that when a ruler acts contrary to justice, the Caliph 
himself may call for the aid of a Sultan who will restrain the usurper’s power and put an 
end to his rule. His theory thus made rulers dependent upon the Caliph’s recognition for 
their legitimacy. However, in practice, the Sultan or the Commander (emir) who seized 
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the reins of power through conquest and governed independently of Caliphal 
administrative oversight. Al-Mawardi’s views helped to legitimise, especially under the 
Ottomans, the role of the Mazalim or ‘Redress of Injustice’ courts and the practice of 
sultanic laws or kanuns.218  
Al-Mawardi’s theory provided a judicial basis for the rise of Great Seljuk Empire in the 
early eleventh century, when the political authority of the Caliph was redefined and 
reduced. The Seljuks redefined the concept of Sultan with a new meaning and connoted 
it with a new claim to universal sovereignty. The term sultan, originally meaning 
‘authority’ or ‘government’ in Arabic, had become a common royal title employed by the 
Seljuk and Ottoman rulers, who adopted it as their principal title.219 However, as a 
honorific title, the word initially described a regional military commander who seizes the 
reins of power through conquest and governs independently of Caliphal administrative 
oversight. With the rise of independent ‘sultanates’ during the later Abbasid period (945 
– 1258) the political authority of the Caliph was redefined and drastically reduced. The 
term sultan became an official title in the eleventh century as the Seljuks redefined the 
concept with a new meaning and connoted it with a new claim to universal empire. 
For the Seljuks, there was one Sultan just as there was only one Caliph, and the Sultan 
was the supreme political and military leader of Islam. It was customary for a Sultan to 
receive a ‘diploma of investiture’ from the Caliph, which legitimised the Sultan’s right to 
rule through a formal act of delegation and recognition of his sovereignty. For instance, 
the Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah requested an official recognition by the Caliph for his 
political position, emphasising his claim to political power and leaving religious 
leadership to the Caliph. As is generally known, the Seljuk redefinition of the concept of 
the Sultan brought with it a formal distinction between the political and military leader 
of Islam, the Sultan himself, and its religious leader associated with the title of Caliph. The 
term Caliph initially meant authority deriving directly from God, ‘deputy of God’, 
meaning one supreme Muslim ruler above all the other in early Abbasid period.220  
The Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah, for instance, used the following titles in an inscription 
on the Friday Mosque in Isfahan:  
‘The mighty Sultan, the greatest King of all Kings [shâhânshâh], the King of the West 
and the East, the Pillar of Islam and the Muslims […] the Father of Conquest, Malik 
Shah, the Supporter of the Caliph of God, the Commander of the Faithful, may God 
glorify his victory’.221  
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The honorific royal title Shahanshah or ‘king of the kings’ is a typical Persian title for a 
sovereign and was used by the Great Seljuks and their successor states to express their 
ideology of rulership. This ideology was based on three elements according to which the 
Great Seljuk Sultan was a powerful ruler, the guardian of Islam and the Muslims and the 
loyal ally and deputy of the Abbasid Caliph. His duties were the support of the Sunni 
Caliph and the protection of the Muslims against heresy and unbelievers. He was obliged 
to uphold Islamic law to ascertain that Muslim lands prospered and that justice prevailed. 
This concept of legitimate rulership remained the same down to the times of the 
successor states of the Rum Seljuks and the Ottomans. Yet, this concept was not static. 
Different options were developed in reaction to the transformations in the historical and 
political circumstances. Hence, the context of the later Anatolian Seljuks or that of the 
Ottomans were in many aspects different from the context of the Great Seljuks. The 
ideological and political opponents of the Great Seljuks were the Shi’i Buheyvis (Buyids) 
in Iraq and the Fatimids in Egypt. They therefore sought to legitimise their claims to 
power and their expansion towards Syria and Egypt with the argument of protecting 
Islam from heresy.222 The priority of Sultan Alp Arslan’s policy was to seize Syria and 
Egypt from his main rival, the Fatimids.  
The Seljuk Sultans had sought legitimacy among their subjects largely through the 
ideals of Islamic political theory. The Great Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah is represented above 
as an absolute monarch according to the Persian-Islamic tradition. But Malik Shah could 
not have been such a ruler and we also cannot be sure if he wanted to be one or whether 
this was the image that his Persian ministers and courtiers found appropriate. Indeed, the 
Turkish nomadic tradition was still influential although in this case the titulature 
remained silent about this. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Great Seljuk Sultans could not 
ignore the ancient Turkish tradition of collective sovereignty and the realm was divided 
among the heirs who already ruled their respective domains as semi-independent 
provinces. Sure enough, the Persian Islamic concept of absolute sovereignty of the Great 
Seljuk Sultans was not easily accepted by the other members of the dynasty and it surely 
did not impress the Turkish nomadic Oghuz princes (Beys). The title of Sultan had placed 
the Seljuk ruler above all these princes. Following the Turkish administrative system, his 
opponents considered the state as the common property of the ruling dynasty and power 
had to be shared.223 The Turkish Oghuz princes in the entourage of the Seljuk ruler were 
accustomed to regard him as primus inter pares; they were annoyed to see him centralising 
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state power and being surrounded by a Persian bureaucracy.224 While the Seljuk court 
increasingly came under the influence of the sedentary Persian culture and the written 
Islamic principles, among the Oğuz nomadic communities the pre-Islamic steppe-beliefs 
and traditions had remained. As a result, this process deteriorated the solidarity between 
the Seljuk dynasty and the Oghuz, who launched several rebellions.225  
Most importantly, it is since the times of the Great Seljuk Empire that we can 
distinguish the development of the practice of a division between Caliphate and Sultanate 
as two supreme authorities.226 Within Seljuk political practice, the real political power of 
the Caliph was replaced by the authority of Sultan. This change meant that the classical 
definition of the Caliphate in terms of lineage was also replaced by state building and 
government in the name of Islam. After the disintegration of the Great Seljuk Empire, the 
title of sultan was informally adopted by regional rulers, such as Zangi and the well-
known Saladin.227 After the Seljuks, the title sultan was also adopted in the thirteenth 
century by the Turkish Khwarazm Shah dynasty in Iran and by the Rum Seljuk Sultanate 
in Turkey, who both claimed the legacy to the universal empire of the Great Seljuks.  
The Seljuk redefinition of the term Sultan thus had the effect to differentiate the 
political and military head of Islam from its religious head, associated with the title Caliph, 
the deputy of God. The title of Caliph or Halîfe in Turkish had initially signified authority 
deriving directly from God, one supreme Muslim ruler above all.228 After the destruction 
of the caliphate in Baghdad by Djengiz Khan in 1258, the title lost its significance and 
came to be applied to all those Muslim rulers who acted to protect Islam. Its real power 
was replaced by the position of Sultan. Ottoman Sultan Bâyezid I could therefore claim 
the right to the title as a protector and defender of Islam.  
After the annexation of Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt in 1517, Sultan Selim I (r. 1512-
1520) appropriated the title of ‘Servant of the Holy Cities Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem’ – 
Hadimül Harameyn, and of the Guardian of the pilgrimage routes. By the era of Süleyman 
I, the Ottoman usage of the title Caliph of the Muslims was accepted by all. The institution 
of the Caliphate had already lost its power. The classical definition of the caliphate in 
terms of lineage was replaced by action in the name of Islam. Sultan Süleyman employed 
the title of Halîfe-i rû-i zemîn (the Caliph of the Universe), which suggested claims on world 
sovereignty.229  
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The Ottoman appropriation of the title of sultan coincided with their expansion into 
Byzantium and the Balkans, after the decline of the Rum Seljuk Sultanate. Orhan Gazi 
(1324-1360) was the first Ottoman ruler to bear the title of ‘Sultan of the Ghazis’ and to 
strike the first Ottoman coins as a symbol of independence. His son Murad I (1360-1389) 
carried the titles Hüdâvendigâr (a Persian title for emperor), and Sultan-ı â’zâm (the most 
exalted Sultan). Yet, it was Bâyezid I (r.1389-1402) who requested from the Caliph in Cairo 
to formally recognise him with the title of Sultân ar-Rum, the Sultan of the Roman lands. 
As the power of the Ottoman dynasty expanded over Muslim lands during the fifteenth 
century, the title Sultan became an integral part of Ottoman rulers’ honorary titles.230  
Concerning the term Rûm, Neşrî described Seljuk and Ottoman Anatolia as bilâd-ı Rûm 
or ‘the Roman lands’. Neşrî based his account on earlier Islamic historical texts, which 
used to describe Anatolia as bilâd ar-Rûm. For instance, the chronicler denoted the 
Anatolian Seljuks in terms of selâtînü’s Selçukiyye bi’r-Rum or ‘Kings of the Rum Seljuks’.231 
While the term Rûm in its political sense was reserved for the (Eastern) Roman Empire, 
the geographical sense of the epithet Rûm was used by the Seljuk Turks to indicate the 
territory which they inhabited and also governed. Because they had founded their state 
‘in the lands of Romans’ Muslim and Ottoman sources referred to it as Seldjûkiyân ar-Rûm 
or Seljuks of Rûm.232 
Neşrî perceived the Rum Seljuks to some extent as heirs to the Eastern Roman Empire. 
There was a period of some confusion when the Seljuk sources referred to the Byzantine 
sovereign as the Roman Emperor and to the orthodox Christians within the Seljuk realm 
also as Rûm.233 Hence, the term Rûm in Ottoman usage was not merely a geographical 
designation, but it rather revealed a symbiosis of various cultures and peoples in the 
process of Seljuk and Ottoman state-building. The term referred to a ‘melting pot’, which 
was supra-religions and stood beyond the ethnic groups.234 As Paul Wittek wrote: ‘in 
associating the great name of Rome with the Turks, it recalls that which is their greatest 
glory, the foundation of the empire that – if only for its duration and expanse – will always 
continue one of the most important chapters in history.’235  
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3.2.4 The Influence of the three Muslim philosophers  
For a further understanding of early Ottoman state ideology I must also first discuss the 
three pivotal Muslim political authors, whose work deeply influenced the development 
of Ottoman state ideology. These are al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092) 
and Nasir al-Dîn Tûsî (1201-1274). In the texts of fifteenth-century historians, such as 
Neşrî and Tursun Beg, the political thought of al-Ghazali, Nizam al-Mulk and Tûsî clearly 
reappears. Therefore, I will briefly outline some elements of their work. 
3.2.4.1 Al-Ghazali 
The role of al-Ghazali in the development of Islamic political theory was important and 
had a profound influence on Seljuk and Ottoman principles of sovereignty. Al-Ghazali 
established the basis of the Sunni view of politics and governance.236 In 1091, he was a 
brilliant teacher at the Nizamiya madrasa in Baghdad, founded by Nizam al-Mulk. When 
in 1092 Nizam al-Mulk was assassinated by Shia Ismaili’s, al-Ghazali initially took to the 
task to defend the Sunni view and to refute the rival Ismaili dynasty of the Fatimids in 
Egypt and Syria. He had also witnessed the falls of Antioch (1098) and Jerusalem (1099) 
during the First Crusade. These internal and external political crises certainly influenced 
his intellectual journey, which equally proved to be a spiritual quest. Al-Ghazali finally 
abandoned academic life and withdrew to meditate in seclusion in his birthplace Tûs. 
After ten years of wandering as a Sufi, he concluded that it was above all the Sufis who 
walked the path to God and that their life was the best life and their method the soundest 
method.237 Al-Ghazali’s importance to Islamic thought may indeed be compared with that 
of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in Europe, where similar political ideas reappeared nearly 
two centuries later in the work of Aquinas, who spent a lifetime explaining Christianity 
through his mystical experience. Likewise, Aquinas emphasised the impossibility of the 
existence of a society without a king.238 
To understand al-Ghazali’s political thought, one has to consider his focus on the Sufi 
concept of ma’rifa, meaning intuitive and direct knowledge acquired through spiritual 
experience. The mystical awareness illuminates the soul and unites it with God; 
knowledge (ilm) and intelligence (aql) are the supreme paths to the divine, the basis of 
happiness and ranking above worship or prayer.239 For al-Ghazali, true inner knowledge 
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was acquired through spiritual experience and accessible to whoever was capable of 
‘penetrating intelligence and strong insight.’ In discussing the merits of mediation, he 
argued that one can understand the world only by experiencing it. Al-Ghazali wrote: ‘True 
knowledge is that in which the thing known reveals itself completely in such a way that 
no doubt remains about it and no error can tarnish it. It is a state in which the heart 
cannot admit or even imagine doubt. All knowledge which does not achieve this state of 
certainty is incomplete knowledge, subject to error.’240 Therefore, he attacked envy, 
desire for power, hypocrisy and pride, which were probably the reasons why he found 
academic life unsatisfying. The very few capable of attaining this inner knowledge should 
pass it on the others.  
Al-Ghazali distinguished two other levels of knowledge. One is the discursive reasoning 
of what philosophers, jurists and theologians are capable of; they sometimes use it to stir 
up trouble and disunity. The other one is proper to common people who, absorbed by 
crafts and daily hard work, are merely capable of following the authority of others; they 
should avoid all controversy.241  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Ottoman sultans kept strong ties and relations with 
masters of Sufism or tasavvuf, 242 some of whom had enormous popular appeal. The 
support of wandering dervishes and spiritual masters or sheikhs became a sort of 
ideological cement for the emerging Ottoman political society. In the broader Muslim 
world, Sufism crossed the differences between the various branches of Sunnism and Shi’a. 
Furthermore, the spiritual disposition of Sufism accorded with the concept of devlet (see 
below), a key-concept for ‘state power’, signifying the divinely favoured choice of a 
dynasty on grounds of merit. Particularly, the advice literature often reminded its readers 
that fortune is changeable, both for individuals and dynasties.243   
In this respect, the connection between the spiritual and the worldly dimensions 
constantly ran through al-Ghazali’s political thought. In a famous work which he wrote 
when he withdrew in meditation, Revival of the Knowledge of the Religious Sciences [Ihya’ ulum 
al-dîn], the philosopher formulated his thoughts on governance or siyasa. He distinguished 
between four types of governance: prophetic, that of Caliphs and Sultans, that of scholars 
(ulema), and that of popular Sufis.244 For al-Ghazali, the Prophets ruled over the internal 
(batin) and external (zahir) lives of both the ruling elite (al-khassa) and common people 
(al-amma). The sultans and rulers administered the external lives of both these groups. 
The learned ulema ruled over the internal lives of the elite and the Sufis over the internal 
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lives of the people. These forms of governance did not stand in opposition to each other; 
they were complementary and co-existing. The noblest was the prophetic one, followed 
by the siyasa, which was related to knowledge and people’s souls. The governance of 
sultans, ulema and Sufis all shared in this. It encouraged the good and forbade the bad 
both by persuasion and by coercion. Such equilibrium in governance was essential to the 
political order. In this view, consent was achieved through a commonly shared 
understanding of the political and moral values and duties of each group. The sultan had 
to seek the advice from the learned ulema and from the Sufis who as ‘true souls’ were 
capable to uncover the hidden knowledge and wisdom (ma’arifa), which played an 
important role in the governance of state.245  
According to al-Ghazali, ‘religion’ and state or in Ottoman terms dîn ü devlet, depended 
on each other: ‘no order exists in the spiritual world without an order in the material 
world.’246 He expressed the classic Islamic idea that ‘the way of God’ (din) and sovereignty 
(mülk) are two sides of the same coin and thus inseparable. He noted: ‘din is the root, the 
state the protector.’247 This meant that if din or ‘the way of God’ is to enhance spiritual 
lives of people, the material world (dunya) had to be organised to an order that enhances 
its potentialities. This premise accorded with the Islamic view that God has arranged the 
things in this world so that we are not so much expected to suffer in order to be moral 
beings, in spite of whatever terrible sufferings one can experience in this world. As such, 
to prevent that people do terrible things to each other, the political power of a Sultan is 
necessary ‘for the good order of this world [nizâm-ı âlem] is necessary for the good order 
of ‘the way of God’ (din) and the latter is necessary for the acquisition of the wisdom of 
happiness in this world and in the hereafter.’248  
The term nizâm-ı âlem, which so often reappeared in Ottoman texts, was in this sense a 
fundamental value to maintain the social order in favour of the society. And the purpose 
of political society was to enable people to attain happiness in this world and in the 
hereafter. Al-Ghazali noted: ‘if one has to spend one’s time in protecting oneself against 
tyranny [zulm] and in searching for food, one cannot devote oneself to knowledge and 
producing good works, which are the means of acquiring happiness.’249 
In his ‘Advice for Kings’ or Nasihat al-Muluk, which he presented to the Seljuk Sultan 
Malik Shah, Al-Ghazali wrote that strong central authority was preferable for the public 
good. He attributed a higher value to the position of the ruler in preventing anarchy and 
in promoting the social order than to the ideal quality of royal justice. When dealing with 
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the required virtues of the sultans, al-Ghazali noted that: ‘a century of unjust rule by 
sultans will not cause so much more damage as one hour of the injustice of subjects 
against each other.’250 The maintenance of the social order required the satisfaction of 
basic human needs. This implied a set of social relations based on a division of labour 
between various occupations and crafts. In this order, each one performed a necessary 
job by which the welfare of the whole society was accomplished.251 
Al-Ghazali was convinced that man was created to live in society and displayed a 
consensus on monarchy as the best form of government. For the social order in the world 
could only be achieved with the help of a legitimate political power, a malik (ruler) who 
reconciled the differences among human beings inherent to diversity of their natures.252 
For him, political authority could only be stable if it resided in a single monarch. His 
arguments were based upon the fundamental moral and legal principle of public utility 
and interest (maslaha).253 We will observe below that his ideas recurred in the thought of 
Ottoman chroniclers, such as Neşrî and Tursun Beg. 
3.2.4.2 Nizam al-Mulk 
Next to al-Ghazali, the most influential scholar in this period was the famous Seljuk vizier, 
Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1098), who was the architect of the Seljuk governance and of the 
judicial, administrative and fiscal institutions. Nizam al-Mulk argued that there was no 
need for the guiding hand of an enlightened monarch or for al-Farabi’s ‘philosopher-king’ 
in order to promote the interest of the society.254 The public good was served by a 
powerful and just ruler who prevented anarchy, enforced law and order, and tempered 
his decisions with compassion and charitable concern about the needy in society. His Book 
of Government, which he dedicated to Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah, opens with an explanation 
of devlet: ‘In every age and time God chooses one member of the human race and, having 
adorned and endowed him with kingly virtues, entrusts him with the interests of the 
world and the well-being of his servants. He charges that person to close the doors of 
corruption, confusion and conflict. And God imparts to him such dignity and majesty in 
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the eyes and hearts of men, that under his just rule they may live their lives in security 
and ever wish for his reign to continue.’255 Sovereignty was transferred from one people 
to another through God’s enigmatic knowledge of their merits.  
Nizam al-Mulk noted that the Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah enjoyed divine favour, and that 
‘such merits had been lacking in the princes of the world before him’. According to Nizam 
al-Mulk, Sultan Malik Shah accorded to the virtues of the ideal ruler, such as: ‘pleasing in 
appearance, a kindly disposition, integrity, bravery, horsemanship, knowledge, skill in 
the use of various arms and accomplishments in several arts, pity and mercy upon the 
creatures of God, performance of vows and promises, sound faith and true belief and the 
practice of such virtuous deeds as praying in the night, respect for ulema, winning the 
society of men of learning and wisdom, giving regular alms, protecting the poor, being 
gentle to servants and officials and freeing the people from oppressors.’256 As we will 
observe below, Ottoman chroniclers expected to see or ascribed similar virtues to the 
Ottoman Sultans as well.  
Nizam al-Mulk continued by emphasising the dominant idea about the connection 
between moral and spiritual observance and political success: ‘Whenever there occurs 
any disobedience or disregard of God’s laws on the part of His servants (…) and He wishes 
to chastise them and make them taste the retribution for their deeds (…); anarchy comes 
up in their midst, opposing swords are drawn, blood is shed and whoever has the stronger 
hand does whatever he wishes, until those sinners are all destroyed in tumults.’257 In a 
later passage, he formulated similar contemplations: ‘At any time the state may be 
overtaken by some godly accident, or influenced by the evil eye. Then the government 
will change and pass from one house to another, or the country will be thrown into 
disorder through seditions and tumults; opposing swords will be drawn and there will be 
killing, burning, plunder and violence.’258  
Nizam al-Mulk’s argumentation was based upon the well-known principle of 
sovereignty, namely the symbiosis between ‘the way of God’ (din) and ‘state power’ 
(dawla). They were interdependent and their fortunes were intertwined. We have seen 
how al-Ghazali elaborated on this idea. An interpretation of it reached its zenith in the 
Ottoman political theory and was expressed in the unity of ‘din ü devlet’. Nizam’s Rules 
for Kings became the most widely used manual for state craft and was one of the influential 
inspirations behind the tradition of Ottoman state craft. His tolerant and statesmanlike 
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approach to political society appears to have left its greatest mark on the Ottoman 
state.259 
3.2.4.3 Nasir al-Dîn Tûsî 
Another scholar whose work would become very influential on the development of 
Ottoman political thought was Nasir al-Dîn Tûsi (1201-1274). The period between 1220 
and 1405, i.e. the rise of Djengiz Khan and the death of Timur Lenk, represent a time of 
ruptures and great changes in the Muslim world. As discussed above, the nomadic Mongol 
armies under Djengiz Khan had invaded the Muslim world. The cultural and intellectual 
centres of learning of the Islamic heartland, such as Balkh, Herat, Marv, Nishapur and 
Rayy have suffered from immense destruction and annihilation of peoples. Finally, in 
1258, the last Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad was executed by the Mongol ruler Hülegü Khan. 
However, half a century later, attracted by Sufism, the Mongol Ilkhanid ruler Ghazan 
Khan converted to Islam. In this period of enormous tumult and chaos, Nasir al-Dîn Tûsî 
produced an original work. Tûsî was a scholar, mathematician and astronomer, who 
worked for the Ilkhanid khan Hülagü. His work provided a link between the Islamic world 
before the Mongols and the sedentary courtly culture of the early Ottoman state.260  
Tusî argued that man was inherently a social creature and government was a necessity 
for human beings to live in peace. Such human cooperation required a kind of precaution, 
which is the siyasa (governance). According to Tusî, government was possible through the 
just administration of a just ruler. Such a ruler would be the vicar of God on earth and the 
doctor of the health of the world.261 The concept of ‘justice’ appeared as a necessary 
element that contributed to the achievement of harmony within diversity. As for siyasa, 
Tusî focused, like al-Ghazali, on the virtues and duties of a ruler whom he called a ‘malik’ 
(king), whose authority was indispensable for the good order of political society. A ruler 
was needed at all times to maintain the laws and the social order.262 Furthermore, 
knowledge in the meaning of wisdom was also pivotal for public order: ‘the ordering of 
cities depends on sovereignty (mulk) and the ordering of sovereignty on governance 
(siyasa) and that of governance on wisdom.’263 The aim of governance, for Tusî, was 
equilibrium and the virtuous ruler was the ‘doctor of the world’. Every person was 
compelled to study political theory in order to attain virtues and expertise in state craft. 
 
                                                     
259 Black, The History, 95-96. 
260 Wilferd Madelung, ‘Nasir al-Din Tusi’s Ethics: Between Philosophy, Shi’ism and Sufism’, Hovannisian (1985): 
85-101. 
261 Bahtiyar Hüseyin Sıddıki, ‘Nasıruddin Tusi’, in İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi vol. 2, ed. M.M. Şerif, (İstanbul, 1990) 192-
195. 
262 Black, The History, 153. 
263 As quoted in Black, The History, 154. 
 248 
This egalitarian idea was remarkably closer to al-Ghazali’s thought and deviated from 
Shi’ite doctrine, which regarded rulership as merely preserved for the divinely elected 
Imam who possessed the divine wisdom of state craft.264 
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3.3 Islamic Political Thought in Early Ottoman Chronicles 
3.3.1 Neşrî 
In the chronicle of Neşrî, the thought of Tûsî and al-Ghazali clearly recured, i.e. the idea 
that the maintenance of the social order required the satisfaction of basic human needs. 
For Tûsî and al-Ghazalî, this equilibrium required a set of social relations based on a 
division of labour between various occupations and crafts. In this order, each one 
performed a necessary job by which the welfare of the entire society was accomplished. 
A central authority, in the person of a pâdişah was the key to the maintenance of 
continuity and balance of this social order. Indeed, the social order in the world could 
only be achieved with the help of a legitimate political power. That was the pâdişah who 
reconciled the differences among human beings inherent to diversity of their natures. A 
similar reasoning was also formulated by the ulema-historian Neşrî.  
At the very start of his chronicle, Neşrî emphasised the pivotal importance of 
knowledge and wisdom, which echoes the thought of al-Ghazali: ‘the obviousness of 
intelligence [akl] witnesses that knowledge [ilm], life and body are signs of health and 
excellence; whereas ignorance and death are related to evil. Though life is the cause of 
knowledge, knowledge in turn is the cause of life, for a life without knowledge is worse 
than death. Indeed, it is said: the one who has no life in his body is not considered as dead, 
but the one who lacks mindfulness [şu’ur] in his body is really the one who has died. […] 
One can distinguish three categories of knowledge: the science of revelation, of the 
Shari’a and that of history.’265  
Subsequently, Neşrî elaborated on al-Gazali’s ideal types of governance as he described 
the ideal sovereignty according to Ottoman understanding. He distinguished among the 
humankind three categories of ‘noble groups’:  
‘the prophets, the men of high learning [ulema] and sovereigns. The dignity of the 
prophets comes from their duty to communicate the revelation; the dignity of the 
ulema or high learned scholars lies in their expertise of the science of prayer; and 
the dignity of rulers comes from [dispensing] justice (adl) and [the affairs of] 
governance [siyaset]. […] The great scholars, even though erudite on various 
matters, are still dependent on the authority of a sultan to implement their 
decisions and are therefore powerless without him.’266  
 
                                                     
265 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 3-4. 
266 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 4: ‘Ve eşref-i insân dahı üçdür: enbiyâ, ulemâ ve ümerâ. Ve enbiyânun şânı teblîg ü 
risâletdür. Ve ulemânun şânı ilm ü ibadetdür. Ve ümerânun şânı adl ü siyâsetdür. […] ammâ ulemâ-i fihâm ve 
 250 
Thereafter, Neşrî explained the values attached to the ideal ruler:  
‘When a monarch [melik] cultivates his knowledge of the shari’a, his knowledge of 
history of the hadith and of the history of the conditions of the earlier kings and 
sultans, he will have adequately interiorized these three sciences. And as the 
heavenly lights enlighten his heart, the judgements of the prophets reveal 
themselves to him and he will discover the secrets of the mission of the prophets. 
As the prophets reveal [the Qur’an] being the messengers of God, they [the rulers] 
put an order into execution and govern. Therefore, the sultans are called ‘the 
Shadow of God on Earth’ [es-sultân zillu’llah fî’l arz], who are the experts of taking 
decisions and governance [mazhar-ı ahkâm ü siyaset] and the treasures of secrets and 
leadership [münhazin-i esrar u riyaset]. If there were no verdicts of governance [emr-
i siyaset], then the order of the world [âlemde nizâm] would not have existed, and the 
grievances of the powerless and the poor would have disappeared in the smoke of 
the fire set up by the cruelties of tyrants’.267  
The passage above quoted from Neşrî gave clues about the construction of the Ottoman 
political thought that elaborated on earlier writings. He seemed to mirror al-Farabi’s idea 
that knowledge and leadership are interconnected; politics requires knowledge. The ideal 
ruler for Neşrî appeared to be the ‘scholar-king’, who only can attain this stage if he has 
the knowledge of the Shari’a, of the prophetic tradition and knowledge of history. His 
discussion of political organisation emerged out of describing the perfect ruler who has 
to uphold a spiritual mind set and wisdom. In this respect, he equated the prophets and 
kings as ‘two rings in a finger.’268 He implied that prophethood and rulership are 
complementary to each other. Neşrî also confirms the general consensus that the 
preservation of social order and the prevention of anarchy and disorder are the primary 
tasks of government.  
Furthermore, Neşrî suggested that the ruler had to be a good Muslim and uphold the 
spirit of the Shari’a, which limited the power of the sultan. For Neşrî, the sovereignty of 
the Ottoman ruler could legitimately be claimed through demonstrating devotion to 
protection of the Shari’a. Although he did not explicitly formulate it, Neşrî referred to the 
idea of the synthesis between the state and ‘the way of God’ (dîn) when discussing the 
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behaviour required from a ruler in order to govern successfully. A sultan was only able to 
rule successfully if he had the knowledge of Shari’a and the traditions of Prophet. He thus 
expressed the classic Islamic idea that ‘the way of God’ (din) and sovereignty (mülk) are 
two sides of the same coin and thus inseparable. The sultan acquires the status of ‘the 
Shadow of God on Earth’ from his diligent observance of the Shari’a and his inner 
knowledge of the Prophetic tradition. The title suggests the divine sanction for rule 
within the Islamic context and its use express the blending of nomadic ideals with the 
sedentary Islamic ideal of a divinely ordained social order exemplified by the Shari’a.  
With the title ‘Shadow of God’ Neşrî referred to the metaphoric duty of the ruler, 
providing shade and shelter to protect the people under his authority from the merciless 
sun. This idea found its expression in the metaphoric title of ‘the Shadow of God on Earth’ 
(es-sultân zillu’llah fî’l arz). According to a tradition of the Prophet, ‘the Sultan is the 
Shadow of God on Earth with whom all people seek shelter.’269 Similarly, another 
Prophetic tradition stated that ‘the Sultan of Muslims is the protector and shadow of God 
for the people.’270 Neşrî here showed himself to be completely in tune with the theoretical 
political tenor of his time. By using this title, he emphasised that the ruler had to protect 
and promote the basic rights of people with no particular social status. Governance (emr-
i siyaset) was in this sense the protection of the socially disadvantaged against the 
damages and aggression of socially and economic dominant groups or magnates. 
Therefore, the sultan was essential to maintain the social order of the world [âlemde 
nizâm] by preventing the preying of the strong on the weak. Because, if the authority of 
the sultan did not exist, ‘the grievances of the powerless and the poor would disappear in 
the smoke of the fire set up by the cruelties of tyrants’. In other words, for Neşrî justice 
or just rule were essential to the practice of good governance. 
 Before continuing with the discussion of Tursun Beg’s view, it is worthwhile to give 
some more background about the term siyasa. The word siyaset, today meaning politics or 
governance, was an Arabic word, which originally meant ‘to manage or to train a horse’. 
In the context of early Islamic history, the sense of training and managing horses passed 
into the conduct of state affairs and the management of the subjects, the reaya. This 
change in meaning was probably influenced by the ancient Near Eastern idea of the ruler 
as the shepherd and manager of his human flock, and also with the nomadic idea of the 
person who leads his horse through its reins. These served as metaphors for the authority 
that governs a society. When the Seljuks and the Ottomans used the horsehair banner or 
tuğ as emblem of authority, they were clearly evoking the image of the horse mounted 
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warrior as the symbol of effective political power.271 Hence, the meaning of siyasa in 
Ottoman and Islamic usage evolved in time to the sense of statecraft, the management of 
affairs of state and eventually that of governance.272 For instance, the Ottoman fethname, 
written after the Battle of Varna in 1444 and addressing to the Karakoyunlu ruler, 
compared the governing of a state to the leading of a horse: ‘The Creator put the halter 
of grasping and distention, and the reins of loosing and binding and of the twisting and 
untwisting into our firm and imperial grasp and into our felicitous possession.’273  
3.3.2 Tursun Beg 
The next fifteenth-century chronicler who in his work devoted particular attention to the 
political theory of sovereignty was Tursun Beg. This bureaucrat-scholar and historian 
wrote the panegyric ‘the History of the Conqueror’, dedicated to the reign of Sultan 
Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481). Tursun Beg started his work by asking the question: why did 
society need a ruler? He answered by discussing the nature of humankind and also based 
his formulation on the social theory of Nasir al-dîn Tûsî, he explicitly mentioned. Tursun 
Beg argued that if human beings were left to their own basic instincts, inherent to their 
nature, conflicts would soon arise. They would not be able to cooperate, but would incite 
treason, fight and destroy each other, failing to form a political society. Therefore, 
according to Tursun Beg, each one has to be assigned to tasks and jobs that fit him best. 
It was necessary to give each person a status or place in the society according to their 
merits and talents so that each would be satisfied with his rights and livelihood and not 
attack the rights of others. To enhance cooperation between people and to increase 
development, human beings needed each other by nature so that they have to live 
together in society. To maintain this set of social relations, there was need for a ruler. A 
king (padişah) was necessary so that this ‘order of the world’ (nizam-ı âlem), which serves 
the public interest, could be preserved and chaos could be avoided.274 As the keynote for 
 
                                                     
271 In old, steppe-nomadic Turkish tradition, the tuğ was the banner, which was composed of a horse’s tail or 
horsehair. The Ottomans continued to use the tuğ as an emblem of royal authority, with the sultans campaigning 
under their banners with nine tuğs. The Turkish word tuğ is the parent of the verb doğmak (to be born, to arise) 
in various Turkish languages; for example, kün tuğdı (the sun has arisen). The horsehair banner symbolized the 
Oğuz kinship in the army during the emergence of a new social and military embodiment. ‘While the warrior 
lived, the horsehair banner carried his destiny; in death, it became his soul. It captured the power of the wind, 
the sky and the sun, and the banner inspired the warrior’s dreams.’ See: Ümit Hassan, Osmanlı. Örgüt, inanç, 
davranış’tan hukuk ideoloji’ye (İstanbul, 2009) 33-41. 
272 ‘Siyasa’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. 
273 Fethname, in Imber’s translation, see: The Crusade of Varna, 189. 
274 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, ed. Mertol Tulum (İstanbul, 1977) 12-13. 
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his view, Tursun also quoted the following verse from the Qur’an: ‘Obey God and obey the 
Messenger, and obey those from among you who are invested with authority.’275 And he 
enunciated the same principle by referring to the tradition of the Prophet, saying: 
‘Besides the Prophet we have sent and the angel we have appointed, there is no other 
supreme rank than that of the sultan.’276  
Tursun Beg also confirmed the classical idea that God distributes rulership by referring 
to a verse from the Qur’an: ‘but God supports whom He wills’.277 Tursun continued by 
acknowledging the metaphoric role of the sultan as ‘shadow of God’ by noting Prophet’s 
tradition, saying: ‘God exalts whom he wishes and He bemoans whom He dislikes’.278 
Tursun asserted again that therefore one has to comply with and show loyalty to the 
authority of the ruler.279 However, he warned that God did not give this supreme attribute 
to the kings merely to satisfy their personal selfish and insatiable whims or to enrich 
themselves with crowded armies.280  
The favouring of God implied that when a ruler took the responsibilities of sovereignty, 
he should bestow justice through the ‘beauty of his governance’, his wisdom and his awe-
inspiring appearance. According to Tursun, the ruler should bring order and keep this 
order in the world through ‘his lightning sword and by the auspices of granting lands. 
The person of the sultan is a candidate to the happiness in this world and he might 
deserve that pleasure by his acts, which should be aimed at attaining the true happiness 
of the world hereafter.’281  
Tursun Beg also indorsed the thought of al-Ghazali on happiness and sovereignty as it 
has been briefly outlined above. Tursun wrote: ‘It is said that this state [devlet], which is 
the elixir of the rare and precious happiness, can only be attained through good virtues 
of ethics.’282 He continued to elaborate on al-Ghazali’s thought by noting that the sultan 
must seek the advice from the learned ulema and the sheikhs. This would enable the ruler 
to open the path towards happiness in this world and in the hereafter. as ‘the secrets of 
 
                                                     
275 Qur’an, 4:59. 
276 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 13. 
277 Qur’an, 3:13. 
278 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 15. 
279 Ibidem: ‘vâsıtasıyle tâ’at ü mütâba’atini ekâsî vü edâni üzre farz-ı ayn itti.’ 
280 Ibidem: ‘bu husûssiyet-i kerâmet anun içün degülmiş, ki pâdişâhlar mücerred istifa-yı lezzât-ı nefsâniyyesine 
velû’ gösterüp asâkir-i cerrâr ile temettü’ ü istizhâr artura.’  
281 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 16: ‘uhde-i saltanatı ahdinde hüsn-i siyâseti ile ve kemâl-i mehâbet ü yümn-i 
kifâyeti ile şah-ı adl müreşşah u bâr-ver, ve bârân-ı ihsân fâyiz olup, tîǧ-ı berk-dırahş ve himmet-i mülk bahşı 
ile mesâlih-i cihân muntazam u ârâste ola; ve râyât-ı dîn-i Hak. Ve niteki zât-ı şerif-i pâdişah müstahıkk-ı devlet-
i dünya-yı zûd-güzardır, şâyân-ı saltanat-ı dârül-karar vakı olup, gabuk-ı devlet-i mecâziyi sabûh-i sa’âdet-i 
hakîkiye ulaşturup, bu cihanda ömr-i devletten ber-hordâr ve ol cihanda…’  
282 Ibidem: ‘Ve bu zikr ittügümüz devlet – ki iksîr-i kimyâ-yı sa’âdettür – dimişler ki husûle mevsûl olmaz, illâ 
tahsil-i mekârim-i ahlâk ile mümkindür.’ 
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sovereignty are hidden from the unfortunate ones who only see the apparent and obvious 
things.’283 Tursun Beg also referred to Tûsî’s ‘Nasirian Ethics’. Relying on this work, he 
explained the cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, gentleness and justice) that rulers had 
to demonstrate, which I will discuss below. According to Tursun Beg, the candidate for 
rulership accredited by lineage was not necessarily the best sovereign; true sovereignty 
and legitimate rule were only demonstrated by the acts and virtues of rulers. He wrote:  
‘No one [ruler] can be worthy of praise or be truly proud unless it is by reason 
of possessing all or some of these four virtues. Those who take pride in their 
descent and lineage can only do so because they have fathers and ancestors who 
were known for these virtues.’284   
It is worth noting that the discourse of the early Ottoman chroniclers explicitly 
emphasised the notions ‘justice’ and ‘gaza’. This was precisely a result of the fact that 
Ottoman dynasty lacked a distinguished lineage from the line of the Prophet or from that 
of the Djengizid imperial house, which both could have provided a legitimacy. Therefore, 
in the introduction to his chronicle, Tursun Beg based the legitimacy of the Ottoman 
dynasty on the customary law (örf) or the laws promulgated by the sultan (kanun). 
Furthermore, in his discourse, he also emphasised Ottoman commitment to justice as a 
tool of legitimacy. Tursun posited the notion of kanun as the primary legitimate ordering 
mechanism for political life:  
‘The laws based on principles that ensure felicity in this world and the next is 
called divine government or şeriat. Furthermore, there are the laws based on the 
reason that endorse the right order of the world [nizam-ı âlem], such as Djenghiz 
Khan did. In these laws, the events are connected to their causality, which is called 
the sultanic politics and imperial law [siyâset-i sultani and yasağ -ı padişâhi] and 
it is named örf in our [Turkish] tradition. Its maintenance requires the existence 
of a ruler [padişah]. There is no need for a prophetic law giver in every age [...] 
However, in every period, there is a need for a ruler who has the authority to 
establish laws and to implement measures for the public interest. If his authority is 
 
                                                     
283 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 28: ‘ammâ esrâr-ı saltanat, her gedâ-yı zâhir-bin fehminden gâyibdür […] Atyeb-
i ahlâk-ı selâtin – ki müstelzim-i sa’âdet-i dünyevî ve uhrevîdür – bunu dahı dimişler ki, takarrüb-ı Hak içün 
terhîb ü takrîbi-i ulema vü meşâyih buyurula.’  
284 Ibidem, 17: ‘Ve hîç bir şahs müstahıkk-ı medh ve müsta’idd-i mübâhât ü müfâharet olmaz, illâ bu dört 
fazîletün cümlesiyle yâ ba’ziyle olur. Ve şunlar ki neseb ü kabîle şerefiyle fahr iderler, merci’i budur ki, âbâ vü 
eslâfında bu fezâyil ile mevsûf kimesne var imiş.’ 
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lost no law can be enforced and people cannot live together; they would destroy 
each other and this world order all together.’285 
As is known, the Ottoman term kanun or dynastic law was modelled on an idealised 
steppe töre/yasa notion.286 The kanun was issued by the sultan and was integrated with 
Islamic law or Shari’a. In this way, the promulgation of a customary law code, the kanun, 
separate from the Shari’a expressed the most enduring blending of nomadic traditions 
with Islamic principles. This synthesis fulfilled the need of the House of Osman to 
legitimacy for its sovereignty.287 However, as mentioned, this synthesis was on certain 
points antithetical. A khan in the nomad tradition was one who had the power to make 
law and had more absolute authority than the caliph, who could only uphold and submit 
to the Shari’a.288 Since the Ottoman sultans were also Muslims, bound to observe the 
Shari’a, the situation had become complex. The Ottoman Sultans had to be just rulers and 
good Muslims. At the same time they had to fulfil the obligations of rulership and submit 
to the spirit of the Shari’a. In this respect, Tursun Beg made a clear distinction between 
the customary law or the kanun promulgated by the sultan and the law code of the 
Shari’a. Separate from the Shari’a, the kanun was the proper sphere of scholarship for 
bureaucrats, the chancery official’s badge of learning analogous to the Shari’a of the 
ulema. As indicated above, one of the earliest promulgation of a set of laws or kanun were 
collected in the Kanunnâme or the Law Book of Sultan Mehmed II. This compilation of 
kanuns was probably written after 1477.289  
3.3.3 Ahmedî 
The importance of kanun for reasons of legitimacy can also be read clearly in the 
introductory verses of the court poet Ahmedî. He referred to the Djengizid model of law 
 
                                                     
285 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 12-13: ‘Ve eğer şöyle ki bu tedbîr bervefk-ı vücub ve kâide-i hikmet olursa ana 
ehl-i hikmet siyâset-i İlahi dirler, ve ehl-i şer’ ana şeriat dirler. Ve illâ, ya’ni bu tedbir ol mertebede olmazsa, 
mücerred tavr-ı akl üzre nizâm-ı âlem-i zâhir içün, meselâ Cingiz Han gibi olursa, sebebine izâfet iderler, siyâset-
i sultanî ve yasağ-ı pâdişâhî dirler ki, örfümüzce ana örf dirler. Keyfe mekân, anun ikâmeti elbette bir pâdişâh 
vücuduna mevkûf. Hatta şöyledir ki, her rûzgârda vücûd-ı şâri’ hâcet değüldür (…); ammâ her rûzgârda bir 
pâdişâhun vücudı hâcettir ki anun tasarruf-ı cüz’iyyâtta vilâyet-i kâmili vardur. Ve anun tedbîri munkati’ olsa, 
bakâ-yı eşhâs ber-vech-i ekmel süret bulmaz; belki bi’l-küllî fenâ bulur. Ve ol nizâm fevt olur.’ 
286 The term kanun is a derivative from Arabic, which meant ‘a measure or rule’, and later ‘assessment for 
taxation’, ‘imperial taxes’ and dynastic law. See: ‘Kânûn’, EI²; Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 65-69; Fleischer, 
Bureaucrat and intellectual, 274; Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, 7-9. 
287 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and intellectual, 286-287. 
288 Ibidem, 274. 
289 Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman, ed. Özcan, XII-XIII. 
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and promoted the ancient Persian-Islamic ideology of justice (adl) to establish a legitimate 
ground for the Ottoman dynasty:  
‘Concerning the justice of the Mongol Sultans [Ilkhanids], hear now the 
explanation of how it was. They did not do as did Djenghiz Khan, who made 
justice to the people, far from injustice. They oppressed them [the people] with 
the law [kanun]; they did not bathe their hands in people’s blood. When tyranny 
[zulm] is performed in the name of law, a just leader [adl beg] comes forth for the 
people. Since all of those oppressors have been named, let us remember all the 
just as well. Let us recall the begs [the Ottoman princes], who were Muslim and 
just rulers.’290  
Following on this statement he established Ottoman legitimacy on the ideology of 
justice and he put forth the yasa (the laws) of Djengiz Khan as an important model for 
Ottoman sovereignty. He denoted the Djenghizid law with the term kanun. Elaborating 
on the customs of nomadic polities, Ahmedî implied that a ruler and his law might be 
accepted in so far as that they could ensure justice and good governance. Such a law 
derived its authority only from the prestige and justness of the ruler. As already 
discussed, the early Ottomans preserved their own legal codes, the Turkish törü and the 
Djengiz Khanid yasa. These expressed the Central Asian concepts of law that received 
authority through formal proclamation by the ruler, the kaghan of the nomadic state.  
Moreover, in the verses quoted above Ahmedî also emphasised the Islamic principle of 
just rule or justice as an important asset. He based Ottoman legitimacy upon justice and 
just governance. Ahmedî clearly blended Turkish-Mongol nomad and Islamic legal 
systems. He combined the nomadic usage of kanun with the Islamic principle of ‘justice’ 
(’adl) as principles for legitimacy. Ahmedî implied that a ruler and his laws could only be 
accepted as long as he could guarantee justice and could protect the people against the 
abuse of power.  
Ahmedî also indicated that just rulership did not necessarily depended upon 
hereditary privileges. He also implied that just rulership is not necessarily co-existent 
with the Muslim identity. To him, a lord who revolted against an established but 
tyrannical ruler could have a more compelling right to rule if he was more just and 
capable. Or, as in the case of the Ilkhanid khans, a non-Muslim but just ruler was 
preferable to a Muslim but tyrannical monarch. This idea implied that governing a state 
could be separated from religion of the ruler, for being a Muslim likewise did not 
guarantee of being a competent and just ruler. This view addressed the political need for 
 
                                                     
290 Ahmedî, Dasitân-i Tevârîh, 25-26: ‘Ol Mogol sultanlarının adlini, niceydi işit imdi şerhini. İtmediler anı kim 
Cingiz Han, zulmden halka ider idi ’ayan. Zulm itdiler velî kânûnıla, ellerin boyamadılar hûnıla. Zulm kim kânûn 
u zabtıla ola, ’adl gibi halka ol âsân gele. Çün anıldı ol kâmu ehl-i sitem, zikre getürelüm ehl-i ’adli hem. Analum 
ol begleri kim serteser, hem Müsülman idiler hem dâdger.’  
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legitimacy of the Ottomans, as they lacked a distinguished lineage. Therefore, as Neşrî 
had also asserted, Ahmedî precisely portrayed the Ottoman rulers as gazi-sultans and just 
sovereigns who protected the people from tyranny and took care of them. In the passage 
above, he echoed in a certain way the thought of Nizâm al-Mülk: ‘when through divinely 
good fortune the evil times pass away, God will bring forth a just and wise king from 
princely stock, and will give him the power to vanquish his enemies, and the wisdom and 
intelligence to judge matters aright.’291 
Yet, the views of Ahmedî, Tursun Beg and Neşrî are complementary to each other. The 
customary law or kanun and the Shari’a, coupled with powerful central authority of the 
ruler, appeared as the pivotal legitimising ideas of early Ottoman state ideology.292 The 
ruler was the key to the maintenance of balance between these two separate law codes 
and spheres, which in practice are co-existent. The Shari’a was universal, immutable, 
revealed by God and hence spiritually superior to the kanun, which was regional, 
amendable and created by human intelligence. The latter had greater relevance for ad 
hoc governance and for the practice of statecraft. The Ottoman chroniclers implied that 
the duty of the sultan was to protect the ‘din ü devlet’ (the way of God and state). In this 
respect, the mandate of the dynasty was also expressed through highlighting its Muslim 
identity. The ideal ruler was considered as the one who had accumulated in his person 
the political wisdom of an administrator, the learning of a scholar and historian, and the 
understanding of the prophetic revelations. Only when a ruler had reached this mature 
state of mind, he could adequately deal with the affairs concerning the governance of a 
political society.293 
Obviously, some elements of Platonic theory had reached the Ottoman intellectual 
literature through mainly the works of al-Farabi, al-Ghazali and Tûsî. The notion of 
‘justice’ and the unity of kanun and Shari’a represented the Ottoman principles of state 
ideology. As we will discuss, the terms of ‘justice’ and ‘gaza’ also appeared in the 
chronicles as the predominant discursive registers of Ottoman state ideology.  
3.3.4 The concepts devlet and saltanat 
It is useful at this point to shed more light on the concepts of ‘devlet’ and ‘saltanat’, which 
figured prominently in the early Ottoman chronicles’. Both terms appeared as important 
concepts denoting ‘state power’. The term ‘devlet’, in the sense that it was used in the 
early Ottoman texts, is difficult to translate into an European language. First of all, the 
historical context and the register of Muslim political tradition in which it evolved was 
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293 Ibidem, 293. 
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very different from that of Europe. The etymology of the Arabic word dawla, from which 
the Turkish notion devlet derives, has not been extensively studied. It is not known exactly 
when and under what historical conditions the term lost its meaning of ‘turn’ or 
‘alternation’ (of success, holding office), a connotation that it had in the early Islamic 
history and during the Abbasids.294 During the later Abbasid period, the word was 
frequently used by the Abbasids with reference to their own ‘turn’ of success. It came to 
be associated with the ruling house. Yet, how and when the term dawla acquired the 
meaning of ‘dynasty’ has still not been established.295 The word devlet certainly acquired 
the meaning of ‘dynasty’ and ‘state’ with the emergence of Turkish and Mongol dynastic 
states in the Muslim world, such as the Great Seljuks, Ilkhanids, Mamluks, Ottomans, 
Timurids and Mughals.  
Rifaat Abou-El-Haj already demonstrated that the term devlet (dawla) only acquired the 
modern sense of ‘state’ towards the end of the seventeenth century. He suggested that, 
before the seventeenth century, the Ottoman use of the concept devlet had neither ‘the 
connotation [nor] the denotation of the modern nation-state’, but rather meant ‘the 
decision-making power of the legitimate head of state as well as of those to whom he had 
delegated this power’.296 Recently, scholars have also studied the semantic development 
of the term devlet. Following their analysis, the term had the meaning of ‘power’ or 
‘dynasty’ in the fifteenth century, with strong implications of ‘divine favour’. The word 
seems to be structured around the divine charisma of the ruler throughout the fifteenth 
century.297 
The Arabic term dawla, or its Turkish equivalent devlet, directly implied the widely 
accepted formulation of the idea that God gives, to whomever he chooses, a turn in 
sovereignty. In this sense, the fifteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers used the term devlet, 
alternately in the meanings of ‘good fortune’, ‘divine favour’ and ‘state power’. Moreover, 
the term was often interchanged with the word kut. Clearly, the historical texts from this 
period used the steppe-nomadic idea of kut or ‘divine favour’ and the Arabic-Islamic 
concept of devlet, in the sense of ‘good fortune’ and ‘state power’, as interchangeable 
synonyms. For instance, Neşrî noted that Sultan Bâyezid I was aware of the importance 
of kut and devlet. Before departing on a campaign with his father, Bâyezid reassured 
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Murad I that God would grant his favour to whomever had wisdom and the devlet on his 
side.298 The term devlet appears here in the meaning of ‘good fortune’ and ‘state power’. 
The word devlet also twice appears in Ahmedî’s history. In one verse, when the city of 
Kastamonu was conquered by Bâyezid I, Ahmedî used the word in the sense of ‘state 
power’: ‘because, for him such is the task of the state.’299 In another verse, devlet clearly 
meant ‘good fortune’, when Ahmedî referred to the reign of Süleyman Çelebi: ‘may 
despair not affect his good fortune.’300  
The word hümâ was another term that the early Ottoman historical texts used as an 
equivalent to devlet (dawla) and kut. The Ottoman use of the term hümâ is related to the 
gradual blending of Persian-Islamic and Turkish traditions. The nomadic idea of kut that 
attributed divine dispensation to its recipient, is transmitted through the Islamic-Persian 
mythical bird of hümâ to whom God has entrusted part of his secrets. It was believed that 
the shadow of the hümâ-bird tumbling on a person’s head proclaimed the divine elevation 
of that person to royal authority, predicting a ‘good fortune’. The mythical hüma-figure 
derived from the pre-Islamic Persian principles of sovereignty. It represented the 
intangible ‘Glory of Light’. According to the philosophical and mystical opinion, the 
candidates for royalty can only enjoy the favour of the hüma-bird if they are spiritually 
qualified to receive it.301 Part of this pagan mythology was reworked and reintroduced 
after the Persians had converted to Islam.302 For instance, the adjective hümâyûn – which 
meant splendid, majestic – was applied to all objects and attributes related to Ottoman 
sovereignty. Particularly since the sixteenth century, the Ottoman ‘state council’ or divan, 
the army, the palace, the tent and decrees of sultans were always accompanied by the 
adjective hümâyûn.303  
The fifteenth-century Ottoman poet Kivamî fashioned the ascension to the throne of 
Mehmed II in the following terms: ‘Sultan Mehmed Han Gazi became the monarch 
[padishah] of the lands of Rûm. He came to sit on the throne of ‘the state’ [saltanat]. Again 
 
                                                     
298 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 128: ‘Zîrâ, devlet ve akl bir kişiye kim yâr ola, zâhir budur ki, Hakk’uñ inâyeti anuñladur.’ 
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a silver winged hümâ-bird [hüma-yı sîmîn-per] such as a coquettish peacock flourished like 
a rose whose perfume gives life to the masters of sense. On the sapling of the devlet a 
hümâ-bird came to sit and his ‘justice’304 made the people of the world reach towards 
infinite happiness.’305   
In this passage Kivamî used the term ‘saltanat’ to denote the entity of ‘the state’ or 
sovereignty. We have seen in the dream narrative that Neşrî also deployed the concept 
saltanat in the meaning of ‘state’ or sovereignty, suggesting the type of regime as ruled by 
the sultan according to God’s verdicts and favour. Neşrî noted that when Osman Bey 
informed the Sheikh of his dream, the latter predicted: ‘O Osman, may it be blessing! God 
gave the saltanat [‘state’] to you and to your descendants. May the entire world find a 
shelter under the shadow of your sons.’306  
But more importantly, the earliest chroniclers rather used the term saltanat to denote 
the entity of ‘state authority’. It appears that saltanat was used as an Ottoman equivalent 
to the term ‘state’. The preference of the chroniclers for the term saltanat shows that the 
Muslim political tradition was prevailing in the ‘knots of signifiers’ of their narratives. 
The concept of saltanat was identified with the ruler’s household and court, thus 
considered in highly personal terms. For instance, in the Law Book or Kanunname of 
Mehmed II, the term recurs in two cases. After having described the regulation of the 
court through a set of clauses, Sultan Mehmed said: ‘so many affairs of the ‘state’ [saltanat] 
have been put into order. Hereafter, let my sons also continue to promulgate laws’.307 And 
when he decreed the famous code on fratricide: ‘to whomever of my sons the saltanat is 
facilitated by God’.308 The term was also used in the fethname written after the Battle of 
Varna in 1444, to the Karakoyunlu ruler in Tabriz. The letter started with a description of 
Ottoman concept of sovereignty: ‘With the favours of divine assistance and with the gifts 
of divine protection, God strengthened the bonds of our dominion and laid the foundation 
of our saltanat and strengthened the good order of our realm.’309 The fethname asserted 
that Ottomans cherish divinely state power, which was given to them in custody by God, 
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Han Gazi pâdişah oldı, saltanat tahtına geçti […] hüma-yi sîmîn-per ve tavus-ı cilve-ger bigi yine sa’âdet 
ravzasında bir taze gül açıldı kim kohusı ma’ânî ehline cânlar bagışlar. Yine nihal-i devlete bir hümâ kondı kim 
cihan halkı saye-i adlinde devletlere ve sa’âdetlere irişdiler, bî-nihâyet ve bî-şumar.’ 
306 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 41: ‘Yâ Osman! Muştuluk olsun. Saña ve evlâduña Hak ta’âlâ saltanat virdi. Mecmû’ı âlem 
evlâduñun zıll-i himâyetinde ola.’ In his account of the same story, Oruç Beg used the word ‘pâdişahlık’, see: 
Oruç Beg Tarihi, 8. 
307 Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman, ed. Özcan, 14: ‘bu kadar ahval-ı saltanata nizam verildi. Şimden sonra gelen evlâd-ı 
kirâmım dahi islâha sa’y itsünler.’ 
308 Ibidem, 18: ‘her kimesneye evlâdumdan saltanat müyesser ola.’ 
309 Fethname in: Imber, The Crusade of Varna, 189. 
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to upheld God’s verdicts, the welfare of mankind and to fight the enemies of Islam. A most 
remarkable playing with the various connotations of the words devlet and saltanat could 
be found in a poem written by Sultan Süleyman. Translated into English from its poetic 
expression in Turkish, the first four verses said: ‘Nothing is more prestigious than ‘state 
power’ [devlet] for the people; Yet, there is no better fortune [devlet] than a healthy breath; 
What they call ‘the state’ [saltanat] is merely a fight for the world; while there is no greater 
happiness than the unity of the world.’310  
Tursun Beg, however, used the words devlet and saltanat interchangeably in the 
introduction to his chronicle. He noted that there had always been rulers (pâdishâh) since 
the beginning of the world and that they would exist as long as God permitted them to. 
However, the wise ruler who had attained the fortunate state of happiness (devlet yâr-ı 
hûşmend), also had to try to reach the sovereignty in the afterlife (ahıret sultanlıǧı).311 
Tursun Beg continued this line of thought by emphasising al-Ghazali’s idea about the 
connection between moral and spiritual observance and political success: ‘the pâdishâh 
will unquestionably win the hearts and mind of his subjects by striving to revive the 
knowledge of the ‘religious’ sciences [ihyâ-yı ulum-ı dîniyye], by dispensing justice day after 
day, by continuing the previous ruler’s deeds of generosity, by distributing wealth, by 
developing the land through his just and virtuous rule. All this generates happiness that 
as a result wins the consent of the people under the rule of that state [devlet].’312 His 
argumentation was based on the principle of sovereignty, namely the symbiosis between 
‘the way of God’ (din) and ‘state power’ (dawla). They are interdependent and their 
fortunes are intertwined. We have seen that al-Ghazali worked out this idea. This idea 
reached an explicit expression in the unity of ‘din ü devlet’ as developed in the sixteenth 
century. 
Furthermore, Tursun Beg introduced his account of the reign of Sultan Mehmed II with 
the following ideological principles:  
‘the almighty God has granted to the House of Osman the sovereignty [saltanat] 
and the universal rule, [the right] to act according to the rules of universal 
sovereignty, [the right] to collect an army and to prepare them for battles, to 
reconstruct the land and to dispense justice, to implement the decrees of 
sovereignty [saltanat], to protect the frontiers of the Muslim world, to establish 
 
                                                     
310 ‘Halk içinde mûteber bir nesne yok devlet gibi / Olmaya devlet cihân da bir nefes sıhhât gibi / Saltanat didükleri 
ancak bir cihân gavgâsıdır / Olmaya baht u saadet dünya da vahdet gibi.’ 
311 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 29. 
312 Ibidem, 30: ‘çün pâdişâh ihyâ-yı ulûm-ı diniyyede ve ifâzat-ı ma’dilette ve ibkâ-yı rüsûm-ı hayrat-ı selâtin-i 
selefte âsâr-ı sıdk u ragbet izhâr ide, ve bezl-i mâl ile celb-i kulûb ve adl ü fazl ile ta’mîr-i memleket kıla, yakîndür 
ki bu devletün dest-i eseri dâmen-i ubûda çeng irgüre. 
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the rules of generosity and to take care of the people, to collect taxes and to fund 
a treasury.’313   
  
 
                                                     
313 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 32: ‘Ammâ ol tavr-ı cihângiri ve kavâ’id-i cihân-küşâyi, ve tertib-i asker ve 
durûb-ı âlât-ı hurub […], ve ta’miri memleket ve intişâr-ı âsâr-ı ma’dilet ve tenfîz-i ahkâm-ı saltanat ve hıfz-ı 
hudûd-ı şerî’at, ve vaz’ı kavâ’id-i hayrat ve bast-ı merâsim-i meberrat, ve cem’i hazâyin ü defâyin ve sâyir esbâb-
ı saltanat ü cihândâri ki, sultan-ı zi’l-batşı’ş-şedid kıbelinden Âl-i Osman’a virildi.’ 
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3.4 The Discursive Registers of Rulership in the Early 
Ottoman State Ideology  
3.4.1 The Gaza or conquest ideology 
After the long discussion of the Islamic and Ottoman political thought, I will explore more 
in detail the discursive registers that frequently recur in the discourse of the  Ottoman 
chroniclers. I will shed more light on the predominant concepts, such as the gaza, justice 
(adl), etc., which served to shape the discourses of early state ideology.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the earliest Ottoman chronicles, gaza (raid into enemy 
territory) served as a foundational concept for the legitimation of the early state 
formation. The Ottoman court poet Ahmedî who wrote the first Ottoman historical text 
that has come down to us in writing (c. 1410, see Chapter 1), was the first author to present 
the Ottoman sultans explicitly as gazi-sultans. He defined the gazi as: ‘the servant of God’ 
(Tangrınun ferrâşıdur), ‘the sword of God’ (Hak kılıcıdur) and ‘the support and refuge of the 
people of religion’ (püşt ü penâh-ı ehl-i dîn).314 Indeed the notion of gaza appealed to a wide 
variety of people. Moreover, what could be called the ‘gaza-ideology’ also corresponded 
with the idea of universal rule that was inspired by the Islamic political thought. The 
political Ottoman world view also frequently applied the juridical concepts of the Muslim 
law. ‘The realm of Islam’ (dar al-Islam), the ‘realm of war’ (dar al-harb) and the ‘realm of 
truce’ (dar al-’ahd) were recurring concepts within the political discourse formulated in 
the historiographical texts.315  
However, these juridical concepts were not always the best tools to formulate a 
comprehensible analysis of the complex political realities and historical practices of the 
Ottoman Empire. If one does not consider the differences between norm and reality, it 
can obviously be misleading to take these fundamentally normative ideas at face value. 
Actually, the concepts ‘dar al-Islam’ and ‘dar al-harb’ were developed by various schools 
of jurisprudence in the tenth century, at a time when Muslims increasingly began to 
travel outside the Muslim world. As a result, the need arose to distinguish the territories 
in which Islamic law was applicable outside the dar al-Islam.316 Muslim jurists subsequently 
 
                                                     
314 Ahmedî, Dasitan-i Tevârîh, 27. 
315 For example, see: Viorel Panaite, The Ottoman Law of War and Peace. The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers (New 
York, 2000) 26-32, 82-86. 
316 For the creation of a territorial juridical system concerning both Byzantium and the Muslim world, see: 
Youval Rotman, ‘Byzance face à l’Islam Arabe 7e -10e siècle. D’un droit territorial à l’identité par la foi’, Annales 
HSS LX, 4 (2005) 767-787, 775-778. 
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developed conceptual frameworks and juridical tools to regulate the relations with non-
Muslim states and communities. The Ottomans also adapted these Islamic juridical 
notions. The fifteenth-century poet, Kivamî, noted when describing Mehmed II’s 
campaign against Moldavia: ‘The Sultan of the World went upon Moldavia [Kara Bogdan] 
with the intention of carrying out the gaza for God’s sake [fi-sebîli’llah niyyet-i gaza]. He 
crossed with the army of the Islam the bloody Danube and passed into the dar al-harb 
[realm of war].’317  
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the gaza did not aim at proselytism against the 
Christians nor did it intend to destroy the infidel world – the Dârülharb – driven by a priori 
religious hatred. It was unlikely that the Ottomans conquered Christian countries merely 
because of religious hostility – as Wittek claimed – while they ensured the non-Muslims 
a safe place in their society. The Ottoman state ideology used gaza as a legitimising 
rhetoric tool to cover its endeavours to subdue their adversary Christian states, as well as 
the rival dynasties in the Muslim world. Both in, medieval European history and early 
Ottoman period, the wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were the products not 
only of simple violence; wars resulted in the growth of centralised jurisdictions, 
governmental intrusiveness and administrative capacity.318 The Ottoman gaza or 
conquest ideology can be considered as a component of state formation, or as Charles 
Tilly noted: ‘war makes the state and the state makes war.’319  
The tensions between different social groups who struggled for power and rewrote 
their history were reflected in the various chronicles. Their discourses reveal that the 
political ideals and self-representation as gazis can also be considered as a part of an 
identity. For the Ottomans, the gazi-ideal could go hand-in-hand with a belief in it. As I 
will demonstrate, the gazi-ideal interacted with other components of the cultural 
environment, practices and legacies. The earliest Ottoman historical texts adapted the 
gaza-register to the horizon of expectations of their intended audiences to whom they 
wished to appeal. It can be considered as a legitimising tool used by the dynasty to justify 
its political status within the Islamic political arena. Ottoman claims to sovereignty had 
to obtain a degree of consent from the people that they ruled. Most importantly, for many 
Muslims, the military successes of the Ottomans offered them a source of status as heroic 
warriors at the frontiers of the Muslim world.320 As the Ottoman dynasty attached great 
importance to their public image, the chroniclers explicitly emphasised the gazi-identity 
of the sultans.  
Indeed, many passages employing the discursive register of gaza can be encountered 
in the early chronicles. Almost every Ottoman campaign was described in terms of gaza 
 
                                                     
317 Kivamî, Fetihnâme, 444. 
318 Watts, The Making of Polities, 19-30.  
319 Tilly, The Formation of Nation States, 42. 
320 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 287-290. 
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and the term became a real topos in the discourse of nearly all the fifteenth-century 
historical texts. The concept of gaza appear in the early Ottoman chronicles as a 
discursive tool to ideologically explain the past with the goal of alleviating the political 
conflicts with Christian and Muslim states. Neşrî, for instance at one point, noted that 
Osman Gazi decided to perform gaza, so that he could win his bread and would not be 
dependent on any other ruler for his livelihood and existence. After Osman captured 
Bilecik, the contemporary sultans and rulers granted him whatever he seized from the 
infidels. For this reason, Neşrî stated that Osman and his descendants were called gazis.321 
Aşık Paşazade asserted that Osman proclaimed his declaration of independence from the 
Seljuks by claiming lineage from the first settlers and by emphasising his dedication to 
gaza. When Tursun Fakih, one of his jurists, recommended Osman Gazi to ask the 
permission of the Seljuk sultan, Osman replied: ‘I conquered this city [Karacahisar] with 
my own sword! What has the sultan to do with this that I should ask his authorisation? 
God gave him the sultanate and He granted me the office of khanate by gaza. Concerning 
the banner he granted me, it was I who bore the banner and fought against the infidels. 
And if he says: I descend from the House of Selçuk; then I say that I am a grandson of Gök 
Alp. And if he says: I came to this land before them; my grandfather Süleyman Shah 
himself came before him. When the people heard this news from Osman Gazi, they 
accepted [his independence].’322 Neşrî clearly considered the first Ottoman rulers both as 
nomadic leaders as well as gazis. 
Curiously, the tone of gaza narratives in the chronicles was not always hostile. There 
was a famous love story told by Aşık Paşazade (with some modifications by Neşrî). This 
romantic story dealt with the daughter of a Byzantine commander of the Castle of Aydos 
letting in the Ottomans, after she fell in love with the leader of the gazis, to become in the 
end the wife of the young leader, Gazi Rahman.323 This ‘gazi legend’ or folk tale played 
during the early reign of Orhan Gazi, to the background of the Ottoman siege of the Castle 
of Aydos (1328), which the Byzantines called Aetos, meaning ‘eagle’. In his chronicle Aşık 
Paşazade recorded this popular narrative about the conquest of Aydos Castle, which was 
 
                                                     
321 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 28-29: ‘Mahzâ etmeği gazâdan çıkarayın ve hiç bir melike ihtiyaç göstermiyeyin; hem 
dünya ve hem âhiret elüme girsin. Ve bunun zamânında olan selâtîn-i izâm ve mülûk-i kirâm, Bilecük’i feth 
idicek aña mâni olmayup, kâfirden ne feth iderse aña helâl olsun, didiler. Anuñçün Osman’a ve evlâdına gâzi 
dinildi.’ 
322 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Yavuz, 289: ‘Osman Gazi eydür: Bu şehri ben hôd kendü kılıcum-ıla 
aldum. Sultânun bunda ne dahlı var kim andan izin alam, didi. Ana sultanlık viren Tañrı bana dahı gazây-ıla 
hanlık virdi, didi. Ve eger minneti şol sancag-ise ben hôd dahı sancak götürüp küffar-ıla ograşmadum, dir. Ve 
eger ol ben Âl-i Selçuk neslindenen dirse, ben hôd Gök Alp oglıyın, dirin. Ve eger bu eyâlete ben anlardan öñdin 
geldüm dirse, benüm dedem Süleyman Şah dedem hôd andan evvel gelüp turur, didi. Osman Gazi’den bu 
habarları işidicek bu halk râzı oldılar.’ 
323 Ibidem, 303-306. 
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an important fortification in the Byzantine defence system guarding the roads to 
Constantinople and protecting the seaports nearby.324  
The synopsis of the story goes as follows. One night the castellan’s daughter had a 
dream in which she saw the Prophet [hazret-i resûl]: a ‘lovely-faced friendly person’ [bir 
hûb ve latîf sûretli kişi] came, raised her out of a pit, washed her and clothed her in new silk 
garments. When she woke up she could not forget the appearance of the man of her 
dream. She was curious about the man who saved her out the well; not yet aware of the 
significance of her dream, she ceaselessly wandered until ‘the Turks’ besieged the castle. 
The girl went to fight the Turks and recognised the ‘man of her dream’ leading the siege. 
With a sudden revelation the girl returned home and wrote a letter in which she described 
her dream and promised to turn over the castle to the gazis at an appointed time. She 
attached the letter to a stone and threw it down. It landed at the feet of Gazi Rahman. 
When the letter was interpreted the gazis decided to leave. The inhabitants of the castle 
rejoiced at the gazis departure. Later, the girl dropped a rope and Gazi Rahman climbed 
up into the castle. Together they captured the doorkeeper, let in the other gazis and 
seized the castle. Gazi Rahman, together with the commander of the castle, his daughter 
and the treasure, was sent to the Ottoman ruler Orhan Gazi, who rewarded him with the 
hand of the girl. Aşık Paşazade concluded by assuring his readers that he did not invent 
this story, he wrote down the information that had reached him.325 This story was clearly 
rooted in thirteenth-century oral epic narratives on the deeds of famous dervish-gazi 
hero’s, such as Battalname and Saltukname – and in the much earlier Oǧuz narrative of Dede 
Korkut stories.326 These narrative sources formed some of the stylistic inspirations of the 
early Ottoman historical texts. As already noted, Aşık Paşazade derived his information 
for the early period from the text of Yahşi Fakih, which only survived in his chronicle (see 
Chapter 1). 
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Korkut narrative, see: William Hickman, ‘The Taking of Aydos Castle: Further Considerations on a Chapter from 
Aşikpaşazade’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 99/3 (1979): 399-407, esp. 402-405. 
  267 
 
Figure 12: Miniature of the legend about the capture of Aydos Castle. Gazi Rahman enters the castle by  
climbing to the hair of his lover, the daughter of the Byzantine commander of the castle.  
Source: Şehnâme-i Âl-i Osman (ca. 1550). Reproduced in: Kafadar, Between Two Worlds.  
 
Indeed, one of the characteristics of the early Ottoman historiographical tradition was 
the blending of fiction and facts, such as the menakıb or legendary narratives woven 
around the deeds of gazis. As such, Aşık Paşazade kept the style and the line of narrative 
of this folk story intact and integrated it into his chronicle. The religious and romantic 
facets of the dream and the story clearly expressed the various dimensions of the gaza; 
i.e. the fusion of the struggle for Islam with more worldly concerns, such as material 
benefits and emotional affairs. This understanding of gaza was mostly widespread among 
the popular social groups, especially among the gazi circles to which Aşık Paşazade 
appealed. A convincing explanation for the girl’s desertion of her own community is 
provided through her dream, where she first sees the Prophet and then the ‘lovely-faced 
friendly person’. He included a poem, which expresses the Anatolian Turkish Sufi 
spiritual ideas. Aşık Paşazade alluded to the fusion of two dimensions of love, spiritual 
and worldly: ‘Who has seen that friend [dost]327 with the eye of the soul; the moment she 
saw him she yielded her whole being to her friend. Nothing but the lover remained in the 
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city of the soul; thought dispersed, the reason is given away to the winds. O dervishes, do 
not be astonished by this; she did not see him, but the eye of the soul saw. Aşıkî, love has 
two meanings; the one is apparent and the other is the Manifest One [God].’328      
In his own version of the story, Neşrî clearly based his account on that of Aşık Paşazade 
with some minor modifications. For instance, Neşrî changed the name of the hero into 
Abdurrahman Gazi. As ‘al-Rahman’ is one of the names of God, he probably found it not 
fitting and modified it into a more permissible usage of Abdurrahman. He also depicted 
the daughter of the tekvur of the castle not as intending to fight, but coming to the edge 
of a tower to watch how the battle against the Turk was evolving [Türk ile nice ceng iderler 
temâşa ide].’329 In both versions, the key character in the story was the girl, the castellan’s 
daughter. A remarkable difference in Neşri’s account is that he gave the story an explicitly 
romantic tone, by leaving out any reference to the Prophet. Neşrî, who was more 
detached from the gazi-ethos, probably wished to distinguish the personality of the 
Prophet from this folk-legend. The obvious reason to tell this story is to cast a familiar 
basis for the ethos of gaza-conquests, represented as wilfully surrender of the 
inhabitants.  
 
3.4.1.1 The Ottoman-Karamanid conflicts 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Ottomans did not exclusively fought against the Byzantines 
or Christian polities, but also battled with the fellow Muslim principalities in Anatolia. In 
the 1380s, for instance, the Ottoman dynasty was involved in a conflict with the Turkish 
Muslim polity of the Karamanids. Contemporary sources such as the Royal Calendars or 
Takvims (see Chapter 1) show that the Karamanids were not the only fighting against the 
Ottomans. These calendars referred to Nasreddin beg of the Dulkadır dynasty, to Hamza 
beg and other local Turkish princes who also were in conflict with the Karamanid ruler 
Ibrahim Beg.330 Moreover, the Karamanids also seem to have bothered the Turkish 
principality of the Germiyanids as well.331 In this respect, Neşrî’s search for a legal base of 
Murad I’s campaign against the fellow Turkish Muslim rulers, is of particular interest for 
our topic. He noted that directly after Murad I’s accession, the neighbouring ‘tyrant lords’ 
intended to attack the Ottoman city of Bursa. Consequently, Murad called his jurists to a 
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council and said that ‘while he gathered his army to go on gaza into Europe, the tyrant 
lords had attacked the Muslim people’.332 As they were harassing the Muslims, Murad I 
asked for a fatwa (religious verdict) from the ulema-judges to evaluate whether fighting 
against these ‘tyrant’ Muslim princes was permissible. The judges replied that although 
the gaza against infidels was not obligatory, however, to remove the oppression of 
Muslims was a compulsory duty for a just Muslim prince.333 We observe that the gaza-idea 
and the concept of ‘tyranny’334 offered the legitimate grounds to undertake a war against 
the fellow Muslim rulers. This kind of justification seem to be supported by the Islamic 
jurists, according to Neşrî. 
In his account of Sultan Murad I’s conflict with the Karamanid ruler Alâeddin Beg in 
1386, Neşrî portrayed Murad I in line with the ideals of gazi-rulership: ‘While I am 
occupied with efforts for the sake of God and religion [Hak ta’âla yolunda dîn gayretine 
çalışup], leave therefore my land, forsake the pleasures of banquets [ayş ü işreti terk idüp] 
and go amidst the infidels [kâfir içine girüp] to dedicate my life day and night to gaza, with 
the intention of repelling calamities and troubles [belâ ve mihnet ihtiyâr idem] from our 
lands. He hinders me from undertaking the gaza and enforces me to use the sword upon 
fellow Muslims. If I leave him and continue with gaza then the Muslims will suffer more 
from this tyrant. And if I decide to fight him, then the gazis will have to use their swords 
against Muslims [mü’minler].’335 In a later passage, the legitimacy of a campaign against 
the Karamanids is justified as follows: ‘Without having defeated you, I cannot undertake 
gaza in peace of mind.’336 […] ‘Every year, he attempts to hinder me from the pursuit of 
gaza. To carry out gaza against who hinders the gaza, is the supreme gaza.’337  
In the passage above, we observe that as undertaking the gaza to expand the realm of 
Islam was considered a higher occupation in Islamic political thought, Neşrî therefore 
situated Sultan Murad I in a superior position to the Karamanid prince, Alâeddin Beg. The 
latter was depicted as a local dynast and most importantly a tyrant who oppressed the 
Muslims. According to Neşrî, Sultan Murad – ‘who worked for the sake of Islam, had 
abandoned the worldly pleasures and had dedicated his day and night to the gaza’ – was 
 
                                                     
332 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 88: ‘Sultan Murad […] leşker cem idüp, diledi ki, Rûm-eline geçüp gazâ ide. Etrafuñ mülûki 
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333 Ibidem: ‘Ulema eyitdiler: küffara gaza nefir-i âmm olmasa, farz-ı kifâyedür. Amma müminlerden mezâlimi 
def’itmek farz-ı âyndur.’ 
334 For the concept of ‘tyranny’, see below under ‘justice’. 
335 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 99-100. 
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337 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 103. 
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hindered in his gaza-endeavours and conquests in Europe by the Karamanids. Neşrî 
suggested that the Karamanid dynasty had hindered Murad I’s gaza activities, making it 
a duty for Murad to take measures against the Karamanids. The rebellious act of the 
Karamanids justified the war against them and Neşrî concluded: ‘to carry out gaza against 
who hinders the gaza, is the supreme gaza’.338  
Obviously, this passage had the purpose of highlighting the Ottoman dynasty’s 
commitment to the gaza, which appears to be explicitly formed during Murad I’s conflict 
with the Karamanid ruler. Neşrî’s account suggested that the Ottoman dynasty 
legitimised and denoted the wars against Christian and Muslim rivalling polities through 
the term gaza. By emphasising its gaza activities, Neşrî ideologically explained that the 
Ottoman dynasty had all rights to claim priority and pre-eminence over the neighbouring 
Turkish principalities in Anatolia. The discursive register of gaza in Neşrî’s account 
clearly constituted the ideological legitimation of the Ottoman dynasty’s sovereignty. He 
clustered his account around the image of Murad I as the Gazi Sultan who reportedly 
personified the ideal ruler. 
Furthermore, following Islamic jurisprudence, the Ottoman historian described the 
Karamanid attack of the Ottoman realm as an act of rebellion. According to the Islamic 
law books, a rebel Muslim prince or regime was called bâgî and warfare against it was 
legal. It was lawful for a Muslim state to wage war against the rebels and bandits. It is in 
this light that the Ottoman jurists prepared a legal ground for the war against Karaman-
oğlu by appealing to the concept of dâr ül-bâgî (land of rebellion). A country in rebellion 
was categorised by Muslim jurists as involved in dâr ül-bâgî, which was very important for 
legitimising the warfare between Muslim states.339  
Remarkably, the dervish-historian Âşık Paşazâde remained silent about this first 
Ottoman-Karamanid conflict between Sultan Murad I and Karaman-oğlu Alâeddin Bey in 
1386, probably because it did not fit well in his line of narrative. Writing in 1485, Âşık 
Paşazâde possibly wished to represent the first Ottoman rulers as sincere gazi-princes 
fighting only against the infidels. Warfare against Christian states was easily covered with 
the ideology of gaza, but wars against fellow Muslim states were more difficult to explain 
to his gazi and dervish audience unless there was a legitimate basis.  
During the preparations for the battle with the Karamanids in 1386, Neşrî recorded the 
visit of a Mamluk embassy from Cairo to Murad I’s princely court in Bursa. The envoy 
brought a message of the Mamluk Sultan who ascribed to Murad I the title of ‘Sultan of 
 
                                                     
338 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 103: ‘Mâni’i gazâya gazâ, gazâ-yı ekberdür.’ 
339 On the concept of rebellious Muslim ruler or bâgî, see: Feridun Emecen, ‘Ottoman policy of conquest of the 
Turcoman principalities of western Anatolia with special reference to Sarukhan Beyligi’ ed. Elizabeth 
Zacharidou, The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1389 (Rethymnon, 1993) 35-36; Bernard Lewis, The political language of Islam 
(Chicago, 1988) 81-82.  
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the Gazis and Mujahidin’ (Sultânü’l-guzât ve’l mücâhidîn). According to Neşrî, the Mamluk 
monarch allegedly asked to Sultan Murad I to recognise him as his son and not to see him 
differently than crown prince Bâyezid. The Mamluk Sultan also said that his affection for 
and fondness of Murad was such that if he had a chance, he would readily take part in the 
gaza on Murad’s side.340 Neşrî likely embellished the content of the envoys’ message in 
order to emphasise the support that Murad I received on the eve of the battle with the 
Karamanids. However, his suggestion that the Mamluk Sultan pleaded to be accepted as 
a son of Murad I implied power relations in which Murad was categorised in a superior 
position than the Mamluk ruler. It meant that the Mamluk Sultan had supposedly been a 
vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. This can of course be hardly the case in 1386, when the 
actual event took place. Writing around 1495, at a time of growing Ottoman-Mamluk 
tensions, Neşrî obviously narrated this event in a way that heralded Ottoman power and 
influence vis-à-vis the Karamanid and Mamluk adversaries. 
Likewise, the campaign of Murad I against the Karamanid ruler Alâeddin Beg was 
explained and defended by Ahmedî by emphasising an Ottoman commitment to gaza 
which was hindered by the Karamanids. Remarkably, Ahmedî justified this conflict with 
the fellow Muslim dynasty by referring to the gaza-ideology. He noted: ‘For good fortune 
befell to Gazi Murad; the crown and throne found adornment through him. He was 
solemnly devoted to continue the gaza; and he inflicted on the infidel what he deserved. 
He was widely known for his heroism. And all his efforts focused on the gaza. His brothers 
[Karamanid prince and other Turkish lords] became hostile to him; Their fate ended in 
his hands. They all perished by his sword. […] The şah of Karaman took up battle with him 
[…] The Varsak and the Turgud and the Turk and Rum and Şam, all were with him 
[Karamanid ruler] without exception.’341 
The rhetoric of gaza did not mean that the Ottomans and neighbouring Turkish princes 
always supported each other and were allies against Christian states. There were many 
conflicts and incidents between the Ottomans and the other Turkish principalities, 
particularly with the beglik of Karaman. Since fighting ‘your own kind’ is obviously not 
favoured in any society, the Ottomans searched for ways to justify their wars with other 
Muslim states, in this case with the Karamanids. In Neşrî’s account of the way how Sultan 
Murad I prepared legitimate grounds for warfare against Karamanid ruler Alâeddin Beg, 
the concepts of gaza and ‘tyranny’342 recur as the important discursive registers in the 
ideological narrative of the text. The chronicler represented Murad I as a sultan who 
 
                                                     
340 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 100. 
341 Ahmedî, Dasitân-i Tevârîh, 36-37: ‘Çünki ol Gazi Murâda irdi baht; Buldı ârâyış anuñla tac u taht. Nezr itdi kim 
kıla dâyim gazâ; Anı ide kafire ki oldur sezâ. Ol bahadurlıkda key ma’rufıdı; Hem gazâya himmeti maşrûfıdı. 
Oldılar yagı ana kardeşleri; Kamunun bitdi elinde işleri. Kılıcından oldılar cümle tebâh. […] İtdi anunla Karaman 
şahı ceng […] Varsak u Turgud u Türk ü Rum u Şâm; Anunıla bileyidi anda tamam.’  
342 For a discussion of the term ‘tyranny’, see below the section on ‘justice’. 
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upholds the ideals of gaza. The concepts gaza and tyranny (zulm) also justified Murad’s 
punitive action against Alâeddin, who was allegedly only good in ‘stealing horses’ and in 
oppressing the poor and defenceless people.  
Neşrî concluded his account of the reign of Murad I by presenting him as the ideal gazi 
ruler: ‘this Sultan Murad, who currently is famous as Gazi King, was a good sovereign like 
his father. He dedicated his entire life to gaza. No Sultan of the House of Osman undertook 
such gaza-campaigns as he did. He was the one who smashed the nose of the infidels and 
crushed their morale and shape.’343 Likewise, Ahmedî also praised Murad I as a gazi-sultan 
in various verses: ‘They seized so many lands and cities from the infidels and subjugated 
all their kings. Keep in mind that God has said ‘My people will ascend and nothing can 
rise above them’, said it for them. The reports are many that Gazi Murad was a man of 
pure sincerity and of pure belief.’344 In his account of the Battle of Kosovo, Ahmedî again 
fashioned Murad I as a ruler who dedicated his life to gaza and subsequently gave his life 
for this purpose: ‘There, in that instant, the Auspicous Sultan, who was a gazi, became a 
martyr. He was a gazi and indeed he was carrying out the gaza. He became a martyr and 
certainly he is a martyr. Recall [in battle] to his soul, so that you can achieve conquests 
by means of his conquests.’345 
These verses strike the keynote of Ahmedî’s work that represented the rulers of 
Ottoman dynasty as gazis who devote their life to gaza and as such are destined to die a 
martyr’s hero death in battle. He heralded gaza through martyrdom: ‘The one who 
became a martyr along God’s path; Do not think that he has died, for the fortunate one is 
alive.’346 As his work was conceived as a eulogy rather than a historical work in the strict 
sense, he preferred to narrate some of their brilliant exploits, their highest merits and of 
course their heroic battles and deaths in presenting the Ottomans to his audience. 
According to Ahmedî, these sufficiently characterised the pivotal qualities of heroes with 
exemplary traits. His account of the events served the portrayal of the ideal types as 
embodied in his heroes. In contrast to Neşrî, Ahmedî seems to aim at telling a story that 
illustrated the historical reality in a simpler form by choosing events and simplifying 
their historical significance. The events he selected were certainly not completely 
invented but were simplified and reframed with an array of legends. In any event, 
Ahmedî’s silence and focus on certain topics have to be understood in this context. As 
 
                                                     
343 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 139: ‘Ve bu ol Sultân Murâd’dur ki, şimdiki zamânda buna Gâzî Hünkâr dimekile meşhûrdur, 
atası gibi ol dahı sahib-i hayrdı. Cemî ömrini gazaya sarf itmişdi. Nesl-i Osman’da bu itdügi gazâyi hiç bir pâdişah 
itmedi. Evvel küffarun burnın ovup, şevketin giderüp sûretin sıyan budur.’ 
344 Ahmedî, Dasitân-i Tevârîh, 43: ‘Kafir elinden bu mikdar il ü şehr; Alıban kıldı mülukin cümle kahr. Ümmeti ta’alâ 
velâ tu’lâ diyen; Bunlarun-çün didi ola fikr eyle sen. Söz öküşdür çünki ol Gazi Murad; Pâk-ihlâsıdı vü pâk- itikâd.’  
345 Ibidem, 44: ‘Ol arada ol demde Sultan-ı sa’id; Gaziyidi mutlaka oldı şehid. Gaziyidi vü gazada ber-hak ol; Çün 
şehid oldı şehid-i mutlak ol. Istianet dile ruhından anun; Ki iresin fethe fütuhatından anun.’ 
346 Ibidem, 27: ‘Anı ki ola Tanrı yolunda şehid; Öldi sanma kim diridür ol sa’id.’ 
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demonstrated in Chapter 2, Ahmedî presented the Ottoman Sultans as gazis in ideological 
ways that served the political purposes and needs of his time.   
In the end, Ahmedî’s representation of gaza became a dominant idea in all early 
Ottoman chroniclers. In Neşrî’s account, when the Karamanid ruler had attempted to 
hinder their activities, he hindered the performance of this gaza-mission and it was a 
moral duty for the dynasty to take measures against him. Neşrî explicitly used the gaza-
register in his attempt to defend Murad I’s campaign against the Karamanids. In the 
chronicles, the dedication to gaza constituted one of the central legitimations of the 
dynasty’s claim to rule. The gaza-register appears as a literary device to explain the inter-
state conflicts and to defend the development of state formation. This phenomenon can 
also be clearly observed below in the correspondence between Bâyezid and Timur.    
 
3.4.1.2 The Correspondance between Bâyezid and Timur 
Apart from the prominence of this motive in the chronicles, the discursive register of 
‘gaza’ also explicitly appeared in the correspondence between Bâyezid and Timur. 
Bâyezid I had responded to Timur’s challenge by reconciling his Muslim identity with the 
nomadic political traditions.347 Like ‘Emir Timur’, Sultan Bâyezid I also appealed to the 
Muslim gazi-idea. Bâyezid said that fighting Timur – whom he compared with infidel 
Mongols – amounted to the ‘greatest gaza’.348 The gaza in this sense meant war against 
the Mongols. They both tried to combine the ideals of a ruler mandated to establish a 
universal empire, in the nomad steppe tradition, with the Islamic ideal of political 
unification of the Muslim world. Before the battle in 1402, both monarchs exchanged a 
series of letters during two years. The records of this epistolary dialogue between Bâyezid 
and Timur were not preserved independently nor were they reproduced in the fifteenth-
century Ottoman chronicles. However, Ibn Arabshah, a historian at the court of Timur, 
did mention the epistolary dialogue and one of the letters is quoted almost verbatim in 
his chronicle.349 On the Ottoman side, four letters are found in a sixteenth-century 
compilation of diplomatic briefs, collected by Feridun Bey (d. 1583), a scribe in the 
Ottoman chancellery).350 The authenticity of the letters in Feridun’s manuscript remains 
 
                                                     
347 For an analysis of the letters between Bâyezid en Timur, with special attention to their invocation of Mongol, 
Turkish, Rum Seljuk and Islamic gazi principles and hegemony claims, see: M. H. Yınaç, ‘Bayazid I’, İslam 
Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2, 269-279; Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam,120-128. 
348 Yınaç, ‘Bayazid I’, 277. 
349 Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans, 121. 
350 See: Feridun Bey, Münşeat us-Selatin, vol. 1 (İstanbul, 1858) 119-126.  
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a topic of intensive debate among scholars.351 However, important for this study is the 
rhetoric of the correspondance and specifically the question whether and how the term 
gaza was deployed. Even if Feridun Bey forged some of these letters in the 1570s, he most 
probably attempted to reformulate them in line with the gazi image which we also 
encounter in the fifteenth-century historical texts.  
 
         
Figure 13: (left) Sultan Yıldırım Bâyezid I.   
Figure 14: (right) Emir Timur Lenk. Timurid period.  
Source: Topkapı Palace Museum H2152, folio 33b.  
 
The first letters between Bâyezid and Timur were written in Arabic. Timur wrote an 
intimidating letter with a brief message: ‘Know this, you king of Rûm, Yıldırım Bâyezid, 
that I am the new sultan in the lands of God’.352 He demanded the return of the two 
Turkish lords who had fled from Timur to Bâyezid’s protection. Bâyezid responded to 
Timur’s claim by rejecting Timur’s Muslim identity because of his violence towards 
Muslims. Bâyezid represented himself and his dynasty as the true gazis, who spent all 
their time ‘fighting the enemies of religion’: ‘Praise the lord who honoured us with the 
Islam and graced us with gaza from amongst the sultans of the Arabs and Persians. Know 
this, you atrocious dog, who is called Timur and who is more infidel than the Byzantine 
emperor, we read your letter, you cursed man. Do you take me as the kings of Persia or 
 
                                                     
351 For the source critic of Feridun Bey’s Münşeat and the debate on the authenticity of the letters, see: M. Halil, 
‘Feridun Beg Münşeatı’, Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası, 162-165, 216-226. A recent overview of the debate, 
see: Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans, 121-122. 
352 Feridun Bey, Münşeat us-Selatin, vol. 1, 120. For these letters in Arabic and Persian, I used the translation of 
Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam, 123. 
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the rabble Mongols of the steppe […] Sure enough, all you do is break promises and vows, 
shed blood and violate the honour of women. Our whole occupation and the bulk of our 
affairs is to fight the enemies of religion, be they infidels or apostates. […]’353 Bâyezid’s 
reply supposedly led to Timur’s first invasion of Anatolia and capture of Sivas in 1400. 
A year later, they exchanged two more letters, in which the princes switched to 
Persian. Timur defended himself by asserting that he was not keen on violating the 
honour of Muslims, and rather portrayed himself as their protector. He again demanded 
of Bâyezid to acknowledge his overlordship and avoid warfare. Bâyezid should not cause 
anxiety as they were like father and son in age. In return for his submission, Timur would 
aid Bâyezid in his gaza efforts as he was a well-known supporter of the gazis. Although 
Timur in his first letter had not recognised Ottoman dedication to gaza, he now seemed 
to have become aware of the Ottoman gaza-tradition from Bâyezid’s letter. He seemed to 
have accepted Bâyezid’s self-representation and called him the ‘protector of gazis and 
mujahids’. Therefore, he proposed to Bâyezid not to fight each other, because the infidel 
Franks would take advantage of it. However, he also implied that Bâyezid’s army was not 
composed of Muslims. Finally, Timur reminded Bâyezid that he undertook world 
conquest and was of Djengizid lineage, in contrast to Bâyezid whom he reproached with 
being of an unknown lineage.354  
Bâyezid answered Timur in the following way: ‘Let him mark that my forefather of 
excellent lineage, Ertuğrul, along with three hundred warriors, dashed himself against 
the army of infidel Tatar Mongols who had overrun Sultan Alaaddin [Keykubad], the 
Seljuk prince, dashed himself against a mountain of iron and tore open the line of 
Mongols with the power of his mace, and with the help of God, broke and defeated them. 
He [Ertuğrul] was honoured with the position of marcher lordship of the frontier lands of 
the Muslims. His rightful heir, Sultan Osman made gaza his motto and his means of 
earning for this world and the next. […] If we had intended to destroy countries and to 
subject people seeking world conquest, we would easily have captured all the lands from 
east to west. Instead, we have battled the adversaries of Muhammed’s religion. You called 
our army born of heathens. There is no shame in that. All the companions of the Prophet 
were thus. Benevolent sons of non-Muslims are better than cruel sons of Muslims. Until 
this day, no member of the House of Osman has repelled the enemy with flattery or with 
ruse. Rather, we come directly as the sun that lights the world.’355  
In Bâyezid’s letters, the image of gazi-sultan was clearly already strongly consolidated 
and emphasised as the identity of the dynasty. Bâyezid dismissed Timur’s Mongol lineage 
by referring to his great grandfather Ertuğrul as a gazi who had already defeated the 
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Mongols of whose decent Timur boasted. He implied that gaza against the Mongols was a 
point of pride to him, since his ancestors had fought and defeated them. To defend his 
sovereignty against Timur’s claims, Bâyezid asserted that the founders of his dynasty 
were legitimate rulers of excellent lineage. He represented his forefathers as proud 
marcher lords who were confirmed in their status by Seljuk Sultan Alaaddin Keykubad, 
the last independent Seljuk ruler before the Mongol invasion of Anatolia. Bâyezid also 
styled himself as the Sultan of Rum (Sultan-ı Rûm) and claimed the legacy of the Seljuks of 
Rum.  
The discursive register of gaza had remained significant, but had changed in 
connotation during Bâyezid’s time as directed mostly against Christian states. However, 
when Timur challenged Bâyezid by boasting his Djengizid lineage, Bâyezid most likely 
drew from the older thirteenth-century meaning of the notion of gaza as fighting against 
the Mongols, which was more appropriate in this situation. As discussed earlier, after the 
fall of the Ilkhanids in the early fourteenth century, the anti-Mongol understanding of 
gaza had steadily changed. When around 1400 Timur appeared on the scene as the new 
Mongol khan, the late thirteenth-century connotation of the gaza in the meaning of the 
fight against the pagan Mongols was revived by many Turkish princely courts in Anatolia. 
When Bâyezid represented himself as Sultan of Gazis, he was clearly drawing on this older 
Turkish rhetoric of gaza in the anti-Mongol sense.356  
Though Bâyezid I represented himself as a gazi, some of the Ottoman chroniclers 
refused to use the title of gazi for Bâyezid, despite the fact that he himself deployed it 
explicitly against Timur. Ahmedî was the first writer who refused to depict him as a gazi, 
although he described his early reign similar to other rulers. In laudatory verses, he 
depicted Bâyezid as a just ruler, patron of sciences and scholars, etc. Concerning his 
conflict with Timur, Ahmedî seems to take to a rather critical tone. For instance, he was 
remarkably silent about Bâyezid’s victory against the crusaders at the Battle of Nicopolis. 
As Ahmedî had recorded his work several years after the Battle of Nicopolis, it was 
impossible that he had no information about this significant success of Bâyezid.  
The obvious reason was that Ahmedî did not find it opportune to portray Bâyezid as a 
gazi, because of his sudden fall at the Battle of Ankara. If he had not been defeated by 
Timur, Ahmedî would probably have fashioned Bâyezid as a great gazi similar to his 
predecessors. But his unfortunate defeat enforced some modifications, because if a failure 
befell Bâyezid as a gazi, it would undermine the whole legitimacy of the dynasty and 
weaken the confidence in it. This was certainly not in the interest of Ahmedî’s patron, 
Süleyman Çelebi, the son of Bâyezid, who competed for the throne. Ahmedî’s treatment 
of the concept was actually the result of a work of art, which was produced in the service 
of the political objectives of his patron, belonging to the Ottoman dynasty. 
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The reason why the author of the Anonymous Chronicles also refused to call Bâyezid a 
gazi was the result of completely different political objectives and concerns. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the anonymous author expressed the concerns of the Turkish gazi nobility, 
who resented the attempts of Bâyezid to extend the bureaucratic and centralised 
administration to the entire realm. This had generated immense discontentment in the 
gazi milieu, as the warriors felt that they were being marginalised from their former 
positions in which they had been in control of resources and had inherited privileges. The 
anonymous text affirmed the concerns and values of that gazi audience about their 
society. As a result, the account of the Anonymous Chronicles is full of bitterness and 
expresses particular hostility towards Bâyezid. Consequently, the anonymous chronicler 
suggested that Bâyezid lost the battle against Timur because he failed to satisfy the needs 
of his followers, and that he should have known better in order not to lose the divine 
support for his kingdom and to behave accordingly.  
However, Neşrî, who wrote almost a century after Ahmedî and was detached from 
these early fifteenth-century ideological and political concerns, saw no objections to 
fashion Bâyezid as a gazi. As he was an ulema-historian, rather addressing a courtly and 
scholarly audience, he portrayed Bâyezid in general both as a just ruler and as gazi.357 
However, he did criticise him for neglecting to consult his officials and for his quick 
temper and anger as these were viewed as behaviours that a ruler should avoid.358 Among 
the fifteenth-century chroniclers, Neşrî was the only historian to praise Bâyezid despite 
his tragic defeat. For instance, he included the following poem in Persian where he 
scolded Timur as ‘a feetless kharidji’: ‘For many years, Gazi Sultan Bâyezid found the grace 
that had reached him. He ruled for nearly fourteen years the lands of Rum, as straight as 
the arrow under his arrow-ring. When the inevitable misfortunate reached him, he found 
his feet tied at the battlefield. Three nights before the start of the outer year, the feetless 
kharidji has defeated him.’359   
 
3.4.1.3 Murad II as the ideal Gazi Sultan  
We have already observed that in the chronicles Murad I was the first ruler who was 
fashioned as the ideal Gazi Sultan. However, the unfortunate defeat of Bâyezid I and the 
subsequent painful civil wars in 1403 represented a rupture in the use of the gazi-
 
                                                     
357 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 155: ‘İy begler! Sizin söziñüz gerçek mi yalan mı inanmazuz. Zîrâ, ol bir gâzî handur’; 151: 
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hâric-râ se şeb kabl ez-duhûl; Hâricî bî-pây ber-vey dest yâft.’ 
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ideology. The unity of the conception of gaza seems to have been broken during this 
period. Somewhat later, during the reign of Murad II, we see the notion of gaza come 
forward again as a prestigious discursive register. It was most strongly elaborated in the 
Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad or the ‘Book of Conquest’ dealing with Murad II’s Varna campaign 
in 1444. This time, the concept was used in the meaning of struggle directed against the 
crusaders or infidels (küffar). During Murad II’s reign, the Timurid threat had faded and 
the Ottoman state had mostly recovered. The anonymous author of Gazavat reported that 
when the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg allied himself with the Byzantine emperor John VIII 
against the Ottomans, Sultan Murad II called the jurists, explained the problem and asked 
them what needed to be done according to Islamic law: ‘The Padişah summoned the ulema 
on the morning of the following day. When he explained the situation to them, he said: 
Masters, what is your ruling? What is the judgement of the Sharia if a man makes common 
cause with the infidel and causes harm and oppression to the community of Muhammed? 
The ulema replied: if this is the case, he is himself an infidel.’360  
Some passages further on, Murad II replied to the Karamanid envoys, who told him 
that the Karamanid prince had repented what he had done and begged forgiveness: ‘that 
scum called the son of Karaman has collaborated with the infidel and coveted the throne. 
Does he believe that he can get away with this mischief? Either I shall seize and kill him, 
or else he takes himself off to another land.’361 The anonymous author of the Gazavat 
portrayed Murad II as a merciful Sultan, who finally forgave the Karamanid ruler on the 
condition that he should never again stir up any sedition or mischief. According to Aşık 
Paşazade and Neşrî, the Karamanids had launched an attack emboldened by the defeat of 
Shehabeddin Pasha (Kula Şâhin).362 They noted that Karamanid lord was acting according 
to his coalition with the Serbians, which foresaw that the Hungarians attacked from the 
west and Karaman from the east.363 
Confronted with a shortage of troops when the crusaders invaded in 1444, the Gazavat 
reported that Sultan Murad II declared the unusual nefiri âm or ‘general mobilisation’. This 
measure obligated all Muslim men in the Ottoman realm to join the army: ‘the Padişah of 
the World gave the command: because the infidels have overrun our dominions and are 
attacking us, it is incumbent on every member of the community of Muhammed to depart 
 
                                                     
360 Gazavât, 5: ‘Yarındası al’es-sabah Padişah ulemayı katına davet edüb ve bu ahvali anlara söyleyüb dedi kim, 
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362 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 172 ; Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 291. 
363 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 156, 158. 
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for this gaza-war.’364 The author noted that even the Ottoman Christians were invited to 
military service: ‘let everyone in Rumelia who is capable of wielding a mace set out, 
whether on foot or on horse.’365  
In early Ottoman military practice, this nefiri âm or general mobilisation was still very 
exceptional, for the Islamic principles considered the gaza not as an obligatory exploit. 
Gaza was usually seen as farz-i kifaye: a battle waged by a group of warriors for the benefit 
of the whole society and community. However, in case of great danger for the Muslim 
community, as in the case of the Battle of Varna, the gaza was asserted by the Ottoman 
government as farz-i ayn: a general obligation and duty (nefiri âmm) for every man. 
According to the Gazavat, Murad II also issued a ferman or royal decree stating the 
obligation of all able men to join the army. This declaration was sent out to the judges or 
kadis in Rumelia and Anatolia, who were responsible for local administration. In return 
for their assistance, Murad offered the participants of the gaza whatever they wished: ‘It 
should be known that whoever accompanies us on this victory-crowned campaign and 
offers assistance out of love for the religion of Islam, my imperial assent has been granted 
for whatever it is they request. Whatever it is they wish, whether a timar or zeamet 
military fief, whether a post in the janissary corps or household cavalry or release from 
yörük (nomadic) status, I have accepted it.’366 
At the eve of the battle, Sultan Murad II called the commanding officers, pashas and 
beys before him and explained to everyone of them what they had to do on the battlefield. 
After having ordered the ranks, he gave the following message to his lords and pasha’s: 
‘Each one of you should stay in this correct position and each one of you should encounter 
his own enemy. Even if the enemy attacks me, if they fall upon my ranks, in no way you 
should break your rank and leave your position. […] My lords and pasha’s, you should be 
aware that if any of you shows cowardice as you did before and turns his face from the 
infidels, he should never again appear before my sight or remain within my realm. 
However, if any of you distinguishes himself and smites the enemy in the gaza, then I 
shall show him even greater consideration than he could wish for, and bestow the highest 
offices to him.’367  
 
                                                     
364 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 12: ‘Padişah-ı âlem buyurdular kim, çünki küffar-i hâkisâr il ve memleketi çiyneyüp 
üstümüze geldi. Cemî’an ümmet-i Muhammed olanların üzerlerine farz oldı kim, bu gazâya çıkalar.’ 
365 Ibidem: ‘şöyle kim Rumelinde eger atlu ve eger yayak çomak atmaga kâdir olanlar bile çıksun deyü nefîr-i ‘âm 
buyurmagın.’ 
366 Ibidem, 14: ‘Şöyle ma’lum oluna kim, bu sefer-i nusret-me’âbıma gelüb Dîn-i İslam aşkına imdâd idüb bizimle 
ma’an sefere varanların her ne mürâcaatları var ise, katımda makbul-i hümâyunumdur, eğer tımar isteyene ve 
eğer zeamet isteyene ve eğer yeniçerilik isteyene ve eğer sipahilik isteyene ve eğer yörüklükten çıkmak isteyene 
her birinin murâdu maksudları makbulumdur.’ 
367 Ibidem, 56-57: ‘Padişah-ı âlem nasihatlar eyledi ve eyitti kim, göreyim sizi hemân her birinüz kollu kolunuzda 
olub hemân her biriniz kendi hasmınıza cevâb veregörün. Şöyle kim, eger küffar benim üzerime dahi yürüyüb 
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We have observed that Bâyezid I was harshly criticised for his defeat. Some historians 
even refused to call him a gazi. It appears that a sultan could only receive the reverence 
of gazi according to his skills as a successful army commander. Those who were not 
victorious in battles were doomed to have a hard time or even lose their right to rule. 
According to the chroniclers, being a successful army commander appears to be a major 
asset and requirement of a ruler. Indeed, as we have observed, in the fifteenth century, 
states were made or collapsed according to their prowess in battles and the position of 
the ruler as a victorious leader of the army seemed to be very important.  
One of the notable examples of this theme can be found in the account of Murad’s role 
as the leader of the army during the Battle of Varna in 1444. According to Neşrî, a fierce 
battle had begun in the early morning. Initially, the crusaders were at the winning hand 
and they had routed the left and right wings of the Ottoman army. Murad witnessed how 
the beylerbeyi (governor general) of Anatolia, Karaca Beg, had been slain. Shortly 
afterwards, the troops from Rumelia also began to retreat and they fled in groups to the 
mountains. Murad was left at the battlefield only with his household infantry or the 
janissaries, who also hoped to quit the battlefield and avoid the capture of Murad.  
Neşrî described this moment: ‘The sultan, left alone with his janissaries, was on the 
verge of fleeing as well. Aware of this situation, Dayı Karaca Beg, dismounted from his 
horse, grabbed the reins of sultan’s horse and said: ‘O, my Sultan! What are you doing? If 
you go, the infidel will chase us to Edirne.’ He did not let go of the sultan’s horse’s reins. 
He rode the sultan’s horse to the top of a high place and halted there. At this time, there 
was a commander (aga) of the janissaries, called Kazancı Doǧan. He reproached Karaca 
Beg and said: ‘Hey you, vicious man! You killed Sultan Alaeddin. Do you intend this time 
to do the same to our prince? Release the reins and let him go.’ Karaca Beg was by no 
means deterred. Even Sultan Murad said: ‘Karaca, the infidel has defeated us.’ However, 
Karaca Beg replied: ‘And we will crush them, with God’s will’.368 Thereupon, Murad 
followed the advice of his lord Karaca Bag and decided to stay, bracing himself to 
imminent assault. This choice proved to be the decisive event in the battle. 
 
                                                     
benim alayıma dest urub benimle ceng iderse dahi siz olmaya kim, gediginizden ayrılub alayı bozasız. […] imdî 
begler, paşalar, bilin ve âgâh olun ki, eger yine evvelki gibi muhannislik edüb her kangınız küffardan yüz 
döndürürse bir dahi benim gözüme görünmesin ve il ve memleketimde durmasın ve ammâ her kangınız ki, yüz 
agırdub düşmana dîn-i mübin ogruna kılıç urub gazâ iderse ana dahi diledüginden ziyade re’âyetler edüb 
mansıblarını a’lâ edeyim.’  
368 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 296 : ‘Rûm-ili leşkeri çekilüp giñ yire çıkdı. Hünkar dahı kapusı halkıyla yaluñuz kalıcak 
kasd itdi kim, ol dahı kaça. Tayı Karaca Beg, bu hâle vâkıf olup, fi’l-hâl atından inüp, hünkaruñ atına berk 
yapışup: ‘Hay devletlü Sultanum! Neylersin? Eger sen gidicek olursan, kafîr ardımuzca Edrene’ye gelür’, diyüb, 
hünkâruñ atını koyu virmedi. Gedip, bir yüksecük yire çıkarup, tutub turırdı. Ol vakt, Kazancı Togan dirlerdi, 
bir yeñiçeri agası varıdı. Karaca Beg’e kakıyub eyitdi: ‘Bire kara yüzlü gidi! Sultân Alâeddin’i öldürdüñ. Bu kerre 
begimize dahı mı kast itdün? Koyuver gitsün’, didi. Karaca Beg aslâ mukayyed olmadı. Sultân Murâd, Karaca 
Beg’e ‘kâfir bizi sıdı Karaca’ didikçe, Karaca Beg ‘Biz de anları sıyaruz, inşâ-Allah’, dirdi.’  
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Interestingly, the moment in which Murad II initially thought for a moment to retreat 
as the battle seemed lost, was censored and not mentioned in the Gazavat, nor by Oruç 
Beg. As the Gazavat was composed as a panegyric narration of the Varna campaign, this 
moment of hesitation experienced by Murad probably did not fit in the image of the 
valiant gazi-sultan that the Gazavat aimed to fashion. From Neşrî’s account, we 
understand that the military insights and skills of Murad’s lord, Karaca Beg, proved to be 
decisive that eventually led to the victory. His account implied that it was one of Murad’s 
statesmen who kept his calm and guided the sultan to take the right decisions. In this 
way, a seeming defeat and the possible occupation of the Ottoman capital Edirne were 
avoided. Furthermore, Murad’s attempt to retreat and to stay at the battlefield seem not 
to be merely expressions of a ruler’s whims. They appear to be bound by rational and 
emotional considerations. Neşrî implied that the choice for retreat, stay and attack had 
decisive consequences not only for the outcome of the battle, but also for the reign and 
realm of Murad II.   
By contrast, the author of the Gazavat fashioned rather the topic of the gazi-sultan: 
‘many of the troops of Islam who had been defeated and fled the field collected their wits 
and saw that his majesty the Padishah the Refuge of the World was standing firm like a 
wounded lion, never retreating from the infidel and never for a moment giving up the 
battle. Those who foresaw what the end would be, had returned and were standing in 
ranks behind the Padishah.’369 Similarly, Oruç Beg noted that when Murad saw the 
withdrawal of the army’s wings, he raised his hands and prayed for the help of God. Oruç 
described the retreat of the greater part of the army as ‘God’s will and His verdict’.370 
Furthermore, while Neşrî described the retreat of the troops in neutral terms, the author 
of Gazavat reproached them as ‘cowards of Rumelia’.371  
The anonymous author of Gazavat portrayed Murad as taking immediate action and 
implementing the necessary battle formation: ‘the Padishah the Refuge of the World 
commended himself to God and sent the rear guard into action, placing his janissaries and 
azabs in front. They took refuge in God, scouted the warriors oath [or gülbânk]372 of Allah 
 
                                                     
369 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 64: ‘ammâ asâkir-i İslam’dan sınub kaçanlardan bir nicesi aklın başına devşirüb bakdı 
gördü kim, Pâdişâh-i âlem-penâh hazretleri kanar asrslan gibi durub küffar-hâkisârdan yüz döndürmeyüb 
dâima ceng u cidâlden bir ân hâli degildir. Bunun sonunu müşâhede edenler yine dönüb Pâdişâh’ın ardında saff 
olub alaylar düzüb durmuşlar idi.’ For Oruç Beg, see: Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67. 
370 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67: ‘iş Hakk’uñ kudret anuñ. Hakk’uñ emrine kimesne girmez. […] Sultân Murâd Han dahı gördi 
kim, hâl böyle oldı, el götürüp yüz göge dutup Hak tâ’âla tarafına tazarru’lar idüp…’ 
371 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 63: ‘Rumeli’nin muhannislerini’ 
372 The word ‘gülbang’, is a Persian term literally meaning ‘the song of the nightingale’ and by extension also 
loud cries of various kinds. In Ottoman usage, the word is applied more particularly to the call of the muezzin 
and to the Muslim war-cry, citing the sacred praise of the name of God (‘Allah Allah’). Specifically in the Ottoman 
case, gülbang was also the name for the ceremenial oath of the Janissary corps. They recited the gülbang at 
 282 
Allah; and as the army band [tablhane]373 began to beat the drums in battle tempo and the 
trumpets brayed, they launched an attack on the infidels who are as low as the dust on 
the ground’.374 The Gazavat described the following battle scene: ‘it was impossible to 
describe how the two armies got so mixed together and fought a fierce battle that day. 
Both the Muslim soldiers and the infidels indulged in such great efforts on the battlefield, 
that a father could not recognise his son, nor a son his father. And the angels in the heaven 
and the fish in the sea marvelled the sight of the majesty of this battle.’375  
The flow of description of the battle in the next episode is more or less similar in both 
the Gazavat and Oruç Beg. When Murad decided to stay on the battlefield, the desperate 
assault of the Hungarian king Wladislas and his slain changed the tide of the battle. Along 
with those among the janissaries and azabs376 who had not yet fled, Murad still had some 
of his household soldiers around him. The Gazavat noted that four hundred janissaries 
 
                                                     
payment parades, accession of a Sultan and during a campaign. In particular, the janissaries cited this praise 
before the corps launched the attack in the battlefield, as a way of building morale and intimidating the enemy. 
Since the jannisary corps had strong relations to the Bektashi mystical order, their gulbang comprised many 
terms deriving from the Bektashi tradition. See: ‘gülbang’, EI²; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtında Kapıkulu 
Ocakları, 249, 375, 421-422, 533-534. The janissaries recited this oath led by an officer (baş çavuş) standing with 
crossed arms: ‘Allah Allah, there is no second God. In barehead, in a state of trance and with the sword in blood. 
No one asks how many heads are cut off in this arena. That’s all right, that’s all right, our fury and our sword 
hurting the enemy demonstrate our loyalty to our Padishah. For the sake of the threes, the sevens, the fourties, 
of the gulbang of Muhammad, the Light of the Prophets, of our spiritual master Ali, our king and sultan Hacı 
Bektaş-ı Veli [patron saint of the janissary corps], for their epoch and wheel of fate, let us recall and say God.’ 
See: Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtında Kapıkulu, 422. It is obvious that this oath was a martial code of 
conduct to create a psychological effect in order to stand firm at the eve of a deadly fight, in which one could 
die after a minute. This implied upholding the morale of soldiers, legitimizing the martial acts and 
strengthening the ties of solidarity and identity among the ones who shared the same fate and the way of 
warrior.   
373 Tablhane ( ltr. ‘the drum house’) or mehterhane was the music band of the Ottoman army. One of its functions 
was to play continuously during the battle. The Sultan’s standard (ʿalem) was located near the mehter, so that 
silence from the direction of the band could lead to abandoning of the battlefield. Certain battle signals were 
given by the percussion section of the mehter. Although Gazavat wrote that the janissaries entered battle at the 
pace of the mehter music, the band was, however, not responsible for regulating the movement of the troops in 
battle. The abolition of the janissary corps in 1826 led to the neglect of the mehter répertoire, which appears to 
have been mostly forgotten by the start of the twenteeth century. See: Walter Feldman, ‘Mehter’, EI².  
374 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 64: ‘Hemân Pâdişâh-i âlem-penâh hazretleri vücudunu Allah’a sipariş kılub dip alayı 
depredüp yeniçerisin ve azabın önüne katub ve Hazret-i Allah’a sıgınub gülbâng-i Allah Allah edüp ve tablhâne 
çeng-i harbiye turralar urub […] küffâr-i hâkisârın üzerlerine hamle edüb yürüdüler.’  
375 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 64: ‘Bu kerre iki asker serâser biribirilerine karılub ol gün bir ceng durdu kim, takrîri 
mümkün degil. Amma ceng gittikçe kızıştı. Eger Islam askeri ve eger küffar ziyade gayret edüb şöyle bir bâzâr 
kuruldu kim, ata ogulu ve ogul atayı teşhîsden kaldı ve ol cengin heybetine gökde melek ve deryada semek 
tahsîn eyledi.’  
376 Infantry made up by recruted troops from the Muslim population. 
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and four to five hundred azabs remained with Murad.377 The chronicler Oruç Beg noted 
that Murad was left with only five hundred janissaries at the battlefield, entrenched in a 
fortified position.378 This position consisted of a trench and bulwark behind which stood 
soldiers armed with arquebus. Many of the crusaders were killed by gunfire and bowshots 
while attempting to breach this defensive fortification of the centre.379 According to the 
Gazavat, the crusaders made seven charges in attempting to break through.380 Neşrî 
impeached the Hungarian commander Janos Hunyadi (Yanko) of deceiving his king to 
personally charge an attack to break through the ditch. According to Neşrî, Hunyadi said: 
‘We have defeated the Turk. What are you waiting for? As the king, you have to maintain 
the honour for yourself and fight Sultan Murad personally.’381 Neşrî suggested that 
Hunyadi wished to become the king of Hungary and he therefore lured all the rivalling 
Hungarian lords to attack the Ottomans. While these were usually captured by the 
Ottoman warriors, Hunyadi fled each time. He called Hunyadi ‘an accursed type full of 
trickeries.’382  
Neşrî portrayed king Wladislas as misled by his own ambitious commander Hunyadi 
and as such charged in pride and vanity towards his own end. Oruç Beg also stated that 
king Wladislas, ‘indulged by pride and arrogance’, attempted to break through the ditch 
and to reach Sultan Murad II.383 The chroniclers unanimously account that after the king 
and his followers had broken through the ditch, the disciplined janissaries let them pass 
only to surround them afterwards. A janissary felled the horse of the king, who fell to the 
ground, and another janissary, called Koca Hızır, chopped his head off.384 Interestingly, 
the fethname written after the battle to the Karakoyunlu ruler in Tabriz, asserted that the 
king was captured and brought to the sultan and was subsequently executed after it was 
ascertained that he was the king.385 Although the battle continued to rage on while the 
retreated troops came back, the Ottoman army had secured the victory.  
 
                                                     
377 Ibidem, 64. 
378 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67: ‘Sultân Murâd Han dahı kendü alayı ile kapu halkuyla tururken kapu halkı tagılub sehel 
yeñiçeri kalub, beş yüz mikdarı kalmamış idi dirler.’  
379 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 62. 
380 Ibidem, 66. 
381 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 296: ‘Yanko yüriyüp kıral’a eyitdi: ‘İşte Türk’ü sıdık. Ne turursın? Sultân Murâd üzerine var 
ki, bege yine beg gerekdür’, didi.’ 
382 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 296: ‘Bu Yanko bir hîle-bâz mel’ûndı, murâdı Ungurus’a beg olmakdı. Ol sebebden ol 
diyârdan kendüye itâ’at itmiyen kâfir beglerinden her kangı olursa, ‘vuralım Türk’e şöyle idelüm, böyle idelüm’ 
diyüp, aldayup götürüp, Türk’ün bahâdırlarına tutıverip, kendü kaçardı. Kırala varup, bu kez işimiz rast gelmedi, 
dirdü. Bu suretile Ungurus beglerinden kırdurı kırdurı az komışdı. Pes kıral dahi mestdi. Yanko’nun sözine 
i’timâd idüp, eline bir gönder alup, hemân hünkâruñ alayına at depti.’  
383 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67.  
384 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67-68; Neşrî, Cihannüma, 296-297; Gazavat, 65-66; Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih, 405.  
385 Imber’s translation in: The Crusade of Varna, 194. 
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Figure 15: The Ottoman army on campaign, by the court miniaturist Nakkaş Osman (c. 1597).  
Source: Şehinşehnâme, Topkapı Palace Museum, H1524, folio 256b.  
The Ottoman descriptions of the deeds and conducts of king Wladislas and Sultan 
Murad II at the battlefield had obvious ideological intentions. The chroniclers suggested 
that Murad II retained his position as the ruler and the commander of the army by taking 
the right decisions, despite a moment of hesitation when the battle seemed lost. By 
contrast, King Wladislas lost his head and his kingdom due to his ‘pride and arrogance’, 
his personal ambitions and his lack of insightful decisions. Furthermore, Neşrî fashioned 
Sultan Murad II in terms of a benevolent and merciful ruler. After the battle was won, the 
soldiers prayed for the sultan and congratulated him with this ‘great gaza’. Murad 
ordered that the lords who had fled the battlefield should be displayed in women skirts. 
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However, his entourage and the lords pleaded for mercy and Murad seemed receptive and 
forgave them.386   
In the discourse of the Gazavat, Sultan Murad is also depicted as encouraging his 
soldiers and commanders by employing the noble understanding of the gaza-register. 
According to the Gazavat, Murad made the following speech before the Battle of Varna: 
‘the Padişah commanded all the Janissaries, infantry officers and azabs into his presence. 
He greeted them all and said: You are all my companions in every gaza-campaign. Let us 
see how for the sake of Islam you fight those unbelievers who are our enemies. You know 
the virtue of gaza and you know how exalted a rank of martyr is. Just as we were born so 
too we shall die. Therefore, we will fight together valiantly now while the opportunity is 
there to undertake the gaza. Those of us who kill shall be gazis and those who die will be 
martyrs. Together let us achieve our desires in this world and the next.’387  
Obviously, being a gazi or actually being the sultan of gazis appeared to be one of the 
most important qualities and duties of the ruler. The author of the Gazavat portrayed 
Murad II as the ideal Gazi Sultan and popularised this image through a courtly view. 
Therefore, he developed peculiar features and topics which he probably borrowed from 
the earlier geste narratives of famous gazi-warriors, such as Battalname (see Chapter 1). 
This becomes clear in the following passage in the Gazavat:  
‘That night the Padishah of the World performed the night prayer and he lifted 
his hand and said: O Padishah of Padishahs! My hope is in You, O my God! O God 
who is the remedy for the sorrowful and the decree for the helpless. With tears 
I have rubbed my face in the black earth, O God, do not abandon me at this hour! 
O Lord of all creation, it is You who are the God, the Creator, the Deity, Allah. 
There is nothing apart from your court, God, who is the mine of mercy for all 
sinners. For the honour of Your beloved, Muhammed, double Your mercy to us! 
The enemies of religion are coming and wish to abrogate the Koran, O God! Make 
me the means for this gaza, grant us the decree, O God! That night the Padishah 
offered prayer and supplication until morning, rubbing his face in the earth.’388  
 
                                                     
386 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 297: ‘dönüp gelüp Sultan Murâd’a du’â idüp, ‘devletlü sultanum gaza-yı ekber mübarek 
olsun’ didiler. Andan Sultan Murad buyurdı, ol kaçan beglere avrat tonın geyürüp, tahkîr idelerdi. Yine nedimler 
ve yine begler dilek idüp, afv itdürdiler.’ 
387 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 57. 
388 Ibidem, 57-58: ‘Ammâ Pâdişah’ı âlem o gece yatsu namâzın edâ edüb ve el kaldurub eyitti: 
Ey Pâdişahlar Pâdişahı; Ümidim sana tutmışım İlâhi; Ki ey dertlilerin dermânı Allah; Mededsiz kalmışım fermânı 
Allah; Yüz urdum kara yere göz yaşiyle; Koma mahrûm bu anda beni Allah; Bu cümle mahlukâtın sensin ey Hak; 
İlâhı hâlikı Yezdânı Allah; Senin kapından özge yokdurur hîç; Heme âsiye rahmet kânı Allâh; Habîbin ol 
Muhammed hörmetiyçün; Muzâ’af kıl bize gufrânı Allah; Bu dîn düşmanları şimdi gelüben; Diler ibtâl ede 
Kur’ânı Allâh; Sebeb kılub beni işbû gazâya; Nasîb edüb bize fermânı Allah; deyüb o gice Pâdişah tâ subh olunca 
yüzünü yerlere sürüp tazarru’ ve niyâz eyledi.’ 
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Aşık Paşazade’s account of the Battle of Kosovo of 1448, in which he participated 
himself, showed remarkable similarities to the language and style of the passage above of 
the Gazavat. The themes emphasised and a number of other discursive registers all 
suggested that Aşık Paşazade strongly relied on the Gazavat and gave prominence to an 
officially endorsed version of the events. His version was very similar to the style of 
narrative of the Gazavat, propagating the glorious image of the gazi-sultan Murad:  
‘Sultan Murad expressed his intention of waging gaza against the enemies. 
When he heard the news that the infidels had moved towards Kosovo, the sultan 
also marched for Kosovo. On Friday, at dusk, he encountered the infidels. When 
the sultan saw the infidel army, he immediately got down from his horse and 
performed two sets of emergency prayers. He lifted his hands and implored the 
Highest Lord, rubbed his face on the earth, and said: O my God, protect this 
handful of Muslims and give them your assistance. For the sake of Muhammed, 
the dear pride of both worlds, protect them. Do not humiliate them at the hands 
of the infidels for the sake of my sins. When he finished his prayer and 
supplication, he restated his intention for gaza, got back on his horse, and 
charged the infidels. That day, they fought an incredibly intense battle. Many 
heroic lords risked their lives and became martyrs. Among the infidels too, 
many princes fell and died and many were taken alive. […] I myself killed an 
infidel and Sultan Murad gave me and Dervish Akbıyık a horse each.’389 
After the disastrous defeat of Bâyezid I at Ankara in 1402, the officially endorsed 
historical texts by the court managed to solidify Murad II’s image as the ideal gazi-sultan 
and propagated it. This view of Murad II as a Gazi sultan was even endorsed by the author 
of the Anonymous Chronicle, who as we have seen was otherwise very critical of the 
dynasty’s centralising policies. Both the author of the Anonymous Chronicle and Aşık 
Paşazade came from gazi and dervish social backgrounds and they accordingly reflected 
the perception and concerns of this gradually ever more marginalised class of frontier 
warriors and semi-nomadic people. Interestingly, the storyline of the Anonymous 
Chronicle also shows some similarities with the Gazavat, such as Murad getting off from 
his horse rubbing his face in the earth and begging to God before the battle of Varna.  
In his panegyric World History or Behcetü’t Tevârih (ca 1458), the Ottoman historian 
Şükrullah included a brief chapter on Ottoman dynasty until the reign of Murad II. As Ali 
Anooshahr already showed, Şükrullah depicted the history of the dynasty as one of early 
rise due to gaza, a decline and absence of it during the reign of Bâyezid I and the following 
 
                                                     
389 Aşık Paşazade, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, 407-408. 
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civil war, and a return to gaza during the reign of Murad II.390 Şükrullah explicitly denoted 
only Murad II as the ‘sultan of the gazis and mujahidin’.391  
He clearly propagated a courtly image of Murad II as the ideal gazi-sultan, which 
demonstrates the effectiveness of courtly propaganda: ‘He performed five gazas. First, he 
conquered Thessaloniki; second was his gaza at the pass of Zlatitsa; third, the gaza of 
Varna; fourth, the gaza of Germe; fifth, the gaza of Kosovo. During the reign of this pious 
Padishah, the believers in the lands of Rûm [Ottoman realm] were safe from disasters and 
oppression, living in security and justice. The experienced and insightful scholars who 
knew the situation in other countries of the world unanimously agreed and said that they 
had never seen or heard about such a prosperous country as the land of Rum during the 
reign of Sultan Murad. […] In no other time had there been as many good and pious deeds 
as during the reign of this religion-nurturing Padishah – deeds such as gazas, conquests 
of the lands of infidels, takings of castles and fortresses, the building of schools, mosques, 
caravanserais, bridges and other works of charity, the education of scholars, the 
ennobling of spiritual masters, and compassion towards the people and the weak.’392  
In the Ottoman fethname written after the Battle of Varna in 1444 and sent to the 
Karakoyunlu ruler in Tabriz, the dedication to gaza is also explicitly formulated as one of 
the prestigious components of Ottoman state ideology. The fethname of Varna emphasised 
this idea by quoting the following verses from the Qur’an: ‘Those who struggle on Our 
behalf, we shall guide them on Our paths.’393 ‘Do not count those who struggle in God’s 
way as dead. No, they are alive and are given sustenance from their Lord, rejoicing in 
what God has given them out of His grace’394; and ‘battle those who make sedition appear 
on earth.’ 395 Thereafter, the fethname grounded the Ottoman claims on sovereignty on the 
gaza topos, in the sense of expanding the realm of Islam:  
‘We […] for years and days held state power in trust for exalting the affairs of 
Islam and for making comfortable the state of mankind, things which are given 
in custody by God, the Omniscient King. We have confined and devoted the 
seasons and the hours to raising the standards of Muhammad and reviving the 
edicts of the law of Islam. We have not for one minute neglected to guard the 
right order of the public affairs [nizâm-ı âlem], to contribute to the welfare of 
 
                                                     
390 Ali Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans, 163. 
391 Şükrullah, Behcetü’t Tevarih, 391.  
392 Ibidem, 392. 
393 Qur’an, 29:69. 
394 Qur’an, 3:168-169. 
395 Qur’an, 40:26. 
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mankind, to make ready the necessities of gaza, and to prepare the weapons to 
wage battle against those ‘who make sedition appear on earth.’396  
And some passages further: ‘we are struggling for the advancement of the true religion 
and the illumination of the straight path. We are putting on our full armour for the gaza 
and the embarrassment of the people of rebellion and sedition […] Through the blessing 
of the beauty of faith and sincerity of mind, victories, new and without measure, come to 
pass in our imperial days.’397   
This fethname depicted Murad II as the ideal gazi-sultan and referred to the Ottoman 
troops as ‘the armies of Islam’. By using the rhetoric of binary opposition, the treachery 
of the ‘infidel’ enemies was contrasted to them: ‘I have exercised my sword with the help 
of God, the Exalted, the Blessed, in scattering and confounding the infidels […] In every 
year and under every circumstance, the victorious armies of Islam have encountered the 
pig-headed Albanians, who are full of hypocrisy. Sometimes they have settled matters 
with contemptible infidels of Constantinople, and sometimes opposed the ill-omened 
Hungarians, who are enemies of the religion of the Prophet and deniers of Muhammad’s 
message. Sometimes, they made treaties and agreements with the wicked and debauched 
bandits of Karaman, who in truth are robbers and enemies of the people of faith.’398  
It has by now become clear from many passages of the chronicles that Murad II 
appeared as the ideal ruler who corresponded to all the virtues of the Sultan of the gazis: 
just, prudent and merciful. Murad II was portrayed according to these values and role 
models, expressed in a narrative style familiar to the various social groups to whom the 
historians addressed their words. In this case as well, the image of Sultan Murad II was 
fashioned in line with their horizon of expectation, with the tastes and presuppositions 
of their intended audiences and anticipating on their personal knowledge of what had 
happened. The discourse on noble and courageous gazi behaviour was indeed crucial in 
shaping the self-representation and forms of behaviour for the intended audience. In this 
respect, Sultan Murad II was unequivocally portrayed as a ruler who confirms to the 
ideals of a gazi-sultan, who undertakes his campaigns in favour of the Muslim community 
and styled as the champion of the faith.  
However, Murad II does not give the impression of a ruler who fights just for the sake 
of warfare. He appeared as a ruler who knows the value of peace as well as an excellent 
army commander at extremely sensitive moments. At the Battle of Varna, Murad showed 
that he knew when and how to battle if circumstances required so. Some non-Ottoman 
historians also described Murad II as a ruler who did not like wars. He was portrayed as 
 
                                                     
396 Fethname, originally written in Persian, in Imber’s translation, The Crusade of Varna, 189.  
397 Ibidem, 190. 
398 Ibidem, 190. 
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an able statesman, with a clear insight of the political situation, but by no means as a man 
who found satisfaction in war. The Byzantine historian Doukas praised Murad II saying 
that he ‘truly despised warfare and loved peace, and the Father of Peace meted out in turn 
a peaceful death’.399 He was gentle to his enemies, kept his oaths and was not vengeful. 
Moreover, ‘he did not set out thirst after the complete destruction of the fallen nation, 
but as soon as the vanquished he sued for peace, he dismissed the ambassadors in 
peace.’400 Kritovoulos, another Byzantine chronicler wrote of Murad II: ‘He was a kind, 
generous, majestic ruler of high character, skilful in military leadership and purely noble 
in descent.’401 Even Bertrandon de la Broquière, praised Murad II’s disposition to peace: 
‘they told me that he hates war, and I think it is true, because if he wanted to use the 
immense wealth at his disposal it will be easy for him to conquer many places in 
Europe.’402 Murad’s nature, which tended toward Sufism, marked his interest for a 
spiritual life and which probably influenced his character and deeds. Most importantly, 
the Ottoman chronicles created his image as ‘an ideal ruler in the late medieval Muslim 
world’. 
Of course, Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror was also portrayed as a gazi sultan. The 
most vibrant comment on Mehmed II’s gaza-identity may be found in Aşık Paşazade’s 
account of his campaign upon Trabzon. Mehmed made a long trip to conquer the city and 
Sara Hatun, mother of Uzun Hasan, the ruler of the Akkoyunlu dynasty, attempted to 
persuade him not to. She said that the mountain road was steep and rough and asked 
whether it was worth taking the trouble just for one city. Sultan Mehmed II explained his 
reasons to her: ‘Mother! All these pains are not for Trabzon, but for the sake of the religion 
of Islam, so that I should not be shamed in the afterlife in front of God. For, we carry the 
sword of Islam. If we do not undertake these efforts, we would not deserve to be called a 
gazi.’403 
Aşık Paşazade provided the following account on the conquest of Kefe, located at the 
southern coast of the Crimea. In 1475, the province of Kefe was conquered by Sultan 
Mehmed II’s brilliant army commander, Gedik Ahmed Pasha, probably of Byzantine 
origin. When the Ottoman army had landed on the port of Kefe, Gedik Ahmed Pasha gave 
the following speech to encourage the soldiers: ‘O Gazi comrades! Work for the sake of 
 
                                                     
399 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 189. 
400 Ibidem. 
401 Kritovulos, İstanbul’un Fethi, 31 
402 Broquière, Le Voyage d’Outremer, 181-182: ‘On m’a dist aussi qu’il het assés la guerre et ainsi me le samble il, 
car s’il vouloit exequiter la puissance qu’il a et sa grant revenue, veu la petite resistence qu’il treuve en la 
crestienté, ce seroit à luy legiere chose à en conquester une grant partie.’ 
403 Aşık Paşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 224: ‘Sara Hatun eydür: ‘Hay oǧul! Bir Tırabuzon içün bunca zahmetler niçün 
çekersin?’, didi. Pâdişâh cevab verdi kim: ‘Ana! Bu zahmetler Tırabuzon içün degüldür. Bu zahmetler dîn-i 
İslâm yolınadur kim ahretde Allah Hazretine varıcak hacil olmayavuz deyüdür. Zîrâ bizüm elümüzde İslâm 
kılıcı vardur. Ve ger biz bu zahmetleri ihtiyâr etmesevüz bize gazi demek lâyık olmaz.’ 
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Islam. This city of Kefe is befitting to be a part of ‘the realm of Islam’ [dârü’l-İslâm]. With 
the help of God, we will add Kefe to the realm of Islam.’404 In this passage, Aşık Paşazade 
clearly expressed a more courtly endorsed gaza-ethos and understanding. Remarkably, 
he used the term ‘dârü’l-İslam’, which derived on Islamic political thought. He made Gedik 
Ahmed Pasha proclaim the gaza in the sense of struggle for the sake of Islam and as an 
activity undertaken to expand the territories of the Muslim world.  
 
3.4.1.4 The material components of gaza 
However, it is important to note that the gaza also carried other connotations and 
meanings, different from the political agenda of the royal court. Especially for the average 
soldiers, gaza implied in the first place material gains, such as spoils and booty. The gaza 
in this understanding can be most explicitly found in the work of Aşık Paşazade, who had 
participated in the campaigns of Sultan Murad II. He noted that he participated in all the 
campaigns of Murad II and that whatever he wrote about the sultan came from his own 
personal observations: ‘I, Aşıkî Derviş Ahmed, have seen and known all the gazas and 
adventures that Sultan Murad Han made as well as the circumstances which occurred to 
him and his utterances and actions, but I wrote them in summary in this menakıbname.’405 
However, in the following passage, sultan Murad II merely played a distant role while the 
story is all about Aşık Paşazade’s personal gains and benefits in highly personal tone: 
‘One day, a fight occurred among the soldiers. Ishak Bey immediately mounted 
on his horse and all the gazis mounted too. Unfortunately, we saw a troop of 
infidels suddenly appear before us and behind them came still many more 
troops. Their infantry was in the front and their cavalry behind them. They 
came upon us swiftly as a thick black cloud. On this side, the Muslim gazis cried 
out ‘Allah is great’, and they attacked the infantry with their horses. […] Then 
Ishak Bey commanded: ‘Hey gazis, that’s enough killing for now. Start taking 
prisoners.’ By God, I myself took five of them captive, apart from the ones I had 
killed. I brought them to Üsküb and sold all five for nine hundred silver coins. 
To say it brief, Semendire was captured in that year.’406  
 
                                                     
404 Aşık Paşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 263: ‘Hey gazi yoldaşlar! Gayret-i İslâm edün kim bu Kefe dârü’l-İslâm’un 
üzerinde havâledür, didi. Bunu dahi dârü’l-İslâm idelüm, didi.’ 
405 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 186: ‘Ve bu gazalar u mâcerâlar cemî’i anun hâlinün, kâlinün, ef’âlinün; bu ben Aşıkî Derviş 
Ahmed her birisini gördüm ve bildüm ammâ ihtisar etdüm. Bu menâkıbda yazdum.’ 
406 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 167-168: Bir gün leşker içinde bir gavga belürdi. Ishak Beg ol sa’at at üzerine bindi. Cemî’i 
gaziler dahi at arkasına geldiler. Nâgâh gördük karşudan bir alay kafir çıka ve arkasından bir nice alay dahı çıka 
geldü. Yayasın önüne tutmus. Ve atlusı ardına turdı. Kapkara pus olup üzerimize yörüdi. Bu tarafdan ehl-i Islam 
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This sample from Aşık Paşazade’s account explicitly displays intimacy with and passion 
for the gazi ideal, something the author experienced as a young man. As already 
discussed, Aşık Paşazade was not writing directly under the patronage of the Ottoman 
court. Rather, he narrated for his personal audience of gazi-dervishes to whom he 
addressed this story.  
One of the most striking comments on and criticism of the motivation of the soldiers 
by prospects on material gains can be found in the famous letter, written by Sheikh Ak 
Şemseddin to Sultan Mehmed II during the siege of Constantinople.407 In the first phase 
of the siege, on 20 April, three Genoese ships managed to break through the Ottoman 
blockade on the sea and reached the city under siege. Tursun Beg noted that ‘this event 
caused a lot of desolation and sadness among the people of Islam.’408 The despair was great 
and it was feared that the entire campaign would end in failure and defeat. The then 
twenty-one year old Sultan Mehmed II was reportedly losing his morale after this naval 
battle. During the military council that was held after this event he was put under 
pressure by the influential grand vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha, who asserted to lift up the 
siege claiming that it might provoke another crusade similar to the one of Varna. 
However, since the policy of appeasement of Halil Pasha had failed to prevent the 
crusader invasion and assault in 1444, it was too naive to think that a withdrawal of the 
siege might avoid such a threat at this point. As such, the young vizier Zaganos Pasha 
dismissed Halil’s claims and argued that the European Christian rulers were too divided 
because of their internal rivalries and could not form an alliance at once. Zaganos also 
asserted that even if they managed to put together a crusader fleet, the amount of soldiers 
they could transport would be far smaller than the Ottoman forces. As there was no 
danger of a large scale crusade, he insisted on continuing the siege and asserted that the 
city could even be seized before the arrival of any military aid.409 Although the young 
Sultan Mehmed II maintained the same view as Zaganos Pasha and wished to continue 
the siege, he seems to have remained undecided.  
At this moment, Mehmed’s spiritual master Ak Şemseddin came to the scene. In his 
epistle to Mehmed, Ak Şemseddin firstly acknowledged that the defeat at sea had caused 
general disillusion and one might easily doubt victory: ‘by this event the heart of the 
Sultan is broken and furious, while the enemy intensifies its zeal. You might have 
 
                                                     
gazileri tekbir getürdiler bir kezden, heman yayanun üzerine at saldılar. [...] Ishak Beg cagırttı kim: Hey gaziler, 
Yiter kırdunuz, esir edün imden gerü, didi. Vallahi fakir kırdıgumdan gayri beşin esir itdüm, Üsküb’e getürdüm. 
Beşini tokuz yüz akçaya virdüm. El-hasıl-ı kelam, ol yılda Semendire dahi feth olundı.’ 
407 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, no. 5584. This letter is reproduced in facsimile in: İnalcık, Fatih Devri üzerinde 
tetkikler ve vesikalar, 217-218.  
408 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 53: ‘bu hâdise ehl-i İslâm arasında fütur ve perişânî saldı.’ 
409 İnalcık, Fatih Devri, 128-130 
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indulged by a lack of opinion and judgement […]’410 The ulema scholar, Ak Şemseddin 
reminded Mehmed II that most of the soldiers did not fight and risked their lives solely 
for the way of God. He noted that they only would fight when they could see the prospects 
on gains: ‘If there was an opportunity for spoils, the soldiers would throw their life 
without hesitation into fire for the material gains in this world.’411 Therefore, Ak 
Şemseddin advised Mehmed II not to let himself go in negligence and to appoint a 
commander with ‘little mercy and gentleness’ in order to fill up the ditches and to attack 
the fortifications.412 The scholar wrote that if Mehmed wished to be victorious, then he 
had to act with determination. The young sultan had to accept and follow the guidance 
of his own fate and fortune. His feeling was that the outcome of the siege would not be a 
retreat in shame and disillusion, but a victorious conquest and triumph.413  
Most importantly, in this letter we can notice that Ak Şemseddin disapproved and 
disliked the booty-driven understanding of gaza that the common soldiers held, as he 
reminded Mehmed of this aspect in order not to give up his endeavour. Apart from the 
courtly endorsed gaza rhetoric as ‘fighting on the path of God’, most soldiers indeed 
appeared to be driven and motivated by booty and profits. As we have seen, this was also 
observed in Aşık Paşazade’s account of his personal gains and benefits in the campaigns 
of Murad II. In this respect, it seems that the siege of Constantinople took a long time 
because most of the soldiers showed indifference to fight. Initially, Mehmed II had 
prohibited the looting of the city, as he wished to make it the new Ottoman capital and 
capture it untouched. Nevertheless, he had to change his mind when he became aware 
that most of the soldiers did not want to risk their lives solely for Mehmed II’s geopolitical 
vision and ambitions.  
According to Neşrî, the Byzantine emperor discussed to surrender the city with Lucas 
Notaras (Kir-Luka). However, ‘the Frank’ (i.e. the Genoese mercenary, de Giustiniani) 
opposed this plan and said that they wished to fight and not surrender. There followed a 
period of fifty days of fierce fighting. Finally, on day fifty one, Sultan Mehmed proclaimed 
 
                                                     
410 In İnalcık’s edition of the letter: Fatih Devri, 217: ‘Oldur ki bu hadise ki ol kemi ehlinden oldu kalbe hayli 
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412 Ibidem: ‘bunun gibiye racı oluna bir merhameti ve rıfkı az olan kimesneye buyurasız ve kal’aya hücum idecek 
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the right to plunder the city and the general attack began.414 Following the advice of his 
spiritual master Ak Şemseddin, Sultan Mehmed II allowed and proclaimed the right to 
plunder on the 27th of May in the army camp. The final and general assault started after 
midnight of the 29th of May. Only a few hours later, in the morning, Constantinople was 
conquered.415  
We can assume that the bulk of the army showed reluctance to fight until the 
perspectives on profits and benefits were real and the plundering allowed. The ulema-
historian Neşrî showed some implicit criticism or distanced himself from this booty-
driven gaza ethos. He recorded that the benefited booty at the conquest of the city had 
become so famous that if one wanted to tease someone one used to say ‘have you profited 
of the looting of Constantinople’. 416 He did not seem to be interested in this practice, as 
he did not provide a further discussion of the immense profits gained.  
According to the Byzantine chronicler, Chalkokondyles, Sultan Mehmed II had sent 
one of his lords, Isfendiyar-oǧlu İsmail Bey, to the Byzantine emperor and offered him an 
agreement for peaceful surrender in order to avoid the plunder of the city.417 Another 
contemporary Byzantine historian, Doukas, mentioned that, after the capture of the city, 
Sultan Mehmed asked the grand duke Lucas Notaras why he did not surrender the city. 
Mehmed II said that in that case the damage and plunder would have been avoided. 
Notaras allegedly replied that he and the Emperor wished to surrender, but neither he 
nor the emperor had the authority to do so. Notaras also said that one of Mehmed’s 
officials, referring to Halil Pasha, had urged them not to surrender and assured them that 
Mehmed could not capture the city.418  
Interestingly, Aşık Paşazade recorded a story which suggested the alleged ‘corruption’ 
of Halil Pasha. According to this story, Halil Pasha had supposedly receive bribes from the 
Byzantines: ‘the emperor said that only our friend Halil Pasha can save us from the Turk. 
However, we have to send him a fish again. They filled the belly of the fish with florin 
coins and sent it to Halil Pasha. Kir-Luka [Lucas Notaras], a vizier of the emperor, warned 
them and said: Halil will eat that fish, but will not support you. The fish came to Halil. 
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416 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 314: ‘Hattâ darb-ı mesel olmışdur, bir kişiyi gınâya nisbet itseler, ‘Istanbul yagmasına mı 
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417 Chalkokondyles as quoted by İnalcık, Fatih Devri, 131. 
418 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 232. 
 294 
Halil Pasha put the belly of the fish into a coffer. He accepted the words of these infidels, 
went to the sultan and told him all kind of things about these infidels.’419  
There might be some elements of truth in it, however, the story might also have been 
entirely fabricated by Halil’s political opponents, becoming a popular narrative widely 
disseminated after his fall and execution. Still, the accounts of Doukas and Aşık Paşazade 
curiously seem to confirm each other to a certain degree. It is remarkable that though the 
conquest of Constantinople took place in Aşık Paşazade’s lifetime, he accounted this 
important event very briefly and did not mention any personal gains. By contrast, he 
usually described in detail his gains in the campaigns of Sultan Murad II. Consequently, 
in his chronicle, Aşık Paşazade gave more attention to the reign of Murad II, while his 
account of the reign of Mehmed II was very concisely recorded, though he also lived in 
this period.  
Particularly interesting, concerning the discursive register of gaza, is that whereas 
Aşık Paşazade was able to reflect the gaza mentality, Neşrî was not. Not because he was 
closer in time to the events than Neşrî, who wrote only a decade after Aşık Paşazade, but 
clearly because they belonged to two different social worlds. Aşık Paşazade expressed the 
historical consciousness of the frontier gazi dynasties that had helped the House of 
Osman to build a state and had received in return the centralising policies of Sultan 
Mehmed II. Mehmed II successfully took over sources of revenue that had still remained 
in the hands of gazi warlord and ulema households, significant for the early consolidation 
of the Ottoman Empire.420 These groups were aware of their marginalisation and 
consequently felt alienated from the dynasty and its household, who formed the new 
ruling elite. As discussed above, this tension characterised the whole process of state 
formation and was also reflected in the fifteenth-century historiography.  
In other words, the constitution of a state ideology in the earliest chronicles was to a 
certain degree determined by the struggle between various political factions. In this 
respect, Aşık Paşazade’s history was characterised by bitterness that stemmed from deep 
feelings of loosening ties (asabiyya) between the dynasty and the Turkish aristocracy.  
Therefore, he was very critical against the officials from this newly emerging elite. In 
many passages, he cherished nostalgia for the old days of sharing of wealth and of 
relatively egalitarian relations, during the reigns of Osman Gazi and Orhan Gazi. By 
 
                                                     
419 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 414: ‘Tekür eydür: eger bu Türkden bize kurtılmaga 
çâre olursa dostumuz Halil Paşa’dan olur. Imdi girü Halil Paşa’ya balıcaklar göndürmek gerekdür. Balıgın karnını 
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balıgı yudar size dermânı tokınmaz, dir. [...] Balıgı Halil’e getürdiler. Halil Paşa balıgun karnını sanduga koydı. 
Kâfirlerin sözini kâbul idüp turdı, hünkara geldi ol kâfirler hakkında niçe sözler söyledi.’ 
420 Linda T. Darling, ‘Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World’, Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 38/4 (2008) 506. 
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contrast, Neşrî’s intended audience consisted mainly of the ulema scholars and the new 
ruling groups closer to the court. He frequently used the gaza-ethos as a literary motif 
with ornamented descriptive style, of which the vocabulary derived from Persian epic 
narratives.421 However, in general, Neşrî’s text displayed no interest in the gazi-warrior 
practice of booty, so vividly expressed and described by Aşık Paşazade. 
  
  
 
                                                     
421 For example, see his ornamented description of the battles during the siege of Constantinople: Neşrî, 
Cihannüma, 311-313. 
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3.4.2 Justice or Adl, the king of all virtues 
It may well be that gaza was one of the most important discursive registers to 
ideologically support the genesis of the Ottoman state. However, possessing military 
leadership capabilities and being a gazi-sultan alone were not sufficient qualities to be 
called a successful ruler or to be represented as one. Without exception, the earliest 
Ottoman historiographical sources agreed on the key importance of ‘justice’ for the 
maintenance of order in the society. The legitimacy of the Ottoman sovereigns’ authority 
relied not only on their capability of negotiation with the subjects. Especially, on the 
perception of the Sultan’s public image by his Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects as a 
just ruler to whom they had given their consent. The loyalty of the people could only be 
won and kept up by justice. As Ali counselled, if the human treasury was neglected, the 
financial one would necessarily pass to another dynasty.422 The Ottoman state ideology 
certainly claimed that it would establish the best and desired social order, in which 
justness and legitimacy was self-evident for everyone. This was illustrated in the 
following verses of a poem included by Âşık Paşazâde in his chronicle: ‘A just khan is a 
friend of God; it is not a shame if the world submits to such a ruler. [Prophet] Süleyman423 
also seized the world through justice; every just khan is equal to Süleyman.’424 
The reason for such emphasis on just rule in Ottoman chronicles, was mainly because 
the base of the Ottoman legitimacy was weak. Regarding the fifteenth-century Ottoman 
political thought, Cornell Fleischer pointed out that the Ottomans had the weakest claim 
to political legitimacy. Neither religion nor genealogy were sufficient to legitimise the 
Ottoman claim on sovereignty.425 Firstly, the Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, who could 
authorise the Ottoman claim to sovereignty, was long ago executed by the Mongols. 
Secondly, the Ottomans were no descendants of Prophet Muhammad or of the imperial 
dynasty of Djenghiz Khan, which also could have legitimised their claims to sovereignty. 
Lacking an imperial lineage and the authorisation of a caliph, the Ottoman historical 
tradition of the early chroniclers, compensated it through the active promotion of pivotal 
ideas, such as ‘justice’ and gaza. These concepts explicitly endorsed a state ideology.  
Commitment to justice was necessarily made as explicit as possible. Indeed, justice 
together with kanun (law code) seem to have provided the tools to consolidate an empire 
 
                                                     
422 As quoted in: Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 282. 
423 In Islamic tradition, Süleyman (or Solomon) is considered as a great prophet and as a divinely appointed 
monarch, who ruled the world with justice. Süleyman, the youngest son of prophet Davud, was endowed with a 
high level of wisdom and with extraordinary gifts. 
424 Âşık Paşazâde, Tevârîh, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 344: ‘Velîdür her ne han kim âdil olsa; Degül ayıb cihân aña kul 
olsa. Süleymân adl idüp tutdı cihânı; Süleymân mislidür han âdil olsa.’ 
425 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 276. 
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that governed over widely diverse territories and religious communities. As Tursun Beg 
noted, a distinguished lineage was not necessary for a good governance. The candidate 
for rulership accredited by lineage was not necessarily the best sovereign; true 
sovereignty and suitable rule were better demonstrated by acts and virtues. Tursun 
wrote: ‘No ruler can be worthy of praise or be justly proud unless it is by reason of 
possessing all or some the four virtues: wisdom, courage, honesty and justice. Those who 
take pride in their descent and lineage can only do so because they have fathers and 
ancestors who were known for these virtues.’426  
Justice was also often highlighted in earlier historical works and advice books. In the 
Oğuzname, it is stated that Tugrul Khan established his state on justice, truthiness and 
goodness.427 Neşrî noted that Gün Han, the son of Oǧuz, was a just ruler: ‘he was a just and 
wise ruler. He restored the lands in south and north with his justice. During his reign, 
many cities were built in Turkistan and elsewhere.’428 Furthermore, the Kutadgu Bilig, one 
of the oldest mirrors-for-princes in the Turkish language, instructed the princes on their 
duties towards the people in order to obtain a successful rule and emphasised justice as 
the supreme virtue: ‘I settle matters with justice. I do not make a difference between lords 
and subjects. I settle the matter with integrity. […] Whoever comes to my door fleeing 
from tyranny finds justice. That man will depart from me in sweetness; he is pleased and 
laughs.’429  
In his siyaset-nâme or ‘Book of Government’, the Seljuk vizier Nizâm al-Mulk also 
emphasised the necessity of justice. He therefore quoted several traditions of the Prophet. 
According to one tradition, Prophet Muhammad said: ‘Justice is the glory of the faith and 
the power of the government; therein lies the secret of the prosperity of nobility and 
commons.’430 Nizam al-Mulk advised: ‘A kingdom may last while there is irreligion, but 
will not endure when there is oppression.’431 He defined just rule as: ‘the right way for a 
sultan to acknowledge God’s grace is by looking after his subjects, giving them justice and 
preserving them from oppressors.’432 Likewise, as mentioned above, Ahmedî had also 
 
                                                     
426 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 17. 
427 Togan, Oğuz Destanı, 74: ‘[...] Tugrul, etraf ve çevre ülkelere elçiler gönderip devleti adalet, doǧruluk ve iyilik 
esasında kurdu.’ 
428 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 9: ‘Veled-i ekberi Gün Han [...] melik-i muvahhid, âkıl ve âdildi. Bilâd-ı şarkiyyeyi ve 
şimâliyyeyi imâret idüp, bunun zamânında Türkistanda ve gayrda niçe şehrler binâ olundı.’ 
429 Yusuf Has Hacib, Kutadgu Bilig, ed. and tr. Reşit Rahmeti Arat (Ankara, 1998) 40: ‘Şekere gelince, o zülme 
uğrayarak, benim kapıma gelen ve adaleti bende bulan içindir. O insan benden şeker gibi tatlı tatlı ayrılır; sevinir 
ve yüzü güler.’  
430 Nizâm al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 49. 
431 Ibidem, 12. 
432 Nizâm al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 45. 
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suggested that the justice of an infidel ruler might preserve his reign while an unjust 
Muslim sultan might lose his throne. 
In several Ottoman advice books as well as in the chronicles, the notion of ‘justice’ or 
‘adâlet was defined as the prevention and elimination of oppressive acts (zûlm) by those 
who exercise state power.433 The concept adl originally meant ‘straight’, ‘balanced’ and 
later acquired the more specific meaning of ‘justice’. The term is frequently used in the 
Qur’an and in the traditions of the Prophet.434 The classical view of ‘justice’ or adl can be 
found in the work of al-Ghazalî, who noted: ‘Justice is distinguished from tyranny (zulm) 
only by law. The religion of God and the law of His Prophet are the goal and the sanctuary 
of every departure and every arrival to justice.’435 In later works, adl was employed in a 
meaning closer to its original connotation of ‘balance’ and ‘equilibrium’. It denoted a 
situation in which the public order of society was kept in balance. For a successful 
government, it was advised to protect the tax-paying classes (merchants, craftsmen, 
peasants) which were the main sources of revenue. This was required to ensure the 
stability of state-society relations. The discourse on justice emerged in this respect as the 
crucial rhetoric tool for maintaining the nizâm-ı âlem or ‘right order of society to the 
benefit of the general public’, which as we have already mentioned was a central concept 
in Ottoman political theory.436  
The earliest known Ottoman siyaset-nâme or Fürstenspiegel was Bedr-i Dilşâd’s 
Muradnâme, written in the early 1420s (see Chapter 1).437 The advices given to princes in 
the Muradnâme relied on the ideas of the ancient philosophers, Quranic verses and the 
traditions of the Prophet. After the conversion of the Turks to Islam, the most important 
sources for the principles of ethics were based upon the Qur’an and the prophetic 
tradition.438 The main principles for good political behaviour and virtues of kings in the 
Muradnâme are clustered among others around being honest, possessing divine sanction 
and favour, obligation to consult statesmen, being prudent, avoiding oppression and 
cruelty, refraining from pride and vanity, being serious, being kind and generous, 
showing mercy, being brave and most importantly implementing a just rule. As we will 
observe, Sultan Murad II, according to the Ottoman chronicles, kept step with all these 
features as the ideal ruler. 
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434 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an (Montreal, 1966) 209-211, 234; See also: ‘adl’, EI². 
435 Lewis, Political Language, 143. 
436 For a brief introduction to the Ottoman use of the concept ‘justice’, see: İnalcık, ‘State and Ideology’, 70-78. 
437 Murâd-nâme,, 2 vols., ed. Âdem Ceyhan (İstanbul, 1997). 
438 Ibidem, 19; Agah Sırrı Levend, Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (Ankara, 1988) 121-122, 166. 
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At the very start of Muradname, the author formulated a set of advices to monarchs, 
emphasising just rule. The author asserted that a monarch has to know God’s verdicts in 
order to rule with justice and mercy and make this his custom, combined with 
benevolence and kindness. If a prince wished to be merciful, he had to be above all a just 
ruler. However, when a prince did not take to divine ordinances, then he would become 
a deputy of the devil, opposing to God’s will. A ruler should know that if officials under 
his command should oppress people, he would be taken responsible for the oppressive 
acts of his statesmen.439  
The Muradnâme continued by emphasising the importance of justice by referring to the 
Prophet’s tradition (hadith): ‘One hour of just governance is more auspicious than sixty 
years of worship in vain’.440 A verse from the Qur’an about just government was also 
quoted: ‘Surely God commands that when you judge between people you judge with 
justice.’441 Various references to the virtue of acting justly can be found in the Qur’an. For 
instance, in one of the Qur’anic verses, it is re-commanded that if two Muslim parties are 
in dispute, they should be reconciled in justice: ‘make peace between them with justice 
and act equitably; surely God dears those who act equitably.’442 The Qur’an frequently 
reminds the believers that God only appreciates the rulers who act justly.  
Likewise, the Muradnâme noted that one of the seven selected groups among mankind, 
which God would keep under his shadow and shelter at doomsday, were the sultans who 
governed their realm with justice. Every monarch, who seeked to find this favour with 
God, should consequently act with justice. Furthermore, the ruler was advised to act with 
empathy toward his subjects. The author of the Muradnâme defined justice by advising 
the ruler ‘to treat the people in a way that you would seem right that you yourself be 
treated’.443 The Muradnâme also referred to a famous tradition of the Prophet, which 
accounted that a monarch should only pray to be a just ruler: ‘because the ruler’s virtue 
underlies the well-being of his subjects and the prosperity of the world’.444   
 
                                                     
439 Murâd-nâme, 209-211: ‘Ulu iş imiş âleme hânlık; Eger Hak süzine hilaf itmeye; İşi kendözinden güzaf imeye; 
Halîfe olur Tañrı’dan âleme; Ki hükm eyleye bunca bin âdeme; Dilerse ki Rahman sıfatlu ola; Gerekdür ki key 
ma’diletlü ola; Ve eger ki Tañrı sözine uymaz ise; Nedür hükmi tuyar ya tuymaz ise; Dahı re’feti şefkati olmasa; 
Halife olur ki şeytan içün; [...] Boyun koya Tañrı’nun emrine; Sora bile Tañrı’nun emri ne; Gerek adl ü insafı âdet 
kıla, Dahı lutf u ihsânı gâyet kıla. [...] Dahı şöyle bilmek gerekdür ki her; Ne zulmi kulları anı ider; Kamusını 
andan sorarlar imiş.’  
440 Murâd-nâme, 212: ‘Kâle’n-Nebiyyü Aleyhi’s-selâm; Adlü’s-sâati hayrun min ibadeti sittîne sene.’ 
441 Quran, 4:58 
442 Qur’an, 49:9. 
443 Murâd-nâme, 213: ‘Hüdâ gölgesinde dutar anları; Ki ol demde râhat ola cânları; Biri ol yidinün şu sultan imiş; 
Ki âlemde adl idici hân imiş [...] Kim ister ise bu makâmı bula; Ne tamu ki dârü’s-selâmı bula; Gerek on kavâ’id 
ri’âyet kıla; [...] Dahı her neyi kim özine anı; Revâ görmeye kendözine anı; Ra’iyyetlere câyiz añlamaya; Dilerse 
güle sonra aglamaya.’  
444 Ibidem, 216. 
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Likewise, Tursun Beg noted that every people and each society are in need of justice.445 
He linked justice with mildness and considered these two as the highest virtues for a 
Sultan. Tursun argued that the maintenance of the political organisation was only 
achievable through the combination of these two qualities. Governance that was based 
on justice would endorse the desired social equilibrium among the human kind. For him, 
justice was sufficient to satisfy the needs of the elite groups. However, the common 
people, due to their excessive requests for material gains, were inclined to acquire 
privileges to the detriment of others. Therefore, Tursun argued that justice alone was 
insufficient to preserve the social order. As the people take no satisfaction by only justice, 
a gentle and just monarch should make the life of the people comfortable so that they 
could manage poverty and difficulties. Tursun counselled the sovereign to be merciful 
and sometimes to forgive the criminals. In this way, the people would truly give their 
consent to the sovereign, whom they would perceive as merciful and just.446 To illustrate 
his point, Tursun accounted a story in which Alexander forgave a criminal. One of his 
officials protested and said: I would have killed him. Alexander wryly replied: I do not find 
suitable to kill him as I am not deficient as you are.’447 In this sense, Tursun Beg counselled 
the virtue of mildness, which he defined as ‘to forgive when one is powerful.’448 
As is generally known, in Muslim mirrors for princes the connection between the 
prosperity of the people and just rule was often explained by referring to the then famous 
‘circle of equity’ or the daire-i adliye. The concept of the circle of justice, which dates back 
to at least the time of the Babylonian ruler Hammurabi, was a model for how state and 
society had to relate to each other. The notion implied that the ruler, whose position was 
at the top of the circle, maintained justice through reasonable taxation and through 
protection from oppressive acts of his officials. The peasantry paid taxes for the treasury 
and the treasury paid the army. The army completed the circle by securing the 
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olur ki, âmme-i re’âyâ ve kâffe-i berâyâ harûr-ı cevr-i dehri anunla teskin iderler. Ve eger, bir nefsine zulm idüp, 
kar’ı bâb-ı inâbet iden mücrimün cürmini safh-ı cemil ile mukâbele eyleye, belki isâ’etine ihsân ide, bu emr ayn-
i tafaddul olur ki, ehvâ vü kulûb anun mütâba’at ü itâ’atine ragıb olur.’  
447 Ibidem, 20: ‘Iskender cevâbında zımn-ı tehcînde bu latîfeyi buyurdı ki: lâcerem, çün senün gibi hazîz-i 
noksânda degülem, katline ikbal göstermedüm, didi.’ 
448 Ibidem, 18: ‘me’l hilm? El afvü inde’l-kudret.’ 
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sovereignty of the ruler. Preserving this circle ensured the social order of the world.449 
Many Muslim writers incorporated the notion of ‘the circle of justice’ into their work. For 
instance, al-Ghazalî, wrote in his ‘Advice for Kings’ (Nasihat al-Muluk): ‘the religion 
depends on the monarchy, the monarchy on the army, the army on money, the money 
on prosperity and prosperity on justice.’450 The concept of the ‘circle of equity’ was also 
emphasised by the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk, who perceived the world as a garden and 
the ruler as the fence defending the garden: ‘The ruler is supported by his soldiers; 
soldiers are maintained by money; money is acquired from the subjects; the subjects are 
protected by justice and justice is maintained by the ruler.’451 If justice is removed from 
this equation, then the subjects will be left unprotected against oppression and they 
would be unable to produce revenues. Such a destabilisation would disable the ruler to 
maintain soldiers and if there are no soldiers, the ruler will not be able to defend the 
country and the whole order would collapse.  
The Ottoman chroniclers also elaborated on the normative discourse of ‘the circle of 
equity’, in which the rulers’ administration of justice gained vital importance. One of the 
earliest references to the notion of ‘circle of equity’ in Ottoman chronicles can be found 
in the advice given by Osman Gazi to his son. According to the chronicler Âşık Paşazâde, 
in his testament, Osman Gazi counselled Orhan Gazi the following: ‘Please those who obey 
and serve you. Always treat your soldiers well and grant them with benefactions and 
favours, for your gifts cause their loyalty.’452 The same advice is repeated in the account 
of Neşrî: ‘make happy those who obey you and do not forget to bestow your soldiers with 
benefactions and gifts’; and he included a tradition of the Prophet, saying: ‘the human 
being only submits to the benevolence he receives.’453 By referring to the circle of justice 
in the meaning of redistribution of wealth, Tursun Beg noted: ‘the wise men have said 
that the friend of a sultan are his soldiers, his possessions are his enemy. If his wealth 
diminishes by distributing it to his soldiers, his friends and helpers will increase. But if 
his wealth increases by withholding it from his soldiers, his friends and soldiers will be 
weakened.’454  
To illustrate his advice, Tursun Beg accounted a story about a sultan and his two 
viziers. One of the viziers advised the sultan to accumulate money in order to generate a 
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451 Nizâm al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 49. 
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454 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 27: ‘Sultânun dostı leşkeridür, ve düşmeni malidür. Eger nökerine bezl itmekden 
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ki dostı ve yardımcısıdur – za’îf olur.’  
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treasury. This vizier argued that when it was required one could easily find servants with 
money. He brought a plate with honey which attracted a lot of flies. And he used to say: 
if we have a treasury, when required we easily can collect the necessary soldiers, such as 
these flies that come to the honey. The other vizier said: the sultan needs soldiers and one 
has to win the hearts of the soldiers with various gifts and goodness, so that they would 
show braveness and courage without hesitation in deadly and dangerous situations. This 
vizier continued and counselled that there can occur such a time, that when needed no 
soldier can be found. And the ones that are found are mostly too weak and hopeless. He 
also brought a plate with honey and put it before the king at night. No fly came to the 
honey, merely a few ants showed up but they were soon drowned. The sultan was sage 
and followed the guidance of his second vizier. He bestowed his servants with donations 
and kindness, succeeded to govern his realm with justice and prosperity, and he became 
victorious upon his foes.455 
In the Fürstenspiegel written for Sultan Murad II, the author mentioned the circle of 
equity in his description of the duties and virtues of princes. The author of Muradname 
noted that when the Prophet was asked why the Persian Sassanid kings succeeded to 
maintain their sovereignty, he replied the following: ‘God granted them rulership because 
they were gentle to the poor; they abandoned oppression and made justice; and they 
reconstructed their realm.’456 When the Prophet was asked what caused the fall of the 
Sassanids, the Prophet allegedly replied: ‘they gave up the consult of reason; the world 
was filled with oppression and justice was neglected.’457 By further referring to the history 
of the Sassanids and quoting the Prophet, the Muradnâme noted that king Anushirvan is 
still remembered for his just rule and that he is discharged from punishment in the hell 
due to his justice.458 In the Muradname, the notion of justice is also emphasised by a 
comment attributed to the Prophet who allegedly boasted of being born in the time of a 
just ruler.459 However, as demonstrated earlier, this statement does not accord with the 
early Islamic political norm, which perceived the status of rulership as something 
objectionable. The Muradname concluded with a reference to the circle of equity: ‘A ruler 
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456 Murâd-nâme, 225: ‘Resûl’e su’âl eylediler neden; Ki Sasaniler’de şehenşâhlık; [...] Ki sultânlık anlara oldı yâr. 
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needs soldiers and smoothness in his affairs; if the ruler loses control then all his affairs 
falls silent.’460  
This normative discourse of the advice books also featured in the early Ottoman 
chronicles. In his account of the reign of Osman Gazi, Âşık Paşazâde included many 
passages on justice. He recorded that Osman Gazi pursued a policy of good relations with 
his Christian neighbours, who suffered from the harassments of the Germiyanids. 
Osman’s conflict with the rival Turkish principality of Germiyan was caused by his 
intention to keep good relations with his ‘infidel neighbours’.461 In a later passage, Âşık 
Paşazâde noted that it was customary for the Ottomans to give meals and open banquets 
to the people. He included a poem praising the justice and laws of Osman Gazi: ‘We heard 
that Osman has laws; his justness and benevolence makes the friends cheerful. The hüma-
bird flies in their shadow, all other birds only become their pray; precisely as might, 
reason and precaution are necessary, recognise that knowledge and estimation are also 
required.’462  
 Âşık Paşazâde recorded a story about the Christian glass merchants from Bilecik. At 
the market, someone from the Turkish principality of Germiyan had taken some of the 
merchandise from these Christian traders without paying. The Christian merchants went 
to Osman Gazi and complained about this wrong and pleaded for its redress. Osman 
retook from the Germiyanid the value of the goods he had confiscated and returned it to 
the Christian merchants. Thereafter, he proclaimed and prohibited that ‘No one should 
hurt the infidels of Bilecik’ and showed justice as such. Since then, the Christian women 
of Bilecik came to sell their goods at the market in Eskişehir in all safety and security. 
These Christians even trusted Osman so much that they said: ‘This Turk acts righteous to 
us’.463 The obvious aim of the story is to represent Osman Gazi as a ruler promoting his 
authority by applying justice and performing his role as protector of the people, 
regardless of their faith. The chroniclers unanimously implied that the dedication of 
Ottoman rulers to justice had been their characteristic already since the first ruler of the 
dynasty.  
 
                                                     
460 Murâd-nâme, 228: ‘Cihân-gîr olan kimse zâbit gerek; Dimezven ki işlerde hâbit gerek; Şu şahun ki zabtı yog ola 
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Türk bizüm-ile eyü togrılık ider’, dirlerdi.’ 
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The most panegyric representation of the justice of Ottoman rulers was formulated by 
Ahmedî. He fashioned Orhan Gazi and the Ottomans as just rulers: ‘Orhân was equitable 
and a dispenser of justice; Because of him, even the justice of Umar [the second caliph 
after the Prophet, famous for his just rule] was forgotten. Where the justice [adl] of the 
Ottomans exists; why would the justice of Umar be mentioned there.’464  
Likewise, Aşık Paşazade noted that Orhan Gazi was famous all around Anatolia for his 
justness. He wrote: ‘In the conquered places, they [the Ottomans] showed so much justice 
that their fame spread across to the regions that they not yet had captured.’465 He 
continued by recording that Süleyman Pasha, the son of Orhan Gazi, had conquered many 
cities in the Balkan through exemplary deeds of justice: ‘they surrendered with consent 
and negotiation (’ahd u eman). Süleyman Pasha did so many just acts that the inhabitants 
said: ‘O why did they not come to rule us before?’ Many villagers observed these Turkish 
people and became all Muslims.’466 According to Neşrî, many cities in Anatolia also 
voluntarily submitted to Sultan Bâyezid I due to his reputation of a just ruler and as the 
people were so tired of oppression that they willingly welcomed and obeyed him.467  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the principle of willful surrender without being harmed was 
an established principle of the Ottoman policy of expansion. The option of 
accommodation to Ottoman rule remained particularly strong among the popular classes 
in the conquered lands. As pointed out earlier, the Ottomans acted according to the 
principles of Muslim Law, which offered the Christian enemies the option of surrendering 
with keeping their rights and properties as an alternative to conquest by force.  
Even a non-Ottoman historian referred to this practice. The Byzantine chronicler 
Doukas noted that in 1422 many inhabitants of Thessaloniki showed a preference for a 
peaceful take-over of their city by the Ottomans in order to avoid a capture by assault (for 
the historical background of this event, see Chapter 2). Many citizens of Thessaloniki had 
fled and had even joined the Ottoman forces.468 The Gazavat also reported that those under 
siege knew that if they surrendered, the ‘Turks’ would be merciful to them and develop 
their city rather than plunder it. In the Gazavat, a Christian ruler speaks about this attitude 
of Ottoman rulers: ‘My expectation is that the son of Osman is open for dialogue. Because, 
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468 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium, 247-249. 
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they are merciful, they do not kill those who ask for mercy and they even do not hunt 
those who flee.’469 Aşık Paşazade summarised the whole issue in four verses, indicating 
the custom of not harming those who wilfully surrender.470  
There were various examples of cities which have surrendered like Bursa and Amasra 
whose inhabitants were not harmed. Kefe was yet another city which voluntarily 
surrendered. Aşık Paşazade made the inhabitants themselves explain the reason for 
surrender. In this case, it was a matter of interests. Those under siege knew by then that 
if they surrendered, the ‘Turks’ would treat them good and develop their city rather than 
destroy it. If this was the case, then why should they seek trouble. Therefore, the city-
dwellers of Kefe appealed their governor (tekür) to voluntarily surrender the city. Aşık 
Paşazade noted: ‘On the third day, they asked for peaceful surrender (emân dilediler). 
[Gedik] Ahmed Pasha accepted their request.’471  
It appears that the ruler had to be just both because it was the right way to behave and 
because the people would give their consent more easily to a just ruler. For instance, Neşrî 
portrayed Bâyezid’s father, Sultan Murad I, in most exalted terms as ‘a just and wise ruler, 
lover of the religion, dispenser of justice, of noble grace, friend of the poor, kind to 
strangers, protector of who fell in poverty, provider of remedy for the helpless, possessor 
of opinion, a wise and successful administrator, a valiant and fearless champion.’472  
In general, the image of the Ottoman sultans as sensitive for the administration of 
justice had a pivotal importance in the passages quoted above. Whether these stories 
were partly true or completely invented, they obviously had an ideological effect. They 
seemed to serve as discourses on morality, prescribing a set of values and norms. For 
instance, the story about the Christian merchants from Bilecik may have been simplified 
or even invented, but it certainly expressed a glimpse of the historical realities of the 
early 1300s in Anatolia.  
A similar story, told by both Neşrî and Âşık Paşazâde, described Osman Gazi as 
establishing the law on taxation. The anecdote was also intended to represent Osman’s 
fairness. He was portrayed as a fair but naive nomad prince who did not know what a 
market tax was. Perhaps its narration served the purpose of reminding the later Ottoman 
sultans about the justness of the founding father of the dynasty. By representing Osman 
 
                                                     
469 Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad, 31: ‘Şöyle umarım ki, Osmanoğlu’na söz geçer. Zira anlarda merhamet vardır, aman 
diyene anlar kılıç urmaz ve kaçanı dahı kovmaz.’ 
470 Aşık Paşazade, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, 185: ‘Gazalar kim edübdür Âl-i Osman / Vilayet kafirin etdi müsülman / 
Kaçanı komadılar yağılarda / Dileyene dahı verdiler aman.’ 
471 Ibidem, 458: ‘[…] kim bu Türk bu hisarı cebr ile alur ise bizi kırar ve bazımuzı esir eder ve malumuzu alırlar. 
Ve şehrümüzi harab eylerler. İmdi bunun gibi olmakdan ise âsanlığ ile verelüm kim cemi’müzi esir etmeyeler. 
Ve hem ol padişah kim bu Türkleri göndürdi, ol padişah her aldugı vilayeti ma’mur etdi. Yıkub harab etmedi. 
[…] Üçünci gün hemân emân dilediler. Ahmed Paşa dahı emân virdi.’ 
472 Ibidem, 139: ‘Âdil ü kâmil ve dîn-perver, adl-güster, âli-himmet, kesîrü’l-menfa’at, fakir-dost ve garîb-nevâz, 
destgîr-i üftâdegân ve çâresâz-i bî-çâregân, sahib-i rây ve ehl-i tedbîr, pehlevân ve şücâ’ u dilïrdi.’ 
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Gazi as a just ruler, the narrative conveyed an image of the first ruler establishing laws 
on taxation. As taxation was one of the basic characteristics of state formation and as it 
was also issued in the steppe empires, it is hard to believe that Osman was unaware of this 
practice.  
The story in Neşrî’s version, in which he rewrote the one by Âşık Paşazâde, went as 
follows: ‘Someone from the Germiyan principality came and asked Osman Gazi: sell me 
the tax [right] for this market. ‘What is this tax for?’, Osman Gazi asked. He answered: 
‘Everyone who brings goods to [sell on] the market, has to pay me money’. Osman gazi 
said: ‘On what grounds can you be allowed to collect money from them? The man said: ‘it 
is customary, it exists in every region: for every merchandise, they collect money for the 
padişah [monarch].’ Osman Gazi asked: ‘Is this the command of God [tangrı buyrugı] or the 
words of the prophet? Or, is this proclaimed by every ruler individually?’ The man said: 
‘Since long before, it is the sultanic custom and law [türe-i sultânî].’ Thereupon, Osman Gazi 
burst into anger: ‘Go away, you cunning rogue! Otherwise I will harm you. These people 
are for nothing indebted to me! What should they pay me money for?’ However, the 
advisors of Osman Gazi said: ‘O Khan! It is customary to pay something to the guards who 
protect the market, so that their efforts are not waisted.’473 Both chroniclers noted that 
only after this counsel Osman legalised the market tax and proclaimed it into a dynastic 
law. As such, the first Ottoman kanun was promulgated.  
Curiously, this story was not recorded by Oruç Beg nor by the anonymous chronicler. 
Once again, this must be explained by the fact that each chronicler adapted his narrative 
to the tastes and presuppositions of his intended audience and their knowledge of what 
had happened. Consequently, some themes were emphasised, while other topoi were 
denounced or omitted. Oruç, who worked as a scribe at the court, chose not to include 
this story. Although he knew the work of Âşık Paşazâde, whom he even mentioned in his 
text, and also that of Yahşi Fakih, the source Âşık Paşazâde for the fourteenth century, he 
clearly composed his chronicle in a careful and selective way.  
The possible reason for omitting this story by the anonymous chronicler can be related 
to the intra-elite competitive power play about controlling resources. As already noted, 
the anonymous chronicler belonged to the gazi circles and explicitly articulated the 
perspective of this social group in his text. His ‘ideological’ framing of events was 
 
                                                     
473 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 53: ‘Germiyan vilayetinden bir kişi Osman Gâzi’ye gelüp eyitti: ‘Bu bâzâruñ bâcını baña 
satuñ.’ Osman eyitti: ‘Bâc ne olur?’ ol kisi eyitdi: Bâzâra her kim yük getürse, andan akçe alayın.’ Osman Gazi 
eyitdi: ‘Bire kişi! Bu bâzâra gelenlerde alımuñ mı vardur ki, bunlardan akça alursın.’ Ol kisi eyitdi: ‘Bu âdetdür. 
Her vilayetde vardur ki, her yükden pâdişahçün akça alurlar.’ Osman eyitdi: ‘Bu Tañrı buyrugı, ya peygamber 
kavli midür? Ya her ilüñ padişahı kendü mi ihdâs eder?’ Ol kişi eyitdi: ‘Evvelden türe-i sultânîdür. Osman Gazi 
gazaba gelüp eyitdi: Yüri ayruk, bu arada turma, ki sana ziyânum dokunur. Bir kişi ki kendü eliyle kesb itmiş ola, 
bana ne borcı var ki râygân akça vire? Bu sözi Osman Gazi’den halâyık işidecek, eyitdiler: İy Han! Bu bâzârı 
bekleyenlere âdetdür. Bir nesnecük virürler, tâ ki bunlarun dahı emekleri zâyi olmıya.’ For the version of Âşık 
Paşazâde, see: Tevârîh, 290.  
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noticeably linked with the view of the gazi groups, who resented the policy of taxation 
that favoured the treasury of the central government. The gazi circles also opposed the 
centralist tendencies of the dynasty. Due to his oppositional stance, the anonymous 
chronicler probably preferred to omit this specific account of Osman Gazi, which 
represented the eponymous founder of the dynasty as the promulgator of laws.  
The anonymous chronicler also resented the introduction of the state treasury and 
condemned all kinds of taxes that diminished the revenues of the gazi milieu. On the 
introduction of the central treasury, he noted: ‘At that time [the reign of Murad I] the 
padisahs were not greedy. Whatever came into their hands they gave away again, and they 
did not know what a treasury was. But when [Çandarlı] Hayreddin Pasha came to the 
court, greedy scholars became the companions of the rulers. ‘He who is a ruler must have 
a treasury’, they said.’474 He also criticised the pençik-tax on captives applied in the 1370s, 
according to which one-fifth of the gaza booty was taken for the state’s treasury and the 
establishment. The chronicler criticised this tax, as it diminished the revenues of the 
semi-independent gazi nomad groups. Likewise, he resented the establishment of the 
janissary institution during the reign of Murad I.475  
The anonymous chronicler’s concern here was clearly not the image of the just and 
fair sultan, but rather the introduction of taxation, the exclusion of the gazi groups from 
resources and the vanishing of their privileges. Indeed, it appears that even for the author 
of the Anonymous Chronicle being a just ruler was an important asset. Although he often 
harshly criticised Bâyezid, he still felt the need to balance his criticism of the dynasty by 
pro forma including a reference to his justice. Though this was certainly not his own view, 
he copied from Ahmedî’s prose chronicle the following verses, representing Bâyezid’s 
justness: ‘He was as just as his father and his grandfather; and a wise ruler in public 
affairs.’476. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ahmedî presented Bâyezid as just as his ancestors 
and as continuing the tradition based on justice. Ahmedî had written: ‘because justice 
reigned in the country, people of all standings could go on with their activities’.477 The 
author of the Anonymous Chronicle rather ascribed justice to the first Ottoman rulers. He 
noted, for example, that the conquests of the first regions in the Balkans by Süleyman 
Pasha, the son of Orhan Gazi, were eased when the local people had heard about how 
 
                                                     
474 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 31: ‘Ol zaman pâdişahlar tama’kâr değüllerdi. Her ne ellerine girürse yigide ve yegile 
virürler idi. Hazîne nedür bilmezlerdi. Heman kim Hayreddin Paşa kapuya geldi, padişahlar ve tama’kar 
danişmendler musâhib olup, hazîne dahi padisah olana gerekdür didiler.’  
475 Ibidem, 28 : ‘Gelibolu’da esîrden bâc almak Cendereli Kara Halîl’den ve Karamanli Kara Rüstem’den kaldı […] 
Bu tertîb üzerine oglanlar devşirdiler. […] Bir kaç yıldan sonra getürüp kapuda yeniçeri eylediler. Ve hem adını 
yeniçeri kodılar’.  
476 Ibidem, 34: ‘Ata dede gibi âdil oldı ol; Kamu işlerinde kâmil oldı ol.’ 
477 Ahmedî, Dastan-i Tevârîh, 45-46: ‘Ata, dede bigi âdil oldı ol / Dükeli işlerde kâmil oldı ol […] Memleketde kıldı 
gayet adl ü dâd / Halk ol adli çün andan buldılar / Ulu, kice işe meşgul oldılar.’ 
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Süleyman Pasha dispensed justice. They subsequently surrendered voluntarily to 
Ottoman rule and became all Muslim.’478  
In the account of the anonymous author, there is no other reference to justice 
concerning the later sultans. He clearly cherished nostalgia for the old days of sharing of 
wealth and relatively egalitarian relations during the reigns of Osman and Orhan. For 
instance, the Anonymous Chronicle accused the judges (kadi) of having become corrupt 
during the reign of Bâyezid I. He claimed that during the reigns of Osman and Orhan the 
scholars (danişmend) in the medrese were reticent to take up the office of judge or kadı. 
‘In former times, one allegedly used to say that the office of kadı was equal to a place in 
the hell. No one wanted to become judge.’ He complained that at his own time ‘people 
even would draw swords and kill each other for the office of kadı.’479 However, in the 
version of the court poet Ahmedî, Bâyezid I was represented as a dispenser of justice by 
praising how he punished the corrupt judges: ‘The Ottoman sultan was the Umar of 
justice. He knew that the judges were dispensers of injustice. Their deeds were bribery 
and corruption of the Sharia. […] He assembled all of them and interrogated them. 
Whatever they had taken he made them give back. He punished them as necessary. 
Through struggle, he brought them one mote closer to the right path. How else could 
anything just evolve from the likes of them?’480 
The next reference to justice in the Anonymous Chronicle does not concern the 
Ottoman Sultans, but is to be found in its in his lengthy account of the legends about 
Constantinople and Hagia Sophia. The chronicler integrated these legends in his concise 
description of Sultan Mehmed II’s conquest of the city. In one of the legends about 
Constantinople, he spoke of a ‘just Muslim sultan’ who had lived a long time ago. The 
anonymous author uttered an implicit criticism of the Ottoman rulers in his own time by 
the following remark: ‘See how the sultans were at that time, they personally listened to 
the complaints of people who suffered from oppression. They were just sultans because 
they feared the punishment in afterlife.’481 He implied that Ottoman rulers neglected their 
duties to dispense justice by personally hearing grievances. The anonymous author 
clearly concealed the practice of Ottoman open courts where grievances were heard and 
injustice redressed. The silence of the Anonymous Chronicle about Ottoman 
 
                                                     
478 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 19: ‘Ol vilâyetlerde ne kadar kâfir var ise Süleyman Paşa’nın adl ü dâdını görüp cemi’ 
müslimân oldılar.’ 
479 Ibidem, 37: ‘Bir mahal dânişmend bulunınca degmesi kadılıga razı olmazlardı. Kadılık, cehennemden bir hasîr 
yeridür dirlerdi. Kadılıkdan kaçarlardı. Bu acebdür ki, şimdiki zamanda kadılık içün eger elinden gelse kılıç 
çeküp birbirin kırarlar idi.’ 
480 Ahmedî, Dastan, 46.  
481 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 119: ‘Ol zamanda olan pâdişâhları gör, her şikayetçiyi kendüler dinler imiş ki kimseye 
zulm ideler, âhiretde kendüye azâb ola diyü şunculayın âdil pâdişâh imiş.’ 
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administration of justice in divan meetings should be situated within the context of intra-
elite tensions.  
Although the anonymous author made no references to the practice of holding open 
court, the Mühimme Defterleri (Chancellary Registers), the first one dating from the 
sixteenth century, amply demonstrate the opposite. It is also well-known that the 
Ottoman sultan regularly called the divan together at whatever place he was at that 
moment. When the sultan went to the Friday prayer, rode to hunt or during a campaign, 
he would listen in person to the grievances of the people.482 As the story about the 
Christian glass merchants of Bilecik demonstrates, the Ottoman rulers heard the 
complaints of the people and set right injustices. Whether the story was invented or not, 
it told of a practice.  
The practice of holding court to redress wrongs and to practise justice was extensively 
discussed by among others Suraiya Faroqhi.483 She demonstrated that various office-
holders lost their positions after complaints of villagers in the sixteenth century. When 
complaints accumulated that local office-holders used their inspection cum tax-
collecting (devir) visits to extract large sums of money from the peasants, Sultan Murad 
III (r. 1574-1594) permitted local peasant militias to chase these officials away and 
instantly prohibited the devir-practice. Faroqhi noted that sultan Murad III, who did not 
left his palace to undertake campaigns, possibly attempted to reinforce his slightly 
shaken image by performing his duty as a ruler protecting his subjects from the damage 
caused by his office-holders.484  
As is generally known, the Ottoman Sultans, especially at their accessions, published 
and promulgated decrees and ordinances, called adaletnames or ‘proclamation of justice 
edicts’. These expressed the sultan’s wish to ensure that justice is delivered to all his 
subjects, in particular the poor and weak, and to prevent any oppression by state officials. 
Through the Divân-ı Humâyun (chancellery) which also functioned as a supreme court, the 
central authority kept an eye on the tax-collectors, local military commanders and 
governors, heard complaints of the people against the officials through petition rights 
against abuses of power and promulgated ‘adâletnâmes or rescripts of justice.485 The 
institution of holding divan also seems to be related with the specific configuration of 
power relations and the ensuing Ottoman political ideology. Only sultan Bayezid I was 
apparently able to remove the influence of the Turkish nobility from the divan, while his 
predecessors in the fourteenth century did not yet have the means to impose themselves 
 
                                                     
482 İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 90. 
483 Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Political Activity Among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation 
(1570-1650)’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 35 (1992): 1-39. 
484 Ibidem. 
485 İnalcık, ‘Decision making in the Ottoman State’, 9-18; Ergene, ‘On Ottoman Justice’, 52-87. 
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and were enforced to use müşavere or consultation with the influential Turkish 
aristocracy.486 This power-play must also have influenced the ideological construction of 
the narrative of the anonymous chronicler.  
One of the most important functions of the divan or state council was the 
administration of justice. The principle of holding open courts was to enable the people 
to address their ruler directly. In a story about the Sassanid ruler Nushirwan, Nizam al-
Mulk emphasised the importance for a ruler to deliver judgements in person and listen 
to the words of opposing parties with his own ears.487 He also noted that the Prophet 
dispensed justice by himself in person and did not delegate it to anyone else.488 As 
discussed in the Muradname, the Ottomans were indeed aware of these ancient traditions. 
Deriving from these traditions and practices, the Ottoman divan also heard the complaints 
of the subjects who had suffered injustice. An essential motive that made up the royal 
image of the Ottoman Sultan was that of a just ruler accessible to the complaints of his 
subjects, particularly if the injustice had been caused by his own officials.489 Anyone, 
regardless of his social status or religion could petition the Ottoman ruler directly, and 
for important matters the reaya (tax-paying subjects) would send delegations to the 
capital. Providing justice and security were perceived as the most important duties of the 
Ottoman sultans in order to receive the consent of the people. Rifa’at Abou-el-Haj 
demonstrated that the Ottoman sultans were observant not to impose their authority by 
simple coercion, but tried to reach a way of agreement through mutual participation of 
the sovereign and the subjects in a meaningful discourse, with room for negotiation.490  
Shams al-Dîn, the physician of Sultan Bâyezid I, wrote: ‘Early in the morning the 
Ottoman sultan would sit on a wide, raised sofa. The people stood some distance away, in 
a place whence they could see the sultan, and anyone who had suffered injustice would 
come to him and formulate his complaint. The case was judged immediately. Security in 
the land is such that nowhere will anyone touch a fully-laden camel whose owner has left 
it and departed.’491 Unfortunately, fifteenth-century Ottoman historical texts did not 
provide any description of the ‘open court’ tradition. However, de la Broquière delivered 
a detailed account of such an open court meeting during the reign of Sultan Murad II. He 
described how Murad organised an open audience and dealt with various matters, such 
 
                                                     
486 Güneş Işıksel, La politique étrangère ottomane dans la seconde moitié du 16e siècle : le cas du règne de Selîm II (1566-
1574), unpubl. PhD (Paris, 2013) 41-42.  
487 Nizâm al-Mülk, The Book of Government, 35-43. 
488 Ibidem, 44. 
489 Mustafa Akdağ, Celali İsyanları, 1550-1603 (Ankara, 1963) 150. On the public image of the Ottoman sultans and 
its reception, see: Suraiya Faroqhi, Yeni Bir Hükümdar Aynası. Osmanlı Padişahlarının Kamusal Imgesi ve Bu Imgenin 
Algılanması, tr. Gül Güven (İstanbul, 2011) 8-11 
490 Abou-el-Haj, ‘Aspects of the Legitimation of Ottoman Rule’, 373-383.  
491 Quoted in: Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı (Ankara, 1948) 1. 
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as receiving embassies and hearing complaints and petitions of subjects, followed by a 
banquet: ‘What we call the court of the king, the Turks call ‘porte de seigneur’. Every time 
the prince receives an embassy, which happens almost daily, ‘il fait porte.’ ‘Faire porte’ is 
for him the same as when our kings of France hold royal state and open court, although 
there is much difference between the two ceremonies.’492 Broquière also commented on 
Murad II’s just rule: ‘Every now and then Amurad beg [Murad II] shows great examples of 
justice, which gain him perfect obedience at home and abroad. He likewise knows how to 
keep his country in an excellent state of defence, without oppressing his subjects by taxes 
of other modes of extortion.’493 
In Neşrî’s account, the references to ‘justice and security’ also appeared in the 
following passages. After Osman Gazi had conquered the fortress of Yarhisar, he showed 
justice (adl ü dad) to the surrounding region. Thereupon, all the villagers returned to their 
homes and made better life conditions than they had under Byzantine rule. As the 
security and mercy was so great, so the chronicler told us, even the Christians from other 
regions immigrated and came to settle in the land controlled by Osman Gazi.494 In a later 
passage, Neşrî noted that when Osman had reached the region of Marmara, the ‘infidels’ 
came and submitted themselves. Osman showed them justice and left them in their 
places.’495 Aşık Paşazade provided similar accounts. According to him, Osman succeeded 
in winning the heart of the villagers around the city of Bursa through providing them 
security, by showing mercy and justice and by reconstructing their villages.496  
In his account of the siege of Iznik, Aşık Paşazade wrote that the people in the 
surrounding villages were not harmed. But the inhabitants of the city under siege were 
troubled by hunger and famine. Finally, they surrendered the city to Orhan. While most 
of the city-dwellers stayed, the Byzantine governor and his officials left to 
Constantinople.497 When relating Bâyezid I’s campaign in Anatolia against the 
Karamanids, Aşık Paşazade noted that Bâyezid had laid siege to Konya, the capital of the 
Karamanids. As it was harvest time, immense piles of barley and hay were amassed at the 
centre of the city. The soldiers approached the city walls and called on the city-dwellers 
 
                                                     
492 Broquière, Le Voyage d’Oultremer, 187-191. 
493 Ibidem, 184: ‘Il est moult bien obey en son pays et de ses gens […] Il fait de grandes justices et tient son pays 
en grant seureté et ne fait nulle extorsion à ses gens, c’est assavoir de taille ou d’autre chose.’ 
494 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 50: ‘Vilâyetlerine adl ü dâd gösterüp, cemî köyler yirlü yirine gelüp, mütemekkin olup, 
vaktleri kâfir zamânından dahı yig oldi. Hattâ Osmân ikliminde emn ü emân ziyâde olmagın, kalan yirün kafirleri 
dahı anun iklimine gelüp şinlik oldı.’ 
495 Ibidem, 54: ‘andan Marmara vilâyetine varup, kâfirleri gelüp itâ’at itdiler. Osman Gazi anlara adl idüp, 
yirlerinde mukarrer kıldı.’ 
496 Aşık Paşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 34: ‘Ammâ köylerini emn ü emanile ma’mur etdi. […] Cemî’sinün vilâyetlerini 
zabt etdi. Adl ü insaf ile ma’mur etdi.’ 
497 Ibidem, 58. 
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to sell some of their barley and hay for the horses. To find out the real intention of the 
soldiers, the inhabitants sent out representatives to Bâyezid. After hearing the situation, 
Bâyezid sent heralds to his troops before the castle, saying: ‘no one should be oppressed. 
The owners should sell their barley according to their own reason and fairness.’ And when 
the merchants had sold their grains and received their money, Bâyezid had them 
accompanied to the entrance of the castle. As the city-dwellers observed that the soldiers 
were not after looting and noting their fairness and mercy, they opened the gates of the 
city. They also allegedly proclaimed to the neighbouring cities that ‘this Sultan is a very 
just and merciful one. He is not after depriving the Muslims from their lives and 
possessions.’ Subsequently, the inhabitants of cities such as Aksaray, Niǧde and Kayseri 
also invited the Ottomans and surrendered their cities and the surrounding villages to 
Bâyezid.498  
According to the chroniclers, Murad II also appeared to follow the advices given in the 
mirrors for princes sincerely. For instance, two times after conflicts with the Karamanids, 
Murad II accepted their apologies and did not take or let anything be taken from them by 
force. Âşık Paşazâde noted that the reason for this merciful act of Murad II was because 
the tradition of the House of Osman was based on justice.499  
Whether these passages were wishful thinking, simple praise for getting recognition 
or the truth itself cannot be said for sure but they demonstrate that just governance was 
an important asset within the ideological discourse produced in the context of new 
conquests. The chroniclers suggested that the people in the conquered lands welcomed 
Ottoman rule. Perhaps much more than the gaza-notion, the Ottoman discursive register 
of justice appeared as the most influential idea of Ottoman sovereignty. The narrative of 
the anonymous chronicler, who was certainly no court historian, reflected the increasing 
tensions between the Ottoman dynasty and the world of the nomadic frontier society. 
The underlying sense of the waning of asabiyya (group solidarity) was apparent in his 
narrative. The constitution of a state ideology in earliest Ottoman chronicles was to a 
 
                                                     
498 Aşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 343: ‘Ol hînde hırmen vaktıyıdı. Konya’nuñ 
meydânında arpa ve bugday çaçları çıkup yıgılup tururdı. Leşker halkı hisâra varup çagırdılar ve eyitdiler: ‘Hey 
hisâr halkı gelüñ bize arpa ve saman satuñ, atlarumuza yiderelüm’, didiler. Anlar dahı bir niçe adamlar 
gönderdiler. ‘Gör bunlaruñ sözleri gerçek midür?’, diyü. Adamları geldiler. Bu sözi hana didiler. Han bir iki kul 
gönderdi, eyitdi: ‘Sakınuñ kimseye zulm itmesünler. Arpa issi kendü insâfınca satsun’, didi. Arpaların kim 
satdılar, han adam koşdı ol kişileri hisâra iletdiler. Bu şehrüñ halkı bunlardan bu adli göricek hemân şehrüñ 
kapusın açdılar, hisâr feth olundı. Etrafdagı şehirlere dahı habar vardı kim: ‘Bu gelen pâdişâh be-gayet âdildür 
ve Müsülmânlaruñ rızkına ve mâlına tama’ı yokdur.’ Bu âdil habarın kalanı hisârlaruñ halkı işidicek ol 
şehirlüden adamlar geldi. Hana: ‘Gelüñ şehirlere tîmâr idüñ’, didiler. Aksaray’ı ve Nigde’yi ve Kayseri’yi 
virdiriler ve bunlaruñ cemî’in nevâhisiyle bile teslim itdiler.’ For a brief version of the same account, see: Neşrî, 
Cihannüma, 143.  
499 Ibidem, 393: ‘Sultân Murâd Han dahı Karaman vilayetinden bir ahad çöpi zulum ile aldırmadı ve almadı. Zira 
kim Âl-i Osmân’uñ muradları ve âdetleri adl ü dâd üzerinedür’.  
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great degree defined by the struggle among various political factions. In this respect, the 
Anonymous Chronicle bore many resemblances to Aşık Paşazade’s history as both 
expressed a bitterness that stemmed from deep feelings of loosening ties between the 
dynasty and the aristocracy.  
 
3.4.2.1 Zulm or tyranny, the supreme vice 
When exploring the narratives and accounts of the chroniclers, cruelty and tyranny or 
zulm appear to be the antithesis of justice. Arbitrary use of political power was considered 
as zulm or injustice and tyranny. As discussed above, the person and the power of the 
sultan were regarded as indispensable to achieve and maintain the social order. However, 
when the ruler oppressed his subjects or neglected to fulfil his duties, this situation was 
rejected as zulm (tyranny). Whereas justice (adl) was considered a cardinal virtue, the 
zulm appeared to be the ruler’s principal vice. Nizam al-Mulk warned princes for tyranny, 
because: ‘when a king is a tyrant all his courtiers begin to practise tyranny; they become 
forgetful of God and ungrateful for His favour. Verily God abandons them in His Wrath 
(…) Then, the rulership is transferred to another dynasty.’500 He also quoted a famous 
saying: ‘A kingdom may last while there is irreligion, but it will not endure when there is 
oppression.’501 The tenth-century Muslim writer, al-Mawardi, considered zulm – as a form 
of turning away from justice – a valid reason for the disposal of a ruler.502  
In the Muradnâme, this theme was reminded as well and it was noted that the dynasty 
of an oppressive ruler would be destroyed in the end.503 According to the early sixteenth-
century chronicler Çelebi Hadîdî, Sultan Murad II advised his son Mehmed to rule his 
realm with justice, reminding him that rulership could not accord with tyranny: ‘Always 
do obey the law of God’s envoy. Also follow the laws of your ancestors. Take the side of 
the poor, do not be a tyrant. For tyranny destroys the divine fortune of the state. It has 
been said that the tyrant cannot achieve fortune. Rulership can go hand in hand with 
infidelity, but never with tyranny.’504 As indicated by Hadîdî and other writers, the rules 
of the Sharia were important in the form of a ‘code of behaviour’ for Muslims. This 
tradition was also followed by the Ottomans. 
 
                                                     
500 Nizâm al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 45. 
501 Ibidem, 12. 
502 Ebu’l Hasan Habib el Mâverdi, El-Ahkâmü’s-Sultâniye, tr. Ali Şafak (Istanbul, 1994) 54. 
503 Murâd-nâme, 241. 
504 Çelebi Hadîdî, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul, 1991) 207: ‘Resûl’ün şer’ini gözle be-gâyet, 
Hem it kânûn-ı ecdâdun ri’âyet; Şefi’ ol ehl-i fakra olma zâlim, Ki bozar devlet ü baht-ı mezâlim; Demişlerdür ki 
zâlim baht bulamaz, Olur küfrile şehlik zulmile olmaz.’ 
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In the chronicle of Neşrî, zulm was condemned, for instance, in the description of the 
Ottoman-Karamanid conflict of 1386. This conflict occurred after Karaman-oğlu Alâeddin 
Bey had attacked Ottoman territories in Anatolia while Sultan Murad I was on campaign 
in Europe. He noted: ‘When Gazi Murad Han heard about the Karamanid attacks, he 
assembled the leading officials of the state in a council in Edirne and said: ‘Look at what 
this foolish tyrant does [Şol ahmak zâlimüñ itdügi işi görüñ ki]. He comes and injures the 
Muslims. O Gazis! What should I do with this tyrant [zâlim]?’505 Murad I asked for a fatwa 
(verdict) from the ulema-judges to evaluate whether fighting against these tyrannical 
Muslim princes was legitimate, since they were hurting the Muslim people. The judges 
replied that to remove the tyranny from Muslims was an important duty for a Muslim 
prince.506 In this way, the chronicler provided an ideological justification for Murad I’s 
decision to transform Karamanid principality into an Ottoman vassal state. Neşrî 
described how Murad projected his pre-eminence as the ‘champion of Islam’ vis-à-vis the 
‘tyrant’ Karamanid prince. According to Neşrî, Murad I motivated his decision to fight 
against the Karamanid ruler, whose vices were explicitly catalogued: ‘Hey you, debauched 
and decadent tyrant [müdbir ve müfsid zâlim]. My only aim is to pursue the gaza-conquests 
day and night. You not only hinder me from the gaza, but you also harm the Muslims as 
well. You are not a man who knows mercy and keeps to his oath [Ahd ü emân bilür âdem 
degülsün].’507 
As we have seen, the Ottoman expansion towards south-east Anatolia had led to the 
struggle for supremacy in Anatolia with the rivalling Karamanids. The historian Neşrî 
portrayed the adversary Turkish prince Alâeddin Bey as a cruel and untrustworthy 
tyrant. He implied that Murad I embodied the virtues of a just Muslim Sultan, which 
Alâeddin allegedly lacked. Sultan Murad I was portrayed as an ideal king and just ruler 
who protected the vulnerable and defenceless people against tyrant rulers. The 
Karamanid ruler, however, was evaluated as unreliable because he did ‘not keep to his 
oath’. He was called a tyrant who knew no mercy, abused his power, plundered the cattle 
and harassed the Muslims.  
Furthermore, Neşri presented the rival Karamanid dynasty as a rebel regime from the 
Ottoman point of view. However, the term rebel or bâgî was not applied in a merely 
common criminal sense here. He rather used the term bâgî to provide a legal and judicial 
authorisation for a war with the fellow Muslim Karamanid state. The term dâr-ül-bagy or 
 
                                                     
505 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 100: ‘İy gâziler! Bu zâlimle nic’edeyin?’ 
506 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 99: ‘Bu tarafdan müluk-i zaleme, müslimin üzere kasd itdiler. Küffar niyyetine cem olan 
leşkerle bunların muharebesi caiz olub, gaza niyyetin tehir itmek reva olur mı? didi. Ulema eyitdiler: küffara 
gaza nefir-i âm olmasa, farz-ı kifayedür. Amma mümünlerden mezâlimi defetmek farz-ı ayndur.’ 
507 Ibidem, 101. 
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‘the land of rebels’ was in fact borrowed from two Quranic verses.508 After the demise of 
the Caliphate in 1258, each Muslim ruler claimed leadership in the Islamic world and its 
rivals were established rebels. In the post-Mongol age, warfare against fellow Muslim 
states was judicially covered and considered legal.  
Âşık Paşazâde explained that, before the Battle of Varna in 1444, the Karamanid ruler 
Ibrahim Beg had attacked Ottoman lands and had broken his oath: ‘The son of Karaman 
did cruel and illegal things to the wives and sons of the Muslims.’509 After receiving this 
news, Murad II assembled his vassal Christian troops and went to Konya, the Karamanid 
capital. As a punishment, Murad ordered to plunder the Karamanid lands by his Tatar 
(Mongol) troops. Thereupon, Karamanid ruler Ibrahim Beg fled and asked for mercy. He 
also sent his wife, the sister of Murad II, to plead for him. The Karamanid envoys 
requested Murad to end the punitive campaign, saying: ‘The son of Karaman did wrongful 
things and has received what he deserved. In front of God, he has disgraced himself, his 
shame will suffice him. Show us your benevolence and favour. You are a generous sultan, 
do not do the same thing as he did.’ And Murad forgave Ibrahim. Âşık Paşazâde obviously 
legitimised Murad II’s punitive act by noting that such ‘cruelty had never been observed 
before in the deeds of Ottomans’. He put the blame on Karaman-oğlu Ibrahim Beg for 
causing this, arguing that ‘the Ottomans never before had intruded the rights of others 
[hakkına zulm itmek].’510  
Neşrî wrote that Murad I argued his decision to undertake a campaign against the 
Karamanids in 1386, by the following reasons: ‘The son of Karaman has many times sworn 
oaths and asked for mercy, which I granted. When I was busy with the gaza, he raided into 
our cities and harassed the Muslims. I do not raid into Muslim lands as he does and take 
away horses and cattle. Let him show up and let us fight. Let the poor not suffer from our 
battle [Hîç arada yohsula ziyân gelmesün].’  
Nearly unanimously, the earliest Ottoman chronicles villianated Timur by 
emphasising his lack of justice and oppressive acts.511 For instance, when accounting 
Timur’s capture of Aleppo and his campaign against the Mamluks, Neşrî portrayed Timur 
as a merciless and cruel oppressor: ‘Timur besieged Aleppo, the people refused to 
surrender the castle. A fierce battle ensued and many people have perished. Timur 
captured the fortress with one heavy stroke and the cruelty reached in his hands its very 
 
                                                     
508 Qur’an, 4:59 and 49:9. See: Feridun Emecen, ‘Ottoman policy of conquest’, 35-36. 
509 Âşık Paşazâde, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, 402: ‘Hünkâra habar geldi kim Karamanoglı ahdını girü sıdı, 
Müsülmânlaruñ avratın ve oglın zâlımlara nâ-meşru işler itdürdi.’ 
510 Ibidem, 403: ‘İmdi azizler, bu Osmânlu’nun zulm itmesinün sebebi Karamanoglı İbrahim’üñ sebebinden olmış-
ıdı, yohsa tâ bugüne degin Osmanlu’dan kimsenüñ hakkına zulm itmek gelmemiş-idi.’  
511 Ahmedî, Dasitân-i Tevârih, 23: ‘Bu arada Rûma yüridi Temür / Mülk doldı fitne vü havf u fütûr / Çün Temürün 
hiç adli yoğ idi / Lâcerem kim zulm ü cevri çoğ idi.’ 
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excellence. He did so many cruel things that are not worth to discuss further. Timur was 
the king of all evil men.’512 Neşrî concluded Timur’s campaign of Syria with the comment 
that: ‘Sivas, Aleppo and the land of Syria, were previously very flourishing. They all fell 
into ruins in the fire of Timur’s army.’513 Ahmedî also contrasted the ‘tyranny’ of the 
Mongols with the ‘justice’ of the Ottomans. He criticised Mongol domination – 
represented by Timur – and its oppression of the Muslims (referring to Timur’s 
occupation of Anatolia) as morally reprehensible. In contrast, he described the Ottoman 
rulers (begs) as just and Muslim gazi-kings, ‘the swords of God, the protectors and the 
refuge of the believers’.  
Neşrî accounted that after Bâyezid had annexed the Anatolian Turkish principalities, 
such as the ones of Germiyan, Menteşe and Aydın, their lords had fled to Timur. At 
Timur’s court, these beys lamented the establishment of direct control of their lands by 
Bâyezid. For instance, the dethroned lord of Germiyan implored of Timur: ‘O Sultan! You 
are a universal sovereign [sahib-kıran], the son of Osman is a cruel person. He made us 
penniless and took the throne of our ancestors and grandfathers out of our hands. It is 
known that we had to beg on our way to come here. That land [Anatolia] befits a khan like 
you.’514 Neşrî commented that these words had flattered Timur’s ego and inflamed his 
desire to become a great conqueror [sahib-huruc]. Out of opportunism, the Turkish princes 
considered Timur as a superior ruler, a universal sovereign, whereas Bâyezid was merely 
perceived as a regional monarch, and accused of being an oppressor for dethroning them.  
According to Neşrî, Timur seemingly did not believe their allegations and said: ‘He 
[Bâyezid] is a gazi khan. He would not perform cruelty without a reason. If you were 
indeed innocent, he would not have hurt you. Probably, you have shown defiance to 
him.’515 In this reply of Timur to the Turkish lords, Neşrî implied that acting harsh upon 
those who showed defiance was legitimate and could not be considered as cruelty or zulm.  
The Anonymous Chronicle also condemned oppression or zulm through the 
apocalyptic legend story of an imaginary figure, the so-called Yanko ibn Madyan who 
allegedly built the city of Constantinople. He noted on Yanko’s deeds: ‘They filled the city 
with zulm [oppression]. They have howled the entire people. As they had brought and 
 
                                                     
512 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 157-158: ‘Temür, Haleb’üñ üzerine varup, halk hisârı virmeyüp, ceng olup, mübâlaga âdem 
kırılup, âhirü’l-emr hisârı darb-ı destile alup, zulmı kemâlinde kıldı, işler itdi ki, dile almaga yaramaz. Temür, 
a’zam-ı eşirrâydı. Andan Hama’ya varup, anı dahı Haleb’den bedter idüp…’  
513 Ibidem, 158: ‘Bûd Sivas u Haleb bâ-mülk-i Şam; Der-imâret çün arûs-ı bî-nikab; Şüd harâb ez-âteş-i ceyş-i 
Temür.’ 
514 Ibidem, 156: ‘İy Sultân! Sen sahib-kıransın, Osmân-oglı bir zâlim kişidür. Bizi müflis kılup, atamuz ve dedemüz 
tahtın elümüzden alup, dileni dileni geldügimiz hod ma’lûmdur. Ol iklîm dahi senüñ gibi hana lâyıkdur.’[…] 
Timur’un dahı dımâgında hod sahib-hurucluk hevesi vardı dahı ziyâde oldı.’ 
515 Neşrî, Cihânnüma, 155: ‘İy begler! Sizin söziñüz gerçek mi yalan mı inanmazuz. Zîrâ, ol bir gâzî handur. Yok 
yire zulm itmez. Sizi bî-günâh incitmez. […] siz muhâlefet itdünüz ola.’ 
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settled the people at that time through oppression, this city received many curses. […] 
Many tears have dropped. This city was decayed into ruins because it caused many 
laments and moaning. Therefore, this city ends up in ruins every time. For one has prayed 
that it would turn into ruins.’516 The city’s myriad stories and legends were translated 
from medieval Greek and Arab texts, and as such adapted and appropriated to serve 
various goals in Ottoman literature. In this way, these stories also figured in the narrative 
of the Anonymous Chronicle. The anonymous writer obviously implied that since the city 
was built under oppression, it would never be free of trouble. He directed an implicit critic 
to the decision of Mehmed II to turn Constantinople into the new Ottoman capital. By 
implying that the city bore many curses, he suggested that Constantinople was damned 
and it would bring no good.517  
In the narrative of the anonymous chronicle, one can sense a hidden opposition to 
Sultan Mehmed II’s policy of centralisation. The gazi circles worried that they would lose 
their privileged positions after the conquest of Constantinople. They very well 
understood that the transfer of the capital to Constantinople was part of Mehmed II’s 
centralist policies of empire-building. As they objected to the city’s status of Ottoman 
capital, those gazi groups depicted Constantinople as the site of oppression, doom and 
destruction.  
In brief, all chroniclers unanimously agree that cruelty and tyranny or zulm were the 
antithesis of justice, which was the greatest vice that a ruler had to avoid. The concept of 
zulm could even provide the legitimate grounds to express criticism or to justify war 
against a tyrant ruler.  
  
 
                                                     
516 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 94: ‘Bu şehri zulm ile doldurdular. Âlem halkını tamamet inletdiler. Ol zamanun 
halkını zulm ile getürdükleri içün bu şehre beddualar itdiler […] Ve göz yaşın akıtdılar. Ol şehrin harab olmasına 
sebeb oldur kim çok ah vah olmuştur. Anun içün her vakit ol şehrün sonu harab harab olur. Zira kim harab 
olmasına dualar kılınmışdır.’ 
517 For a discussion of the apocalyptic Turkish legends and texts about Constantinople, see: Feridun Emecen, 
Fetih ve Kıyamet: 1453 (Istanbul, 2012) 30-78; Stefanos Yerasimos, La foundation de Constantinople et de Sainte Sophie 
dans les traditions turques (Paris, 1990). According to Yerasimos, the writers who supported the policy of empire-
building developed their own version of legends about the city. 
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3.4.2.2 İmaret or restoration and rebuilding 
A sub-category of the concept justice was the duty of the ruler to rebuild and to 
reconstruct the realm in order to enhance prosperity. Architectural activities aimed at 
the revival of the prosperity of the cities and villages formed one of the duties of the 
sultan. In the Muradnâme, three things were recommended to the rulers who wished to 
be the Alexander or Solomon of their own time. One was to make public improvements 
in their realm and the other was to take care of the poor.518 The historian Şükrullah 
praised Sultan Murad I for being a friend of the poor, feeding and clothing them, along 
with the qualities of just, wise, pious and brave.519 Similarly, Aşık Paşazade portrayed 
Sultan Murad II as an exemplary ruler who decided to take care of the underdeveloped 
region of Ergene in the Balkans. This place had been a forest zone, not properly looked 
after. It had become a nest of bandits who killed and robbed people. Murad donated great 
amounts of money from his treasury to build a bridge, a public kitchen and a mosque 
there. The forest was removed. Very soon a city emerged, with unrest replaced by peace, 
prosperity and security of life and possessions. Murad went there in the company of the 
ulema and the poor of Edirne, distributed money and land to the inhabitants.520 This 
passage fashioned the image of Sultan Murad II, who was represented as being concerned 
about the security and welfare of his people, who strived to bring them prosperity and 
security. 
Tursun Beg accounted that two days after the conquest of Constantinople, when 
Mehmed II entered the city he observed that the city was in a ruinous state. He was 
especially saddened by the ruinous state of Hagia Sophia. Subsequently, Mehmed II 
implemented an urban project to transform the city into the seat of his throne (pâyitaht) 
and he took measures to rebuild and repopulate it.521 As the Ottoman state in the fifteenth 
century was further built up around political centralisation and the creation of a new 
ruling elite and a new concept of sovereignty, likewise the spaces and image of 
 
                                                     
518 Murâd-nâme, 224-225: ‘Rivâyetdür ehl-i ‘akıldan bize; Hikâyet iderem nakıldan size; Ki vâcibdür üç nesne 
sultanlara; İskenderler’e ve hem Süleymanlar’a; Biri ol ki milkin ‘imâret ide; Dilerse ki hayli imâret ide; İkinci bu 
yoksul hakına katı; Gerekdür ki ola anun şefkatı.’ 
519 Şükrullah, Behcetüt-Tevarih, 382. 
520 Aşık Paşazade, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, 388-389: ‘Bu Ergene köprisinün yeri evvel ormanlıg idi. Çamur ve çökek 
idi. Ve haramılar turagıyidi. Hîç vakt olmayayadı kim anda haramiler adam öldürmeyeyidi. Sultan Murad Han 
Gazi hazine ve meblaglar harc itdi. Ol ormanları kırdurdı. Pâk etdürdi. Ol arada bir âli binâ bile köpri yapdurdı. 
Köprinün iki başını ma’mur etdi. Şehir itdi. İmâret, Cuma mescidi yapdı. Hamam ve bazarlar yapdı. Gelen giden 
müsâfirlere zıyâfetler ederler, nimetler bişürürler. Ve ol vaktın kim imâretin kapusı açıldı, Sutan Murad kendüsi 
Edreneden ulemâyı ve fukârayı aldı. Ol imârete vardı. Bir niçe gün ziyâfetler etdi. Akçalar ve filöriler üleşdürdi. 
Evvel ta’am bişdügi gün kendisi mubârek eliyilen fukarâya verdi. Ve çırağın dahı kendü uyardı. Ve yapan 
mi’mara hil’at geyürdi. Çiftlik yerleri verdi. Ol şehrinün halkını cemi’ avârızdan mu’af ve müsellem etdi.’ 
521 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 64-71. 
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Kostantiniyye – the new Ottoman capital – were reconstructed and reshaped. Sultan 
Mehmed also ordered his notables to construct public and private buildings and 
monuments.522 The reconstruction (imâret-i Kostantiniyye) project entailed among others 
repopulation, grants of properties and building of commercial centres (bedestans). Tursun 
gave a detailed account of Mehmed II’s efforts to rebuild the city. For instance, he 
recorded: ‘He [the sultan] decreed that both the common and rich people might come and 
inhabit the empty and ruinous houses of the infidels, which would be granted to them as 
their properties. As a result, many people from abroad came and took up their residence. 
However, the rich merchants who did not wish to leave their businesses had not yet come. 
As the essential goal of this application aimed to attract the merchants, […] commercial 
centres with shops [bedestan], bazaars and caravanserais to lodge travellers were 
constructed.’523 Tursun Beg suggested that the revival of the devastated city and its 
prosperity were owed to the efforts of Sultan Mehmed II.  
Likewise, Neşrî confirmed this view: ‘In short, Sultan Mehmed Khan rebuilt the Hagia 
Sophia and the entire city of Istanbul. And he established many hamams that have no 
equals elsewhere. He made the city flourish in such a degree that travellers observe and 
say that there is no city like this in the world.’524 He also noted that Sultan Mehmed had 
built many monuments and that the entire government of Anatolia (vilâyet-i Rum) had 
flourished under his reign. Moreover, Mehmed distributed livelihood to the ulema, the 
poor and widows.  
However, the author of the Anonymous Chronicle from the gazi circles downgraded 
Sultan Mehmed’s efforts to restore and revitalise the city as less successful than the 
chroniclers closer to the court: ‘Even a monarch like Sultan Mehmed restored ‘Islambol’ 
[Constantinople] with difficulty in two, three, four years. Many parts of it are still in 
ruins.’525 The narrative of the anonymous author reflected the political tensions between 
Mehmed’s imperial vision and the interests of the centrifugal forces such as the gazi 
nobility. The loyalty of the gazi nobility was maintained as long as they could preserve 
their semi-independent positions and their political and economic interests. The gazi 
groups were considered as an destabilising factor by the dynasty.  
 
                                                     
522 For example, see: Çiǧdem Kafesçioǧlu, Constantinopolis/Istanbul. Cultural Encounter, Imperial Vision and the 
Construction of the Ottoman Capital (Pennsylvania, 2009). 
523 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 67: ‘Ve buyurdı ki keferenün urûş-ı hâviyesinden ve dûr u büyût-i hâliyesinden, 
âmm ü hâs her kim ihtiyârı ile gelüp sâkin olur ise, tuttugı ev mülki ola. […] ve anlarun içün, âli bezzâzistân ve 
çarşular ve bâzârgâhlar ve âyende vü revende içün vâsi’ kârvânsarâylar yapturdı.’ 
524 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 316: ‘El-hâsıl, Ayasofya’yı ve cemî’ Istanbul’ı Sultân Mehemmed Han yapdı. Ve dahı nice 
hammamlar yapdurdı ki, âlemde kimse mislin görmiş degüldür. Bir vechile ma’mûr oldı kim, etrâf-ı âlemde 
anun misli şehr yokdur, diyü şehâdet iderler seyyahlar.’  
525 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniǧi, 111-112: ‘Ve hem pâdişâh Sultan Mehemmed gibi pâdişâh Islambol’un meremmetin 
iki, üç dört yılda güç ile meremmet itdiler. Dahı nice yerleri harâbdur.’  
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The conquest of Constantinople marked the final resolution of the continuing tension 
between the dynasty’s efforts of centralisation and the semi-independent interests of the 
aristocratic lords of the frontiers. In this process, power of the Turkish aristocracy within 
the Ottoman political spectrum was marginalised and they were increasingly replaced by 
the new military and administrative class that emerged as the builders of the centralising 
state. It is the resentment about this evolution that underlie the narrative of the 
Anonymous Chronicle. For instance, the anonymous author was bitter and yearned for 
the earlier times: ‘During the reign of Sultan Murad, only the servants of the sultan and 
their sons received a salary and were granted timars. Today, many nests of servants have 
trooped together at dynasty’s household. The one who comes from abroad has a greater 
esteem. Therefore, the blessings and prosperity of the earlier times have vanished.’526 He 
often criticised the dynasty for depriving the Turkish aristocracy from their privileges, 
income and positions.  
Similar concerns also left a mark of bitterness and criticism in the narrative of Aşık 
Paşazade, especially regarding the introduction of the mukataa-tax on properties in the 
reconstruction project of Istanbul. The dervish-historian appeared to be discontent with 
Sultan Mehmed II’s fiscal policy of centralisation and the costs of rebuilding Istanbul as 
the new Ottoman capital. The payment of this imperial project also affected Aşık 
Paşazade’s properties in the city. He owned a considerable amount of property in 
Unkapanı and Galata and was exposed to the imperial fiscal measures of Sultan Mehmed 
II and his officials. Instead of criticising Sultan Mehmed II directly, the historian chose to 
aim his arrows at the statesmen. He criticised the elite change, in which the members of 
kapikulu were appointed as vizier. Aşıkpaşazade accused Rum Mehmed Paşa of the 
introduction of the rent payments for properties, as the architect of the resented fiscal 
policy: 
‘The son of an infidel was appointed as the vizier of the sultan and he became very 
intimate with the sultan. The old infidels [Byzantine families] from Istanbul were 
the friends of the ancestors of this vizier. They came to him and said: ‘Hey, what are 
you doing? These Turks have succeeded in reconstructing this city; you have to do 
something. They took the lands of our ancestors and our lands from ourselves and 
they possess it in front of our eyes. Since you are now a favourite companion of the 
sultan, you must do something that will stop these people from rebuilding and 
settling the city in order to keep this city in our hands as before.’ The vizier replied: 
‘Let us reintroduce the old tradition of mukata’a [rent payment or tax], so that these 
people would stop with reconstructing their properties and the city would remain 
 
                                                     
526 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniǧi, 112-113: ‘İlerü Sultan Murad zamanında pâdişâh kulı ve pâdişâh kul-oglı olmayana 
kapudan ulûfe ve timâr itmezlerdi. Şimdiki zamanda kuldan kapuda yuvalar ziyâde. Yabandan gelenün ragbeti 
ziyâdedür. Anun içün ilerü zamandaki bereket yokdur.’ 
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in ruins and in our hands.’ On one occasion, this vizier was able to convince the 
sultan to reintroduce the tax payments on properties. […] You ask who was this 
vizier? It was Rum Mehmed. On the sultan’s order, he was strangled like a dog.’527  
Aşık Paşazade obviously resolved his anger by aiming it at the former Byzantine official 
of Sultan Mehmed. As Sultan Bâyezid II (r. 1481–1512) was trying to soften his father’s 
policies, the chronicler praised Sultan Bâyezid II for putting an end to ‘the illegal 
dispositions’ introduced by Nişancı Paşa and Rum Mehmed Paşa; for returning hundreds 
of waqf and mulk lands and villages to their former owners; for re-establishing the justice 
and the Ottoman law and order [kânun-ı Osmanî] by restoring the means of livelihood of 
the people [sheikhs, dervishes and Turkish aristocracy].528  
Dealing with the same events, the ulema-historian Neşrî softened Aşık Paşazade’s 
criticism of the statesmen, but followed his narrative in general. As Neşrî’s work was 
written for the learned and sedentary circles, he was rather inclined to endorse the 
official narrative that was promoted by the princely court. Remarkably, he shared the 
criticism that it was wrong to introduce the mukataa-tax on properties. Neşrî noted that 
the reconstruction project was not an easy process and Mehmed II had to implement a 
policy of forced resettlement from other parts of the Ottoman realm: ‘He [the sultan] sent 
messengers to all Ottoman governments, saying, ‘anyone who can, may come and gain a 
property in Istanbul’. But no wealthy person did come and no one showed enthusiasm in 
the reconstruction [project]. Thereafter, the sultan ordered to transport from each region 
an amount of wealthy and poor people. […] However, the mukataa tax on properties was 
issued, which was intensely resented by the people.’529  
According to Neşrî, Shehabeddin Pasha, a vizier of his father, succeeded to convince 
Mehmed to withdraw this rent-tax on properties. He argued that none of his grandfathers 
 
                                                     
527 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 193-194: ‘Pâdişaha bir vezir geldi kim ol bir kafirün oğluyıdı. Pâdişaha gayetde 
mukarreb oldu. Ve bu Istanbul’un eski kafirleri bu vezirün atası dostlarıyıdı. Yanına girdiler kim: ‘Hey 
neylersin?’, didiler. ‘Bu Türkler gine bu şehri ma’mur etdiler’, didiler. ‘Senüñ gayretüñ kanı? Atan yurdunu ve 
bizüm yurdumuzu aldılar. Gözümüze karşu tasarruf ederler. İmdi sen hod Pâdişahun mukarrebisin’, didiler. 
‘İmdi cehd eyle kim bu halk bu şehrün imâretinden el çekeler. Ve girü evvelki gibi bu şehir bizüm elümüzde 
kala’, didiler. Vezir dahi eydür: ‘Buna şol mukata’a kim evvel komuşlaridi, anı girü koduralum.’ Dedi kim: ‘Bu 
halk dahi mülkler yapmakdan çekileler. Bu şehir ol nesneyile gine harâba yüz tuta. Âhir gine bizüm tâ’ifemüz 
elinde kala’, didi. Bu vezir, pâdişaha bir münsabetile ilka itdi; gine mukata’a ihdas itdi. Sual: Bu vezir kimdür? 
Rum Mehmed’dür kim anı pâdişah it gibi boğdurdu.’  
528 Ibidem, 292-293: ‘Ve hem vilyetinde adl ü dâd, bedl ü ihsan ve kerem memlû olundu. Ve hem ol Rum vezir 
bozduğu teşrifleri girü evvelki kanun-ı Osmânî üzerine mukarrer etdi. Ve ol nesli bühtan vezir kim vakıfları ve 
mülkleri kim bozmuşidi. Gine sâhiblerine mukarrer itdi.’ 
529 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 314-315: ‘İstanbul’u imâret itmek isteyüp, cemî Osman vilâyetlerine âdemler gönderüp, 
‘hâtırı olan gelsün İstanbul’da mülk tutsun’ diyü etrafda çagırtdılar. Bu haber âleme çav olup, hâtırı olan gelüp, 
bu vechile imârete yüz tutmadı. Andan buyurdı, her vilâyetün ganîsinden ve fakîrinden süreler. [...] Andan bu 
gelen kişilerün evlerine mukâta’a vaz itdiler. Halk nefret idüp...’ 
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had applied such a tax in the lands that they had conquered. Mehmed accepted and 
withdrew it. However, when Rum Mehmed Pasha became a vizier he convinced Mehmed 
to reintroduce the rent-tax. Neşrî wrote: ‘For, he [Rum Mehmed Pasha] was a boy from 
Istanbul. He envied that the Muslims restored and built their city. This rent-tax today was 
established on his insistence.’530   
Concerning this tax, Tursun Beg provided in his narrative the perspective of the 
princely court. As a specialist of the financial bureaucracy, he noted that he was 
appointed to survey the landholdings and houses in the city in order to levy the rent-tax. 
He wrote that this tax had led to many changes in properties. For example, a person who 
could not afford to pay the imposed tax on a house would change it for another house 
which he could afford. According to Tursun Beg, when he was asked for the reason to 
apply the rent-tax payments, Sultan Mehmed defended his decision by the following 
argumentation: ‘My wish with this tax was not aimed at [gaining] property [for myself], 
but to set an order in the public affairs and to redress the situation of the greedy and pride 
people. For, triggered by greed, people with insufficient incomes and no money desired 
to possess a house of high value. At the same time, they also did not show a desire to sell 
and buy in order to purchase money. In that situation, many houses and villas would be 
soon neglected and decayed into ruins. As such, the initial purpose of restoration and 
reconstruction works would not be carried out. Therefore, I suggested applying the rent-
tax payments so that everyone would select the house that he could afford and meet the 
expenses of restoration. When I saw that this happened, I have granted the houses as 
properties to my servants and subjects, for acquiring property was not my wish. In this 
way, it was established that everyone who selected a house could acquire it as his own 
property.’531   
Neşrî also asserted that during the reign of Bâyezid I the Ottoman realm had attained 
such prosperity that even the neighbouring states envied it. He wrote: ‘The Padishah, the 
Refuge of the World, settled himself in Bursa and called together engineers, architects 
and masons, and laid the foundation for a great mosque. He also abandoned wine 
drinking, took great scholars and wise sheikhs as his companions, performed the right 
guidance of the Shari’a and blanked out oppression from the world. He dispensed justice 
 
                                                     
530 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 315: ‘Zirâ kendü İstanbul oglanıydı. Müslimanlar kendü şehirlerinün evlerini müft tasarruf 
itdüklerine hased itdi. Bu şimdiki makata’a anun igvâsıyla olmışdur.’ 
531 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 69: ‘Vaz-ı mukâta’adan murâdum mâl degül idi; belki tertîb ü ta’dîl-i umûr-ı 
cümhûr ve islâh-ı ahvâl ü mâl-i ehl-i tama’a u gurûrdur ki, temlik emrinün tama’ı ile, bir denî-mikdâr kimesne 
bir âli-mikdâr dâr tutmış, ve henûz satmak almak raǧbeti yok ki satup kifâyet idine. Lâ-büd az müddette ol dûr 
u kusûr imâretten dûr olup harâba yüz tutar idi, ve ta’mîr ki murâd-ı aslîdür, fevt olur. Pes vaz-ı mukâta’a sûretin 
teklif ittüm ki, her kimesne mukâta’anun a’bâ-yı edâsına mütehammil oldugınca ev ihtiyâr ide. Çün gördüm ki 
bu matlûb husûle mevsûl oldı, murâdum olmayan – ki mâldür – yine ihsân yöninden kullaruma ve re’âyâma 
baǧışladum. Ve ihtiyârı ile tuttuklı tuttuǧını temlîk itmek emir dahı sâdık oldı.’ 
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in such a degree that the rich and the poor, the blessed and the despicable, the powerful 
and the weak, they all reached happiness under his shelter. The Ottoman realm was 
reconstructed in such a degree that the neighbouring lands envied the Ottoman lands.’532   
As Neşrî was an ulemâ-historian close to the princely court, he portrayed Bâyezid I as 
a devout and just sultan. Neşrî represented him as a monarch, who was pious, had quit 
drinking, dispensed justice and built and restored the realm up to prosperity. Of the 
duties that were expected from a ruler, according to Neşrî, Bâyezid I reportedly 
performed most of them. 
3.4.2.3 Redistribution of wealth and prosperity  
Public buildings and reconstruction works or imar activities appeared to be interrelated 
with the notion of redistribution and prosperity of the people. Both activities promoted 
the image of the ruler as a generous sovereign, who enhanced the prosperity of the 
people. Redistribution of wealth was perceived as a pivotal act that was required for the 
prosperity of the people and well-being of the society, as well as the personal glory both 
in this world and the next. As al-Ghazali reminded, the reward of a good sultan will not 
only be of this world, but also in heaven. The ruler had to strife to attain happiness both 
in this world and the next. The notion of redistribution was explicitly emphasised in the 
Kutadgu Bilig, one of the oldest mirrors-for-princes in Turkish language, which instructed 
the princes on their duties: ‘The people must be satisfied, to make them content they must 
have full bellies. Never let them have too little to eat and to drink. […] Be generous, forgive 
and feed […] Handle the sword with your right hand and give assets with your left. Open 
your treasury and distribute your wealth […] You should plentifully reward your retinue, 
if they are naked clothe them and feed them if they are hungry.’533  
The author of Kutadgu Bilig blended the Turkish tradition with the Islamic political 
ideas that viewed the wealth of the ruler deriving from people’s labour and prosperity. 
He insisted that the ruler had to care for the poor in order to maintain a good governance. 
The rich must not load their burden upon the people who produce and pay taxes, as that 
would upset and impoverish them. As İnalcık remarked, the Kutadgu Bilig or ‘the Wisdom 
 
                                                     
532 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 151: ‘Pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâh Bursa’da mütemekkin olup, mühendisler ve mi’mârlar ve 
bennâlar cem’ idüp, bir ulu câmi bünyâdın idüp, şürb-i hamrdan vazgelüp, ulemâ-i izâm ve meşâyih-i kirâmile 
musâhabet idüp, icrâ-yı şer-i kavîm üzerine müstakîm olup, âlemi, zalemeden hâlî kılup, bir vechile adl itdi ki, 
ganî vü fakîr, azîz, hakîr, vazî vü şerif, kavî vü za’îf, hep anun zıll-i himâyetinde âsûde olup, memleket-i 
Osmâniyye bir vechile şin oldı ki, etrâf-ı memâlik, vilâyet-i Osmân’a hased iderlerdi.’  
533 Yusuf Has Hacib, Kutadgu Bilig, 155: ‘Cömert ol, bağışla, yedir ve giydir’; 156: ‘Sağ elinle kılıç sallarken sol elinle 
mal dağıt’; 220: ‘Maiyetine hizmetine göre bol ihsanlarda bulunmalı, çıplak ise giydirmeli, aç ise doyurmalıdır.’  
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of Happiness’ advised to the ruler to perform his functions in a just way so that the poor 
would become ‘middle class’ and the least become more wealthy.534 
Broquière described how Murad gave an open audience and a banquet. After the meal 
was served and distributed among the public, Murad left ‘for he never eats in public’. 
Broquière continued: ‘On his going away, the musicians, who were placed in the court 
near the buffet, began to play. They played instruments and sung songs that celebrated 
the heroic deeds of Turkish warriors. When the public in the gallery heard anything that 
pleased them, they shouted cries after their manner. Not knowing what they were 
playing, I went into the court and saw they were string instruments of a large size. The 
musicians entered sultan’s apartment and ate whatever they could find.’535   
This last practice was the continuation of an old custom of the nomadic Turkish 
tradition. As discussed above, the eighth-century Orhun Inscriptions of the Kök Türk 
Empire noted that the essential role of the ruler was to ensure the welfare of his followers 
and subjects, share the revenues and redistribute tribute to feed and clothe the people.536 
As İnalcık has argued, this custom evolved into an institution within the steppe 
environment of nomadic life.537 One of the duties of the nomadic ruler was to create 
opportunities in which people came together and eat. The nomadic principle of toy, which 
later was translated into Persian as khan-ı yağma (literally, ‘plundering the tent of the 
ruler’), was a custom that continued into the Ottoman state as well.538 However, after the 
intensive contacts with the Persian Islamic principles on state and sovereignty, the 
Turkish nomadic custom of toy took more a form of symbolic meaning.539 
 
                                                     
534 İnalcık, ‘Turkish and Iranian’, 15; İbrahim Kafesoğlu, ‘Selçuklular’, Islam Ansiklopedisi, 390. 
535 Broquière, Le Voyage d’Oultremer, 192. 
536 Talat Tekin, Orhon Yazitlari: Kül Tigin, Bilge Kağan, Tunyukuk (Istanbul, 1995) 25 ; Peter B. Golden, An Introduction 
to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle 
East (Wiesbaden, 1992) 71, 117, 143. 
537 Halil İnalcık, ‘Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig’, in: ibid, The Middle East 
and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society (Bloomington, 1993) 13-14. 
538 Altan Çetin, Orta Çağda Devletin İki Yüzü. Devletnâme: Liyâkatın İzinde Devleti Düşünmek (Ankara, 2013) 74. 
539 İnalcık, ‘Turkish and Iranian’, 14. 
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Figure 16: Miniature depicting a banquet given by the Sultan for the janissaries.  
Source: Surname-i Vehbi (1720), Topkapı Palace Museum. 
 
The same idea reappears with some modifications in the expression used in a 
sixteenth-century Ottoman chancellery register, about the ‘open door’ ceremony at 
sultan’s court: ‘My door marked by Felicity is not closed and by the grace of God, is always 
open to those who come in friendship or enmity.’540 This expression manifested itself in 
most of the deeds of sultans and referred to the norms to which the sultans had to strive. 
Neşrî suggested that the Ottoman rulers already performed their duties since the earliest 
days of Osman. He noted that ‘it was a custom of Osman Gazi to feed and to clothe the 
poor in every three days and to give alms to the widows.’541 He viewed the fortune of the 
ruler deriving from people’s labour and prosperity. Therefore, Neşrî portrayed Osman 
Gazi as a ruler who looked after his subjects. As feeding people and taking of care of the 
poor endorsed the consent of people and consequently consolidated the authority of the 
 
                                                     
540 Mühimme Defteri, vol. X, 108. 
541 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 68: ‘Osman Gâzi’nün âdetiydi. Üç günde bir ta’âm bişirüp, fukarâyı cem idüp it’âm iderdi. 
Ve hem yalıncakları getürüp, tonadurdı. Ve tul avratlara dâyim sadaka virürdi.’  
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ruler, this practice developed into the Ottoman institution of ‘public kitchens’ or 
imarets.542 
As it is the case for any socio-political system, similarly for the Ottomans, the question 
of legitimacy was also essential. Indeed, any socio-political system can hope to survive 
only if its distribution of wealth, power and status seems generally right to the people 
and various groups who constitute the society. Tursun Beg summarised this view as 
follows: 
‘a sultan should show his gratitude for his sovereignty [saltanat] by dispensing 
justice to all men and by doing beneficence and by supporting people. The gratitude 
for rulership is to recognize the right of God’s blessings and to be right to those who 
serve you. The gratefulness for the vastness of the realm is expressed by not 
touching the properties of people. The gratefulness for being exalted is expressed 
by having empathy with the fate of the one who has fallen down. The gratitude for 
a rich treasury is shown by charity without expectations in return; the gratitude for 
power is demonstrated by providing shelter and protection to the weak, and by 
redressing the wrongs through the law of justice […] the gratitude for the heavenly 
gardens at your palace means to protect and to shelter the subjects [re’aya] who 
seek accommodation under the shadow of sovereign. […] As the Prophetic hadith 
said: You [sovereigns] are all shepherds and all of you are responsible for those 
under your rule.’543 
In the chronicle of Aşık Paşazade, the notion of redistribution of wealth was most 
clearly described in his account of Sultan Murad I marrying his son Bâyezid to the 
daughter of Germiyan-oğlu. During the wedding, various lords, Murad’s notables and 
envoys from various lands such as the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt brought gifts. 
Particularly, Gazi Evrenoz Beg brought precious gifts, such as silver and golden trays filled 
with golden pieces. Murad I did not take anything for himself, but distributed all of them 
among the ulema, his men, the poor and the envoys.544 Whereas redistribution of wealth 
 
                                                     
542 See: Nina Ergin, Christoph Neumann and Amy Singer eds., Feeding People Feeding Power. Imarets in the Ottoman 
Empire (İstanbul, 2007). 
543 Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth, 25-26: ‘Şükr-i saltanat âlemiyâna adl’dür ve zîr-destâna ihsân; şükr-i fermân-
revâyî hakk-ı ni’met-i Mevlâ’yı ve hizmet-i hizmetkârı bilmektür. Şükr-i füshat-ı memleket, emlâk-ı ra’iyyetten 
tama’ kesmek; şükr-i bülendî, baht-ı nejend-bahta merhamet buyurmak; şükr-i hazâyin-i bisyâr, sadakât u idrâr 
ve ibkâ vü takrîr-i hayrât-ı selef-i ebrâr; şükr-i kudret, acizlere rahmet etmek; şükr-i sihhat, bîmâr-ı zulme 
kânûn-ı adl’den şifa virmek […] şükr-i bârgâh-ı felek-sâyebân ve besâtîn-i bihişt-nüzhet, kendünün zıll-i 
zalilinde ola re’âyânun emâkinini nüzül-i azâb ü suhre nüzûlinden mu’af u müsellem tutmak […] küllüküm râ’in 
ve küllüküm mes’ûlün an ra’iyyeti.’  
544 Âşık Paşazade Tarihi, ed. Öztürk, 80: ‘Ve dahi Murad Han Gazi gör kim dahi ne kılsa gerekdür. Bu Evrenez 
getürdigi kulları ve cariyeleri bu etrafdan gelen elçilere üleşdürdi. Ve bu etrafun elçileri getürdigi yahşi atları 
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was praised as a virtue and a duty of a ruler, the opposite was generally disapproved. Neşri 
attributed such an example of ‘vice’ to Çelebi Musa, who instead of granting favours and 
gifts started to kill the wealthy marcher lords and take their possessions. Musa justified 
this by arguing that these lords were disloyal to his brother Süleyman, and as such it was 
uncertain whether they would be loyal to him. However, as was often warned in advice 
literature, Musa’s act of depriving the marcher lords of their wealth led to the weakening 
of their loyalty. The resentment against Musa caused his opponents to overcome their 
disputes and band together against him. The marcher lords changed sides and joined the 
forces of his brother Çelebi Mehmed.545  
The Anonymous Chronicle accounted this incident as follows: ‘Çelebi Musa had put his 
own servants [kuls] forward and the Rum [marcher] lords fell from grace. He saw how they 
had betrayed his brother and knew that they also would betray him. Indeed, this was an 
old characteristic of the Rumelian people. He decided to kill or imprison the lords whom 
he distrusted. When the Rumelian lords understood this, they retreated themselves and 
observed what the wind would bring forth.’546  
Eventually, the powerful marcher lords Evrenos Beg and Mihal-oğlu Mehmed Beg and 
even the commander of the Janissaries had defected to the side of Çelebi Mehmed. Only 
the akıncı-raiders stayed with Musa.547 Musa’s imprudent and hasty centralising policies, 
which aimed at undermining the power of the influential frontier lords (uç begleri) and 
replacing them with the members of his own household (kul), led to the hostility of the 
influential lords. 
The Anonymous Chronicle, which reflected the viewpoint of the gazis in the Ottoman 
Balkans, addressed to an audience of warriors, dervishes and tribal elements. In the 
horizon of expectation of this audience, the ideal ruler had to live a simple life, provide 
his men with raiding opportunities, share his wealth with them and respect his begs, 
without whom ruling was impossible. These expectations of the ruler were similar to the 
 
                                                     
cemi’sin kendünün kulu Evrenez’e verdi. Ve getürdigi filörinün dahi ba’zısın Evrenez’e girü verdi. Ve bâkisini 
ulemâya ve fukarâya üleşdürdi. Ve kendüye hiç nesne almadı. Ve niçeler müflis geldiler ve gani gittiler.’ 
545 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 227-228: ‘Rum-ili beglerinden be-nâm be-nâm maldâr begleri tutup helâk idüp, mâlın 
almaga başladı. Hattâ dîvânda otururken, mâldâr beglerden ve paşalardan kimesne görse, ‘Şol arada filori kokar’ 
diyüp, öldürüp mâlın alurdı. Şol sebebden ki, ‘karındaşum Emîr Süleyman’a ne vechile sadâkat itdüniz ki, baña 
ne vechile sadâkat idesiz’, dirdi. […] İbrahim Paşa dahı cemî’i beglerle tanışıp, ‘bu kişinin bed-hâli var, giderek 
cemî’mizi öldürüp mâlımuzı alur. Sultânı davet etmek evlâdır.’ diyicek, cemî’i begler bu fikri savâb gördiler, ol 
umûrı İbrahim Paşa’ya ısmarladılar. Paşa-yı mezkûr İstanbul’a vardugı bigi, fî’l-hâl sultâna haber gönderüp, 
Mûsâ Çelebi’nüñ ef’âl-i şenî’asın ilâm idüp, beglerinden nefret itdügin bildürdi.’ 
546 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 59: ‘Çün Musa Çelebi kulların ilerü çekdi, Rum beglerin mansıbdan düşürdi. Gördi kim 
karındaşından nice döndiler hâyin oldilar, bildi kim kendüsine dahi hâyin olurlar. Zîrâ kim Rum-ili’nün evvelden 
âhire âdetleridür. Ve kangı begde, kim şüphesi var idi kim, kasd itdi kim cümlesin helâk ide ve kimini dahı habs 
ide. Bu hâli bilüp Rum begleri çekilüp oturdılar, rûzigârı gözlediler kim ne göstere.’ 
547 Ibidem, 60-61. 
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functions of khan in Oğuz political thought (see above). In general, the chroniclers 
reproached those who kept the assets for themselves instead of distributing them. The 
anonymous chronicler explicitly criticised the introduction of the state treasury during 
the reign of Murad I and condemned all kinds of taxes that diminished the revenues of 
the gazi milieu. For example, he criticised the pençik-tax on captives applied in the 1370s, 
according to which one-fifth of the gaza booty was taken for the state’s treasury and the 
establishment. The ulema official, Kara Rüstem warned Çandarlı Halil Pasha that ‘wealth 
was wasted. According to God’s command, one-fifth of the gaza booty belongs to the 
padishah. Why don’t you claim it?’548 The anonymous chronicler criticised this tax as it 
diminished the revenues of the semi-independent gazi groups.  
The anonymous author claimed that Hayreddin Pasha had introduced ‘greed’ at the 
Ottoman realm. He noted that until his arrival even the infidels had not been excessively 
taxed. He yearned for the earlier period when the rulers were ‘not yet greedy’ and gave 
whatever they had to the soldiers instead of keeping it to themselves. During Murad’s 
reign, he accused that this sharing of revenues was lost with the new arrivals. Therefore, 
he detested the introduction of the central treasury: ‘At that time [the reign of Murad I] 
the padisahs were not greedy. Whatever came into their hands they gave away again, and 
they did not know what a treasury was. But when [Çandarlı] Hayreddin Pasha came to the 
court, greedy scholars became the companions of the rulers. ‘He who is a ruler must have 
a treasury. Greed and oppression have emerged. Indeed, for where there is greed, there 
is oppression’549  
About the administrative innovations of the Çandarlı dynasty of high-ranking ulema 
officials and grand viziers, the anonymous writer was also very critical: ‘When the 
Persians and Karamanids became the companions of the princes of the House of Osman, 
these princes committed all kinds of sins […] When [Çandarlı] Ali Pasha came to the 
Ottoman lords, sin and wickedness increased. Until then nothing was known of account 
books. The practice of accumulating money and storing it in a treasury comes from them. 
The house of Osman was a solid people, but these outsiders came to them and introduced 
all kinds of tricks.’550 In contrast, the court historian Ahmedî praised the vizirate of the 
 
                                                     
548 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 28: ‘Nice bunca beglik malı zayi idersin? […] İşbu esirler kim gazadan gaziden 
getürürler. Tanrı buyrugında beşde biri pâdişâhındur.’ 
549 Ibidem, 31: ‘Ol zamanda harâc az idi. Şöyle alurlardı kim kâfirler dahi incinmez idi. Kebesin ve öküzün veya 
oğlın kızın satdurup veya rehin kodurup almazlardı. Ol zaman pâdişahlar tama’kâr değüllerdi. Her ne ellerine 
girürse yigide ve yegile virürler idi. Hazîne nedür bilmezlerdi. Heman kim Hayreddin Paşa kapuya geldi, 
padişahlar ve tama’kar danişmendler musâhib olup, hazîne dahi padişah olana gerekdür didiler. Pâdişâhı 
kendülere uydurdular. Tama’ve zulm peydâ oldı. Elbetde tama’ olduğı yerde zulm dahı olsa gerekdür’  
550 Ibidem, 38: ‘Heman kim Osman beglerine Acem ve Karamanlular musâhib oldı. Osman begleri dahi dürlü dürlü 
günahlara mürtekib oldılar. Heman kim Ali Paşa Osman beglerine geldi, dürlü dürlü hîle ile âlemi toldırdılar. 
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Çandarlıs. Ahmedî wrote: ‘ He [Sultan Murad I] understood the difficult situation of 
poverty in exile [of Çandarlı]; Graciously, he honoured and appointed him to high office. 
Ultimately, he made him vizier of the realm. What a vizierate! He became a great 
prince.’551  
The Anonymous Chronicle also criticise the establishment of the janissary institution 
during the reign of Murad I.552 The anonymous author resented the employment of ill-
reputed iç oğlanı (pages), coming out of the palace as kuls (servants) of the dynasty’s 
household to dominate over the free-born Turkish nobility. He criticised the breakdown 
of the established privileges of the Turkish gazi aristocracy who were replaced by 
appointed officials belonging to the dynasty’s household. He wrote: ‘There were ancient 
nobles and persons had rights. When a sipahi [Ottoman cavalryman] died, his office was 
given to his son. And if he had no sons, but left behind a daughter and wife they were 
given to a servant of the dynasty so that they would not be disgraced. The land fief of the 
one who had died was also transferred [to his family].’553  
As already discussed, the process of centralisation was a tension-ridden phenomenon. 
While the dynasty and its household attempted to centralise state power, the gazi circles 
who were increasingly excluded from their former revenues and privileges opposed to 
this process of centralisation. 
In this respect, Sultan Bâyezid I was accused of allegedly storing and accumulating 
wealth in the treasury. Aşık Paşazade suggested that rulers who accumulate riches are 
condemned to fall in disgrace. According to him, Bayezid had accumulated riches and 
kept it to himself. However, Timur took it and consumed it all. Consequently, the realm 
had deeply suffered. Aşık Paşazade noted that a ruler should spend his wealth on charity. 
The chronicler advised that ‘the sultan needed many friends who had full bellies and who 
were not occupied by concerns of hunger.’554  
 
                                                     
Andan evvel hisab difter bilmezlerdi, anlar te’lif ettiler. Akça yığıp hazîne itmek anlardan kaldı. Âli-i Osman bir 
sulb kavm idi. Anlar ki geldiler dürlü dürlü hîleler başlayub takvâyı götürdiler.’ 
551 Ahmedî, Dastan-i Tevârîh-i, 36: ‘Gurbet ü halin ü fakrin bildi ol; Lutfıla anı ehl-i mansıb kıldı ol. Akibet mülke 
anı itdi vezir; Ne vizaret ki oldı bir ulu emir.’ 
552 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 28 : ‘Gelibolu’da esîrden bâc almak Cendereli Kara Halîl’den ve Karamanli Kara 
Rüstem’den kaldı […] Bu tertîb üzerine oglanlar devşirdiler. […] Bir kaç yıldan sonra getürüp kapuda yeniçeri 
eylediler. Ve hem adını yeniçeri kodılar’.  
553 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 38-39: ‘Heman kim Ali Paşa vezîr oldi, fisk u fücûr ziyâde oldı. Mahbûb oglanları yanına 
aldı. Adını iç oglanı kodı. Bir nice zaman ne gerekse ider. Andan çıkarup mansib virür oldılar. Andan ileru 
kadimler var idi. Kişi ıyalleri idi. Cümle mansib anlarun idi, azl idüp birine dahı virmezlerdi. Eger bir sipahi ölse 
mansibin oglina virülerdi. Ve ger ogli kalmayup kizi veyâ avrati kalsa zelîl olmasun diyü anlari bir kula 
virürlerdi. Ol ölenün rimârin bile virürlerdi. İç oglanına ragbet itmek Ali Paşa’dan kaldı.’ 
554 Âşık Paşazade, Tevarih-I Al-i Osman, ed. Yavuz and Saraç, 483-484: ‘Merhum Yıldırım Hündkâr mâl cem’ itdi, 
tedbîr-i memleket kaldı. Akçalar cem’ idüb hazînelere koyar, memleket kesedlik oldı. Âhir ol mâlı Temur-i 
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Both Aşık Paşazade and Neşrî accounted an incident during the Battle of Ankara (1402). 
When the auxiliary troops of the Anatolian principalities had defected to the side of Timur 
and his own sons, Mustafa and Süleyman, had fled, Bâyezid was left alone on the 
battlefield. Only the ‘infidel troops of the Serbian lord, who fought very well’555 and 
Bâyezid’s household troops and janissaries stayed with him. At this time, one of Bâyezid’s 
personal guards, Solak Karaca, reproached him: ‘O Bâyezid Khan! Where are now your 
sons and those marcher lords in whom you trusted so much? Where are those drunken 
viziers of yours? This is their comradeship in arms! You could not sacrifice your money, 
you stored all of it in the treasury and used to say: this is the portion provided by God to 
my sons.’556 These words of his guard had deeply hurt and upset Bâyezid. He replied: ‘are 
you obligating me through witty remarks for a kindness received!’557 In fury, Bâyezid 
galloped out of his household troops followed by his solak-guards and attacked Timur’s 
troops. However, in the end, he was captured.   
By contrast, Sultan Murad II appeared in the chronicles as an accomplished ruler who 
knew that he had to satisfy his soldiers in order to guarantee their enthusiasm as well as 
to keep their loyalty. He provided them with opportunities to promote themselves both 
in wealth and in rank. For instance, as discussed earlier, during the Battle of Varna, Murad 
II had ordered the general mobilisation. In return for their assistance, he offered to the 
participants whatever they wished: ‘It should be known that whoever accompanies us on 
this victory-crowned campaign and offers assistance out of love for the religion of Islam, 
my imperial assent has been granted for whatever it is they request. Whatever it is they 
wish, whether a timar or zeamet military fief, whether a post in the janissary corps or 
household cavalry or whether release from yörük (nomadic) status, I have accepted.’558  
The Gazavat noted on the capture of the castle of Tirnovi: ‘The troops took more booty 
than can be counted. No one bothered with common stuff, they took only pure gold and 
silver coins.’559 After the crusader army was defeated at Varna, the inhabitants of the 
 
                                                     
bedbaht yedi. Vilâyet ayak altında kaldı. […] İmdi azizler! Mâl oldur kim hayra sarf ola. Pâdişâhlaruñ dostu oldur 
kim karnı dok ola ve galaba ola. Kendü açlıgı kayısı olmaya.’ 
555 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 160: ‘Vılk-oglı kâfir çerisiyle gâyet eyü ceng itdü.’ 
556 Âşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 351: ‘Hay Bâyezid Han! Kani ol güvendügüñ oglanlaruñ. Ya kani ol 
güvendügüñ sancaguñ begleri veyahud kani ol serhos vezîrlerüñ? Ne gökçek yoldaslik itdiler!’ Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 
161: ‘Akçayı harc itmege kıyamazduñ, hazîneye koyup, oglancuklarum rızkıdur, dirdüñ.’  
557 Âşık Paşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 351 : ‘Çünkim bu sözi Bâyezid Han işiticek katı acıdı: ‘Bak, bana minnet 
idüp nükte de mi idersiz?, didi. Hemân atını depüp kuluñ arasından taşra çıkdı.’ 
558 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 14: ‘Şöyle ma’lum oluna kim, bu sefer-i nusret-me’âbıma gelüb Dîn-i İslam aşkına 
imdâd idüb bizimle ma’an sefere varanların her ne mürâcaatları var ise, katımda makbul-i hümâyunumdur, eğer 
tımar isteyene ve eğer zeamet isteyene ve eğer yeniçerilik isteyene ve eğer sipahilik isteyene ve eğer 
yörüklükten çıkmak isteyene her birinin murâdu maksudları makbulumdur.’ 
559 Ibidem, 46: ‘ol kadar mâl-i ganimet aldılar kim, hesabı mümkün degil idi. Kaba saba esbâba kimse bakmayub 
sâfi altun ve guruş aldılar.’ 
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castles of Varna, Bedric and Sumlu that had been taken captive were also freed. The 
Gazavat accounted: ‘everyone rejoiced as they found their sons, daughters and wives […] 
That day, the Padishah of the World bestowed lavish gifts on those unfortunates that had 
been released from captivity. He endowed those poor with so many gold coins that they 
all became rich and free from desire for goods and they offered prayers for his majesty 
the Padishah the Refuge of the World.’560  
Moreover, Murad seems not only to be redistributing wealth to the soldiers, he also 
favoured the architects and scholars with lavish gifts and regularly distributed money to 
the poor. For instance, he awarded the architect, who had built a bridge and the 
settlement in Ergene, with a robe of honour and with a farm. The inhabitants of the village 
of Ergene were also exempted from paying taxes.561  
It appeared that Sultan Murad’s campaigns provided the participants with abundant 
prospects of wealth as well as with promotion in the army. For instance, Murad II granted 
favours to Hacı İsa. He was one of the soldiers of Lord Hasan Beyzade, who was killed 
during one of the vanguard skirmishes with the forces of Hunyadi. Hacı İsa was the only 
survivor of that clash and one of his arms was wounded. As Sultan Murad II was informed 
about the events, he called Hacı İsa into his presence, ordered to clothe him with a robe 
of honour (kaftan) and treated him with kindness, gifts and favours. Murad also permitted 
him to gather troops under his command and to assemble his own following.562 Sultan 
Murad II’s generosity toward his soldiers is also attested in the Selâtin-nâme. After the 
Battle of Kosovo in 1448, the amount of booty was copious and the soldiers got rich, but 
Murad himself did not take anything for himself and left it all to his soldiers.563 Oruç Beg 
noted that during the Battle of Varna, after the Ottoman troops defeated the Hungarian 
forces in the wagenburg position, ‘they plundered the treasury of the king. The gazis 
became very rich and they were very satisfied.’564  
Likewise, in Aşık Paşazade’s account of the unsuccessful siege of Belgrade in 1439, we 
read the immense wealth that the soldiers had gained. It is actually Aşık Paşazade’s own 
 
                                                     
560 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 69: ‘her birisi kimi oglunu ve kimi kızını ve kimi hâtûnunu bulub mesrûr oldular […] ol 
gün Pâdişâh-ı âlem ferman edüb ol esirlikden halâs olan fukarâya lûtf u ihsânlar edüb her birine şol mertebe 
altun guruş ihsân eyledi kim, cümlesi ganî olub ve mâlden müstagni olub Pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâh hazretlerine 
dua’âlar edüb…’ 
561 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 276: ‘Sultân Murâd Edirne’den ulemayı ve fukarâyı cem idüp, getürüp ziyâfet idüp, akçalar 
ve filoriler üleşdürüp, evvel aşı kendü eliyle üleşdirdi. [...] Ve yapan mi’mâra hil’atler geyürdi, çiftlikler virdi. Ol 
kasabanun halkını avârızdan mu’af ve müsellem kıldı.’  
562 Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad, 15: ‘Pâdişâh emr edüb kaftan giyürdiler ve in’âm ve ihsân edüb Pâdişâh ana lûtfile 
mu’âmele edüb var imdî askerini düz dediklerinde, Hacı İsâ taşra çıkub kapusını düzmege başladı.’ 
563 Kemal, Selâtin-nâme, 158: ‘Şu denlü geldi şâha nimet-i mâl; Bular mâl ile oldular mâlamâl; Orada cem’ 
olur mâl-ı ganimet; Birin şah almağa kılmadı niyyet; Şeh anı leşkerine eyledi bahş; Kabûl itmedi andan câme vü 
rahş.’ 
564 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 68-69: ‘Arabayı feth idince âkibet gâziler arabayı ve kıraluñ hazînesini yagma ve talan idüp, 
gâzîler gâyet toyum olup ganî oldılar.’ 
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adventures that we read about and the failure of the siege is overshadowed by the 
immense wealth that the soldiers had gained. Murad II appears in the account as a 
strategist who takes decisions about master plans and as the benevolent sultan who 
rewards his soldiers. Aşık Paşazade wrote:  
‘Sultan Murad looked upon the land of Hungary. He realized that Belgrade was the 
gateway to Hungary. He resolved to open this gate. […] While they pretended to lay 
siege to the fortress, they crossed over the Sava and suddenly raided into [akın 
saldılar] Biline. The gazis came back so rich with booty, that one would give a 
beautiful slave girl for a boot. Well, I was there too. I bought a boy of six or seven 
years old for one hundred silver coins. Be aware, in those days one would pay a 
servant a hundred and fifty silver coins to look after a horse. In any event, on that 
campaign I obtained seven male and female captives from the akıncıs [raiders]. […] 
Now, one day during that campaign, I went to Sultan Murad and he deigned to grant 
me a captive. I said: ‘My glorious Sultan, I need both a horse in order to bring this 
slave home and some money for the road.’ He awarded me five thousand silver coins 
and two horses. So, I ended up returning to Edirne from that campaign with nine 
captives and four horses. In Edirne, I sold them for two or three hundred silver coins 
each. I earned an outstanding keep, praised the sultan and prayed for him.’565    
We can conclude from all these examples from the early Ottoman chronicles that 
Murad II through his character and deeds appear to comply with all the expectations and 
virtues that were required of a sovereign. Neşrî’s following praise of Sultan Murad II 
represented him as the ideal ruler of his age. He praised Murad as a Gazi Sultan who acted 
as a protector of the people and the soldiers. During his reign, the learned men and the 
poor lived in prosperity. Justice, peace and safety reigned in the Ottoman realm. Travelers 
used to say that such a tender and kind ruler was unusual. The situation of the realm was 
so good that people could practice their religion freely and work for their salvation in the 
next world in peace. With all the buildings and deeds, he brought prosperity to the realm 
and pleased his subjects. In Bursa, Murad built an ‘open kitchen’ or imarethane and a grand 
mosque with a medrese or high school. He appointed thirty reciters and fourteen mühellil 
to the mosque so that every day ‘God’s unity was pronounced’. Likewise in Edirne, Murad 
built a great mosque, a poorhouse, an ‘open kitchen’, a medrese and a dervish lodge. He 
established the town of Ergene with a bridge and an imaret. He also built many other 
lodges, baths, mosques and guesthouses. He sent an annual gift of three thousand five 
hundred florins to the Holy Cities of Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina. Every year, Murad 
personally distributed one thousand florins to the descendants of the Prophet. Murad also 
established an endowment (waqf) that generated revenues for the poor of Mecca. He 
 
                                                     
565 Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, 164-165. 
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never neglected to give alms to the poor after the Friday prayers. As ‘the land of Sultan 
Murad’ was so secure and prosperous that ‘seventy two millet’ came to live in Ottoman 
lands. Neşri noted that no matter in how many ways Sultan Murad II was to be praised, 
he deserved even more every time.566 
The following question arises: why was Sultan Murad II represented as the ideal ruler, 
while his grandfather Bâyezid I was harshly criticised? The possible explanation is that 
the reign of Murad II entailed a period of transition from the Turkish semi-nomadic 
organisation to a sedentary and centralised state formation, of which the fundaments 
were firmly consolidated by Sultan Mehmed II. We have observed that Bâyezid’s policy of 
centralisation and establishing direct rule over the vassal states had made him very 
unpopular. The semi-independent marcher lords also resented Bâyezid’s imperial 
tendencies at court, increasing centralisation of decision-making and employing of 
kapıkulu bureaucrats in the administration. All these developments diminished the 
positions and threatened the privileges and revenues of the marcher lords.  
After the near destruction of the Ottoman state in 1402, it was only recovered and 
reconsolidated during Murad II’s reign. However, the position of the dynasty was still 
delicate. At Murad II’s time, the dynasty and the state were to some degree still dependent 
on the marcher lords who had their own entrenched households. As Murad II was aware 
of the opposition of the semi-independent marcher lords against centralisation, he seems 
to have been mindful not to disturb them too much. He sought to maintain the political 
stability among the various social-political groups. It appears that Murad II rather applied 
a prudent and discreet policy when he continued his father Mehmed I’s aims in 
centralising the polity. It was Sultan Mehmed II who actually developed a new princely 
court with a regulated hierarchy in all respects and who distinguished the ruler as an 
absolute monarch henceforth. He established a new model of sovereignty with principles 
that he selectively appropriated from the Eastern Roman and Islamic political traditions.  
The historiographical works of both those authors close to the court and those who 
opposed it, attributed to Murad II nearly all the virtues of the ideal ruler. Particularly, the 
chroniclers from the gazi milieu contrasted Murad II to both Bâyezid I and Mehmed II, 
who were criticised for their centralist policies. Murad II appeared as the last 
representative of rulers who complied with the ancient customs and traditions, while 
discretely exploring the potentialities of change. It is also worth noting that most of the 
early chronicles were produced during the reign of Bâyezid II (r. 1481–1512), which 
marked a period of pacification. Bâyezid II softened his father’s centralist policies and 
appeased the social groups which had lost some of their privileges and revenues. In this 
respect, the chroniclers’ praise of Murad II as the ideal ruler and the criticism of Mehmed 
 
                                                     
566 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 304-306. 
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II and Bâyezid I can be read as expressions of expectations from the reigning sultan and 
as voicing their concerns and interests.   
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3.4.3 Consultation or Meşveret 
No matter how undisputed the authority of the sultan may have seemed, in order to 
administer the realm he had to encircle himself with wise and prudent viziers and he was 
expected to consult them on important matters. A ruler ultimately relied upon ministers 
and functionaries for the efficient governance of the realm. In Islamic tradition, 
consultation was a firmly established aspect of the political culture. The principle of 
consultation derived on Qur’anic verses and the traditions of the Prophet.  
Muslim philosophers such as al-Ghazali and Nizam al-Mulk had emphasised the 
obligation of rulers to consult men of learning and to surround themselves with capable 
and wise ministers. Al-Ghazali asserted that the sultan had to seek the advice from the 
learned ulema and from the Sufis who as ‘true souls’ are capable to uncover the hidden 
knowledge and wisdom (ma’arifa), which play an important role in the governance of 
state.567 Nizâm al-Mulk noted that as everyone knew something better than someone else 
in every branch of knowledge, ‘holding consultation on affairs is a sign of sound 
judgment, high intelligence and foresight’.568 He referred to the Prophet who consulted 
others in various matters and as God commanded him to seek advice, Nizam al-Mulk 
concluded that if even the Prophet needed counsel then nobody could do without it.569 As 
such, the sultan always needed to consult with ‘wise men and loyal friends’ and they 
should say what they think. When various opinions and thoughts are heard and compared 
to each other, the right course will stand out; that is to which all agree.’570  
In the Muradnâme, the importance of consultation for the ruler was also highlighted in 
various parts of the work. The author reminded the sultan that whoever becomes ruler 
of the people should keep close ties with wise men and consult them.  He also referred to 
the relevant hadith saying: ‘there is no greater support than consult’.571 As an example, he 
told the story of the Sasanid king Anushirvan, who, when asked why nobody opposed 
him, referred to his custom of consultation as one of the reasons.572 The author of the 
Muradnâme also noted that the Prophet was asked about the reasons why fortune had 
turned away from the Sassanids after they were able to rule so long. The Prophet replied 
 
                                                     
567 Al-Ghazali, Revival of the Knowledge, 28. 
568 Nizâm al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 95. 
569 Ibidem. 
570 Ibidem, 96.  
571 Murâd-nâme, 221: ‘Pes anla ki sultan olan kişiler, Bu âdemlere hân olan kişiler, Hep erbâb-ı akl ile hem-râh idi, 
Anun-çün cihâna şehenşâh idi. Gerek pâdişaha ki âkıllara, İde meşveret akl-ı kâmillere. Ki Tanrı Te’âlâ Resûli 
bile, Bu ma’nîyi gelmişdürürler dile.’ 
572 Ibidem, 223: ‘Meger meşveretdür ki ayn-ı savâb.’ 
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that they had forgotten to consult, tyranny had filled the world and justice had 
disappeared.573 The benefit of consultation was considered as equally pivotal as justice. 
The importance of consultative assemblies was also clearly emphasised in the early 
Ottoman chronicles. For instance, on the eve of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Neşrî noted 
that sultan Murad I gathered the state nobility and officials for a counsel, which he 
opened with the words: ‘My lords, with the help of God I have defeated many armies and 
fought many battles. However, this battle shall be different. To consult each other is a 
tradition of the prophet. We must forge alliances and win each other’s hearts and 
minds.’574 Neşrî suggested here that sultan Murad I behaved in accordance with the 
tradition by seeking the advice of his officials before taking any important decisions. 
Murad particularly wished to hear the opinion of Evrenos Gazi, as he appeared to be the 
most experienced and expert marcher lord concerning the adversaries in the Balkans. In 
the dialogue, there appeared to exist a mutual respect between the notables and the 
Sultan. Neşrî remarked that consultation was also recommended by the traditions of the 
Prophet.  
Likewise, the Anonymous Chronicler praised the value of consultation and 
recommended it as solving every problem: ‘No one was ever exposed to defeat by 
consultation [meşveret], no one has ever regretted it. Every hope is realised through 
consultation, which is the key to solve the affairs.’575 The anonymous writer criticised 
Sultan Bâyezid I for neglecting to consult his officials and ignoring their advices when he 
decided to confront Timur. As a result, he fell prey to his pride. If he had listened to what 
they had said, he would not have ended up as captives and not have been robbed.576 He 
also included the following verses to emphasise once more the benefits of consultation: 
‘The statesmen can only stay firm by seeking advice. When a person neglects to hear the 
counsel of intellect, what calamities will he bring upon his head?’577  
 
                                                     
573 Murâd-nâme, 225-226: ‘Akıl tanışıǧını unutdılar, Zulüm cevr dünyaya toldı tamâm, Adil dâd işidilmez oldı 
tamâm.’ 
574 Neşrî, Cihannuma, ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul, 2008) 123-124: ‘Hünkâr dahi erkân-ı devleti ve a’yanı saltanat-
ı bir yire cem’idüb müşavere kıldı […] Hünkâr eyitdi: ‘Begler, eğerçi Hak inâyetiyle çok çeri sıyub, cenk itdüm. 
Ammâ bu kalan cenk gibi degüldür. Müşavere itmek sünnet-i Resûl’dür. İttifâk-ı ârâ, goñül berkidürmek 
vâcibdür.’ 
575 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 46: ‘Meşveretsüz işini iş sanmagıl; Kendi râyınla işe el sunmagıl; Meşveretden kimse 
hüsran bulmadı, Meşveret iden peşîman olmadı; Meşveretle hâsıl olur her ümid; Meşveretdür bağlı işlere kilid.’ 
576 Ibidem: ‘hiç kimseyle meşveret itmedi. Nice kim nasîhat itdiler işitmedi. Kendi kendüye mağrur olup yürüdi 
ve kimseyle tanışmadı. Kendü başına birlik iderdi, kimseyle meşveret etmezdi.’ 48: ‘Eğer Yıldırım söz tutaydı 
başına bu hâl gelmezdi. Ve hem biz dahı dutsak olmazduk soyulmazduk. Ve illâ takdîrde olacakdur olur kimse 
mâni olmaz.’ 
577 Ibidem, 47: ‘Ehl-i devlet ol durur ki öǧüt ala; Öǧüt almayan kişiden ne gele. Âkılun pendin işitmeyen kişi, Ne 
aceb gerekidür olursa başı.’ 
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The traditional custom of ‘counsel and discussion’ was probably seen as a counter 
mechanism to the growing independence of the rulers, as the Ottoman state extended its 
authority during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As such, the sultans consulted 
publicly and the forum of royal assembly allowed grievances to be heard, judicial cases 
and principles of law to be settled, plans for peace and war to be discussed and in general 
the policies of the state to be determined.578 In the account of Broquière, Murad II had 
received in 1433 the Milanese embassy with brilliance, but the real negotiations took 
place a few days later with the viziers at the divan. His account demonstrates that 
Ottoman diplomacy during the reign of Murad II perceived all foreigners who personally 
embodied a political power or were accredited by a political entity were likely to become 
dialogue partners for the Ottoman state.579  
Concerning the Hungarian embassy of 1444, the anonymous author of the Gazavatname 
suggested that Sultan Murad II preferred an indirect role in the discussions, relegating 
the essential matters of the negotiation to his divan and viziers: ‘When the pâdişah [Murad 
II] had heard the letter, the embassy presented the gifts that it had brought and then left 
the Imperial Council. The pâdişah, the refuge of the world, looked directly at the paşa’s and 
said: ‘What do you think about this? This infidel asked to conclude a peace, but demanded 
Semendire in return.’ The paşa’s replied: ‘My king, this is not like other matters. Please 
summon a council to bring together the janissary officers and all men of state affairs, 
great and small. Let them discuss the issue […] Nothing can be decided until all this has 
been discussed. […] The pâdişah ordered that it would be wise to accept the peace at an 
early stage and to strengthen the bargaining position.’580 Unfortunately, the page of the 
Gazavat manuscript, which probably related the discussion in the divan, is missing. The 
text resumes with Murad II saying that it would be wise to accept peace. The accounts of 
the Gazavat and Broquière imply that Murad II was indeed relatively detached from the 
daily functions of government. But he was aware of his authority and he followed the 
meetings regularly and influenced the decisions. In sensitive matters such as foreign 
policy, he reserved the final decision for himself.  
According to the chroniclers, Sultan Murad II often sought the advice of his statesmen. 
Before a campaign on Thessalonica, he consulted his notables. He asked them how far the 
city was situated and how it could be taken. The siege of the fortress lasted long and 
 
                                                     
578 Işıksel, La politique étrangère ottomane, 55-57. 
579 For his eyewitness account of the Milanese embassy to the princely court of Murad II, see: Broquière, Le 
voyage d'outremer, 186-196. 
580 Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd, 32: ‘Pâdişâh nâmeyi dinledi, andan sonra elçi getürdügi hedâyâyı teslim edüb Dîvân-i 
Pâdişahîden taşra çıkdı. Pâdişah-ı âlem penâh hazretleri paşaların yüzlerine bakub: ‘Ne dersiniz? İşte bu küffar 
barışmak için rica etmiş. Ammâ Semendire kalesini istemiş.’ Paşalar eyitdiler: ‘Pâdişahım, bu iş gayri işe 
benzemez. Dîvân fermân buyurun ki, sigâr ve kibâr iş-erenleri ve ocak halkı cümle cem’olub müşâvere olunsun 
[...] Bu, müşâvere olunmayınca olmaz.’  
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Murad again asked his notables for advice on the measures and precautions that had to 
be taken. Evrenoz-oğlu Ali Beg said that this fortress was a difficult castle to take and he 
suggested proclaiming ‘plunder’ (yaǧma), which would motivate the soldiers. Murad 
agreed with his advice and indeed the fortress was soon captured.581 Âşık Paşazade noted 
in a later passage that Murad consulted Ali Beg and asked who knew best the ways of 
Hungary. Ali Beg declared that he was ready to swiftly scout the ways and the land of 
Hungary. Murad agreed and offered him to take regiments from the Balkans and Anatolia 
with him. Ali Beg asserted that the akıncı-raiders would be sufficient to carry out the 
mission. And Murad decided to let him go.582  
 According to the Gazavat, Murad II was given a remarkable number of bad advices by 
the marcher lord Turahan Beg before and during the Battle of Zlatitsa pass in the winter 
of 1443. The crusaders had invaded Ottoman territories, they headed toward Sofia and 
the Ottoman vanguards failed to stop their advance. Turahan Beg, who led one of those 
vanguards, went to Murad who was in Sofia with the main army and portrayed a 
pessimistic picture. He said that they formed no match for the enemy and that its force 
could not be resisted. He advised to retreat and to give the order to burn Sofia and its 
surroundings so that the enemy could not find any shelter and food when they arrived 
here. Murad followed his advice and ordered to set fire to the city and its villages. 
However, afterwards Murad was deeply grieved about what had happened by taking a 
wrong decision. Murad suffered bitter pains of conscience, but nothing could be done 
anymore. According to the Gazavatname, Murad abhorred: ‘What a fate we have visited on 
fair Sofia! The man who told us to do this is not our friend. Alas! We acted without 
thinking when we followed the evil word of a man that caused this calamity.’583 Turahan’s 
‘evil advice’ had led to Murad II’s wrong decision. Murad reportedly regretted of taking 
advice from Turahan Beg. As they were in the middle of a military campaign, he did not 
punish him immediately. 
Moreover, according to the Gazavat, Turahan again succeeded to mislead Murad. This 
time, it happened at the Battle of Zlatitsa pass in the winter of 1443. After the initial 
setback, the Ottoman army succeeded to turn the tide and the army was on the winning 
hand. At that time, Turahan Beg galloped up and came to Murad and requested to 
withdraw the troops from attacking the enemy that was entrenched in the wagenburg 
position. Turahan argued that unless the troops withdrew, the enemy arquebus and 
cannons would inflict heavy casualties. The Ottoman troops would be routed and the 
enemy would attack thereafter. However, Murad replied that he was wrong, because the 
 
                                                     
581 Âşık Paşazade Tarihi, 154-155. 
582 Ibidem, 161. 
583 Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd, 15: ‘Ammâ Pâdişâh ziyâde melûl olub eyledüǧi işe nâdim oldu, ammâ çi fâide! Olan oldu 
ve dün gün endîşesi bu idi kim, eyvâh nâzenîn Safya’ya ne yavuz iş eyledik. Bunu bize diyen dostumuz deǧil 
imiş, hayfâ gâfil deprenüb bir nekbetînin sözüne uyduk deyü müteellim olub çok hayıflandı.’ 
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enemy did not had enough strength left to fire either arquebus or cannon. However, 
Turahan insisted and said that he did not wish to witness the disgrace of defeat: ‘Look, my 
Padishah, there is no one older than me among your lords. There may be one among your 
Anatolian commanders, but they do not know the treachery and deceitfulness of these 
infidels. My Padishah, you cannot strike the target with hope alone. The wise act slowly 
and with caution, the foolish in anger and in haste. Think what this will lead to, my 
Padishah. You will suffer for this or you will unless you let the words of this old man be 
your sovereign remedy.’584 
Sultan Murad II was not convinced of Turahan’s words. However, the latter insisted so 
much that Murad found himself agreeing out of the concern of seeming like not caring 
for the opinion of an elder wise man. According to the author of the Gazavat, Murad 
thought to himself: ‘If things turn out as I said, fine; but if they do not, people will say that 
the Padishah’s word cannot be trusted. The best thing is to pull back our troops and see 
what God most High ordains.’585 The troops were called back. While they returned to their 
tents, many cursed Turahan as they had already broke through the carts of the enemy. 
The next day, during the council, Murad reproached Turahan for ruining the plan by 
withdrawing the forces and letting the enemy escape.586 He asked him what to do about 
this. Turahan replied that he would personally pursue the enemy.  
However, in the meanwhile, while they withdrew the enemy had laid an ambush. The 
commanders of Ottoman forces had set out to pursue them, stopped underway to 
deliberate in case the enemy had laid an ambush at the pass. Once again, Turahan Beg 
disturbed their plans by asserting that fugitive soldiers did not lay an ambush. As a result, 
the pursuing forces were effectively ambushed and routed and some of the Ottoman lords 
were taken captive. The scattered troops came back to the main camp together with 
Turahan Beg. Murad was furious about the outcome and set off for Edirne without 
showing favour to any of the lords.587 In Edirne, when Murad was holding a council and 
seeing to the affairs of the poor, he saw Turahan. Murad II ordered to seize Turahan Beg 
and imprison him in the castle in Tokat.588   
 
                                                     
584 Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd, 24: ‘Baka Pâdişâhum, senün beglerin ve kulların arasında benden yaşlu bir kimesne 
yokdur, meger kim Anadolu kullarunda ola. Ammâ anlar dahi bu düşmânın kallâşlıǧın ve hilekârlıǧın bilmezler. 
Pâdişâhım ummakla menzil alınmaz, te’ennî hilmle âkillerindir, gazab ta’cîl ile câhillerindir. Bunun âkibetini 
düşün Pâdişâhım, bu işden sen zarar görürsün. Belki bu pîrin sözleri sana tiryâk-i ekber ola, deyüb çok söz 
söyledi.’ 
585 Ibidem, 25: ‘bu iş benim dedigim gibi olursa ne güzel, ammâ âksi zuhûr edecek olursa Pâdişâh söz tutmaz 
derler. Hemân olısı budur ki, askerimizi geri çekelim, görelim hakk ta’âlâ hazretlerinin takdîri ne yüzdendir.’  
586 Ibidem: ‘Baka Turahan, işte bizim pişmiş aşımıza sovuk su katub neyledin ise eyledin, askerimizi geri 
çekdürüb küffâr-i hâkisâra başlarını bağışlattırdın.’ 
587 Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd, 26, 28-29. 
588 Ibidem, 31. 
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Besides the fact that Murad II consulted with his men before taking decisions, he was 
also represented as a prudent leader who cared about his soldiers. According to the 
Anomymous Chronicle, during a campaign against Albania, they laid siege to the castle of 
Akça-hisâr. When the castle did not surrender, Murad’s lords suggested to capture it. 
However, the winter was approaching. In view of the disadvantages and risks of a siege in 
winter, Murad decided that the insignificant fortress was not worth sacrificing his men. 
Arguing that many people would pointlessly perish, Murad lifted the siege saying that ‘he 
would not sacrifice even one soldier for fifty castles like that one’.589 While Oruç Beg, for 
instance, only mentioned in passing that the castle was not captured,590 the anonymous 
author probably attempted to vindicate an unsuccessful siege.  
All these examples show that consultation was one of the foremost obligations and 
duties expected from a sultan. We have observed that particularly Murad II appeared as 
attentive of consultation and of prudence in the battles and decisions he took. He gave 
importance to consult old wise men. However, whose advice to take and whom to consult 
were equally pivotal issues and concerns. As such, the ‘ill-advices’ of the marcher lord 
Turahan Beg proved to be disastrous, as he probably wished to prevent the absolute 
success of Murad II, which only would strengthen the position of the dynasty. Turahan 
possibly attempted to prevent such a victory, as this would perpetuate the ongoing 
centralisation to the detriment of the gazi marcher lords.  
  
 
                                                     
589 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 84: Sultan Murad ayıtdı: ‘Yürüyicek, bir nice âdem helâk olur. Ben hod bir yigidi elli 
bunun gibi kal’aya virmezin’, deyüp kal’ayı koyup gitdiler.’ 
590 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 75. 
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3.4.4 Virtues of a Ruler 
Whether the ruler enjoyed divine favour and dispensed justice, as the sovereign was a 
human being he also had to accord to a set of virtues and certain physical qualities. The 
accounts of the chroniclers show that, in this respect, there could be exceptions as far as 
obeying the ruler was concerned. The chronicles deliberately discussed rulership and 
arrived at firm conclusions as to who the ruler was to be and what his duties and 
attributes should be, in the form of both political treatises and the popular genre of 
mirrors for princes.  
Relying on Tusi’s ethics, the Ottoman historian Tursun Beg distinguished three forces 
at work in the human spirit each of them causing various acts and deeds. The first of these 
was the ability of perception or (kuvvet-i natıka), which served to think and to distinguish 
the objects. The second force was the anger or gazab, which was the characteristic of the 
predatory animals. This force produced fury, fearlessness, boldness, attempt to become 
superior, challenging rivals and the desire to be praised. The third force dealt with lust 
(kuvvet-i şehevânî), which produced the will to eat and for pleasure from sexual 
intercourse. When in equilibrium, the power of perception could produce the virtue of 
knowledge (ilm), which led to wisdom (hikmet). When the power of anger was controlled 
by the intellect, then there emerged the virtue of gentleness (hilm), which produced 
bravery (şecaat). Gentleness was the opposite of fury and anger. And if the animal (behîmî) 
instinct was controlled by the intellect, the virtue of honesty (iffet) would develop, which 
produced generosity (sehâvet).591  
Those three powers of human spirit also had qualities, such as a positive exaggeration 
(ifrat), negative overdoing (tefrit) and the quality in between. For instance, Tursun Beg 
noted that although gentleness was to be praised, its overdoing can tend to weakness. 
The ruler had to preserve the awe of his authority by avoiding the extremities. To avoid 
exaggeration and extremes was a quality, which caused the rise of the virtue of justice 
(adâlet). In this respect, Tursun Beg selected the following virtues as the paramount ones 
for a ruler: wisdom, bravery, honesty and justice.592 
 
  
 
                                                     
591 Tursun Beg, Tarih-I Ebu’l Feth, 16-17.  
592 Ibidem, 17. 
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3.4.5 Vices of a Ruler 
When it came to the image and deeds of the ruler, unpleasant personal features and habits 
could easily be transformed into real vices. These vices could have severe consequences 
not only for the ruler himself, but also for the realm he is governing. Consequently, the 
personality and disposition of the prince were considered as very important. Moreover, 
in this discourse, the ruler’s behaviour, whether good or bad, reflected the situation of 
the realm under his reign in general. This was wisely expressed by the Muradnâme: ‘How 
are the times? The times revolve around you; you make it with your vices and virtues.’593 
The ideal sultan had to avoid a set of behaviours and vices. If he was not careful enough 
in avoiding certain deeds or exaggerated some of them, the consequences could be quite 
grave both in this world and the next. Vanity and pride were among the key vices that a 
ruler had to avoid. For instance, Sultan Bâyezid I was generally criticised for being 
defeated by Timur due to his pride. Especially, the Anonymous Chronicle accused Bâyezid 
of indulging in pride and of underestimating Timur. According to the chronicler, even 
though Timur addressed him respectfully, Bâyezid would keep on insulting him. 
Moreover, Bâyezid had not consulted with anyone, but did as he wanted in pride.594 Pride 
and vanity were considered as vices to be avoided by rulers.  
Likewise, Oruç Beg wrote that during the Battle of Varna in 1444, the Hungarian king 
Wladislas, who ‘indulged in pride and arrogance’, attempted to break through and was 
killed.595 He also depicted the Byzantine Emperor as falling prey to his pride and 
consequently losing the city. Oruç accused the Emperor of the fact that when Sultan 
Mehmed II laid siege to Constantinople, he did not ask for mercy and voluntarily 
surrendered. The Emperor (Kostantin teküri) allegedly believed the priests who asserted 
that the city would not be captured, because this was proclaimed in the Bible. 
Consequently, they chose to fight. They even insulted and spoke contemptuously about 
the Prophet and thus ‘the almighty God sent them this calamity and destroyed them’.596 
Beside pride, anger and quick temper were also viewed as grave vices for a ruler. An 
Ottoman ruler notorious for his quick temper appears to be Sultan Bâyezid I. The 
anonymous chronicler often criticised him for his furious nature. He provided an 
 
                                                     
593 Murâd-nâme, 230: ‘Sensin zaman; Hata vü sevabında sensin zaman.’ 
594 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 42, 46: ‘Tevekkül olmayıp mağrurlık iderdi’; ‘Kendi kendüye mağrur olup yürüdi ve 
kimseyle tanışmadı’. 
595 Oruç Beg Tarihi, 67 : ‘bu tarafdan kıral-ı mel’ûn dahı kendüye magrûr olup magrûrlıgından, tekebbürliginden 
gevdesine derisine sıgmayup, Sultan Murâd üzerine yürüyüb alayına at depüp…’  
596 Ibidem, 79: ‘Kostantin teküri aman dilemeyüb, ol gayretle cenk idüp İncîl’de keşîşler alınmaz diyüp, tekür 
dahı keşişler sözine inanup, kendüye magrûr olup […] haşa Hazret-i Muhammed-i Mustafâ’ya dil uzadup […] Hak 
tebâreke ve ta’âlâ dahı anlara bu belayı virüp, bunları kahr idüp..’ 
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anecdote about how Bâyezid’s quick temper had worsened the situation in which he 
found himself. Oliveira Despina, Bâyezid’s Serbian wife had accompanied her husband to 
the battle against Timur but they were both captured. One day, Timur allegedly ordered 
to bring Bâyezid’s wife to a drinking party. He then told her to serve the drinks. Bâyezid 
obviously felt humiliated as his wife was exposed to such a disgrace. In fury, he insulted 
Timur. The anonymous chronicler commented: ‘because Bâyezid was furious of nature. 
He easily inflamed in anger for even the most trivial things that disturbed him. He told 
whatever came to his mind in fury.’597  
Remarkably, the anonymous chronicler showed little understanding for Bâyezid’s 
anger as he was humiliated by Timur. Probably, this was not a serious issue for the 
chronicler as he had earlier accused Bâyezid’s wife of having introduced drinking parties 
to the princely court and of having perverted Bâyezid. He had asserted that ‘until the 
arrival of the daughter of the Serbian lord, the first Ottoman rulers and even Bâyezid did 
not drink wine.’598 However, this was not entirely correct, as the ulema-historian Neşrî did 
not feel the need to omit the references in which Ottoman rulers relaxed and entertained 
themselves while drinking and listening to music. However, the anonymous chronicler 
obviously used every possible device allowing him to criticise Bâyezid.  
He continued his story by noting that Bâyezid made things worse as he was Timur’s 
prisoner.599 However, the anonymous chronicler was not fair toward Bâyezid who was left 
no other choice than to take Timur’s challenge. If he had submitted to Timur’s supremacy, 
then Bâyezid’s own authority over his vassals would have been radically weakened. This 
could have caused a great threat for the survival of the empire, which he had built. 
Bâyezid had to react. However, his disadvantages of character appeared to be his 
impulsiveness and lack of prudence.  
Neşrî also criticised Bâyezid’s impulsiveness in an anecdote when he was a captive of 
Timur. According to the Neşrî, they were bathing together in a hamam in Denizli and 
Timur said to Bâyezid: ‘It was God’s wish. The wind has blown this way. However, if you 
had captured me, what would you have done?’ Bâyezid Gazi was good-hearted and quick 
tempered. Because of his impulsiveness, he could not show patience and replied: ‘If I had 
captured you, I would have put you in an iron cage.’ Timur said: O khan! You said well.’ 
 
                                                     
597 Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, 51: ‘Yıldırım Han katı gazab ehliydi. Sehelce nesneden kendüzin incidse helâk iderdi. 
Diline ne gelürse heman söylerdi’. 
598 Ibidem, 36. 
599 Ibidem, 51: ‘Bire cüllâh sakallu ebleh köftehor, ben maşrıkda olam sen maǧribde olasın. Dahı nene gerekdi 
kim, dürlü dürlü haberler gönderüp aydasın kim kahpenün erisin. Eger bana gelmezsen ve eger ben dahı 
varmazsam avratım boş olsun didün? Ve dahı beni bunda getürüp başuna bu belâları getürdün, deyüb aralarında 
hayli yaramaz söz oldı.’ 
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He ordered to prepare an iron cage and they imprisoned Bâyezid Khan in this iron cage.’600 
Although this was obviously an imaginary conversation, Neşrî probably included this 
story in his chronicle as a discourse on morality. He clearly wished to demonstrate that 
impulsiveness and recklessness could lead to bad consequences. He implicitly advised 
that a ruler should be careful not to get angry too quickly.  
Neşrî also related another story about the death of Sultan Bâyezid I. According to his 
account, Bâyezid was deeply saddened when Timur had invaded Anatolia and 
dismembered his realm among the Turkish princes. He noted: ‘some say that Bâyezid 
Khan was very ambitious and of quick temper. When he heard that his land was occupied 
and divided among the Tatars and the Karamanids, he took the poison that he kept in his 
ring. He said that it was ‘better to die instead of witnessing any more disgrace in the hands 
of the enemy and seeing how my land is being occupied’. Because of his honour, he ended 
his life.’601 By contrast, Sultan Murad II was not criticised for having a quick temper or for 
impulsive acts. He rather appeared as consulting his officials, changing his mind and 
taking the right decisions before any damage was done.  
According to the advice literature and the chroniclers, the sultan was certainly allowed 
the right to entertain himself. However the dose of entertainment appeared to be 
important. Feasting, hunting and drinking were tolerated as long as it did not keep the 
ruler from his official business and as long as he did not exaggerate. Nizam al-Mulk called 
for carefulness about giving verbal orders in drunkenness. He noted that orders 
concerning state affairs given in ‘a state of merriment’ have to be delicately handled and 
had first to be confirmed by the divan before acting upon.602 He also advised that a ruler 
could not do without suitable boon companions with whom he could enjoy complete 
freedom and familiarity. ‘The constant society of nobles and generals tends to diminish 
the ruler’s majesty and dignity because they become too arrogant and too intimate.’603  
To Nizam al-Mulk, it was only through boon-companions that the ruler could relax and 
‘refresh himself in sport, telling stories, jokes and curious tales without detriment to his 
sovereignty, because he keeps them for this purpose’.604 A highly esteemed boon-
 
                                                     
600 Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, 163: ‘Temür Han, Yıldırım Han ila Toñuzlu şehrinde ikisi bir hamama girüp, bir kurnada 
yunurken, Temür-leng, Yıldırım Han’a eyitdi: ‘Hikmet Allah’un. Rüzgar böyle gösterdi. Eger bu vartaya ben 
düşsem, sen beni nice iderdüñ?’, didi. Bâyezid Gâzî gâyet ile göñüllü ve tiz-nefesdi. Tîz-nefesliginden sabr 
idemeyüb, eyitdi: ‘Eger bu vartaya sen düşsen, bir demir kafese koyardum’, didi. Temür-leng eyitdi: ‘Iy Han! 
Yaman söyledün’, didi. Hemân buyurdı, bir demür kafes düzdiler. Yıldırım Han’ı kafese koyub, habs itdi.’ 
601 Ibidem, 165: ‘Bazılar eydür: Bâyezid Han gâyet gayretlü ve tîz-nefesdi. İşitdi kim, memleketini Temür-leng 
Tatar’ıla Karaman-oglı’na virdi; bilesinde zehri vardı. Gayretinden kendüyi sakınmayup, düşmen elinde zebûn 
olup, memleketi eller elinde görmedin ölem yegdir, diyüp kendü nefsini helâk eyledi.’ 
602 Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 91. 
603 Ibidem, 92. 
604 Ibidem, 123. 
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companion was the person with life experience who had travelled widely. Nizam al-Mulk 
advised that a ruler should consult his boon-companion concerning entertainment 
matters, such as feasting, drinking, hunting and wrestling.605 The ideal boon-companion 
also had to have a rank and a status.606 Neşrî, for instance, noted that the former Byzantine 
aristocrat, Köse Mihal, had become the boon-companion [muhibbi] of Osman Gazi.607 
Similar advices and advices concerning the sultan’s close companions (nedim) were also 
formulated in the Muradname.608 The author warned Murad II to: ‘never drink wine when 
you feel yourself proud and powerful. You cannot wander day and night in merriment, be 
sober and govern wisely your realm’.609  
 
Figure 16: A scene of feasting at the princely court of Sultan Murad IV (seventeenth century). 
Source: Topkapı Palace Museum, H2148, folio 11b.  
 
                                                     
605 Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 93. 
606 Ibidem, 94. 
607 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 39: ‘Harman Kaya tekvurı Köse Mihal […] Osman Beg’e nöker olup, cân u dilden muhibbi 
oldı. Göç aç memleketde müdebbirlik it.’  
608 Murad-nâme, 277-280. 
609 Ibidem, 242: ‘’Sakın pâdişâhlık gurûriyle câm; içüp mest olayım dime subh u şâm.’  
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However, the right of a ruler to relax and to entertain could become a grave vice when 
it was exaggerated. This was especially the case concerning the drinking of wine. For 
instance, he author of the Muradname instructed the ruler not to drink. However, as he 
knew that Sultan Murad II preferred to drink wine in some occasions, he advised him not 
to exaggerate ‘as too much wine had negative effects on the health of intellect, mind and 
body’. The Muradname referred to the verse in the Qur’an about drinking, which stated: 
‘although it may have some benefit, however, its sins are far more greater than its 
benefits.’610 In other words, the author implied that drinking wine was permissible only if 
it was done modestly. Of course, the ideal was not drinking. Yet, if one still wished it to 
drink, then preferably in small proportions by mixing with some water, which in this way 
‘gave refreshments to the heart’.611   
The discourse of this mirror for princes shows that the person and the position of the 
ruler were regarded as an inseparable single entity. The behaviour of the ruler, whether 
good or bad, reflected the situation of the realm during his reign. The Muradnâme advised 
that it was harmful for the ruler to laugh too much, as it would make his retinue perceive 
him as an ordinary man, rendering his judgment light. As a result, ‘the order [at the 
princely court] would be disturbed, respect to his office would disappear and arrogance 
would emerge’.612 Similar views are also formulated in the chronicles. Neşri noted that 
Çelebi Mehmed I entertained himself (ayş u işrete meşgul olup) after he ascended the throne 
in Bursa.613 The ulema-historian did not feel the need to censure the fact of entertainment 
and relaxing of prince Mehmed I at his court. However, he did criticise Mehmed I’s 
brother Süleyman Çelebi for indulging himself too much in drinking parties.  
In Neşrî’s account, a spy of Mehmed informed him that his brother Süleyman was 
drinking wine day and night. The spy reported: ‘he goes to the hammam and drinks wine. 
If he likes the hammam, he stays there for a month and entertains himself with drinking 
parties. There is no better opportunity than to strike now.’614 Indeed, when Mehmed 
attacked, Süleyman was still in the hammam drinking wine. In general, the chronicles 
portrayed Süleyman as a debauched ruler who lost the throne due to decadent parties. 
They depicted him as spending all his time in bath, drinking wine and indulging in courtly 
 
                                                     
610 Qur’an, 2:219. 
611 Murad-nâme, 299-302. 
612 Ibidem, 233: ‘Ki küstahlığa bulunmıya yol; Dimişler ki sultâna çok gülmeden; Ziyanlu yoğ ol hâna çok 
gülmeden; Ki çok gülse sultân haşemle hadem; Sanurlar vücûdını anun adem; Hüküm geçmez olur bozılır nizâm; 
Gider padişahlara ihtirâm’. 
613 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 200. 
614 Ibidem, 215: ‘karındaşun be-gâyet halvetdür.[…] Gice gündüz şaraba meşguldür. Şöyle ki, hammâma girüp 
şarab içer. Bir ay anda oturub, ayş ü nûş ider. Eger üzerine hücum idersek, be-gâyet fursatdur.’ 
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pleasures, while praising the youngest son Çelebi Mehmed, who is portrayed as generous 
to his soldiers, lords and allies.615  
Neşrî described the end of Süleyman as follows. When his brother Çelebi Musa 
attacked, Süleyman was allegedly again entertaining himself in the hammam. One of his 
men, Hacı Evrenos came in and informed him about the battle outside. However, Çelebi 
Süleyman did not mind the warnings and indulged further in drinking party saying not 
to disturb him, as Musa had not the strength to battle.616 The commander of the 
janissaries, Hasan Aga, also tried to speak him . However, this only made Süleyman even 
angrier and he ‘ordered to pluck the beard of Hasan Aga’. The lords of Süleyman Çelebi 
were in despair and they deliberated on what to do. Hasan Aga said: ‘Know this that good 
and divine fortune has left this person.’617 Consequently, most of Süleyman’s lords decided 
to abandon him and defected to the side of his brother, Çelebi Musa. Süleyman was 
captured by Musa as he tried to escape and was strangled. Besides his weakness for wine 
that allegedly caused his downfall, Neşrî depicted Süleyman as ‘unequalled in generosity 
and unmatched in bravery. He was discarded from pride and envy, enjoyed a great fame 
under the entire population as he was a just sultan.’618  
Although old age as such was not considered as a problem for a ruler, a heavy disease 
causing physical and mental obstructions did pose problems. Physical or mental disorders 
could affect the ruler’s ability to administer the affairs of the realm. They were regarded 
as unacceptable for the office of sovereign. In this respect, one of the striking incidents 
of ‘incompetent’ rulership and dispute on a succession question can be found in the 
account of the end of the reign of Sultan Bâyezid II (r.1481-1512) by an anonymous 
chronicler.619 Bâyezid II had already reached an old age and suffered from gout. His illness 
had advanced so far that undertaking a campaign had become too much of a burden to 
him and he had to stay in bed most of the time. At the same time, with the steady growing 
Safawid power in Iran, the Ottoman eastern provinces in Anatolia were thrown into chaos 
due to the lack of effective rule by Bâyezid II. Unrest was spreading in the Ottoman 
heartland of Anatolia, while the threat of Safawid dynasty was increasing.  
According to the anonymous chronicle of Haniwaldus, the janissaries had become 
impatient about these developments and openly accused Sultan Bâyezid II for his 
 
                                                     
615 Dimitris Kastritsis gave several examples from the anonymous chroniclers. See: Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 
213-214. 
616 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 225: ‘Hacı Lala! Beni sohbetümden ayırma. Anun cânı yokdur ki, bunda gelüp benümile 
mukabil ola’. 
617 Neşrî, Cihannüma, 225: ‘bu kişiden devlet ve sa’âdet gitdi. Şöyle bilmiş olasız.’ 
618 Ibidem, 227: ‘Merhûm bur hûb-suretlü ve mergûb-suretlü, sahâvetde bî-misl ve şecâ’atde bî-nazîrdi. Ve kibr 
ü hasedden berî olup, cemî halka eyü sanlu, adl ü dâd issi pâdişâhdıdı.’ 
619 Haniwaldus Anonime’ne Göre Sultan Bâyezid-i Velî (1481-1512), tr. Öztürk (İstanbul, 1997) 34-64. 
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incapability of checking the Safawid threat. Upon their protests, Sultan Bâyezid II, 
realising his old age and suffering from the pains of gout, decided to abdicate in favour of 
his son Ahmed.620 However, the janissaries did not approve his choice for crown prince 
Ahmed. They argued that the sultan had named the wrong candidate to succeed him. 
They did not trust the leadership skills of Prince Ahmed and asserted that his sole concern 
was ‘drinking and entertaining himself’. Thereupon, Bâyezid offered them to recognise 
his son Ahmed at least as the commander of the army (ordu serdarligi). However, the 
janissaries again opposed the sultan’s proposal and described to Bâyezid II the type of 
successor they wished: ‘Your son Ahmed is precisely like you. He is not much different 
from a wood block and is useless for work. Moreover, he is weak-spirited and with his fat 
belly, he is not fit for battles. Therefore, we will never obey him. We need a ruler who is 
valiant, dynamic and a warrior, who can reinstall the authority on the provinces, their 
inhabitants and their governors; someone who can bring the affairs in order again and 
take the initiative of action.’621  
According to this chronicler, though the janissaries recognised Bâyezid as their 
legitimate sultan, they nevertheless blamed him for losing his skills and failing to 
maintain the security and prosperity of the realm. In the following passages, the 
anonymous author criticised the insolence and rude behaviour of the janissaries. He 
described in detail the riots they had caused that were difficult to restrain. The chronicler 
said that the janissaries were worried by the growing unrest in Anatolia and were losing 
their hope in Bâyezid II could not solve the crisis: ‘Concerning you [Bâyezid II], expecting 
from you to find a remedy for this bad condition would be in vain. It has been three or 
four years since you have been in bed because of gout. Nobody can see you. You hear 
neither official nor personal complaints. You have no information on the economic 
condition of the realm [c. 1480]. The revenues from Anatolia nor from Rumelia are sent 
to the treasury. We see that the treasury is empty and poverty is spreading all over the 
land. If we want to preserve this land, we have to revive the fire of this hearth [referring 
to the janissary corps].’ Thereupon, Bâyezid II asked them what they suggested and they 
replied: ‘We need a commander for the army [serdar] whom we can follow into battles, a 
ruler sound and strong who can endure the burdens of campaigning.’622 The janissaries 
claimed that Bâyezid II had to be succeeded by a dynamic sultan.  
 
                                                     
620 Haniwaldus Anonime’ne Göre Sultan Bâyezid, 34, 44-46, 59-61. 
621 Ibidem, 63: ‘Oglun Ahmed tıpkı sana benziyor. O, bir kütükten farksız ve dünyada hiç bir işe yaramaz. 
Cesaretsiz, yaǧlı ve tombul göbeǧiyle cenge uygun deǧildir. Bizim atılgan, cengâver, otoritesi ile eyaletleri, 
onların ahâlisini, beglerbeglerini düzene koyacak ve yiǧitce ve cesareti ile teşebbüse geçecek birine ihtiyacımız 
var.’ 
622 Ibidem, 60: ‘Sana gelince, senden bütün bu kötü duruma çare bulmanı beklememiz beyhûdedir. Senin 
nikristen yatakta yatmak zorunda kalışından beri üç ya da dört yıl geçti. Hiç kimse senin huzuruna çıkamıyor. 
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Sometime before, alarmed by his father’s decision to give the throne to his brother 
Ahmed, Prince Selim I had left his governorship in Anatolia, crossed over to the Balkans 
and gathered an army of Tatar troops in Edirne. This was a plain act of rebellion, by which 
Selim disapproved his father’s decision and attempted to seize the throne from his father. 
However, at that time, the janissaries still supported the reigning sultan Bâyezid and after 
a brief battle, Selim was defeated. The janissaries told Selim to wait a little longer and 
Selim returned to his governorship in Teke.623 Meanwhile, the janissaries increased their 
pressure upon Sultan Bayezid II, who was ultimately left with no other choice than to 
leave the throne to his youngest son Selim. Prince Selim enjoyed the preference of the 
janissaries on the account of possessing the required competences and passion for 
conquests and action.624 Fifteenth-century chronicler, Hadidî, commented on Selim’s 
accession to the throne, as follows: ‘Neither Ahmed, nor Korkud were fit to the throne, 
both of them indulged in entertainment. However, Sultan Selim was the one who carried 
out the gaza; his sword was always girded on his waist’.625  
The passages above reflected the idea that the state needed a competent ruler. Physical 
health and strength, as well as mental health were expected from rulers. As the prince 
was responsible for dispensing justice to the people, he had to be able to attend councils 
personally and hear their complaints. In brief, the chroniclers suggested that though 
descent may provide a prince with a valid claim to the throne, however, he had also to be 
worthy of the duties of the sultan and be capable of ruling a land. Consultation was one 
of the those duties for a sultan. Without exception, the earliest Ottoman historiographical 
sources agreed on the key importance of ‘justice’ for the maintenance of the political 
society. Whereas justice (adl) was considered a cardinal virtue, the zulm (tyranny) 
appeared to be the ruler’s principal vice. Redistribution of wealth was another pivotal 
duty of a ruler to enhance the prosperity of the people and the well-being of the society. 
In the same line, public buildings and reconstruction works or imar activities were also 
important. These deeds promoted the image of the sultan as a generous and just 
sovereign, as well as served to enhance the prosperity of the people.  
 
 
                                                     
Se ne resmî ne de hususî şikayetleri duyuyorsun. Ve ülkenin iktisadi durumunun nasıl oldugu hakkında hiçbir 
malumatın yok...’ 
623 Haniwaldus Anonimi, 47, 56-57. 
624 Ibidem, 63. 
625 Çelebi Hadidi, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 358: ‘Ne Sultan Ahmed idi tahta layık; Ne Sultan Korkud idi bahta layık; 
Buların her biri îş ü safada; Veli Sultan Selim idi gazâda; Komazdı kılıcın her dem belinden; Zebûn olmışdı 
Gürcistân elinden; Ne Gürcistân ki tutdı şark u garbı; Salâbetle sadâ-yı darb u harbı.’ 
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Conclusion 
Early Ottoman State formation consisted of a complex process that gave rise to a specific 
state ideology. As scholars Barkey, Tezcan, İnalcık, Köprülü, Findley, Fleischer, Kafadar 
and Di Cosmo have shown, the steppe origins of the Ottoman state was an important 
determinant of the early development of the polity. The nomad Turkmens from central 
Asia gradually constructed a polity within the hybrid frontier zone in Anatolia that 
separated the Byzantine Empire from the Seljuk Rûm Sultanate. This frontier region was 
characterised by a high degree of cultural diversity, mobility, sharing of lifestyles, ideas, 
institutional practices and independence from the hinterland, etc. In the following 
century and a half, the Ottomans would selectively adopt elements of the settled cultures 
they had brought into their sphere of influence. They created a specific synthesis of 
political organisation and governance which also influenced the discursive ideological 
production in their earliest written sources, including the first Ottoman chronicles. 
As Osman’s polity expanded, the dynasty’s household grew along with it. The 
opposition of the gazi groups and marcher lords to the centralist government was already 
widespread during the reign of Murad I. This was most clearly expressed by the author of 
the Anonymous Chronicle in his criticism of the dynasty’s centralising policies. Despite 
his criticism, the anonymous chronicler still considered the House of Osman as the only 
source of legitimate rule.  
The process of putting into writing the earlier historical narratives that had first only 
circulated in oral tradition was closely related to the development of a nomadic 
community into a settled society with a centralised state form. The first fully-fledged 
Ottoman historical texts or chronicles were produced in the late fifteenth-century. By 
then, Ottoman society had started using writing to generate a discourse that could 
provide legitimacy about the past one century and a half. This usage of writing produced 
new discursive registers, in the first place originating from Islamic political thought in its 
written form. The earliest chronicles combined ancient Turkish and Islamic ideas and 
concepts to construct legitimising narratives and to build bridges between different 
social groups. This reflected the composite nature of the Ottoman state ideology which 
had already been developing in the early fifteenth century before it took its written form 
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in historiographical discourse. Over time, Islamic political thought was more and more 
explicitly formulated in the discourse of the early Ottoman chroniclers. In the model of 
ideal governance these texts prescribed – similar to the contemporary genre of mirrors 
for princes – a strong, central authority, in the person of the sultan as the key to the 
maintenance of balance between the kanun or customary law on the one hand and the 
Sharia (Islamic law) on the other. Both manifested the political idea of universal justice. 
Both Ottoman and Islamic mirrors-for-princes shared common principles with 
classical antiquity, such as sovereignty and legitimacy. These principles appeared in the 
earliest Ottoman chronicles dealing with the monarchy, the ideas of good governance, 
the virtues that the ruler had to display. Indeed, all Ottoman chronicles emphasised gaza, 
justice, law and virtuous rulership. 
The term gaza is one of the ideological signifiers that recurs most often in the 
chronicles. This suggests that this notion was indeed one of the predominant concepts of 
early Ottoman state ideology. The Ottoman chroniclers described almost every military 
campaign in terms of gaza and the term appears as a real topos in the discourse of nearly 
all the texts.  
Until the 1980s, Wittek’s influential gaza-thesis remained the dominant explanation of 
Ottoman State building. Wittek and many of his critics and followers interpreted the 
concept of gaza as synonymous to the western term ‘holy war’. Subsequently, as gaza is a 
central notion in the Ottoman texts, many scholars have for generations assumed that 
holy war was the raison d’être of the Ottoman state. However, in this thesis, I have 
demonstrated that gaza did not mean the same as jihad and that both terms have different 
connotations to the European term of ‘holy war’. In the Ottoman historical texts gaza was 
not aimed at proselytising the Christians nor was it directed at destroying the ‘infidel’ 
world – the Dârülharb – or driven by a priori religious hatred. Moreover, the Ottomans also 
used the concept when describing Ottoman campaigns against the neighbouring Muslim 
principalities.  This clearly shows that religion and holy war were not the main driving 
forces behind gaza.  
The discourse of the chroniclers also shows that the notion of gaza had various 
dimensions and carried different ideological connotations. The defence and expansion of 
the Muslim world were accompanied by more material concerns, such as the benefits and 
gains from booty. This understanding of gaza was most widely spread among popular 
social groups, especially among the gazi and dervish circles to which Aşık Paşazade and 
the author of the Anonymous Chronicle appealed. In contrast to the political agenda of a 
monarch, the soldiers appeared to consider the gaza in the first place as an opportunity 
to gain material benefits. However, not all chroniclers shared the same understanding 
and audiences when it came to this topos. For instance, Neşrî’s text displayed an 
indifference to the gaza mentality, while Aşık Paşazade expressed and described it so 
vividly. Each of these chroniclers appealed to different audiences, consisting of the ulema 
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(men of learning), kapıkulu (conscripted servants of the dynasty’s household), 
bureaucrats, gazi marcher lords, dervishes, and others. 
Wittek was perhaps right in emphasising the importance of gaza, but as I have shown, 
he did not understand its precise ideological meaning. The discursive register of gaza was 
clearly intended for internal consumption, adapted to the horizon of expectations of the 
audiences to whom the chroniclers wished to appeal. The Ottoman dynasty clearly wished 
to fashion itself as a line of Gazi Sultans in order to enjoy the prestige attached to this 
‘chivalric’ and noble notion. As the Ottomans attached great importance to their public 
image, the chroniclers emphasised the gazi-identity of the rulers. However, the defeat of 
Bâyezid I and the subsequent painful civil wars in 1403 represented a rupture in the use 
of the gazi-ideology. The use of the concept of gaza seems to have diminished during this 
period. Somewhat later, during the reign of Murad II, we see the notion of gaza emerge 
again as a predominant discursive register in the chronicles.  
By the fifteenth century, Ottoman society had become imbued with Islamic principles. 
As a result, the Ottoman dynasty and their chroniclers referred to their gazi identity as 
an explanation for their successive victories and conquests. As we have observed in the 
chronicles of Ahmedî, Âşık Paşazâde and Neşrî, the continuous successes were described 
as the exploits of the ‘champions of the faith’. The chroniclers represented the Ottoman 
rulers as the Gazi Sultans who not only safeguarded the ‘gates of the Islamic world’, but 
also expanded them. Precisely this aspect of being successful gazis at the frontiers of the 
Muslim world was explicitly emphasised by the earliest chroniclers. The gazi identity 
appeared to function as a discourse that fulfilled the ideological needs of various social 
groups, such as the dynasty, the marcher lords, the ulema, the nomads, soldiers and 
others.  
However, it also appeared that solely being a Gazi Sultan was not sufficient quality to 
be regarded as a successful monarch or to be represented as one in the chronicles. 
Without exception, the earliest Ottoman historiographical texts emphasised the key 
importance of ‘justice’ for the maintenance of order in society. According to the 
chronicles, it was the pivotal duty of the ruler to maintain the equilibrium between 
society and the state. The discourse of the Ottoman chronicles upheld the idea that the 
state could only flourish in a prosperous society when the prince provided just rule. The 
reason for such an emphasis on justice in the Ottoman chronicles was mainly that the 
basis of Ottoman political legitimacy was weak. Lacking an imperial lineage and the 
authorisation of a caliph, the earliest chroniclers tried to compensate this through the 
active promotion of pivotal ideas such as ‘justice’, i.e. a just and good governance that 
enforces law and maintains the social order. 
In several Ottoman advice books for princes as well as in the chronicles that were 
under scrutiny in this thesis, the notion of ‘justice’ or ‘adâlet’ was defined as the 
prevention and elimination of oppressive acts (zûlm) by those who exercised state power. 
The discourse on justice emerged as the crucial rhetorical tool for maintaining the nizâm-
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ı âlem or ‘right order of society to the benefit of the general public’, which was another 
central concept in Ottoman political theory. In this respect, the chroniclers referred to 
the well-known idea of the ‘circle of equity’. This notion implied that the ruler, whose 
position was at the top of the circle, was supposed to maintain justice through reasonable 
taxation and protection from oppressive acts of his officials. The peasantry paid taxes for 
the treasury and the treasury paid for the army. The army completed the circle by 
securing the sovereignty of the ruler. The maintenance of this circle ensured that the 
proper meaning of the universe was preserved. 
Arbitrary use of political power was considered zulm or injustice and tyranny. The 
person and the power of the sultan were regarded as indispensable to achieve and 
maintain the social order. However, if the sovereign oppressed his subjects or failed to 
fulfil his duties as a ruler, this was rejected as zulm. Whereas justice (adl) was conceived 
to be a cardinal virtue, zulm (tyranny) was considered a principal vice. 
Another duty of a ruler was to rebuild and reconstruct the realm in order to enhance 
prosperity. Architectural activities aimed at the revival of the prosperity of a certain city 
or region. The sultan was expected to make public improvements and to take care of the 
poor. Public buildings and (re)construction works or imar activities appear to be related 
to the notions of redistribution of wealth and prosperity of the people. Both activities 
helped to promote the image of the ruler as a generous and just sovereign, who improved 
prosperity. Redistribution of wealth was perceived to be necessary for the well-being of 
the people and society. 
The notion of the maintenance of the social order (nizam-ı âlem) that satisfied the basic 
social needs was also a central thought in Ottoman state ideology. The social order 
required a set of social relations based on a division of labour between various 
occupations and crafts. Each individual performed a necessary job that fit him best 
according to his merits and talents and by which the welfare of the entire society was 
supported. Human beings needed each other by nature. Thus, the idea was that in order 
to enhance cooperation between people and to increase development, they had to live 
together in society. To maintain this set of social relations, there was need for a sultan. 
The public interest could be served and chaos could be prevented through the authority 
of a legitimate political power. And this was the sultan. His role was to prevent people to 
do each other harm and he also preserved the ‘order of the world’ (nizam-ı âlem).  
Furthermore, the sultan had to seek the advice from the learned ulema and from the 
Sufis who played an important role in governance. Knowledge, wisdom and leadership 
needed each other, as governance (emr-i siyaset) required knowledge. The ideal ruler was 
the one who upheld a spiritual mind set and wisdom, had the knowledge of the Shari’a, of 
the prophetic tradition and of history. The chroniclers equated prophets and sultans to 
‘two rings on a finger.’ The sultan was called the ‘Shadow of God on Earth’ (es-sultân 
zillu’llah fî’l arz), which metaphorically referred to the duty of the ruler, providing shade 
and shelter to protect the people under his authority from the merciless sun. Governance 
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(emr-i siyaset) was the protection of the socially disadvantaged from the oppression by 
socially and economically powerful groups. In this sense, the sultan was regarded as ‘the 
shepherd’ of his people. The early Ottoman historiographical tradition also expressed the 
classic Islamic idea that ‘the way of God’ (din) and state (devlet) were inseparable.  
In their account of social and political matters, the early Ottoman chronicles suggested 
that the dynasty achieved legitimate sovereignty through attempting to gain the 
acceptance of the people. Legitimacy was the outcome of the negotiations between the 
ruler and the ruled. The ruler who claimed the right to sovereignty had to win the consent 
of the ruled by ensuring them with justice, protection of life and continuity of the social, 
cultural and economic activities.  
The Ottoman notion of ‘political power’ or ‘state’, the devlet was another important 
concept. It also had a mystical meaning, such as ‘good fortune’, ‘divine favour’, etc. This 
devlet, which was ‘the elixir for rare and precious happiness’, could only be achieved 
through good virtues and ethics. Even though God selected a dynasty to rule over the 
people, the ruler still had to deserve his position by winning the consent of the people 
through fulfilling his duties. For good governance, he had to consult the opinions of wise 
and learned men and viziers. He was also expected to redistribute wealth and to be 
generous not only toward his own household, but also toward the people in general in 
order to reassure that each group in society prospered. Following the ‘way of God’ (dîn), 
he had to work for his happiness and that of the people in this world and the next. This 
happiness was achievable only if the ruler prevented oppression and cruelty, refrained 
from pride and vanity, undertook gaza, was generous, showed mercy, and most 
importantly, dispensed justice. The chroniclers seem to have specifically praised Sultan 
Murad II for complying with all these virtues. It may be asserted that Murad II personified 
the ideal sultan of the early Ottoman state ideology. 
This study did not offer an exhaustive analysis of all types of sources available for the 
period. Nevertheless I have attempted to contribute to our understanding of fifteenth-
century Ottoman state ideology. The discursive analysis of concepts like gaza and justice 
as well as of the sets of virtues and vices expressed in the chronicles has revealed the 
commonly shared principles of early Ottoman state ideology. Focussing on a very specific 
topic I have attempted to contribute to the field of Ottoman Studies by shedding more 
light on how the Ottomans considered their own political organisation. Pragmatically 
making use of Norman Fairclough’s methodologies of ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, I have 
attempted to make early Ottoman history somewhat more intelligible by trying to 
understand the ‘political language’ or ‘state ideology’, as the earliest Ottoman chronicles 
formulated it in their own words. Nevertheless, I have attempted to avoid imposing 
preconceived models of analysis on these discourses. Of course, my work relies on and 
wants to pay tribute to the major scholarly output of venerable historians such as Halil 
İnalcık, Suraiya Faroqhi, Dimitris Kastritsis and many others. I hope this thesis gives rise 
to further discussion which will help to refine this scholarly endeavour. 
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